


中国农业经济学博士论丛

经济组织的制度逻辑

一个理论框架及其
对中国农民经济组织的应用研究

● 罗必良 著



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内 容 提 要

本书将经济组织作为研究对象,通过对经济组织进行规范的政治学意义上的理论实证研究,构建一个关于经济组织的制度经济学分析框架,并在此基础上对农民经济组织问题进行应用分析。依此目的,本书一方面以坚持新古典经济学传统的新制度经济学为理论背景,来构建经济组织的制度逻辑框架,以求达到对经济组织内在机理及若干依存关系的理解与把握;另一方面以农民经济组织为现象范围,运用所建立的理论框架对农民经济组织的动因与特殊性,不同类型农民经济组织的结构、行为与绩效,农民经济组织的制度变迁与效率,农民经济组织规模的效率决定,农民经济组织的激励机制设计,政府和市场与农民经济组织的关系等一些经过挑选的问题进行分析,以求达到对特殊问题本身及其依存关系认识的深化。

本书除导论外,共分为3编。第一编(包括第1,2章)的主要内容是提出问题和为整个研究提供一个理论

实证的逻辑起点。第二编(第3,4,5,6,7章)是本书的核心部分。其主要内容是通过在经济组织性质与组织制度演进逻辑的把握,来解释经济组织的结构多样性、功能差异、效率边界与规模极限,并通过对经济组织内在机制的解析,来认识经济组织的集体行动逻辑,理解组织制度变迁的线索、方式及其绩效。第三编(第8,9,10,11,12,13章)的主要内容是运用第二编所建立起来的理论框架和分析思路对中国农民经济组织问题进行应用研究。这种应用研究既是对第二编提出的理论框架的检验与深化,也是对现实农民经济组织进行解释与预言,并由此提出相应的对策。

本书综合运用现代经济学的前沿理论,所构造的经济组织制度逻辑的分析框架是同类研究中的重要成果,不仅具有重要的理论学术价值,也具有广泛的应用价值。而应用所构建的理论框架对农民经济组织进行系统的经济学研究,也是同类研究中的开创性成果。

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a theoretical and empirical economic study on economic organizations and particularly the peasant economic organization, based on the neoclassic economic theory and the new institutional economics, with applications of the public choice theory, the economics of information, the theory of incentive mechanism design, and the theory of industrial organization. The objective of this study is to establish an analytical framework of the institutional logic of the economic organization, on which an empirical study of the peasant economic organization in China is based.

This dissertation consists of thirteen chapters in addition to the introductory chapter, which is organized into three parts.

The first part is divided into two chapters under the title Concepts, History, and Issues, providing a conceptual basis and empirical background. In Chapter 1, several fundamental concepts are clarified, hypotheses and methodologies on which this study is based are emphasized and relevant literature is reviewed. This study is conceptually based on such hypotheses as profit maximization, the bounded rationality, the opportunistic behavior, the specificity of assets and the positive transaction costs. A skeleton description on the historical process, the peasant characteristics, problems and tendency of China's peasant economic organizations can be found in Chapter 2.

The following five chapters constitute the second part, which is the theoretical core of the study that provides a framework to establish the institutional logic of the economic organization and an observational system for the empirical analysis hereafter. The diversity, structure, functional differentiation, efficiency boundaries and size limits of the organization are fully explained through the consideration of the nature and the evolution of the organization. The analysis of the implicit characteristics of the economic organization is carried out to understand the logic of its collective actions, the mechanism, the pattern and the economic performances of its institutional changes.

A new explanation is given in Chapter 3 for the nature of the economic organization which delineates its multi - nature and reexplains the origin and evolution of the organization. Chapter 4 describes the diversity of the economic organization, analyzes the characteristics of the structure, functions, and efficiency differentiation of various economic organizations, and defines the efficiency boundaries and their size limits. The inherent mechanism of the economic organization is analyzed in Chapter 5, which includes the division - cooperation mechanism, the decision making - information mechanism, the incentive - constraint mechanism, and disintegration - integration mechanism. Chapter 6 is an investigation into the underlying causes, regulations and the implicit logic of the collective choice behavior of the economic organization, which brings to light the association between the degree of the publicity of the goods (or property rights) and the economic organization. A

brief discussion is made on the functions of organizations and the mechanism, patterns, affecting factors and economic performance of the institutional change in Chapter 7.

The empirical analysis is included in part 3 with the application of the theory and methodology that have developed in part 1, which consists of chapters 8 through 13. Special attention to case studies are paid to test the theories stated above. Chapter 8 explains the underlying causes and particularity of the peasant economic organization, explores the essence and the embodied institutional implications of agriculture, summarizes the diversity, the transferability, and the communal characteristics. As for the diversity, this study further expands the economic thoughts of property rights about the “public domain” developed by Yoram Barzel. A variant of the “structure – behavior – performance model” in institutional analysis is developed in Chapter 9 to compare the comparative advantage, structures, behaviors and performances of different peasant economic organizations. The analysis shows that different economic organizations choose different institutional arrangements, and the same institutional arrangement can be found in different institutional environments, but in any case, all result in different economic performance.

Through an explanatory model based on “the property right structure, measurement capability, and environmental characteristics”, Chapter 10 investigates the evolutionary process and efficiency features of the microeconomic organization of Chinese agriculture, by which the underlying causes of the failure of the people’s commune system are further explained, and

the rationality of the household operation is reexamined, therefore, clarifying the basic characteristics and the institutional innovation path of the agricultural operational system. The efficiency determinant of the size of the peasant economic organization is discussed in Chapter 11. Special attention is given to the efficiency determinant of the size of farming so as to provide further reasoning of the household system in Chinese agriculture.

Chapter 12 discusses the issues related to incentives, information and mechanism design of the peasant economic organization, analyzes the realization conditions of the public benefits and principles for the design of incentive mechanism. The low efficiency of the collective labor is further explained based on a “lemons” market model. Introducing the principal – agent framework, this chapter analyzes the selective incentive mechanism, optimal monitoring, residual claim rights and the arrangement of the principal rights. From the viewpoint of the compatibility of the technical structure of transaction with a specific organization. Chapter 13 clarifies the dimension of the functions between the government, the market, and the peasant economic organization, analyzes the important role of government in institutional innovation, and diagnoses the relationship between the market organization and other peasant economic organizations. Based on the discussion on the peasant’s economic rationality, this study finally develops the criteria for government policy alternatives, and recommends a policy scheme so as to improve the peasant economic organization.

In summary, this study shows that the development pro-

cess and the performance of China's peasant economic organization depend not only upon the market development but also on the changes in the macro institutional environment. Furthermore, it relies on both peasants' efforts and government behavior and policy alternatives.

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导 论



问题的提出

经济组织及其经济学性质,一直是经济学尤其是新制度经济学关心的重要议题。科斯(R. H. Coase)较早注意到了组织的性质问题,从而引发了对企业本质及企业与市场边界的持久讨论;诺思(D. C. North)的制度变迁理论、奥尔森(M. Olson)的集体行动理论以及现代经济学中成长迅速的激励机制设计理论等,则引发了学术界对经济组织制度逻辑的广泛思考。然而,许多问题尚见仁见智。经济组织为什么呈现多样性、经济组织的结构与功能及绩效差异的根源何在、经济组织的效率边界及规模极限的决定因素是什么、经济组织制度安排与演进的内在机制如何等,都仍是悬而未决的问题。更重要的是,关于经济组织制度分析的框架,还远未建立起来。

在我国的实践中,关于与市场经济体制转轨相适应的农民经济组织及其制度建设问题,受到了人们的广泛关注。之所以如此,