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
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Edited by

George Ritzer

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Developmental idealism

ARLAND THORNTON

For centuries, the related systems of modernization theory and developmentalism have dominated scholarship by giving scholars models for understanding social change. This model has specified the elements considered to be modern and has indicated that high levels of development and the good life were located in Northwest Europe and its diasporas. With its causal theories, the model specified both the factors that produced development and the consequences of development for various aspects of life.

The starting point is the recognition that modernization theory and developmentalism have been globalized so that they affect not only scholars but other elites and ordinary people throughout the world (Thornton 2001, 2005). Developmental idealism is a set of beliefs and values that has emerged from modernization theory and developmentalism and that provides models or schema for people living in and dealing with the world. This ideational framework has been disseminated widely around the world with the potential to have many effects at both individual and societal levels.

The concept of developmental idealism was originally formulated to focus on family matters, although it was understood to be applicable to "almost every dimension of life, including the political, psychological, economic, familial, cultural, and social" (Thornton 2005, 134). The basic idea was that the globalization of modernization theory provided individuals throughout the world with ideas specifying new goals to be achieved, new methods for achieving goals, and statements about fundamental human rights. More specifically, developmental idealism, as it relates to families, suggests that modern families – including the attributes of individualism, intergenerational independence, marriages at mature ages, courtship as part of the process leading to marriage, gender equality, and planned and low fertility – are good and

attainable. Developmental idealism also states that modern society – including the attributes of being urbanized, industrialized, highly educated, and wealthy – is good and attainable. It also indicates a reciprocal cause and effect relationship between modern society and modern families, giving individuals and communities guidance about means to achieve developmental goals and about expected consequences of development. Developmental idealism also specifies that freedom, equality, and consent are basic rights. Also, by locating development and the good life in Northwestern Europe, developmental idealism suggests that life there could serve as a useful model for the less advanced.

Modernization theory also specifies free markets, democracy, pluralism, secularism, science, and the separation of church and state as elements of modernity that are good and should be attained. Modernization theory also specifies that these elements of life are interconnected in cause and effect relationships with various other aspects of society and family defined as modern. Consequently, a broad definition of developmental idealism includes each of these dimensions of life, and the ways in which they influence and are influenced by other factors.

The developmental idealism framework recognizes that modernization theory has received numerous critiques and has fallen out of favor in many sectors of the academic community. However, the diminished enthusiasm for modernization theory in academia does *not* mean that modernization theory and developmental idealism have no relevance among policy makers and ordinary citizens around the world. Furthermore, the issue is not whether the ideas and values of developmental idealism are true or false, or good or bad. Instead, the issue is whether or not the beliefs and values of developmental idealism are endorsed, modified, or rejected by people and how this influences decision-making and behavior.

As numerous scholars have observed, globalization has disseminated the ideas of modernization and development widely around the

world where they are powerful forces affecting the lives of scholars, policy makers, and ordinary people (Pigg 1992, 1996; Abu-Lughod 1998; Ferguson 1999; Ahearn 2001; Thornton 2005; Osella & Osella 2006). There have been many mechanisms globalizing developmental idealism. Among these are the distribution of modernization literature, colonialism, mass media, mass education, and industrialization and urbanization. Other dissemination mechanisms include social movements for political democracy, Marxism, civil rights, women's equality, and controlled and low fertility. Elements of developmental idealism have also been embedded in governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the United Nations, and are encouraged through various foreign aid programs.

Of course, the people of the world have had their own long-standing belief and value systems, and developmental idealism has been in conflict with these indigenous ideational frameworks in many ways. Consequently, the ideas and values of developmental idealism frequently generated tension, opposition, and conflict when they came into contact with indigenous belief and value systems. In fact, the tension between developmental idealism and indigenous worldviews and value systems is an important source of conflict in many places. Consequently, contact with developmental idealism is infrequently followed by simple adoption, but is more frequently resisted and modified. The result is different or alternative versions of modernity in different locales. Nevertheless, the extent to which developmental idealism has been accepted or rejected in various countries has influenced health practices and outcomes, educational decisions, democracy, human rights, migration, elder care, women's status, and marriage and childbearing.

SEE ALSO: Cultural globalization; Developed and less developed societies; Europeanization; Hybridity; Modernity; Westernization.

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Diaspora

ELENA FIDDIAN-QASMIYEH

The term "diaspora" derives from the classical Greek word διασπορά, which literally means "scattering" or "dispersion." While the classical Greek term reflected the positive and widespread scattering of seeds, in addition to the dispersion of people, today "diaspora" is used in academic and popular discourses primarily with reference to peoples who have been involuntarily displaced. The usage of the term diaspora in the Greek translation of the Bible to refer to the expulsion of the Jews (Deut. 28:25), led both to the Jewish diaspora being considered to be the archetypal diaspora, and to the equation of diasporas with forced displacement. Other prototypical diasporas have included the Greek and Armenian diasporas.

In the late twentieth century, and since the 1980s in particular, there has been a renewed interest in studying the formation, reproduction, and actions of diasporas across different historical periods and diverse geographical locations. In 1991, the multidisciplinary journal *Diaspora* was founded by Khachig Tölölyan to study both the "classical diasporas" and those groups which have been identified by others or by themselves as "new diasporas." It has been claimed by some that the explanatory power of the concept "diaspora" risks being diluted since it is increasingly being invoked to refer to all migrant populations. A range of typologies have therefore been suggested by theorists such as Safran (1991) and Cohen (1997) to facilitate the identification of diasporic characteristics and groups, and, therefore, their differentiation from non-diasporic migrant populations.

Cohen (1997), for instance, identifies a range of "common features" which are typically held by diasporas in the contemporary world. Key among these are the following. First, members of a diaspora (and/or their ancestors) have been dispersed from their original homeland. This dispersion was either involuntary (resulting from forced displacement) or voluntary (arising from a search for employment, attempts to maximize trade, or the aim to colonize other lands and peoples). Within the context of this first point, Cohen in turn identifies five key diasporic "ideal types": *victim diasporas* (the prototypical groups referred to above, in addition to groups such as the Palestinians); *labor diasporas* (such as Indian indentured laborers); *trade diasporas* (including Lebanese and Chinese diasporas); *imperial diasporas* (for example, the British); and *deterritorialized or cultural diasporas* (Caribbean peoples and Roma are identified). Second, the members of diasporas maintain a common and collective memory about the homeland; crucially, this memory is transmitted to their descendants over time, and also to other members of the diaspora located in other hosting contexts. Perhaps reflecting, or laying the foundations for the maintenance of, a close connection to the idealized homeland, the third common feature consists of diasporas' claims to be alienated from the majority population resident in their host context. As a result, they idealize their ancestral homeland and, finally, they strongly relate to, and may develop a political project to return to, this original homeland.

Cohen's typology builds upon Safran's earlier criteria (1991) which primarily revolve around two cores: first, the diaspora's focus on nurturing and reproducing a collective memory or myth of the original homeland, and second, the extent to which diasporas idealize, relate to, and aim to restore this ancestral homeland. Brubaker (2005) similarly stresses the primacy of dispersion and homeland orientation, but also highlights the significance of maintaining a clear and distinctive boundary between the diaspora and the respective host society/societies (a process which he denominates "boundary maintenance").

While such typologies may be helpful in developing a comparative framework through which to identify and study diverse diasporic groups, these and other authors recognize that typologies are limited in many respects. For instance, typologies are typically normative in nature insofar as they require that migrant communities comply with most, if not all, of the categories and characteristics delineated in the framework proposed. This, in turn, therefore lays the foundation for explicit or implicit hierarchies of "true" versus "lesser" diasporas, and the solidification of the dichotomy between diasporic and non-diasporic groups. Although this separation may have analytical advantages, it nonetheless raises the key question: who has (and, indeed, who should have), the authority to claim that a community is or is not a diaspora?

The power of the label "diaspora" is increasingly being recognized, with research focusing on when and why a group may call itself, or be labeled by others a diaspora, despite not necessarily fitting into definitions proposed by academics. Certain migrant groups may themselves claim to be a diaspora in order to gain access to material and political resources in their hosting country or their state of origin. Indeed, many hosting and sending states, and

international organizations such as the International Organization of Migration have created social, political, and economic initiatives to capture the developmental potential of groups which they refer to as diasporas. The European Union (EU), for instance, encourages diasporic organizations to become partners in targeted co-development programs, recognizing that migrants send substantial amounts in remittances to their countries of origin and may have the potential to invest in businesses and infrastructure there. These diaspora organizations in turn receive grants from the EU, and accrue social and political recognition in the EU and in their contexts of origin. The African Union (AU) equally aims to capture the resources of the African Diaspora (the term is always capitalized by the AU) composed of all individuals with African heritage living outside of the continent. The AU has developed a broad definition which encourages individuals of African descent to develop a pan-African commitment and investment strategy, rather than a strong nationalist or ethnic stance (see Weinar 2010).

International actors are therefore increasingly attempting to mobilize dispersed migrant communities and their descendants (which these states and organizations refer to as diasporas) to implement socioeconomic development policies around the world. Many states are also implementing extra-territorial voting systems to enable "their" diasporas to participate in elections and thereby strengthen their sense of connection and responsibility for events transpiring in the homeland. However, diasporas are also often categorized as potential threats to stability and peace. Since the early 2000s in particular, political scientists and international relations scholars have conducted research not only into how a diaspora's connection to the homeland is created and reproduced across time and space, but also under which conditions political elites mobilize diasporas to be either "peace-makers or peace-wreckers" (see Smith & Stares 2007). While the archetypal "ideal" diasporas are denominated legitimate "victim diasporas," many academics and policy makers equate specific "new diasporas" with illegitimate, violent attempts to regain control over their ancestral homelands. Approaches which characterize an entire migrant or diasporic community as "ideal" or "dangerous" take "the community" to be a unified and internally homogeneous unit of analysis. Alternative research strategies examine the heterogeneity within diasporic communities, exploring the ways in which factors such as age, gender, class, generation, and sociopolitical status influence interactions within and between groups, and the ways in which different proposals are negotiated, implemented or contested.

Research which focuses on the creation and reproduction of diasporas' collective memories and their homeland orientation is also paralleled, and at times challenged, by multidisciplinary examinations of the cultural and linguistic hybridization (or creolization, Cohen 2008) which results from diasporic encounters around the world. Rather than focusing on boundary maintenance between diasporas and their host environments, such lines of enquiry explore the multidirectional exchanges which influence different members of diasporic, host and home communities alike. Academics within the fields of anthropology, critical theory studies, and geography, for instance, have examined contemporary cultural and identity politics, multiculturalism, difference, and race through the interconnected lenses of diaspora and hybridity. In addition to innovations in the application of the well-established concept of diaspora, in the early 1990s the notion of transnationalism emerged as an alternative analytical lens to understand and respond to cross-border migration and its multifaceted impacts over time and space.

SEE ALSO: Collective memory; Creolization; Development; Hybridity; Imagined communities; Transnationalism.

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Diffusion, cultural

ALAN TOMLINSON

Diffusion, a term with powerful connotations whether as noun, verb, or adjective, has usually been used to refer to the transmission or transfer of social practices and cultural values between societies. Its strength is its broad applicability to almost unlimited historical and societal contexts; its weakness is the pseudo-neutrality that is widely assumed in the usages in which an apparently descriptive category in fact veils a theory and/or an interpretation.

The concept of cultural diffusion has a long-established pedigree in cultural history and sociology. Ferdinand Braudel, in his magisterial history of the Mediterranean region in the sixteenth century, wrote of the "rich consequences" of "the extent and immensity of the intermingling of Mediterranean cultures" within what he called a "zone of exchanges" populated by numerous cultural groups (1973: 763). There was no law of cultural development in this process: one group might retain its regional distinctiveness while "exchanging and borrowing from other groups from time to time"; other groups might merge their cultures producing carnivalesque spectacles and "the extraordinary charivari suggestive of eastern ports as described by romantic poets," embracing "hairstyles, fashions, foods and manners." But Braudel noted too that in seeking to "unsnare the tangled threads" of diffusion the historian could "easily go astray"; the saraband, a dance conceived in novelist Cervantes's time (1547–1616), might be mistaken for an ancient Spanish tradition. Here we need the cautions of Max Weber's interpretive sociology, a focus upon cultural meanings and specificity rather than an addictive hunt for cultural precedent. Braudel's notion of cultural diffusion is rooted in the capacity of a "living civilization" to export itself, "spreading its culture to distant places" (p. 763). But it is never a smooth and predictable process, and Braudel recognized the key countercurrent of resistance, or "refusals to borrow" (p. 764), particularly by relatively strong societies or in his own terminology "great civilizations", and in his own example, the case of religion.

These conceptual debates apply equally to how different forms of diffusion – of work practices, popular music, and sport – have been related to the wider globalizing process. Sociologists of work and industry have long been interested in the question of cultural diffusion, particularly in relation to the introduction of work and labor practices in capitalist economies and phases of the industrializing

process. In the second half of the twentieth century the Japanese economic miracle was discussed in these terms. How could a society of a particular traditional kind adapt to the globalizing forces of an international economy? Many sociologists of work and economic development were intrigued by the diffusion of industrial principles to the Japanese context, combined with culturally specific modes of adaptation of those principles in the institutional and labor practices of the country. In the popular cultural sphere, despite commonalities of cultural flow and adoption, equally complex dynamics characterize the diffusion process.

Rock 'n' roll's history is a story of cultural diffusion within a society and then across societies, but not of any pure or unadulterated cultural form. Its very naming, after the black slang for sexual intercourse, is testimony to adaptation and reinterpretation. Sam Phillips of Sun Records had been searching for a white singer who sounded black; for "a white man who can sing like a Negro." The personification of the new music was his discovery Elvis Presley, born in Tupelo, Mississippi and raised in the hinterlands of rural and urban United States. His influences included gospel, country, and blues and his rockabilly style was a combination of elements of all of these musical types into the new hybrid form. His "achievement and his originality" were not based in any "cultural theft" of others' musical styles, but in Presley's capacity to absorb "their music into his own … [Presley's] ambition … was to encompass every strand of the American musical tradition" (Guralnick 1999: xv, xiii). In June 1954, delivering his unique version of Arthur Big Boy Crudup's classic *That's All Right,* "Elvis's voice was mesmerizing, a mix of gospel, the low, gravelly sounds of country, and a startling 'black' sound … an odd synthesis of blues and country" (Brown & Broeske 1997: 35).

In turn, Presley influenced the young John Lennon and Paul McCartney, whose early albums featured versions of Chuck Berry and Tamla Motown classics. In his Aunt Mimi's home in Liverpool, the young John Lennon (and Paul McCartney) would use the front porch of the house as an echo chamber to replicate the reverberating sound of classic rock. As their own creativity came to the fore, and later blended with forms of musical culture from the East, the Beatles then stimulated new generations of musicians across the world. This is how cultures travel; not in any smooth and predictable process of transplantation, but in newly formed cultural formations, adapted for and by recipients who attribute their own meanings to the formation, and also, in a globalized era, do so in unprecedentedly fast ways due to increasingly sophisticated forms of mass communication and technological reproduction.

The history of sport has been told as a narrative of diffusion. Football (soccer) was played in England's public schools, codified in that country's ancient universities and then diffused to the working classes of Britain, and to colonies throughout the formal and informal British Empire. Major histories of sport's international growth and development have given primary place to the concept. These include J.A. Mangan and Allen Guttmann, the first in relation to the spread of British sports across its Empire (1986), the second in relation to the international spread of sports in imperialism (1994), though Guttmann explicitly acknowledged instances of resistance in the examples of the Turnen gymnastics movement, and traditional sports. The narrative is a fairly convincing one, though too often premised on a relatively unproblematic sense of smooth-flowing cultural transmission. But cultures are not boxed imports, aspects of a globalization process immune to change, and replicable in any part of the world. Lifestyle sports resonant of Bourdieu's (1986) *les sports californiens* spread on the basis of privilege as much as opportunity. Diffusion is rooted in relations of status and power, and the influence of elites and change-agents.

Jason Kaufman and Orlando Patterson (2005) have shown how cricket's diffusion across parts of the British Empire, and its low profile in post-Civil War United States and

Canada, highlight the influences that make or break a cultural formation. Cricket in the United States was, as one might put it, unmade by the specific actions of sociocultural agents such as baseball player/entrepreneur Albert Spalding, and his reading of the cultural tastes and leisure needs of an expanding population in a new and dynamic society. Successful top-down, or heterophilous, diffusion occurs when change-agents have authority and high social status; are willing to not merely transmit but to also participate in promoting the innovation or diffused practice; and when change-agents have the desire to continue their own engagement in the practice, after it has spread down and across social hierarchies.

Recognition of the ideological currents underlying cultural diffusion processes does not equate to wholesale abandonment of the concept. On the contrary, acknowledging broad commonalities of process that nevertheless exhibit specific nuances of power and status relations in different societies and at different historical conjunctures is the promise of comparative sociocultural analysis; and provides a warning against any reading of globalization as the production of cultural homogeneity.

SEE ALSO: Cultural globalization; Flows; Popular music; Resistance to globalization; Sport.

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Digital divide

GILI S. DRORI

The phenomenal global diffusion of digital technology, whose rate surpassed the spread of any other technology in human history, has resulted in staggering global gaps in access to, and use of, this newest of social resources. These gaps, which mark the uneven distribution of information and communication technology (ICT) both internationally and intranationally worldwide, came to be known as the "global digital divide." Internationally, digital divides differentiated between developed and developing nations, setting them on diverging trajectories of social development and global integration. In addition, digital divides differentiated among groups within countries, setting further apart rich from poor, educated from illiterate, and residents of urban areas from rural residents. The confluence of such international and intranational digital divides exacerbates social inequalities and thus has done little to offset the great advances in economic prosperity and integration and the great spread of information that ICT enable. With that, the global digital divide is widening over time, dampening hopes that ICT will serve as a liberation technology to advance democracy and as a leapfrogging technology to advance social development.

Digital inequality or division, defined as both first order inequality of access to digital media and second order inequality of use of such digital media, reveals global proportions, which are not diminished by the phenomenal diffusion of digital technology worldwide. Therefore, in parallel to the expanding distribution of new technological means in different countries, in different world regions, and to new populations, access to and use of digital technology are still unevenly distributed. High

rates of access and use are concentrated in developed countries, whereas developing countries, troubled by poverty, illiteracy, illness, and social strife, are trailing in access to and use of new digital technologies. These varying rates of access to and use of digital technology come to distinguish between "digerati" and the digital have-nots, thus defining global "cyber-classes." This digital divide is widely docu-mented, with analyses of various indicators of digital technology and various categories of global divides.

Furthermore, there is now an abundance of evidence to suggest that the global digital divide is expanding: countries or world regions that have wide access to and wide use of digital technologies build on such capacity to further expand both access and use of such technolo-gies, whereas laggard countries fall further behind. This trajectory of the global digital divide, documenting a trend of growing ine-quality among countries and among world regions on several ICTs, is evidence of a "Matthew effect" in regards to digital technol-ogy (Drori 2005: 144; Guillén & Suárez 2005: 697; Zillien & Hargittai 2009: 288).

In spite of the short history of ICT, traced only some six decades back, the issue of global digital divide has rapidly been defined as a global social problem. The rapid ascent of this issue to be defined as a critical dimension of global inequality owes much to the great prom-ise pinned on digital technology (Drori 2004). Propelled by the digital revolution and related visions of a global knowledge economy, digital technology was quickly defined as the platform for a globally integrated economy, as a super-highway for delivering information and knowl-edge, and as liberation technology for enabling political agency and government accountabil-ity. With that, concerns with global inequality in access to and use of digital technology were not focused on the technical means or skills *per se*, but rather these concerns were raised because of the impact that the lack of such skills and means have on health, work, political inclusions, gender parity, and overall well-being. In this way, any barrier to digital access

was declared an offense to a universal right and digital divides were redefined as digital ine-quality (Hargittai 2003), where digital technol-ogy is the basis for reproduction of social inequality (Hargittai 2008). Jeffrey Sachs's (2000) proclamation, that "today's world is divided not by ideology but by technology," reflects the spirit of the era in which the global digital divide was defined as a global social problem and in which global policy initiatives came forth to alleviate this problem.

While the digital divide pertains specifically to digital technologies, it traces a wide spec-trum of social inequalities and, with that, global inequalities. The causes of the global digital divide all pertain to differences in social power and capacity. Specifically, cross-national studies of the causes of the global digital divide reveal its roots to be cross-national differences in income or wealth (Guillén & Suárez 2005; Chinn & Fairlie 2007; Kim 2007), embedded-ness in world society activity or world status (Drori & Jang 2003; Guillén & Suárez 2005), regulatory environment pertaining to privati-zation and IT competition, and democracy (Guillén & Suárez 2005); proficiency in the English language, however, is not necessarily a contributing factor (Hargittai 1999). And, codiffusion patterns between ICTs are most important for closing or widening of the digital divide: the globalization of PCs strongly affects the global diffusion of Internet access, espe-cially in developing countries (Dewan et al. 2005). In summary, cultural, regulatory, and political conditions, as well as world systemic standing, are significant precursors to digital penetration and which demarcate digital lead-ers and from digital laggards.

Once conceived as a dimension of a global social problem (Drori 2004), the global digital divide quickly became a rallying call for agen-cies whose mission is and has been to alleviate global problems. The most prominent interna-tional policy initiatives to alleviate the problem of the global digital divide are the United Nations' Information Society initiatives. The pinnacle of such global policy initiatives has been the two World Summits on Information

Society (WSIS). Organized by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Summits (2003 in Geneva and 2005 in Tunisia) formed a collaborative platform for policy and a mechanism for collaborative action on the emerging social problem of the global digital gap. These Information Society initiatives imprinted other international policy initiatives, most directly in regards to development. For example, Target 18 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) specifies the goal of establishing a global private-public partnership on the development agenda (Goal 8) by calling for "[making] available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications."

While current global policy to alleviate the global digital divide is still coordinated by the ITU, it is challenged by the overlapping jurisdictions of UN agencies and the multiplicity and heterogeneity of partnering organizations. UN agencies with issues pertaining to the digital divide include the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO; in, for example, championing digital literacy and digital school initiatives), WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization; in, for example, sponsoring open source initiatives), and International Telecommunication Union (ITU; in, for example, harmonizing digital standards). Partnering with these UN agencies are also other categories of organizations: (a) international governmental organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, which administers the TRIPS agreement (formally, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and governs the dimensions of global trade in digital technology), (b) international nongovernmental organizations, such as Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which administers some of the World Wide Web's operations, (c) multinational IT firms, and (d) many civil society associations whose missions pertain to social inequality and delivery of digital means to close social gaps. WSIS forums brought all these diverse constituencies into a dialogue under the banner of the euphemistic title of "information

society," but regrettably attention has since been drifting towards the race to innovate and the worries about the "global innovation divide" (Drori 2010).

SEE ALSO: Information and communication technologies; International Telecommunications Union.

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Digitality and socio-political networks

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Globalization entails growing interconnectedness across time and space due to the greater ease of international travel and enhanced information and communication technologies. Digitality, or the way social, cultural, and political life is increasingly organized through digital networks, is a critical feature of contemporary globalization. New digital technologies, including the Internet, cell phones, and social networking sites, have radically altered the way we communicate, and by extension how we socialize, build communities, and engage in politics. Despite early fears that digital technologies would exacerbate alienation and erode social ties or, alternatively, the hyped claims that they would completely alter our social and political worlds beyond recognition, it is now clear that new digital technologies are being incorporated into daily social and political life, enhancing and transforming our everyday forms of social and political engagement at local, regional, and global scales. Contemporary globalization is thus facilitated by and constitutive of a widespread expansion of digitally powered socio-political networks.

DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, NETWORKS, AND GLOBALIZATION

Manuel Castells is perhaps the preeminent theorist of the relation between new digital technologies, networks, and globalization. In his study of the "Information Age," Castells (2000/1996) identifies a new technological paradigm involving electronics-based information and communication technologies that has given rise to a new economy that is informational, global, and networked. Informational suggests that knowledge generation and information processing increasingly shape economic production and distribution; global means core economic activities have the capacity to function on a planetary scale in real time, while networked refers to new forms of economic organization based on inter-firm networking and strategic alliances. At the same time, networking forms and logics have diffused beyond the economic realm, transforming social organization, global governance, and even social movements. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001) have argued that a new form of globally networked sovereignty has arisen based on national and supranational institutions such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. For Hardt and Negri, "Empire" is not rooted in physical territory, but is rather a deterritorialized, networked mode of rule, against which they posit the rise of an alternative networked counter-power, or "multitude." Digital networks are thus transforming the nature of domination and resistance in the global era.

DIGITALLY POWERED SOCIAL NETWORKS

At the most basic level, new digital technologies are changing the way we relate to one another on local, regional, and global scales. Although new technologies such as cell phones or the Internet decrease the need for face-to-face contact, communities are not being undermined so much as changing in form. Bounded, locally rooted physical communities are giving way to extended, diffuse, and virtual communities. As Barry Wellman (2001) has argued "computer-supported social networks" are changing the nature of community, sociality, and interpersonal relations. The proliferation of individualized, loosely bounded, and fragmentary social networks predates the Internet, but digital

communication enhances these trends, allowing communities to communicate and interact at a distance. New technologies are also being incorporated into more routine aspects of daily social life, as virtual and physical activities are increasingly integrated. In this sense, digital networks facilitate global connectedness, even as they strengthen local ties.

Whereas much of the early literature in this field focused on Internet email and listserves, more recent research has examined the impact of cell phones and online social networking sites. Significantly, cell phones have had a much more profound impact among low-income people in developing countries. Once again, digital technologies are seen to be incorporated into existing patterns of sociality. As Horst and Miller (2006) suggest in their study of cell phone use among poor communities in Jamaica, the cell phone does not so much generate entirely new practices as expand upon already existing modes of communication. At the same time, similar to other new digital technologies, cell phones expand and reinforce the speed and scale of social interaction, providing enhanced capabilities for communication and interaction across space. The research on social networking sites such as Facebook or MySpace is still in its infancy, but emerging trends suggest a similar pattern of enhanced speed, density, and scale of interaction combined with the support of existing social relations (Boyd & Ellison 2007). In sum, digitally powered social networks are a constitutive feature of contemporary globalization, allowing communities to communicate at-a-distance, but at the same time, they tend to be incorporated into prevailing patterns of social interaction.

DIGITALLY POWERED POLITICAL NETWORKS

Digital technologies have also facilitated innovative modes of political engagement. The Internet and related computer technologies have greatly expanded the scope, scale, and capacity of transnational activist networks and social movements around issues such as human rights, the environment, and global justice. Anti-corporate globalization movements have made particularly effective use of new digital technologies, operating at multiple geographic scales and integrating online and off-line political activity (Juris 2008). Transnational activists have thus built on the early use of the Internet by the Zapatistas and anti-free trade campaigns to organize global actions and mobilizations, share information and resources, and coordinate at-a-distance.

Beyond electronic listserves, activists have also used interactive web pages to facilitate transnational planning and coordination. Particular activist networks have their own home pages, while temporary websites are created during mobilizations to provide information, resources, and contact lists; post documents and calls to action; and house real-time discussion forums and chat rooms. Activists have also begun to collectively produce and edit documents across space using online "wiki" open editing technology, reflecting a growth in digitally powered, transnationally networked collaboration. Similarly, grassroots media activists have founded Independent Media Centers in hundreds of cities around the world, providing online forums that allow activists to post their own news stories, bypassing the corporate media. Cell phones and social networking sites represent the latest frontiers of transnational activism. On the one hand, activists have used cell phones to convene flash mobs, coordinate protests, and spread the word about mobilizations, altering political landscapes in countries as diverse as Iran, the Philippines, and Spain (Castells et al. 2007). On the other hand, as we have recently seen in the pro-democracy protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries in the Middle East during the so-called "Arab Spring," activists increasingly use online social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter to publicize local, regional, and global actions and campaigns.

NETWORKED ORGANIZATION

Facilitated by the speed, adaptability, and flexibility afforded by new digital technologies,