

WORLD SECURITY

**Trends & Challenges
at Century's End**



**MICHAEL T. KLARE
DANIEL C. THOMAS**

World Security

TRENDS AND CHALLENGES AT CENTURY'S END

*A Project of the Five College Program
in Peace and World Security Studies*

Michael T. Klare

HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE

Daniel C. Thomas

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

**ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
NEW YORK**

Senior editor: Don Reisman
Managing editor: Patricia Mansfield
Project editor: Elise Bauman
Production supervisor: Alan Fischer
Graphics: G&H Soho
Cover design: Jeheber & Peace, Inc.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 89-63910

Copyright © 1991 by St. Martin's Press, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except as may be expressly permitted by the applicable copyright statutes or in writing by the Publisher. Manufactured in the United States of America.

54321

fedcb

For information, write:
St. Martin's Press, Inc.
175 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10010

ISBN: 0-312-03747-3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An earlier version of "The Environment and International Security" appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989, Volume 68, Issue 2. Copyright 1989 by the Council on Foreign Affairs, Inc.

David Wirth, "Climate Chaos," from *Foreign Policy* 74 (Spring 1989).

*This book is dedicated to the students, faculty, and staff
of the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts
and their consortial arm, the Five Colleges, Inc.*

Preface

World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End is intended to provide college students and general readers with an introduction to the critical security threats facing the world community in the 1990s. Included in these threats are serious problems that remain from the Cold War era—for example, the continued existence of large nuclear weapons stockpiles with hair-trigger launching systems—as well as environmental and developmental perils whose magnitude has only become apparent in the past few years. In all of these cases, we believe that new and innovative solutions must be sought to overcome the threats involved, and such solutions must address the problems on a *global*, rather than merely national or regional scale.

The original concept for this volume developed out of our work in editing the fifth edition of *Peace and World Order Studies: A Curriculum Guide*, the standard guide for curriculum development in the field of peace studies. In assembling the *Guide*, we inspected literally thousands of syllabi from undergraduate courses in peace studies, international relations, world order studies, and related fields. To our dismay, we discovered that most existing courses on contemporary world security issues lacked sections on such problems as regional conflict, hunger, chronic underdevelopment, and environmental degradation, or lacked up-to-date texts and reading materials on these topics. Because we believe that the study of world security should encompass all significant threats to global peace and well-being, and that students should be made aware of both the nature and the interconnectedness of these threats, we set out to produce a text that would provide faculty and students with a comprehensive and rigorous introduction to the entire span of world security affairs.

In structuring the book, we have attempted to arrange these global perils in some sort of rough chronological order, beginning with those that first arose in the early Cold War era, and then proceeding to others whose urgency has only been recognized in the past few years. Hence, we begin our survey with an assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations, the status of the nuclear arms race, and the prospects for nuclear arms control. Two other manifestations of the Cold War—the arms race in space and the question of European security—are the subject of the following essays. We then examine the

dynamics of militarization and violence in the Third World, and consider the relative effectiveness of the United Nations and other international bodies in controlling such violence. Finally, we examine several global problems—hunger, the debt crisis, the violation of human rights, and environmental degradation.

In addressing these threats, we have asked our authors to follow a roughly similar approach: first, to describe the extent and nature of the particular threat as it was manifested in the late 1980s; second, to look at current trends and speculate on the evolution of the threat in the 1990s; and third, to provide a range of possible solutions to the problem—ranging from immediate, concrete steps to long-range and visionary proposals. Our intent, in using this format, is both to indicate the seriousness of the perils involved and to demonstrate that solutions *can* be found if we put our minds to work on the problem.

These problem-oriented essays are set between two other chapters of a more general nature: an introductory essay by Richard Falk of Princeton University on some of the theoretical issues raised by this new constellation of problems, and a concluding essay by Robert Johansen of the University of Notre Dame on policy perspectives for world security. We have included these two chapters because we believe that the discussion of particular security concerns should be viewed in the context of the debate now occurring in the academic and policymaking communities over the basic principles that have heretofore guided U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, we believe that the various proposals advanced by the authors of the other chapters should ultimately be subsumed in a coherent, forward-looking approach to the advancement of world security.

In selecting authors for these essays, we have attempted to choose individuals who are both experts on the particular threats involved and committed to a constructive, problem-solving approach to its amelioration. We do not ask, nor do we expect our readers necessarily to agree with any or all of the particular ideas advanced by these authors. We do believe, however, that these essays can provide a starting point for informed discussion of outstanding world security problems, and of the methods by which they can be brought under effective control. It is not our intention to provide *the* blueprint for world security, but rather to stimulate fresh thinking about these problems. Most of all, we seek to encourage readers to participate fully in the search for new pathways to lasting world peace and security.

Clearly, a project of this scale requires the advice and assistance of a great many people, only some of whom can be adequately thanked here. This list quite properly begins with the authors of the following essays, who devoted considerable time and effort to preparing their manuscripts and to responding to the editors' numerous queries and comments. They are to be lauded for working so hard on their essays solely out of the expectation—

vigorously cultivated by the editors—that this volume will contribute significantly to the discussion of world security issues in the years ahead.

Next, we wish to express our appreciation for the guidance provided by the Faculty Steering Committee of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies (PAWSS), under whose auspices this volume was produced: Jan Dizard, Ronald Tiersky, and William Taubman of Amherst College; Allan Krass, Patricia Romney, and Brian Schultz of Hampshire College; Vincent Ferraro and Anthony Lake of Mount Holyoke College; Thomas Derr, Deborah Lubar, and Thomas Riddell of Smith College; and James Der Derian, Jerome King, and George Levinger of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Some of these fine people, it will be noted, did double duty as contributors of essays to the volume.

For offering St. Martin's Press comments about the project in its various stages of development, we would like to thank Carol Edler Baumann, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee; Mark A. Cichock, The University of Texas at Arlington; June Teufel Dreyer, University of Miami; Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University; Patrick M. Morgan, Washington State University; Bennett Ramberg, University of California–Los Angeles; J. Philip Rogers, George Washington University; Philip A. Schrod, The University of Kansas; and Paul Watanabe, University of Massachusetts. We would also like to acknowledge the wonderful cooperation and assistance we have received from the fine people at St. Martin's Press—especially Don Reisman, our editor, and Elise Bauman, the project editor for the book.

Great appreciation is also due to the staff of Five Colleges, Inc., the consortial arm of the five institutions that jointly support the PAWSS program, and to its director, Lorna Peterson. We also wish to acknowledge the tremendous support PAWSS has received through the years from the staff of its host institution, Hampshire College. We particularly wish to thank Adele Simmons and Gregory Prince, the two presidents of Hampshire who have supported our work since PAWSS was established in 1983. Finally, we extend our deepest thanks to the staff of the PAWSS program itself—Adi Bemak and Linda Harris—without whose support and encouragement this project could not have been completed.

Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas
Amherst, Mass.

Contents

Introduction 1

- 1 / Theory, Realism, and World Security
RICHARD A. FALK 6
- 2 / Soviet-U.S. Relations: Confrontation, Cooperation,
Transformation? WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR. 25
- 3 / The Future of Nuclear Deterrence
KOSTA TSIPIIS 45
- 4 / Death and Transfiguration: Nuclear Arms Control
in the 1980s and 1990s ALLAN S. KRASS 68
- 5 / The High Frontier of Outer Space in the 1990s:
Star Wars or Spaceship Earth?
DANIEL DEUDNEY 101
- 6 / From Mutual Containment to Common Security:
Europe during and after the Cold War
THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN 123
- 7 / Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s
PETER A. CLAUSEN 144
- 8 / Deadly Convergence: The Arms Trade, Nuclear/
Chemical/Missile Proliferation, and Regional
Conflict in the 1990s MICHAEL T. KLARE 170
- 9 / Militarized States in the Third World
NICOLE BALL 197

- 10 / Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict
DONALD L. HOROWITZ 225
- 11 / The Terrorist Discourse: Signs, States, and Systems
of Global Political Violence
JAMES DER DERIAN 237
- 12 / Multilateral Institutions and International
Security
MARGARET P. KARNS AND KAREN A. MINGST 266
- 13 / Promoting Human Rights STEPHEN P. MARKS 295
- 14 / Global Debt and Third World
Development VINCENT FERRARO 324
- 15 / World Hunger: A Scarcity of Food or a Scarcity of
Democracy? JOSEPH COLLINS 345
- 16 / The Environment and International
Security JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS 362
- 17 / Catastrophic Climate Change
DAVID A. WIRTH 381
- 18 / A Policy Framework for World Security
ROBERT C. JOHANSEN 401
- About the Contributors 425

Introduction

Though ten years short of century's end, the onset of the 1990s seemed to herald the beginning of a new era. With the Berlin Wall newly ruptured, strategic nuclear arms control talks making rapid progress, and conflicts in Africa and Central America recently settled, it appeared that the world was entering a new epoch in which peaceful cooperation would triumph over contentious rivalry as the dominant mode of international relations. True, the world community had not succeeded in preventing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; nor had the world found common solutions to other outstanding international problems. Still, as we began the countdown to the year 2000, there seemed to be good reasons for optimism regarding the future course of global security. Even the Kuwait crisis provided some grounds for optimism, in that it sparked a near-universal commitment to U.N.-mandated sanctions against the aggressor.

Set against this backdrop of progress, however, were a number of less auspicious trends. These included the continued spread of nuclear and chemical weapons, the further deterioration of economic and environmental conditions in many Third World countries, and the intensification of ethnic and religious warfare on all five continents. Also producing cause for alarm was the emergence of troubling aftereffects of the Cold War: the buildup of toxic wastes from nuclear weapons programs; the outbreak of interethnic violence in Eastern Europe and the USSR; and the diversion of surplus superpower arms to potential belligerents in the Third World. While these various problems did not eliminate all grounds for optimism regarding the future of global security, they did suggest that further progress would require even more effort and ingenuity than had first appeared to be the case. They also served notice that the final years of the twentieth century could entail shocks and crises of types both familiar and unfamiliar.

As we move further into the 1990s, therefore, it appears that the world community has two paramount tasks: first, to continue the progress made over the past few years in resolving international conflicts and in devising means for the collective solution of global problems; and second, to respond effectively to the emerging threats to global security. Clearly, the accomplishment of these tasks will require a renewed commitment to peace and cooperation on the part of all nations, along with the development of new

strategies for dealing with global problems of unprecedented scope and severity.

Navigating through these risks and challenges in the 1990s will call for particularly enlightened leadership on the part of the United States. While its international role is likely to be circumscribed by fiscal constraints at home and the emergence of new power centers abroad, the United States remains a major actor in the international community, and a beacon of hope for many in other countries who seek to promote respect for human rights and democratic values. By working with our allies, with former adversaries like China and the Soviet Union, and with international bodies like the United Nations, Washington can play a vital role in devising the new policies and instruments that will be needed to ensure global peace and security in the twenty-first century; if the United States fails to perform this role, the world we inherit in the year 2000 is likely to prove much less serene and healthful.

For the United States to perform the sort of international leadership role that is needed at this time in history, we will have to learn new collaborative skills and unlearn old patterns of dominance. That is, we will have to become more adept at thinking in terms of cooperative solutions, at using persuasion and logic—rather than threats and promises—to gain support for our suggestions, and at acceding to the suggestions and advice of others. As suggested by Secretary of State James Baker during his confirmation hearings in 1989, “U.S. leadership must adjust for a world that has outgrown the postwar era.” It must adjust, he noted, to a world with new global challenges “that cannot be managed by one nation alone—no matter how powerful.”

Clearly, if the United States is to adjust to this emerging world system, we must all become more knowledgeable about critical global problems and about the various proposals that have been advanced for their amelioration. As we become more familiar with the dynamics of these problems, moreover, we should begin to employ our own inventive skills in the search for more promising solutions. American colleges and universities have an important role to play in this process, by educating students and the community about world security affairs, by conducting research on critical problems, and by devising and testing innovative responses to emerging global hazards.

In this spirit, we have assembled the following collection of essays on world security problems in the 1990s. These essays are intended to provide a “status report” on the current direction and dimensions of the problems, to speculate on future developments in the field, and to consider various strategies for bringing these problems under control. These strategies range from practical steps that can be taken tomorrow to visionary proposals for sweeping international change; all, however, reflect a common desire to harness the creative energies of the world community in the search for constructive solutions to the perils that beset us.

In assembling these essays, we were guided by a number of basic pre-

cepts or concerns. These principles were not intended to limit our choice of authors or topics, but rather to lend a sense of purpose and coherence to the enterprise as a whole. Three precepts, in particular, guided our work.

First, the concept of “security” must include protection against all major threats to human survival and well-being, not just military threats. Until now, “security”—usually addressed as “national security”—has meant the maintenance of strong military defenses against enemy invasion and attack. This approach may have served us well in the past, when such attack was seen as the only real threat to national survival; today, however, when airborne poisons released by nuclear and chemical accidents can produce widespread death and sickness (as occurred with the Bhopal and Chernobyl disasters), and when global epidemiological and environmental hazards such as AIDS and the “greenhouse effect” can jeopardize the well-being of the entire planet, this perspective appears increasingly obsolete. As individual economies become ever more enmeshed in the world economy, moreover, every society becomes more vulnerable to a global economic crisis. And, as modern telecommunications brings us all closer together, we are made acutely aware of the pain and suffering of those living under oppression, tyranny, and injustice.

Given the fact that our individual security and well-being will depend to an ever-increasing extent on the world’s success in mastering complex political, economic, environmental, and epidemiological problems, we must redefine “security” to embrace all of those efforts taken to enhance the long-term health and welfare of the human family. Defense against military aggression will obviously remain a vital component of security, but it must be joined by defenses against severe environmental degradation, worldwide economic crisis, and massive human suffering. Only by approaching the security dilemma from this multifaceted perspective can we develop the strategies and instruments that will be needed to promote global health and stability.

Second, given the multiplicity of pressing world hazards, the concept of “national security” must be integrated with that of “world security.” Until now, most people have tended to rely on the nation-state to provide protection against external threats, and have viewed their own nation’s security as being conversely affected by the acquisition of power and wealth by other nations. Thus, in the interests of “national security,” nation-states have often engaged in a competitive struggle to enhance their own economic and military strength at the expense of other nations’ capabilities. This *us-versus-them*, zero-sum competition for security is naturally biased toward unilateral solutions to critical problems, frequently entailing military and/or economic coercion. In today’s interdependent world, however, the quest for security is rapidly becoming a *positive-sum* process, whereby national well-being is achieved jointly by all countries—or not at all.

The connection between national and international security is perhaps best illustrated by the dilemma of nuclear weapons. Given the unbelievably

destructive nature of these weapons, any effort by one nuclear power to enhance its defensive position through the deployment of additional nuclear weapons will inevitably provoke suspicion, fear, and comparable arms acquisitions by its rival(s)—a process that usually leaves the original nation with less rather than more security. Only through *mutual* reductions in nuclear arms—accompanied by joint efforts at confidence building and crisis control—is it possible to promote genuine security in a world of multiple nuclear powers. Similarly, in an integrated world economy, any effort by one country to enhance its economic status through the systematic exploitation of other nations will inevitably produce hostility, indebtedness, and shrinking world markets—a natural recipe for widespread social and economic disorder. Only by promoting economic health and development in the poorer nations can we be assured that there will be a market for the products of the richer, more developed nations. And it is painfully obvious that protection against global environmental and epidemiological hazards can be attained only through joint international effort.

In light of these developments, it is evident that the health and safety of the nation—the traditional goal of national security—cannot be successfully assured in isolation from the quest for world security, broadly defined. This does not mean that the nation-state will lose its responsibility for the pursuit of security—far from it. In the absence of a supreme world government, security affairs will remain a central function of all national governments. But whereas security goals were once pursued through zero-sum, unilateral initiatives, today the attainment of these goals will require multi-lateral endeavors involving groups or associations of states. Cleaning up the Mediterranean, for instance, will require cooperation among all of the nations bordering on that body of water; protection of the ozone layer will require curbs on certain chemicals by all of the industrial powers; and avoidance of a global economic crisis will require cooperation among both the debtors and creditors in the international system.

Even in the military realm there is a close connection between national and international security. Given the growing worldwide incidence of terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and ethnic/religious warfare, it is apparent that increased international collaboration is needed to monitor terrorist and criminal organizations, to prevent the outbreak of regional conflicts, to protect neutral air and sea transportation in the event of war, and to conduct peacekeeping operations once a cease-fire has been arranged. International cooperation on an even larger scale will be needed to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, and to control the diffusion of advanced conventional munitions. Clearly, no matter what problem area we examine, the ultimate goals of national security can be successfully attained only through a world security system of some sort.

Finally, in the pursuit of both national and international security objectives, we must never lose sight of basic human values and concerns. Thus,

when devising multilateral measures for the solution of a given problem, we must never neglect to weigh the human consequences of any particular action, or agree to a proposal that would place a disproportionate share of the cost or pain of change on any particular community or constituency. Unfortunately, the world has known too many “ideal” solutions that have been imposed through tyrannical rule accompanied by massive human suffering. Hitler’s “solution” to Germany’s “Jewish problem” and Ceausescu’s “solution” to Rumania’s “debt problem” are only two of the most recent products of such misguided thinking. Clearly, the avoidance or at least minimalization of human suffering must be the *sine qua non* of all of our efforts on behalf of world security.

It is for this reason that the advancement of fundamental human rights has been included in this volume as a world security concern. Because human rights abuses are both a cause and a consequence of a wide range of global problems, one cannot speak of world security without addressing this issue. In fact, the role of human rights considerations in the policy process is a revealing barometer of progress toward humane governance on a global scale.

Together, these three precepts constitute the conceptual framework for this volume. Not all of the authors we have included would agree with this articulation of the principles involved, and many would probably supply a different set of concerns if they were asked to set the criteria for such a collection. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the book as a whole does demonstrate the saliency and validity of these three suppositions.

1 / Theory, Realism, and World Security

RICHARD A. FALK

Several historical processes climaxed toward the end of the 1980s in ways that bear fundamentally on the outlook for international relations in the years and decades ahead. These developments also raise some serious questions about whether the most influential theory relied upon to interpret international relations is any longer adequate, and if not, what alternatives can be recommended as a basis for understanding, explanation, and prescription. In the United States, the predominant theory of international relations is known as "realism." Although there is a great deal of diversity within the framework of realism, realists generally agree that the state is the prime actor in international political life, that force is widely available and frequently used to adjust relations on the basis of power, and that humanist values offer neither a guide for action nor a basis of appraisal.

Realism has always had its share of critics and detractors, especially among those who believed that war must be overcome and that moral purpose should pertain to every domain of political action, including that of international relations. The argument set forth here, however, is that while such criticism did not amount to very much in the United States during the past fifty years, the new global setting poses a far stronger challenge to realism and increases the need for an alternative framework of interpretation. During the most recent period—a period of extraordinary change—three sets of remarkable developments took place that were not at all foreseeable through the realist lens as recently as the mid-1980s.

First of all, a shift in Soviet leadership produced dramatic changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policy, enabling a reduction of tensions in East-West relations of such magnitude as to support the now widely held view that the Cold War is over, and that, no matter what happens to Gorbachev or to Soviet-American relations, a revival of what we had come to know as the Cold War is highly improbable. As such, the East-West focus that had dominated postwar international relations is now quite marginal to an assessment of the future of world politics. Without the Cold War, and without its attendant arms race and periodic crises arousing fears of nuclear war, the realist focus on the geopolitical and strategic designs of the leading states (and clusters of states) is of far less consequence.

It is a violation of the law to reproduce this selection by any means whatsoever without the written permission of the copyright holder.

The second, and related, set of developments has involved the rise of a new form of revolutionary mass politics that provided the decisive element in the process of emancipation that occurred in the countries of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. A somewhat analogous popular movement brought Corazon Aquino to power in the Philippines in 1986, and mounted an historic, if ultimately unsuccessful *democratic* challenge to the Chinese government in early 1989. In all of these cases, a mass mobilization of political opposition occurred without reliance on violent tactics and without any intervention on its behalf by foreign governments. Popular forces, acting creatively, toppled or challenged a series of militarized repressive governments without firing a shot. As the tragedy at Tiananmen Square suggests, not every challenge was successful; and, as Aquino's experience has shown in the Philippines, not every success of "people power" can be translated into a positive political performance—even when control over the state is achieved. What seems evident, however, is the vitality of popular, democratic forces in promoting changes that profoundly alter the character, and even the structure, of international relations. Such an appreciation works against the realist tendency to interpret international relations without giving attention to the social forces within states.

There is another implication of these political surprises of 1989 that has yet been hardly noticed, let alone assessed—namely, the relative inability of the superpowers to control convulsive political change on the level of states and regions within their traditional "spheres of influence." These democratizing movements unfolded in opposition to the political will of the respective dominant superpower, and without any substantial assistance by its adversary. Indeed, these extraordinary changes were brought about largely by movements from below, with help (largely inspirational) coming not from outside the bloc but within—the contagious spread of revolutionary fervor in Eastern Europe during 1989. The hypothesis of bipolarity, relied on to explain the division of Europe and postwar stability, became strangely irrelevant. Also proved ungrounded was the belief that Soviet control over Eastern Europe was rigid and more or less unshakable from within.

Of course, this reaffirmation of populist politics can be carried too far. Intervention from above and from without can frustrate popular forces of change. The United States demonstrated this during the 1980s by its interventions in Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Panama. What 1989 does supply, however, is a corrective to a geopolitical view of political development that links stability to governmental control, and change to military intervention and war. The revolutions of 1989 demonstrated that under certain conditions, even in the face of sustained and brutal authoritarian rule, fundamental change can be achieved *nonviolently* from within. Such a demonstration is likely to encourage forces of democratic resistance elsewhere for years to come.

The discrediting and weakening of the Soviet Union is by now widely

recognized. President Gorbachev's contribution was to acknowledge these circumstances, and to remove obstacles from the path of the popular movements in Eastern Europe—a contribution that has had a more severe than expected backlash at home, stirring the hot irons of revolutionary nationalist fervor throughout the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union and even in the Russian heartland itself.

What is less understood is the greatly diminished importance of the United States in Western Europe, given the political dynamics of 1989. During the Cold War years, the United States, as superpower and leader of the Western alliance, exerted a predominant influence on NATO governments, often substantially encroaching on their sovereignty by unilaterally devising doctrines of nuclear war-fighting and targeting. European resentments mounted during the 1980s, leading to discussions about the erosion of the sovereignty of the NATO countries on the most vital decisions affecting war and peace, including the use of nuclear weapons. Now, almost in exaggerated reaction, political discussion on the future of Europe—especially in the Western half—proceeds as if the United States no longer is an important player. It is hard to give a convincing explanation of this new situation. So far it has only rarely been analyzed, and then only to admit that this unanticipated circumstance does indeed exist.

One possible explanation for the abruptness of the shift of view in Europe is an intuitive reading of the 1989 experience. These changes took place in a manner that exceeded the fondest hopes of Western European leaders and peoples: quickly, nonviolently (except in Rumania), and without U.S. intervention. Such an outcome led people to recognize that Europe's destiny is not controlled by the United States, as had previously been assumed. This conclusion is reinforced decisively by the widespread perception that whatever military threat was once posed by the Soviet Union has largely ceased to exist. Europeans are more anxious today about the dangers posed to Europe by a Soviet Union that is quickly becoming weak and unstable at its political center and is increasingly threatened by civil strife as its economy weakens and its regional divisions become more pronounced.

What seems evident from an assessment of these European developments is that the interplay of domestic and international factors is more complicated than is portrayed by realist theory. The domestic political setting—including popular movements and cultural patterns—needs to be included in our conceptualization of international political life. Further, it is now evident that the fit between structural realism and the Cold War depended upon tightly organized and ideologically defined blocs presided over by the two opposed superpowers. Without the special circumstance of these bloc antagonisms, the geopolitical structure may have become far too ambiguous and fluid for the constraints of realist thinking.

The third set of developments that challenge realism involves the spreading realization that environmental decay involves a series of major problems