



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

20

國家圖書館出版社

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COPY NO. 81

RE : HONJO, SHIGERU, Baron, Gen.
STATUS : ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Closed


AGE : 69 Years

ADDRESS : 8 Venohara Nakano-Ku, Tokyo

GOVT POSTS : 1931-35 Commander Kwantung Army
1935 - Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor
1935 - Member Supreme War Council
1936 - Retired from active service
1938 - President Soldiers Protection Board
1943 - Director Military Health Bureau, Welfare Ministry
1944 - Advisor to New Asia Movement of IRAA
1945 (May) - Member of Privy Council
1945 (30 June) - Named one of leaders of Home Defense League

FAMILY : Wife, Mume, sister of H. Kashimo

INCIDENTAL : As Commander of Kwantung Army, took prominent part in occupation of Manchuria in 1931. Late Count Uchida, at that time president of South Manchuria Railway, and Honjo were lifelong friends, and many well-informed Japanese believed that the two conceived, planned and executed the Mukden incident 18 Sept. 1931 without reference to Tokyo. Was retired because of technical implication in Tokyo Army Revolt of 26 Feb. 1936. His son-in-law, Capt. Ichitaro Yamaguchi, was sentenced to life imprisonment for assisting the insurgents.
A Japanese source characterizes Honjo as a stern and resolute military man, but friendly and gentle as an individual, neither drinks nor smokes.
(Foregoing from Japanese Govt. Officials, 1937-45 - MID)
Among those to be present at a dinner to be given by the Black Dragon Society Oct. 29th; Mitsuru Toyama is chief of this Society. (From Tokyo Radio, FCC Daily Report 23 Oct 43)
Was present at a dinner given by Joseph Lany Spann, Head of the Nazi Party in Tokyo (From Domei, 4 Feb. 44).
Attended the annual meeting of the Japanese, Germany, Italy Friendship Society in Tokyo, 23 Jan 45 (From Domei, 24 Jan. 45).
Shigeru Honjo is a member of the Anti-Treaty faction. (From Toshiyo Hasegawa, P.O.W.; Fascism in the Jap Army and Navy, Vol. 2, MIS, 15 June 42).
Deemed a key Japanese War Criminal (United Nations War Crimes Commission, List #3, Sept. 45).
SOURCE : JIS File 40 Nov. 45


J. J. GAINES, JR.
Capt. Inf.

INCIDENTAL: Committed Hara-Kiri 20 Nov 45

COPIES : 3 File
1 Capt. Robinson

CASE NO. : 81

SERIAL : 1

8 December 1945

Case No. 81.


RE: Baron Gen. Shigeru HONJO.

STATUS: CLOSED.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

The Tokyo edition of the STARS AND STRIPES
stated that subject
of the issue of 21 November 1945[^] had committed hara-kiri after
ascertaining that he had been listed among those publicized in
the press as a war criminal and learning that his arrest had
been ordered.

In view of the demise of subject, no further investigation
is being conducted and the matter is considered closed.



LeRoy H. Barnard,
Major, Infantry.

.....
Copies:

3 File
1 Capt. Robinson
1 Col. Rudisill.

81-2

LHS/ja

12 Jan 1946

FILE NO.: 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Woodcock
Colonel Morrow
Mr. Sackett
Colonel Woolworth
Mr. Hammack

1. A review of File No. 81 reflects that it contains information which may be of interest to the members of Groups A, B, C, F and G.
2. This information is forwarded for such action as may be deemed appropriate.

LEROY H. BARNARD,
Major, Inf.,
Executive Officer,
Inv. Div., I.P.S.

COPIES:

- 1 General Woodcock
- 1 Colonel Morrow
- 1 Mr. Sackett
- 1 Colonel Woolworth
- 1 Mr. Hammack
- 1 File 81
- 1 File 249
- 1 File A
- 1 File B
- 1 File C
- 1 File F
- 1 File G

FILE:

REPORT BY: D. L. Waldorff

RE : HONJO, Shigeru, Baron and General
(Suicide)

STATUS: Pending

DATE: 19 January 1946

Commanding Officer, Kwantung Army 1931-35. believed to have conceived and executed Mukden Incident without reference to Tokyo. Privy Councillor. Adviser, New Asia Movement of Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 1944. Has been termed "ring-leader of the Japanese War Lords." Born 1876. Address: 8 Henchara, Nakano-ku, Tokyo.

On apprehension order of 17 November 1945.

PENDING

(Counter Intelligence Justification Files reflected the above indicated information concerning subject.)

COPIES: 3 File

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 613

DATE 13 Feb 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: War Ministry, Confidential Record of Manchurian Affairs. (3 July to 6 July 1934)

Date: 7 June 1932 Original ☒ Copy ☐ Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ☐ No ☒

Has it been photostated? Yes ☐ No ☒

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____:

Document Section.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry Records, by Document Acquisition Section.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HONJO, Shigeru and MIYAKE, Mitsuji

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Aggression in Manchukuo.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Item 2 is a communication from the Kwantung Army (HONJO, Shigeru, C in C and MIYAKE, Chief of Staff) to the Vice Minister of War dated 7 June 1932.

The document recommends seizure of custom-houses in Manchuria, to aid that country's finances. To do this, Chinese officials must be induced to side with Manchukuo and thus render the Nanking government helpless. Japan should do as much as it can to see that Manchukuo carries out this measure.

Manchukuo should take this step while the investigation committee of the League of Nations is in Manchukuo. This is a good opportunity to prove she is an independent state.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Wilds

Doc. No. 613

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 910

20 Mar 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Envelope, "Material Presented by Japanese Forces, Hqs., KWANTUNG ARMY, 1932" forwarded with Far Eastern Comm. of Inquiry material (Envelope A)

Date: 1932 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____;

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Classified Records Sec., W.D., Washington, D. C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Lt. KAWAMOTO; Col. HIRATA; Lt. Gen. HONJO; Lt. Gen. TAMON; Maj. Gen. HASEBE; Maj. KUROISHI; Lt. Col. OGAWARA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Included, (with a typed Summary of Contents):

1. A Review on Sino-Jap clashes in Manchuria;
2. On the Significance of the Chinchow Question;
3. Harbin Campaign;
4. Suppression of Bandits by Kwantung Army
5. Bandits Plan to Create Disturbances in Manchuria;
6. The Present State of Banditry in Manchuria;
7. A Report on the Communistic Movements in Manchuria;
8. The Strength of Police Force of Manchuria;
- 9-16. Maps covering Distribution of Forces
17. Explanations given to Comm. by Kwantung Army;
18. Announcements by Japanese War Ministry.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 910

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 911

20 March 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Copy #1, Far Eastern Comm. of Inquiry (Military), Annex A, "Records and Extracts of Interviews on Military and Related Subjects."

Date: 1932 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Classified Records Sec., W. D., Washington, D. C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: (see Summary)

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Incident

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Records of Interviews with:

1. Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA, (A-1);
2. Gen. ARAKI, (A-2), (A-29);
3. Mr. MATSUOKA, (A-6);
4. Gen. HONJO, (A-9), (A-23);
5. Gen. DOIHARA, (A-10);
6. Gen. HASHIMOTO, (A-11);
7. Gen. TAMON, (A-16);
8. Gen. HIROSE, (A-17);
9. Col. KOMATSUBARA, (A-18);
10. Gen. AMANO, (A-21);
11. Lt. KAWAMOTO, Col. SHIMAMOTO, (A-24);
12. Gen. NISHI, (A-25);
13. Count UCHIDA, (A-30);
14. Adm. OSUMI, (A-3); et al

Also, certificate and photostat of original letter of transmittal.

Analyst: Capt. Phelps

Doc. No. 911

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 904

Date: 19 March 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Handwritten records of Privy Council Meeting (including a report by Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA on the China Problem).

Date: 7 Oct 1931 Original ☒ Copy ☐ Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ☐ No ☒

Has it been photostated? Yes ☐ No ☒

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of _____:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Privy Council

PERSONS IMPLICATED: HONJO, Shigeru; MINAMI, Jiro.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Waging aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The first part concerns an Austrian-Japanese Trade Agreement.

The second part (pp 19) contains a report by Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA on the Manchurian Incident and on the Resolution of the League on September 30, 1931 in particular. (Analyst's Note: This resolution noted the Japanese intention to withdraw troops as rapidly as possible.)

Privy Councillor KANEKO made the following inquiry:

"1. Is it true that the delegate at Geneva, YOSHIKAWA, stated that the dispatching of Japanese troops into Manchuria did not stem from an intention of the Government, but was only a strong measure from the side of the Military?

"2. According to the 'Advertiser' the Foreign Minister objected to the statement by the Commander, HONJO. Is this true?

Doc. No. 904

Page 1

"3. If one looks at the development of the Manchurian problem, one is led to the consideration that the present incident is to be settled between Japan and China and is not such a problem as to be a concern of the League. However, it is said that our delegate, YOSHIZAWA, abandoned the right to vote in the Council of the League. Has the Foreign Minister agreed to this? "(pp 40 and 41)

SHIDEHARA answered the second inquiry with "No". He added: "As for the first point, it is not true that our delegate YOSHIZAWA said that the dispatch of troops into Manchuria was not known to the Japanese Government and was only a strong measure of the military." (p 42)

To the third point, he answered that the voting right was foregone by YOSHIZAWA only because he had not yet received his government's instructions regarding the action to be taken to the Council's resolution. (pp 43 and 44.)

Privy Councillor KANEKO criticizes SHIDEHARA for having fallen into the trap set by China, namely, to bring the matter before the League and avoid direct negotiations (pp 44-47). SHIDEHARA states that he had always wanted to settle the matter by direct negotiations and had no intention of settling the matter depending on the League. (pp 47 and 48)

An inquiry by Privy Councillor KURODA regarding the fact that many Chinese graduates of the Japanese Military Academy later became leaders of Anti-Japanese groups in China is answered by War Minister, MIYAMOTO. He states that the policy of the Military Academy in this respect will remain unchanged, since the problem of co-operation with China is more important than any restriction on the admission of Chinese students to the Academy. (pp 69-71)

Privy Councillor ISHII inquired as follows:

"Regarding the Manchurian Incident, I requested the other day an explanation concerning the fact that the Commander dispatched one unit of the Korean Army into Manchuria, carrying out an independent decision. The answer received from the War Minister was that he rather encouraged the execution of such an independent decision. Since this increased my doubts, I repeat my inquiry in this matter. As I stated before, I understand that the Commander of the Korean Army advanced troops as far as the frontier on the 19th,

following immediately the outbreak of the incident at midnight of the 18th, and that he farther advanced his troops across the frontier into Manchuria on the 21st without consulting the Chief of the General Staff and without Imperial approval. (p 72) Encouragement of such an arbitrary action belongs to the time of warfare and is not to be advised in peaceful times. If not, it would bring about very serious consequences such as question of infringement upon the prerogative and diplomatic troubles. For instance, we had a serious problem of infringement upon the prerogative concerning the London Treaty last year. The arbitrary dispatch of troops to a foreign land by the Commander of the Korean Army seems to me another question of the same kind. This kind of action should never be encouraged. (p 73) In spite of the statement made by the Premier that there is no discord in the Cabinet, I doubt if there is no discord between the government and the military, or at least between the central and local military officials. If you have not arrived at the final conclusion concerning this point, I do not ask you to make an answer today.

"But, first of all, I request your explanation in connection with the military Commander's arbitrary dispatch of troops to a foreign land. I request you to define whether it is a matter to be encouraged or to be instructed. (p 74)

"From the beginning of this incident, I have been much worried about the lack of complete understanding between the civil and military officials. Generally speaking, the sword and the pen should be the two wheels of a wagon. Perfect communication is necessary between the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry. If there should be a lack of understanding between the two -- if, for instance, the military should predominate -- the country will be ruined through diplomacy by the military clique and the military government. However, I am sorry to say that this worry of mine seems to have come true. At the last Council, Councillor KANEKO expressed his opinion that it is very regrettable that China got the better of Japan in making propaganda to the League of Nations. We hear that the Minister of Foreign Affairs proclaimed a statement on the 24th, because in the beginning he was not informed of the Japanese military movements in Manchuria. (p 75)

"The communication between Japan proper and Manchuria is in perfect order, but the communication between the Foreign Office and

the War Office seems to be insufficient. In the present incident, a large army is not moved as it was in the Russo-Japanese War, therefore every military movement must have been reported instantly to the War Minister. Therefore, it is the more regrettable that the proclamation of the statement was much delayed, making Japan's position in the League of Nations more or less disadvantageous. If the statement would have proclaimed a little earlier, it would have brought more favorable consequences. (p 76)

"Therefore, I would like to ask the War Minister if he transfers all the reports which come to him and which have something to do with the Foreign Ministry without any delay to the Foreign Office.

"Is the official instruction by the Commander HONJO a fact? And is the content of the instruction the same with what appeared in the newspaper?"

War Minister MINAMI:

"We shall not discuss for the time being whether an arbitrary measure should be restricted to the field of battle or not. At any rate, the dispatch of troops to a foreign land is not arbitrary but outrageous. (p 77) However, in this specific case, the movement of the Korean Army has a foundation to support it. For it was included in the plan of military operations, sanctioned by the Chief of the General Staff, that the Korean Army would advance to Manchuria in case of emergency. But it was only a plan, and an order must be issued before actually starting an action. The Korean Army which was waiting for orders on the frontier on the 19th, advanced into Manchuria on the 21st without receiving any order to that effect. It was because the main force of the Mukden Army had advanced to Changchun and Kilin, leaving Mukden in the hand of scanty troops. And as there was a danger of Chinese troops making a counter-attack, the Commander-in-Chief recognized the tenseness, admitting no further delay and dispatched his troops on his own responsibility. (p 78) It is true that there was an omission of procedure, but it is not so serious as an infringement on the prerogative. If there was no previous sanction of the operation plan, and if it were in the peace-time, it would have been outrageous. However, when the situation at that time is taken into consideration, there is some foundation for the move. The Chief of the General Staff reported to the Throne, viewing the matter in the same light.

"As to the liaison between the War Office and the Foreign Office, I think nothing is left to be desired. Concerning the outbreak of the incident at midnight of the 18th, I received a report before eight o'clock on the 19th morning and made a report at the Cabinet Meeting that morning. In ordinary times, we often hold a liaison conference between the officials of the Foreign and the War Offices, where all the information is exchanged. Therefore, I do not think there is a lack of understanding. The Government's instructions to our delegate to the League of Nations Conference was delayed and reached him on the 24th, because there was something to be investigated before sending the instructions. Between the military and the dispatched officials there is a fairly good communication. However, as a minority was fighting against a majority, existence of a few cases of negligence should be admitted.

"With regard to Commander HONJO's statement, I will answer your question when the whole texts arrives by telegram."

Analyst: STEINER

Doc. No. 904
Page 5

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1025

28 March 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Chinese Report on Japanese Attacks in MANCHURIA.

Date: Sep 1931 Original (x) Copy () Language: Chinese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: DOIHARA, Takashi and HONJO, Shigeru

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Aggressive warfare in MANCHURIA

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

These two volumes were procured by Japanese working in the Japanese Legation at Peking. The first volume is called "Damage Caused by The Japanese Forces on the North Peking Railway". It contains an account of the attacks of the Japanese forces (especially air forces) against the railway between 19 September and 20 October 1931.

The second volume is called "Occupation of MANCHURIA by the Japanese Forces".

A letter of HONJO, Shigeru Commander in Chief of the KUANTUNG Army dated 19 September 1931 is summarized as follows:

"Chinese forces destroyed a part of the South Manchurian Railway at HANK-YANG at 10:30 P. M., 18 September 1931 and also attacked the Japanese Garrison. The Japanese forces will retaliate if such incidents continue to occur."

Doc. No. 1025
Page 1

Doc. No. 1025, Page 2, SUMMARY CONT'D

The Japanese forces attacked HANK-YANG on 18 September 1931 and established a military government there headed by Col. DOIHARA. (p. 1-4).

Here follow descriptions of attacks made by the Japanese in other localities, in view of which the Chinese Government decided to appeal to the League of Nations. (p. 9).

The League of Nations asks for cessation of hostilities. (p. 20) and conferences are held which are fruitless.

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Wilds

Doc. No. 1025
Page 2