

INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ENGLISH

国际贸易英语

政策、组织与实务

张军 李磊 等 编著

21
世纪商务英语》》



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内 容 简 介

本书是“21 世纪商务英语”丛书之一。全书选取了国际贸易政策、国际贸易组织及国际商务活动三个方面的多篇文章,每篇文章后附有词汇解释和中文译文。读者通过阅读这些文章,不仅可以提高自己的专业英语水平,掌握国际贸易方面的英语词汇,而且对如美国、欧盟等国家和地区的国际贸易政策、国际出口贸易及策略等商务活动都会有更深了解。

本书适用于商务工作者及欲想进一步提高英语水平的读者,也可供高校相关专业的学生使用。

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——贸易政策回顾——

Part One Trade Policy Review



Chapter 1 Trade Policy Review

—Mexico

Mexico has continued the process of economic reform initiated in the mid-1980s. The efficiency gains achieved since then, the greater opening of the investment framework and closer integration in the world economy, together with the support of the international financial organization help Mexico's recovery from the 1995 recession. However, the health of the banking system remains a concern, as do a number of lagging sectors in agriculture and manufacturing. Modernization of the institution and legal framework is continuing. While unilateral trade liberalization on a MFN basis has been carried forward, trade policy changes have been dominated by regional liberalization under NAFTA and other agreements, and the share of Mexico's merchantise trade with the United States rose from 75 per cent in 1992 to 80 per cent in 1996. Some elements of regional liberalization have benefited all WTO members; others more clearly favor regional partners. Moreover, remnants of the earlier import-substitution policy still affect the automotive industry, while selective tariff increases (within bound levels) have been introduced to support other activities. The active use of anti-dumping measures makes them a potential trade barrier. The reform process is thus not yet complete; its continuation is necessary for Mexico to achieve a higher, sustainable rate of economic growth.

The dominant macroeconomic event since the previous Trade Policy Review in 1993 was the financial crisis of December 1994 and the subsequent recession and recovery. While the recession of 1995 was sharper than the debt crisis of the 1980s, the recovery has been more rapid; however, real GDP is still below the level of 1994. In contrast with the crisis of the early 1980s, export growth was driven by manufactures rather than crude petroleum, and Mexico had avoided imposing new trade barriers or controls on the capital and current accounts.

While macroeconomic stabilization has been at the forefront since the financial crisis. The increased opening of the economy since the mid-1980s facilitated recovery. Under the influence of a more realistic real exchange rate, real growth of 5.1 per cent was achieved in 1996, and the current account deficit has also fallen. Immediate pressures on the financial market seem to have eased; short-term nominal interest rates and inflation are falling; the performance of the stock market has improved; and gross international reserves are moving towards their pre-crisis level. Mexico has also improved the steps of accessing to international capital markets; this is likely to be important in consolidating the recovery, as the domestic banking system remains fragile.

Mexico's trade policy is closely associated with the promotion of foreign investment

flows. This link has been formalized through a permanent framework of trade and investment rules which embody multilateral and preferential arrangements. In the multilateral arena, Mexico became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1994 and a founding member of the WTO in 1995. Mexico's active programmes of regional negotiations—adding to its earlier cooperation agreement with Chile — resulted in the entry into force of *The North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States in 1994, and of free-trade agreements with Costa Rica, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela in 1995.

Mexico's trade strategy has progressively shifted away from unilateral reforms bound in the multilateral system, to negotiated liberalization in a regional context. The reduction of non-tariff trade barriers and the liberalization of investment agreed with preferential partners have often benefited third parties, for example in services. However, variations in treatment have emerged in government procurement and customs valuation.

These commitments, jointly with Mexico's mentioned efforts to facilitate trade and investment flows have resulted in substantial modifications to the legal framework. Work is ongoing to harmonize domestic rules and external commitments, reduce the number of regulations and strengthen the judicial system and law enforcement institutions. Mexico's new investment rules, in particular, demonstrate its greater opening towards foreign capital, notwithstanding the restrictions that still apply in a few activities. Recent changes have also improved the regime of protection for intellectual property rights, which has already been widely regarded as fundamentally sound.

Overall, Mexico's use of trade instruments since 1993 seems to be consistent with an increasingly open trade regime. However, assessment is difficult, because various instruments have evolved in different directions.

The major change in the use of tariffs has been the implementation of new regional preferences, reducing the trade weighted average tariff but, at the same time, widening the gap between the simple average MFN rate (13.2 per cent) and preferential rate (e. g. 4.2 per cent on imports from the United States). During the period, Mexico also liberalized about 1 000 items to duty free levels; this was to some extent offset by increases in MFN rates on certain sensitive goods (e. g. beef, clothing and footwear) using the flexibility available under ceiling bindings. Tariffication in agriculture has created new tariff peaks and increased tariff dispersion. As a result of the Uruguay Round, Mexico reduced its bound ceiling rate for manufactures from 50 per cent to 35 per cent; however, this is still more than double the average level of duties currently applied. Many of Mexico's tariff lines have been covered by bills since its accession to the GATT in 1986.

There has also been a significant increase in the number of mandatory standards; queries have been raised about new marking and labeling requirements. Mexico has not signed the Multilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, and restricts participation

in national public tenders to national supplies and domestic goods. Mexico also maintains various schemes of restriction in the automotive industry (including parts) that has been notified under the provisions of *The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures* (TRIMs). Mexico's NAFTA partners will benefit from the liberalization of both public procurement and investment measures, but these benefits may not necessarily be extended to other trading partners.

The entry into force of a new competition law in 1993 and the subsequent establishment of the Federal Competition Commission were important steps complementing Mexico's privatization programs; their further development could help to ensure that consumers benefit fully from Mexico's liberalization efforts and that the high market connection observed in certain activities does not impair economic efficiency.

Since 1993, practically all sectors of the Mexican economy have come under strong pressures for change from the intensified liberalization of trade and investment rules spearheaded by the NAFTA. Building on the unilateral opening began in the mid-1980s.

The agricultural sector has been particularly affected by economic liberalization. Steps have been taken to reduce support to this sector and introduce assistance mechanisms based on direct income support; as a result, the average Producer Subsidy Equivalent has recently been calculated at only 13 per cent. As required by the NAFTA and WTO Agreements, Mexico has converted all its no-tariff measures into tariffs or tariff quotas; very high out-of-quota duties protect sensitive areas. Despite important structural changes, this sector as a whole still suffers from historical weaknesses arising from low labor productivity.

Mexico has a long tradition as a mining country, although the relative economic importance of mining has diminished in recent decades; new regulations were introduced in 1993 to promote the sector. Despite significant diversification away from petroleum exports over the last decade, the hydrocarbon industry remains economically important, and world oil prices still have a considerable impact on the government budget. Limitation to the public sector's financing capacity has caused the falling of oil reserves and slowed the productive growth; such constraints have also affected the petrochemicals industry. The authorities have sought ways to allow greater private enterprises' involvement in these activities and have taken steps, within the constraints imposed by the Constitution, to liberalize private participation in natural-gas-related operations and petrochemical projects.

Mexico's manufacturing sector is quite diversified; overall, the sector appears to have taken advantage of the trade liberalization programme and large investment inflows to increase efficiency and profitability. Based on these gains and stimulated by real exchange rate depreciation, the sector has been able to overcome the depression in 1995 in domestic demand by increasing sales in international market.

The degree of the involvement of the Mexican State in the supply of services has decreased dramatically during the last decade. Mexico has a number of world-class

suppliers, but inefficiencies have been appeared by constraints on other sectors of the Mexican economy; more recently the most serious problems have arisen in relation to financial services, although transport and telecommunications services have also been areas of concern. Steps have been taken to reduce such inefficiencies, strengthen the regulatory framework, and attract foreign investment. The NAFTA in particular has proved a powerful catalyst for liberalization, both through its formal requirements and the competitive pressures it has created to increase efficiency in Mexican economy. Mexico has also participated actively in the Uruguay Round *General Agreement on Trade in Services* (GATS) and subsequent service negotiations, undertaking sector-specific commitments in a large number of areas. Mexico's accession to the OECD is also helping to promote further liberalization. Fully extending the past and future liberalization on a MFN basis would ensure that Mexican producers have access to the lowest cost services, making them more competitive vis-à-vis foreign producers.

Mexico provides a generally positive example of progressive liberalization maintained over an extended period, at times in the face of serious macroeconomic shocks. Its persistence in carrying through this process has begun to pay dividends, and the bases are now in place for achieving long-term sustainable economic growth. Continuing trade and economic liberalization is a vital factor in achieving this goal, ensuring that the resulting flow of benefits more visibly to a larger proportion of the population would also be important in securing the continuing support for the reforms.

Given the importance of economic relations with the United States, NAFTA has become the cornerstone of Mexico's trade and investment policies. Mexico is also actively forgoing new trade links through its regional agreements within the America, with the EU, and also within APEC.

The intensification of structural change, and in particular the opening up of trade, has been defining features of Mexico's economic policy over the past four years. This has been carried out both unilaterally and through regional and multilateral negotiations, in keeping with the commitments which was made when it entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO). A noteworthy aspect of this opening in recent years is that it has continued despite the economic crisis of late 1994.

For Mexico, the entry into force of the Uruguay Round commitments in 1995 coincided with the worst economic crisis in the country's recent history. The sudden interruption of foreign capital flows to Mexico in late 1994 led to a sharp devaluation of the peso and imposed the need for a severe adjustment programme. Despite the crisis, the government did not adopt protective measures, as had occurred in the 1982 crisis. In fact, it even proceeded to intensify the economic reforms undertaken in recent years, particularly with respect to the liberalization of trade and investment, while at the same time to pursue a far-reaching agenda of international trade negotiations.

By maintaining and pushing the reforms, particularly in the trade area, Mexico laid the foundations for renewed economic growth after only 20 months, whereas it had taken several years to overcome the 1982 crisis.

During 1995, economic activity shrank very significantly, with a 6.9 per cent decline in the value of GDP compared with the growth of 2.0 per cent and 4.4 per cent in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Nevertheless, the economy turned around and grew by 5.1 per cent in 1996, and is forecast to expand at about 5 per cent annually until the year 2000.

Over the last two years, exports have made a fundamental contribution to GDP growth, and today account for about a quarter of the product. Between 1993 and 1996, the average annual growth rate of total exports was 20 per cent, and in 1995 alone exports increased by 30.6 per cent. In 1996, the value of Mexican exports totaled 96 billion dollars. Manufacturing exports grew at an average annual rate of 22.7 per cent over the period 1993-1996, reaching 80.3 billion dollars in 1996.

Along with renewed economic growth, inflation has followed a downward trend. Inflation climbed from 7.1 per cent in 1994 to 52 per cent in 1995, but in 1996 almost halved to 27.7 per cent while the economy picked up strongly. This trend is continuing, and from June 1996 to June 1997 inflation stood at 20.4 per cent. This year's inflation rate is expected to be 15 percent, with a continuing downward trend for subsequent years.

The weakness of Mexican economic activity in 1995 was reflected in the labor market. The open unemployment rate rose from 3.9 per cent in November 1994 to 7.6 per cent in August 1996, the highest level since the crisis. It has steadily declined since then, reaching 3.4 per cent in June 1997, a level comparable to that before the crisis.

Lastly, Mexico's economic crisis over the last 20 years have been characterized by a low level of domestic savings and high dependence on external savings. The measures formulated between 1995 and 1996 to boost domestic savings succeeded in raising it considerably, from 15.0 per cent to 20.4 per cent of GDP. At the same time other measures have been introduced to bolster private savings in the coming years, such as a new pension system, the promotion of public savings and a tax policy aimed at encouraging savings and investment. The goal is to make domestic savings the main source of financing for economic growth, only supplemented by external savings.

On joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, Mexico began to speed up the structural change and unilateral liberalization launched three years earlier. Opening up the economy has increased its efficiency and enabled Mexico to compete more aggressively on world markets, with the ensuing impact on economic growth, exports and job creation. It also laid the foundation for negotiating free-trade agreements and for Mexico's participation in the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations.

Between 1993 and 1997, Mexico unilaterally eliminated most-favored-nation tariffs on over 1 200 products; the number of duty-free products increased from 414 in 1993 to 1 658

in 1997. This tariff elimination primarily concerned inputs and machinery used in the agricultural, chemical, electrical, electronic, textile and publishing sectors.

Although the simple average tariff has remained at about 13 per cent over the last four years, the weighted average tariff has fallen significantly, down from 7.8 per cent in 1993 to 2.9 per cent in 1996 and 2.7 per cent in 1997.

In connection with the elimination of prior import licenses, it is significant that they have been replaced by tariffs for 67 agricultural products, in accordance with the Uruguay Round tariffication commitment. Mexico has also established tariff quotas to ensure the entry of specific quantities of agricultural products to Mexican market.

In order to attract a higher inflow of foreign capital, in December 1993 the government issued *The Foreign Investment Law*, subsequently amended in December 1996. This Law, together with *The North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA), intensified the policy on foreign direct investment shifting towards greater liberalization.

As part of the drive towards trade liberalization in recent years, Mexico has modernized its system of the protection of intellectual property rights in order to increase substantially the level of the protection of such rights. This has been achieved by changes in the regulatory framework and by strengthening the institutions responsible for enforcing these rights.

The Industrial Property Promotion and Protection Law considered one of the most advanced in the world was enacted in 1991. It was updated in 1994 and retailed *the Industrial Property Law*. In addition, the new Copyright Law was enacted in December 1996, replacing the law of 1984.

Since 1989, one of the main aspects of structural reform in Mexico has been the improvement of the regulatory framework governing economic activities. For this purpose, various legal provisions related to different economic sectors have been updated and simplified. The sectors concerned include tourism, railways, air transport, ports, land transport, petrochemicals, electricity, telecommunications, satellites, customs, foreign exchange, water supply, financial institutions, mining and fishing. As a consequence, the efficiency of Mexican economy has increased significantly.

Furthermore, as from November 1995 the Federal Government of Mexico began to implement *the Business Activity Deregulation Agreement*, Which aims at improving administrative procedures and cutting down red tape affecting the establishment and operation of business. This program is coordinated by the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development (SECOFI) with the collaboration of the Economic Deregulation Council (consisting of representatives of the public sector, industry, labor and the academic community). Its purpose is to review all the formalities and relative laws required for setting up and operating business, as well as the relevant legislation, in order to reduce the administrative burden on companies.

In accordance with the Mexican Constitution, international treaties signed by the

President and ratified by the Senate, which is the case of the Uruguay Round Agreements, have the status of supreme law and therefore do not require any further legislative act for their application. The changes and reforms introduced in Mexican legislation have been prompted by the need to harmonize domestic trade rules with international rules so as to facilitate their application.

Mexico considers the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments and disciplines by all WTO members to be fundamental for strengthening the multilateral trading system. Mexico has fully complied with all these commitments, including the notification ones. With respect to services, it is important to stress that Mexico's initial commitments under *The General Agreement on Trade in Services* (GATS) cover 68 sectors and 329 activities, which bears witness to Mexico's desire to contribute to opening up this sector on a most-favored-nation basis.

Since its accession to GATT in 1986, Mexico has been one of the countries where the pace of liberalization has been swiftest. This liberalization was not checked by the 1994 economic crisis; on the contrary, it was pursued and intensified, which played an important part in the rapid recovery of Mexico's economic growth.

Mexico has implemented important measures of structural change and liberalization in recent years, with the fundamental goal of enhancing its economic competitiveness. These measures concern in particular tariffs, non-tariff barriers, investment, customs procedures, standards, competition policies, intellectual property and economic deregulation, and they are compatible with Mexico's WTO commitments.

These unilateral measures have been accompanied by an ambitious policy of international trade negotiations. That is precisely what the free trade agreements have achieved greater opening and greater access to international markets. Mexico will continue to seek agreement of this kind as a complement to multilateral liberalization under the WTO.

New Words and Expressions 生词和词组

unilateral 单边的、单方面的

MFN (most-favored-nation) 最惠国

NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreements) 北美自由贸易协定

WTO (the World Trade Organization) 世界贸易组织

remnant 残余物

GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 国内生产总值

fragile 易破坏的, 不持久的

OECD (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 经济合作与发展组织

catalyst 催化剂

red tape 繁文缛节

参考译文

贸易政策回顾——墨西哥

从 20 世纪 80 年代中期开始的墨西哥经济改革从未停止。从那时起形成的更加开放的投资结构,与世界经济更紧密的融合,以及国际金融机构的支持等有效的成果帮助墨西哥从 1995 年的经济衰退之中复苏过来。然而,银行系统的运转仍令人担忧,同时农业和制造业中的大量落后部门亦是如此。制度和法律结构的现代化进程仍在继续。当最惠国基础上的单边贸易自由化向前发展时,贸易政策的改变主要体现在北美自由贸易协议和其他协议下的区域自由化。墨西哥与美国商品贸易所占的份额从 1992 年的 75% 上升到 1996 年的 80%。区域自由化的一些因素使所有世界贸易组织的成员国都有所受益,而另一部分因素则明显地使区域性伙伴受益。此外,早期的进口替代政策的残余依然影响着汽车工业,而选择性关税的增长(在约束水平下)被用来支持其他的活动。反倾销条款的积极运用使其成为一个潜在的贸易壁垒。改革的进程远没有结束,对墨西哥来说,要达到一个更高的、稳定的经济增长率就必须让改革继续进行。

自 1993 年前一次贸易政策评估以来,突出的宏观经济事件便是 1994 年 12 月的金融危机和随之而来的衰退与复苏。虽然 1995 年的衰退比 20 世纪 80 年代的债务危机更剧烈、复苏也更迅猛,然而实际的国内生产总值仍低于 1994 年的水平。与 20 世纪 80 年代早期的危机相比,出口的增长更多的是由制造业而非原油产品驱动,同时墨西哥也避免了在资本和现金账户方面设置新的贸易障碍或管制。

自金融危机以来,宏观经济的稳定被放在了首要的位置,自 20 世纪 80 年代以来不断扩大的经济开放加快了复苏的进程。在更加现实的实际汇率的影响下,1996 年经济实际增长率达到了 5.1%,现金账户的赤字下降了,对金融市场的即时压力减轻了,短期名义利率和通货膨胀率下降了,股票市场的表现也有所好转,总的国际储备正恢复到危机之前的水平。墨西哥也加快了进入国际资本市场的步伐,这对巩固复苏是很重要的,但其国内银行系统仍很脆弱。

墨西哥的贸易政策与外国投资的增长有着紧密的联系。这种联系通过一个永久的贸易和投资法规体制来实现,包括多边和优惠协议。在多边的竞争市场中,墨西哥在 1994 年成为经济合作和发展组织的成员国,并在 1995 年成为世界贸易组织的创始国之一。它在区域协商方面的行动计划——加上早期与智利签订的合作协议——促使其在 1994 年与美国和加拿大签署了北美自由贸易协议并生效执行,在 1995 年与哥斯达黎加、玻利维亚、哥伦比亚和委内瑞拉签订了自由贸易协议。

墨西哥的贸易战略已经从多边体系内的单边改革过渡到在区域性背景下经协商达成的自由贸易。与优惠贸易伙伴达成的非关税壁垒的削减以及投资自由化常常使第三方(比如服务业)受益。然而,政府采购和海关估价方面出现了待遇上的变化。

墨西哥的这些承诺及其有利于贸易和投资流动的持续努力导致了法律体制的实质性变化。墨西哥进一步协调了国内法规和对外承诺,并减少了法规的数目,还加强了审判系统和法律执行机构的力量,特别是其新的投资法规对外国资本更加开放,当然,在少数行为上仍有限制。最近的改变也促进了知识产权保护制度的改善,这已经被广泛地认为是很明智的做法。

总之,自1993年以来,墨西哥贸易工具的使用似乎一直在为一个逐步开放的贸易体制服务。然而,对其进行评估却很困难,因为不同的工具朝着不同的方向发展。

在关税运用方面的主要变化是新的区域性优惠政策的执行削减了贸易偏重的平均关税,但与此同时,也扩大了单一平均最惠国税率(13.2%)和优惠税率(例如,从美国进口的税率为4.2%)之间的差距。在这一期间,墨西哥有约1000种商品达到了免税水平,但在一定程度上,这种情况又被特定敏感商品(比如牛肉、纺织品和鞋类)的最惠国待遇税率的增长所抵销,因为这些商品在最高税率限制方面是可变通的。而农业方面的关税制度创造出新的关税峰顶并增加了关税的分散性。作为乌拉圭回合的结果,墨西哥将其最高限制税率由50%降至35%,然而,这仍然比近来所采用的平均税率高一倍。自1986年墨西哥加入关税与贸易总协定以来,许多关税种类已纳入法案。

同时,强制性标准的数目有了显著增加,而关于新商标和标签要求的疑问有所上升。墨西哥没有签署多边政府采购协议,对参与国家供应品和国内商品的国家公开招标进行限制。墨西哥仍然保持着各种各样的对汽车工业(包括零部件)的限制,这在世界贸易组织协议中的与贸易有关的投资条款中已被提及。墨西哥的北美自由贸易协议的伙伴们将从公共采购和投资条款所提及的自由化中获利,但这一利益不一定扩展到其他贸易伙伴。

1993年一部新的竞争法案生效实施,并随后建立了联邦竞争委员会,这些都是完善墨西哥私有化计划的重要步骤;他们的进一步发展有助于消费者从墨西哥自由化努力中充分获利,同时特定活动遵守的高度市场联系也并没有削弱经济效率。

尽管墨西哥从20世纪80年代中期就开始建立单方面开放体系,但从1993年开始,其所有的经济部门都因作为北美自由贸易协议的先锋而在贸易和投资自由化加强的变化中承受了巨大的压力。

农业部门尤其受到经济自由化的影响。政府已采取措施减少了对农业的支持,并引入了基于直接收入支持的补助机制,其结果是最近计算出的平均生产者补贴率仅为13%。根据北美自由贸易协议和世界贸易组织相关协议的要求,墨西哥将其所有非关税措施转为关税或关税配额,并用超高配额税保护敏感领域。尽管政府做了如此重要的结构性改变,农业部门作为一个整体仍遭受着由低劳动生产力引起的历史性衰弱。

墨西哥作为一个采矿业国家有着悠久的采矿历史,虽然近十年来采矿业在经济中的重要性有所降低,但1993年新法规的引入又提高了该部门的地位。尽管在过去的十年里,原油出口已明显多样化,但石油业仍保持着经济上的重要性,世界原油价格对政府预算仍有相当大的冲击力。对公共部门融资能力的限制导致了石油储备下降,生产增长速度减缓,这种限制也对石油化工行业产生了影响。政府已找到允许较大的私人企业参与这些行动的方法,并为此采取了一些措施,以便在宪法的约束下,逐步允许私人参与与天然气有关的经营和石油化工项目。

墨西哥的制造业部门是多样化的。总的来说,该部门从贸易自由化计划和大量投资的涌入所产生的效率和利润增长中获得了利益。基于这些成果及实际汇率贬值的刺激,制造业部门通过增加在国际市场上的销售克服了1995年国内需求的不景气。

最近十年墨西哥政府在服务业供应方面的参与程度戏剧性下降。墨西哥有一批世界级的供应商,但由于其他经济部门的限制而变得毫无效率。虽然运输和电讯服务领域也十分令人担忧,但最近发生的最严重的问题与金融服务相关。政府正在采取措施以减少这种无效率的状况,加强法规结构,吸引外国投资。北美自由贸易协议被证明是自由化有力的催化剂,该协议正式的要求和竞争压力提高了墨西哥的经济效率。墨西哥还积极参与乌拉圭回合《服务贸易总协定》(GATS)以及随后的服务业方面的协商,在大量的领域承担了具体的部门承诺。墨西哥加入经济合作与发展组织也促进了进一步的自由化。在最惠国基础上全面扩展过去和未来的自由化将保证墨西哥的生产者得到最低成本的服务,从而与外国生产者相比更具竞争力。

在面临严重的宏观经济震荡时期,墨西哥树立了一个总体积极的典范,即长期保持循序渐进的自由化。坚持实施自由化开始得到回报,长期稳定的经济增长的基础已经打好。继续贸易和经济自由化是达到这一目标的重要因素,它保证了更多人能明显获益,以确保其对改革的继续支持。

由于与美国存在非常重要的经济关系,北美自由贸易协议成为墨西哥贸易和投资政策的基石。同时,墨西哥也通过与美洲、欧盟和亚太经合组织的区域性协议来积极地发展新的贸易关系。

结构性改变的加强,尤其是贸易的开放,是过去4年墨西哥经济政策的显著特征。墨西哥通过单边、区域性和多边协商来实现这些变化,从而使墨西哥信守了进入世界贸易组织所作的承诺。尽管1994年发生了经济危机,但开放仍在继续,这是近年来一个非常值得注意的方面。

对墨西哥而言,1995年乌拉圭回合承诺的生效与该国近代史上最严重的经济危机同时发生。1994年末流向墨西哥的外国资本突然中断导致了比索的急剧贬值,政府被迫实行严厉的调整计划。尽管有此危机,政府并没有像对付1982年危机那样采取保护主义措施。事实上,在近些年它甚至逐步加强了经济改革,特别是在贸易和投资自由化方面加快了步伐,与此同时在国际贸易协商中寻求面向未来的议程。

通过保持和推动改革,特别是在贸易领域的改革,墨西哥仅在20个月后就打好了恢复经济增长的基础,而克服1982年的经济危机却花了几年的时间。

1995年,经济活动的紧缩非常明显。与1993年和1994年经济增长分别为2.0%和4.4%相比,1995年国内生产总值下降了6.9%。然而,在1996年经济得以扭转并增长了5.1%,同时人们预计到2000年墨西哥经济每年都会以大约5%的速度增长。

在过去的两年多里,出口为墨西哥国内生产总值的增长奠定了基础,如今已占整个生产总值的1/4。1993~1996年,墨西哥总的出口平均年增长率为20%,1995年的增长率为30.6%,1996年,其出口总值达960亿美元。1993~1996年,制造业出口平均年增长率达22.7%,1996年制造业出口总值达到803亿美元。

随着经济增长重新开始,通货膨胀呈下降趋势。通货膨胀率从1994年的7.1%上升