

美英报刊文章选读

周学艺 编

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SELECTED ARTICLES
FROM AMERICAN & BRITISH
NEWSPAPERS & PERIODICALS
VOLUME I II

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Volume II

周 学 艺



北 京 大 学 出 版 社

美英报刊文章选读(下)

周 学 艺

责任编辑: 刘皓明

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Unit Eight

World Affairs(I)—East-West &
International Triangular Relationships

Lesson Twenty-six

Turning the Tables on Moscow^①

Once "their" guys were the rebels;
now it is often "our" guys

Guerrilla. Rebel. Insurgent.

In the American lexicon of the 1960s and '70s, those words were synonyms for the enemy. In the paddy fields of Indochina, in jungles and deserts and tumbledown villages elsewhere around the world, leftist insurgencies seemed to be the cutting edge^② of Soviet expansionism, a principal cause of American retreat and defeat.

A decade later, the U.S. has gone a long way toward turning the tables on Moscow. In many civil wars today, it is Soviet-backed regimes that face insurgencies. Frequently the U.S. provides some degree of support to the rebel forces.

► In Nicaragua, the U.S. has waged what is probably the least secret "covert operation" in history, helping the *contras* against the Sandinistas.^③

► Half a world away, in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union faces what is frequently, though simplistically, called its own Viet Nam: ^④ a made-in-Moscow clique is holed up in Kabul,^⑤ caravans of Soviet-supplied armor venture forth by day into hostile hinterlands as helicopter gunships and bombers conduct a bloody pacification campaign, complete with carpet bombing.^⑥ The U.S. is aiding the mujahedin rebels^⑦ to the tune of many millions of dollars a year.

► In Africa, Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)^⑧ is waging a classic war of attrition in

the bush. Its target, the pro-Soviet government in Luanda,^⑨ relies heavily on some 30,000 Cuban troops, much as the South Vietnamese government relied on American forces until 1975. UNITA's principal backer is South Africa, but Savimbi has visited Washington as frequently as some anticolonialist revolutionaries used to visit Moscow.

► In Indochina, the site of America's humiliation a decade ago, a loose coalition of anti-Soviet states in the region is aiding a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese occupiers and Hanoi-installed puppet rulers of Kampuchea.

There have been earlier instances of American support for uprisings against regimes inimical to the U.S., but they were sporadic and a number ended in failure. In the Nixon and Ford Administrations, Henry Kissinger worked through the Shah of Iran to support Kurdish separatists inside Iraq, but in 1975 the Shah pulled the plug on the Kurds in exchange for Iraqi concessions in a border dispute.^⑩ When Kissinger sought to back the pro-Western factions in the Angolan civil war, he was thwarted by Congress, which was then in the throes of its post-Viet Nam withdrawal syndrome.

Ronald Reagan came into office fervently embracing the notion that Uncle Sam^⑪ should take off his coat and tie, roll up his sleeves and actively oppose Soviet henchmen in the back alleys of the world.^⑫ Reagan's motivation was quite explicitly connected with Viet Nam. He felt it was high time to demonstrate that the U.S. had recovered from the paralysis and pessimism caused by the trauma of the only war it ever lost.

Support for anti-Communist rebels was part of an overall attitude sometimes called "global unilateralism":^⑬ by assisting indigenous armed resistance to Soviet-backed regimes around the world, the U.S. could leapfrog over its formal military alliances, thus bypassing nervous and sometimes unreliable foreign friends, and strike directly behind enemy lines. The Soviet Union had inadvertently invited precisely this American strategy. Moscow's surge of expansionism in the '70s had left it overextended and therefore vulnerable

to Western harassment and counterattack in the '80s.

According to Francis Fukuyama, a former member of the State Department policy-planning staff now at the Rand Corp.,¹⁴ there has been a "role reversal" between the superpowers. Today, says Fukuyama, "the Soviets may find themselves trying to defend the status quo,¹⁵ while the U.S., its allies and associates offer up challenges." The U.S. has an opportunity "to wean away Soviet clients from close embrace with Moscow."

Last year Stephen Sestanovich, an analyst on the staff of the National Security Council,¹⁶ wrote an article suggesting that the Soviet leadership has been debating whether its forces are indeed spread too thin and whether it should reduce its far-flung foreign entanglements. The question for the U.S. is how to encourage the Soviets to decide in favor of what Sestanovich calls "retrenchment."¹⁷ The answer favored by the Reagan Administration has been for the U.S. to turn the screws on governments that are dependent on Moscow, thus raising the price that the Soviets must pay for their adventurism.

This course is especially appealing to CIA Director William Casey,¹⁸ who would like his agency to get back wholeheartedly into the business of covert action. As Casey put it during a meeting at the White House, the CIA should be aiming "discreet but vigorous counterpunches against all forms of Soviet aggression."

Reagan, according to aides, likes the idea of using against the Soviets many of the rough-and-tumble techniques,¹⁹ accompanied by high-minded rhetoric, that Moscow used against the U.S. during the bad old days of the Viet Nam War. "I want to see us on the offensive and the other guys on the defensive for a change," he told a group of advisers early in his first term. Reagan also wanted to dramatize his belief that history is on the side of democracy and capitalism, not Marxism-Leninism, and that what the Soviets smugly term "the correlation of forces" is actually shifting in favor of the West.²⁰

In his State of the Union address²¹ in February, the President

articulated what has since been dubbed the Reagan Doctrine.²² "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth," said Reagan. "Support for freedom fighters is self-defense."

Here was a new form of containment,²³ part of what the Atlantic Council of the U.S.,²⁴ a private foreign policy study group, has termed "assertive deterrence."²⁵ In its ongoing effort to oppose and restrain the Soviet Union, the U.S. must have capabilities offsetting Moscow's at every level, from small-caliber bullets to multimegaton thermonuclear warheads; the Soviets must not be permitted a monopoly in any significant category of competition, military or paramilitary. To avoid the danger of escalation, the U.S. must have the ability to combat the Soviets and their proxies on their own turf, without resorting to higher levels of violence. In practice, the Reagan Doctrine has given the U.S. both the will and the way to punish and perhaps sometimes reverse Soviet expansionism.

At the same time, support for anti-Communist insurgencies has its limitations. As Nicaragua makes clear, the U.S. is still incapable of waging truly covert warfare of any magnitude. In this respect, the Soviets enjoy a permanent advantage. The First Chief Directorate of the KGB,²⁶ the principal clandestine arm of Soviet foreign policy, can engage in dirty tricks while preserving its "plausible deniability." The CIA's Directorate for Operations,²⁷ by contrast, is subject to oversight by a notoriously leaky and fastidious U.S. Congress.

As Nicaragua also illustrates, Congress is nearly as reluctant today to approve secret wars as it was a decade ago, when Henry Kissinger wanted to bankroll Savimbi and other anti-Communists in Angola. Thus, while the worldwide network of Soviet clients is vulnerable to American counterpressure, it is difficult for the U.S. to sustain that pressure, not to mention apply it clandestinely.

Naturally the moral rationale for such tactics is not quite as clear-cut as Reagan made it seem when he proclaimed his doctrine.

Almost by definition, doctrines make up in lucidity what they lack in subtlety. The enemies of our enemies do not always qualify as friends with whom the U.S. can feel comfortable. Even those Nicaraguan *contras* who are genuinely committed to building a free society and a pluralistic political system are uneasy about their comrades-in-arms who were *Somocista* national guardsmen.²⁸

Kampuchea offers a more extreme example. The anti-Vietnamese (hence anti-Soviet) resistance there includes the Khmer Rouge forces of Pol Pot.²⁹

Unfortunately, the nastiness of a regime often has little to do with its viability. A right-wing junta like Chile's,³⁰ largely because it is so distasteful to Americans, and to its own people, often ends up being in an isolated and untenable position, and therefore a geopolitical liability for the U.S.

While support for guerrillas is a useful instrument of U.S. policy, it can rarely be decisive all by itself. Rather, covert action can serve to soften up a situation so that it will be more amenable to a negotiated settlement, or to direct military intervention. Sooner or later the secret agents and jungle warriors must give way to the diplomats and politicians—or to the generals.

On this point there is no better example than Viet Nam. Guerrillas started the war; diplomats and politicians failed to end it; generals won it. Alas for the U.S., they were Hanoi's generals. When the last Americans left Saigon, they were fleeing not Victor Charlie in his black pajamas and Ho Chi Minh sandals³¹ but the uniformed and armored legions of North Viet Nam's army, then fifth largest in the world (now fourth, having supplanted India's army).

The guerrilla movements in which the U.S. is most involved, in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, may both be approaching turning points. The civil wars there have indeed succeeded in softening up the Soviets and their local comrades. The regimes in Managua³² and Kabul, while not crying uncle,³³ are clearly hurting and may even be looking for a negotiated compromise. The rebels, while not about to win, are not about to surrender either. Soon the U.S., as their

principal backer, may have to decide on the next step.

The application of direct U.S. military pressure is simply not feasible in Afghanistan; there are already some 115,000 Soviet troops there. Also, the Kremlin can fight fire with fire.³⁴ Most covert American aid to the mujahedin is channeled through Pakistan, a country that is painfully susceptible to "destabilization" by the Soviet Union. Logistically, it is easier to contemplate the introduction of U.S. combat troops into Central America, but the political obstacles there are considerable. Congress has made it clear that it opposes U.S. military intervention in the region.

That means the time may have come for the diplomats. A number of Western experts believe Mikhail Gorbachev is looking for a face-saving settlement in Afghanistan. In Nicaragua, continued American support for the *contras* might eventually force the Sandinistas to accept a peace plan along the lines of one put forward by Opposition Leader Arturo Cruz.³⁵ He calls for a cease-fire in exchange for new elections and democratic guarantees. A settlement should also provide for a reduction in the Nicaraguan armed forces and limitations on Soviet and Cuban arms. The U.S. is not likely to ease up on the Sandinistas unless they accept such a deal.

Even if the U.S. pulled out the stops on its support for the *contras*,³⁶ most experts agree these forces could not bring about the overthrow of the Sandinistas—an objective that the President has come within a hairbreadth of supporting. Nor is there much chance that Congress will restore direct aid to the *contras* unless they, and their sponsors in the Administration, are willing to accept a political compromise.

Last week the Administration took what may be an important step in that direction. Having previously pursued a strategy of fight and talk—supporting the *contras* while promoting negotiations—the President shifted to a strategy of fight or talk—offering the Sandinistas a limited respite in the *contra* campaign as an inducement for them to enter serious negotiations.

In Nicaragua, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the U.S. has clear

ly recognized that support for guerrilla warfare can be a legitimate and effective play in the great game of superpower competition. Recently the Administration seems also to have come around to recognizing that its hand, while strong, should not be overplayed.

By Strobe Talbott (From Time, April 15, 1985)

Notes

1. Turning the Tables on Moscow — to reverse a situation and gain the upper hand:

They had won the first game, but we turned the tables on them and won the second.

2. cutting edges — the efficient portion of an instrument or the part that makes initial contact.
3. the *contras* against the Sandinistas — see Note 40 of Lesson Twenty-three.

Sandinista — a member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front.

4. Viet Nam — here refers to the Viet Nam war (cf. Note 22 of Lesson Four).
5. a made-in-Moscow clique is holed up in Kabul — The ruling clique fostered by the Soviet Union hides itself in the capital of Afganistan.

In order to save space and simplify sentence structures, adjectivisation or adjectival formations (形容词化或形容词性自由联缀词组) are often used in journalist's articles. One more example:

the pick-up-our-marble-and-go-home philosophy (捡起石头子回家不跟对方玩了的做法。即小孩玩石头子(或玻璃球)游戏时生气了,就捡起石头子来回家,不跟对方再玩。)

6. carpet bombing — a method of bombing in which an area containing numerous targets is carpeted with bombs. (地毯式轰炸)
7. mujahedin rebels — 反叛阿富汗现政权的圣战战士(者)。

8. Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) —— Savimbi 领导的争取安哥拉彻底独立全国联盟 (简称“安盟”)。

The pro-Western UNITA, formed in 1966, together with the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (安哥拉人民解放运动, 简称“人运”) and the pro-Western National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) (安哥拉民族解放阵线, 简称“解阵”) waged a guerrilla war against Portuguese colonialism from 1961 to 1974. When Portugal was forced to offer independence in 1975, both the pro-Western UNITA and FNLA, and the MPLA separately declared the founding of a republic in Angola. Supported by Cuban troops and massive Soviet aid, the latter won most of the country.

9. Luanda —— the capital of Angola, a seaport on the Atlantic.
10. In the Nixon and Ford Administrations,...in border dispute. ——
- 1) The militant Kurdish (库尔德人或语的) minority in the north has long been a problem to Iraqi officials. The Kurds (库尔德人), a nomadic non-Arab people, have traditionally been hostile to rule from Baghdad (伊拉克首都“巴格达”), and they engaged the Iraqi army in sporadic guerrilla warfare. Closely related to the issue of the Kurds, who have ethnic ties to the Persians, is Iraq's conflict with Iran over navigation rights in the Shat al Arab (阿拉伯河). In 1975 Iran and Iraq signed a reconciliation agreement with Iraq abandoning its claim to the estuary and with Iran ending its support of the Kurdish rebellion. Shortly thereafter, the Kurdish rebellion collapsed. Kurdish rebels continued their war in 1979.
 - 2) Nixon, Richard —— see Note 1 of Lesson Twenty-two.
 - 3) Ford, Gerald —— (1913—); 38th U.S. President (1974-77); Republican.
 - 4) Henry Kissinger —— see Note 5 of Lesson Twenty-three.
 - 5) the Shah of Iran —— refers to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-80), who ascended the throne in 1941, assumed control of Iran in 1951, and was forced to flee the country in 1979 before

exiled religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran.
Shah/ʃɑː / — the title of the ruler of Iran.

- 6) pull the plug — to disconnect the life-sustaining equipment such as respirator (呼吸器); here to cut off the crucial support (for the Kurds).
11. Uncle Sam — symbol for the collective citizenry or government of the U.S.
12. in the back alley of the world — off the main streets, i.e., the Third World; out of glaring public view (implies street-fighting techniques).
13. “global unilateralism” — the U.S., acting worldwide, on its own initiative; The U.S. resolutely supports anti-Communist rebels even if the other Western nations will not go along.
14. the Rand Corp. = Rand = Research and Development or Research and No Development (只研究, 不发展) — (兰德公司) a think tank (思想库) in Santa Monica, California, regarded as the most important comprehensive strategic research institute of the U.S. with military strategy as its top priority.
15. status quo/steitəs /ˈkwəu/ — (lat.) the state of things as they are; existing state of affairs.
16. the National Security Council — (abbrev. NSC) a board of advisors to the President of the U.S. on military, economic, and diplomatic affairs relating to the national security. (国家安全委员会。总统、副总统、国务卿、国防部长、紧急战备局局长为该委员会正式成员。通常列席的人员有：财政部长、中央情报局局长、参谋长联席会议主席。总统国家安全事务助理为该委员会官员，主管其日常工作。)
17. “retrenchment” — here refers to the actual practice of retreat and consolidation.
18. CIA Director William Casey — 中央情报局局长 Casey。
19. rough-and tumble technique — showing confusion and violence; with little regard to rules.
20. Reagan also wanted...the West. — We should take Reagan's view critically.

“the correlation of forces” —— It refers not simply to the balance, but to the posture in which the forces are balanced: who is active; who is passive —— how are they “correlated.” (cf. the balance of forces —— see Note 16 of Lesson Twenty-three)

21. State of the Union address —— see Note 4 of Lesson Twelve.
22. the Reagan Doctrine —— see Note 1 of Lesson Ten.
23. Containment —— policy of limiting the “expansion of Communism” by military means, in the vain hope that its failure to expand will weaken and eventually destroy the Communist system. (遏制战略。美以前的做法是以常规部队为主要作战手段，以原子弹为讹诈工具，以“美苏必战”为宣传烟幕，大力侵略和控制亚、非、拉广大中间地带。)
24. the Atlantic Council of the U.S. —— (美国大西洋委员会) founded in 1961. It is not a membership organization, and governed by board of directors to act as an educational medium, a non-governmental center for authoritative information, on matters relating the political, economic, and cultural affairs of the Atlantic and Western nations. It supports and serves as the U.S. office for the Atlantic Institute (大西洋学会) and the Atlantic Treaty Association (大西洋公约协会), both with headquarters in Paris, France.
25. “assertive deterrence” —— here means the U.S. counters aggressively and on every level the Soviets’ attempts to expand their geographical spheres of influence.
26. the First Chief Directorate of the KGB —— (苏) 国家安全委员会 (克格勃) 第一总局 (该局统辖克格勃在国外的一切行动)。
27. the CIA’s Directorate for Operations —— (美) 中央情报局行动处 (秘密行动机构)。
28. Somocista national guardsmen —— 索摩查国民警卫队 (反革命) 分子 (自从1936年国民警卫队司令 Anastasio Somoza Garcia 暗杀了民族英雄 Anastasio César Sandino 就任总统后, 政权一直落在索摩查家族手中, 直至1979年被桑地诺民族解放阵线推翻)。 (cf. Note 40 of Lesson Twenty-two)
29. the Khmer Rouge forces of Pol Pot —— 波尔布特领导的红色高

棉部队

Pol Pot —— (1928—); Secretary of the Central Committee of the Cambodian Communist Party and Prime Minister in the government of Democratic Kampuchea (1977-79).

30. a right-wing junta like Chile's —— Chile's military junta (发动政变后上台的军政府) headed by Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, who assumed power in 1973. (cf. Lesson Twenty-four)
31. Victor Charlie in his black pajamas and Ho Chi Minh sandals —— refers to the Viet Kong or the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front.
32. Managua —— the capital of Nicaragua, on Lake Managua of West Nicaragua.
33. cry uncle —— to admit defeat; to give up.
34. fight fire with fire —— to respond in kind with the same sort of weapon.
35. Opposition Leader Arturo Cruz —— Cruz, head of the anti-Sandinistas guerrilla alliance —— United Nicaragua Opposition (UN-O), formed in 1985 and based in Honduras, was a former member of the Governing Junta (执政委员会, 全国最高行政权力机构), but broke with the Sandinistas in 1981.
36. Even if the U.S. pulled out the stops on its support for the *contras* —— to increase its support to maximum possible level.
pull out the stops —— to proceed with no restraint whatsoever.

Questions on the text

1. How is a "role reversal" effected in the game of the superpowers' competition in the Third World?
2. What has made Reagan able to launch an offensive against Russia in the rivalry ever since he came to office in 1981?
3. What is a new form of containment?
4. Why does the U.S. government take the Nicaraguan government as a thorn in its flesh?

