

英语注释读物

# THE ULTRA SECRET

## 超级机密



外语教学与研究出版社

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(英) F·W·温德博瑟姆著

仲掌生 注 释

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**THE ULTRA SECRET**

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F. W. 温德博瑟姆著

仲掌生

注释

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## Preface

This is primarily the story of how, during World War II, the highest form of intelligence, obtained from the 'breaking' of the supposedly 'unbreakable' German machine cyphers, was 'processed' and distributed with complete security to President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and all the principal Chiefs of Staff and commanders in the field throughout the war.

It also tells what the most important signals contained and how the various commanders reacted to and used the information and, finally, illustrates the decisive part it played in the Allied Victories.

I have given some of the background of the cypher breaking operation which was accomplished by a team of brilliant mathematicians and cryptographers at Bletchley Park near London, but both for security reasons and because I am not a cryptographer I have not given details of this near miracle.

Since virtually all the signals quoted or referred to in this book were in the Enigma Cypher I have thought it unnecessary to label each one and have therefore included them all under the 'umbrella' of the code name *Ultra* which was given to this particular

intelligence.

This code word will be repeated from time to time to remind the reader that this narrative is about intelligence available at the time, and not a history based on hindsight.

Unfortunately I have had no access to official records, and the book is written from my own recollections of the events described and of the hundreds of signals which I left locked in the vaults of Whitehall. If therefore I have made any errors on the cryptographic side they will, I hope, be forgiven; they might in any case add to the security of cryptography.

It has not been my intention in this book to magnify the part I played in the war effort. Rather it is my hope to add a necessary contribution to the history of World War II, a contribution resulting from the job I was given to do by the Chief of the British Secret Service.

The laurels for the Enigma Operation belong to the Codebreakers of Bletchley,

F.W.W.

## II

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## Foreword

by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor  
GCB, KCB, CB, DSO, MC, DL

It will probably occur to some readers of this book to wonder whether it is wise to make public so much about the supremely important source of Intelligence information which General Eisenhower described, just after the end of the Second World War, as a decisive factor in the Allied victory, and as having saved thousands of British and American lives. What has been known during the past thirty-four years to relatively very few people, even in the fighting Services, as *Ultra*, was indeed an almost incredibly valuable source of Intelligence—more even than the other British triumph in that field when we controlled and actively ran the German espionage system in Great Britain, described by its leading spirit, Sir John Masterman, in his enthralling book *The Double Cross System*. There is something especially thrilling about any really authentic story about Intelligence in war.

When the lights went out in 1939 Fred Winterbotham had been the senior Air Staff representative in the

Secret Intelligence Service for ten years. In the early days of the war he was largely responsible, in co-operation with people like R. V. Jones and with Denniston, Knox and other excellent 'back-room boys' at Bletchley, for the inception of *Ultra* and subsequently for its working, through the Special Liaison units, throughout the war. I don't suppose anyone had a more interesting time of it during those years, dealing direct as he did with virtually all the leaders on the highest levels, British and American, from the Prime Minister downwards on this incomparably useful and entirely reliable means of informing them about what was going on 'on the other side of the hill'. It will be seen from this book that no one was more conscious than the author of the vitally essential need for the complete security of the system at the time. Incidentally it is a curious reflection on our system of Honours and Awards that he should have finished up after the war as a retired Group Captain with a CBE on a quiet farm in Devon.

There was nothing very new about the art of cracking enemy cyphers as such — see for instance Kahn's *The Codebreakers* and Roberta Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbour*. But with the secret abstraction from Poland of the theoretically unbreakable German cypher machine *Enigma*, which gave birth eventually to *Ultra*, that art took on a completely new dimension; and surely no



other act in history of officially sponsored skulduggery ever had comparably fruitful results.

The official ban on any reference to *Ultra* until the Spring of this year 1974 has certainly had an inhibiting effect on the writing of military history in every field. I have myself made several unsuccessful attempts, on the highest levels, during the past twenty years to get that ban lifted. And I am sure that this long-deferred disclosure of *Ultra* and of its almost fabulous influence on Allied strategy — and even sometimes on tactics — in the last of the great conventional wars, will not be a danger in any great, and hence inevitably nuclear, war of the future.

As Director of Plans in the Air Staff I was, of course, aware of *Ultra* from its inception. On the fall of France I well remember the deep anxiety of dear Archie Boyle (for years the link between the Air Staff and the Secret Service) lest this gift from the Gods should fall into enemy hands which, thanks to the gallant and loyal Colonel Joubert, in the event it did not. It is a pity that the author has felt unable to deal more fully with the influence of *Ultra* on the Maritime side where (characteristically and not always with happy results) the Admiralty were allowed to keep these Signal Intelligence matters in their own hands. But I have the best reason to know that in the Battle of the Atlantic *Ultra*, in conjunction with HF/DF,

was a real war-winner. As Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command in 1943 I made a habit, at specially critical times, of attending the regular morning conference over the scrambler telephones, referred to in this book, between Roger Wynn at the Admiralty, Max Horton's Headquarters in Liverpool and my own at Northwood — by the end of which there was little or nothing we did not know about what the U-boats were up to in the Atlantic at the time.

To me an interesting feature of this book is the light it throws on the character and methods of some great leaders — Churchill, Montgomery, George Patton and 'Stuffy' Dowding, for instance. It may detract a bit from the glamour surrounding some of them to know that they might not have done quite so well, had they not so often held in their hands pretty full details of the enemy's strength and dispositions, logistic situation and operational plans, before and throughout their battles. I am glad the author gives Dowding the credit that is his due for never letting on, in the course of that unhappy (and wholly unnecessary) Air Staff conference in October 1940, that he had known so much from *Ultra* of the Luftwaffe's plans throughout the Battle of Britain. I was present on that occasion, and was not aware — though I ought to have taken it for granted — that Dowding was 'in on' *Ultra*: but I know that in his place I should have been sorely tempted to

use my knowledge of it to confute his more junior critics who, unfortunately but quite rightly had, for security reasons, not been admitted to this priceless secret.

The word 'fascinating' tends to be overdone in forewords and reviews of books; but I feel sure that readers of this book will agree that it amply merits that description.

J. C. SLESSOR

9 April 1974

MRAF

# I

## Introduction

On 25 May 1945, at the request of the Prime Minister.<sup>1</sup> I sent a signal message<sup>2</sup> to all the Allied Commanders<sup>3</sup> and their staffs in the European theatre of war<sup>4</sup> who had been in receipt of Intelligence from what Winston Churchill called 'my most secret source'.

It asked them not to divulge the nature of the source or the information they had received from it, in order that there might be neither damage to the future operations of the Secret Service<sup>5</sup> nor any cause for our enemies to blame it for their defeat. After thirty years, time has changed both these conditions of secrecy. The techniques employed by the Secret Service and the code breakers<sup>6</sup> have been widely published and, indeed, have long been known to governments and Intelligence ser-

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1. the Prime Minister — 指当时英国首相邱吉尔。 2. signal message — 电报。 3. the Allied Commanders — 盟军司令官们。 4. the European theatre of war — 欧洲战区。 5. the Secret Service — (英国)秘密情报局。 6. Code breaker — 密码破译者。

vices around the world, whilst our war-time enemies are now our allies.

It is, however, the privilege of the victor in war not to disclose just how or how often he broke his enemy's cyphers, and in this book the privilege will be maintained. At the height of hostilities<sup>1</sup> the German war machine was sending well over two thousand signals a day on the air. It can be recognized therefore, that when, from time to time, we were able to intercept a number of signals and break the cypher, their contents covered a very wide field.

The enemy signals referred to in this book are those which in my view played a decisive part in our conduct of World War II. They are only a part of those which passed through my hands and bear little relation either to the number which were broken or to those periods during which we were able to break them.

Nevertheless, I would go so far as to<sup>2</sup> say that no history of World War II is complete which does not take into account<sup>3</sup> our knowledge of our enemy's intentions, disclosed by our 'most secret source'.

Winston Churchill's appreciation of this Intelligence is not available for publication, but that of General

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1. at the height of hostilities — 在战事最激烈时。 2. go so far as to — 竟到……的地步。 3. take into account — 考虑。

Dwight D. Eisenhower,<sup>1</sup> sent to the Chief of the British Secret Service, is amongst his papers in his Presidential Library at Abilene, Kansas, for all the world to see:<sup>2</sup>

July 1945

Dear General Menzies,

I had hoped to be able to pay a visit to Bletchley Park<sup>3</sup> in order to thank you, Sir Edward Travis,\* and the members of the staff personally for the magnificent services which have been rendered to the Allied cause.

I am very well aware of the immense amount of work and effort which has been involved in the production of the material with which you have supplied us. I fully realize also the numerous setbacks and difficulties with which you have had to contend and how you have always, by your supreme efforts, overcome them.

The intelligence which has emanated from you before and during this campaign has been of price-

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\* Commander Edward Travis, knighted in 1942, was, during the 1930's, head of the Naval Section of the Government Code and Cypher School and also No. 2 to its Chief, Commander Alastair Denniston.

1. Eisenhower — 艾森豪威尔, 第二次大战期间曾任盟军在北非和欧洲的最高司令。 2. for all the world to see — 世人都能看见。 3. Bletchley Park — 布雷契莱庄园。

less value to me. It has simplified my task as a commander enormously. It has saved thousands of British and American lives and, in no small way, contributed to the speed with which the enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender.

I should be very grateful, therefore, if you would express to each and every one<sup>1</sup> of those engaged in this work from me personally my heartfelt admiration and sincere thanks for their very decisive contribution to the Allied war effort.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) Dwight D. Eisenhower

The dramatic part that this special Intelligence played in the war created for me, and those top Allied commanders who received it, the unique experience of knowing not only the precise composition, strength and location of the enemy's forces, but also, with few exceptions, of knowing beforehand exactly what he intended to do in the many operations and battles of World War II.

No doubt future historians will continue to argue the pros and cons<sup>2</sup> of the value of secret information. I am only concerned here in telling the story of how this topmost secret Intelligence was received and pro-

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1. each and every one — 每一个人。      2. pros and cons  
— 正面和反面的理由。

cessed<sup>1</sup> by a brilliant team of men and women, of how it was safely distributed to commanders in the field<sup>2</sup> and how, in my first-hand and personal opinion, it played a vital part in our survival in 1940 and 1941, and in our later victories. Our ability to read, at most of the important periods of the war, secret signals between the topmost enemy commands including Hitler himself, was obviously not only of unparalleled positive strategic value, but it also had a valuable negative use in telling us what the enemy did not know about our own operations.

As I was lucky enough to get to know most of the top Allied commanders personally, it was interesting and sometimes frustrating to find the different attitudes the varying personalities adopted towards the information — those with rigid ideas on orthodox methods<sup>3</sup> of fighting an enemy seemed to think it was not quite right to know what he was going to do; those, on the other hand, with more flexible minds were ready to take every advantage the information offered them.

In due course,<sup>4</sup> if the full British secret documents are made available for comment, history may change its assessment of some of the generals and personalities

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1. process — 处理, 分理。      2. commanders in the field — 战地司令官。  
3. orthodox method — 正统保守的方式。  
4. in due course — 在适当的时候。



of World War II, but the fact that the commander in the field knew that all the information he received was also received by the chiefs of staff and principal political ministers at home must be taken into consideration, for it was this fact which might well have accounted for undue caution by some, while others would 'have a go',<sup>1</sup> and usually succeed.

As many of the situations are sufficiently bizarre<sup>2</sup> to raise doubts in some minds as to their authenticity, before proceeding with this book I have thought it advisable to give my own credentials and explain how I came to be responsible for much of the organization which handled this 'sensitive' subject.

I started World War I as a seventeen-year-old subaltern<sup>3</sup> in the Royal Gloucester Hussars Yeomanry,<sup>4</sup> but in 1916 our beloved horses were taken from us and we were supplied with bicycles or finally drafted to the infantry. Flying was to me the obvious alternative, so I became a fighter or 'scout' pilot in the RFC<sup>5</sup> and finally got to France to join No. 29 Squadron early in April 1917. Alas, I was shot down in a 'dog fight'<sup>6</sup>

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1. have a go — 干一下。 2. bizarre [bi'zɑ:] — 稀奇古怪的。  
3. subaltern — 英国陆军中尉或少尉。 4. Royal Gloucester Hussars Yeomanry — 皇家格洛谢斯特轻骑兵团。 5. RFC — Royal Flying Corps 的缩写, 皇家飞行队。 6. dog fight — 飞机混战。