



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

17

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Request for Interrogation

**Central
Interrogation Center,
IFS**

**Investigation Division,
IPS
Attention: Lt. Waldorf**

19 Sep 46

1. Major O'Riordan, USA, of the Korea Military Government desires to interrogate KOISO, Kuniaki at 1615 hours on 20 Sep 46 at Sugamo.

The interrogation will concern an investigation of LYUH WOON HYUNG, a Korean (known to the Japanese as RO UN KYO) of his character and activities.

**NAKOTO M. KIMURA
2d. Lt., AUS
Exec. Off.,**

Pass Approved:

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2614

30 August 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Record of Process of Independence Movement, a translation of official report by Japanese 16th Army H.2 to Allied Hdq in Singapore. (Certification is awaited and will be added later)

Date: Original ☒ Copy ☐ Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ☐ No ☐

Has it been photostated? Yes ☐ No ☐

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Netherlands Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO, Hideki; KOISO; HATA; NISHIMURA; 16th Army Leaders

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Japanese-Netherlands Relations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

This is an official report regarding the process of the Independence Movement made by 16th Army H.2 to the SINGAPORE and SAIGON H.2. It lays special stress upon the situation after the surrender but also contains valuable material re the Independence problem during war time.

Analyst: 2d Lt Blumhagen

Doc. No. 2614

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2922

13 Jan 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Handwritten and typed, Army Manchurian Secret Telegram No. 1725 "Disbursement of Secret Expenditures for the MANCHURIAN INCIDENT" (MANSHU JIHEN KIMITSU HI KOFU NO KEN)

Date: 27 Dec 34 Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: War Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Chief of Staff Kwantung Army, KOISO, Kuniaki; UEDA, Kenkichi; KIKUCHI, Monya; DAIO, Keikichi; OTSUKA, Kennosuke; YANAGAWA, Heisuke; HATA, Shinji

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Military Aggression; Conspiracy for Aggression

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Doc. No. 2922 - Leaders involved shown receiving various sums of money; KOISO received ¥1,770,000

Doc. No. 2922-A - Telegram of 28 Dec 34 to Army Vice Minister acknowledging above from CHOSUN Army

Doc. No. 2922-B - Telegram of 28 Dec 33 (perhaps a misprint) same as 2922-A

Analyst: E.H. WAGNER

Doc. No. 2922

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2954

16 Jan 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Extracts from Minutes Shorthand of Second Joint Conference of Sections I, II, III, and IV of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet on 17 March 1940

Date: 17 March 1940 Original ☒ Copy ☐ Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ☐ No ☒

Has it been photostated? Yes ☐ No ☒

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Imperial Diet

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KOISO, Kuniaki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Expansion to South; Conspiracy for Aggression

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

KOISO states his policy is to encourage population movement on the Continent to aid Japan's advance there, and in the South (Philippines, etc) economic expansion.

Notes taken from minutes of committee meetings of the House of Representatives, 75th Imperial Diet Session, Accounts, Petitions, Proposals, Official Residence of the Prime Minister, Nagata-Cho, Kojimachi-Ku, Tokyo City

Analyst: W.F. GNER

Doc. no. 2954

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2965

11 Feb 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Handwritten Notes of KOISO, Kuniaki, titled "Materials for Future Reference", an Outline of KOISO's Official Activities and Reasons Therefore

Date: Undated Original (x) Copy () Language:

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division (Temporarily returned to American Defense Counsel for KOISO)

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: KOISO, Kuniaki, (March 1946)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KOISO, Kuniaki, OKAWA, Shumei; KIDO, Koichi; Henry PU-YI; UGAKI, Kazushige; HATA, Shunroku; IITAKI, Seishiro; TOJO, Hideki; SMIGELITSU, Mamoru; YONAI, Mitsumasa

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Military Aggression; All-China Military Aggression; Relations with the USSR; Relations with the Netherlands

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

The document, which runs to forty handwritten pages, is a justification and explanation of KOISO's acts, both in the military service and the government, written while KOISO was held in Sugamo Prison. His stand on the following subjects are discussed in some detail:

IMPERIALISM AND KOREA: KOISO says he cannot be called an imperialist, having advocated independence for Korea, and opposed those who had territorial ambitions in Manchuria.

MARCH INCIDENT: He arranged an interview for OKAWA with UGAKI, but only at the repeated insistence of OKAWA, and both he and UGAKI thought OKAWA's plan for armed uprising and

Doc. No. 2965

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seizure of the government were ill-advised and evil, and told him. OKAMA replied that a loss of human lives was inconsequential in the accomplishment of the greater mission. Marquis TOKOGAWA gave OKAMA 50,000 yen to disperse the ruffians he had brought to Tokyo.

THE OCTOBER AND THE MAY 15TH INCIDENT: RAKI was chosen by the General Staff to admonish the young officers responsible, because he had their confidence, in the October Incident. In the May 15th Incident (assassination of Premier INUKAI by young army officers), KOISO relates it was not expected, so the Army "decided to pay more attention to.....discipline in the future", mentions no other measures taken.

THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT: KOISO's dream, here, he claims, was to make Manchuria "an unarmed peaceful land if possible, or an area jointly to be inhabited by the peoples of Japan, China, and the Soviet Union". To this end later he wanted to evacuate all troops gradually. In 1931, when he was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, he attempted to head off the Manchurian Incident, which he feared would occur due to mistreatment of Japanese by Chinese there, by asking Major General TATEKAWA of the General Staff to visit the Kwantung Army.

He was too late to prevent it, but KOISO claims that he had tried his best. KOISO claims that in all measures taken to set up PU-YI and the independent government, "the central government of Japan had nothing to do with it" and that its formation was a "spontaneous initiation by Chinese residents of Manchuria". In discussing the SHANSHI-KAN and JEHOL Incidents, KOISO's attitude is that the advances were justified because of the "provocative attitude taken by Chinese troops" in areas allotted to Manchukuo, and that penetration into North China was nothing but a counter attack.

In the Tangku Armistice Agreement, Japan left behind a small number of troops "only to maintain public order".

As far as responsibility for the Manchurian Incident is concerned, KOISO holds that the Chinese blew up the railway at Mukden, and that advances beyond the railway for a certain distance was necessary to protect Japanese lives. Headquarters in Tokyo even specifically drew back Japanese troops

advancing too far. But Emergency Acts gave the Kwantung Army enough money early in 1932 to increase forces in Manchuria to about four divisions. He maintains again that the Kwantung Army "never committed themselves in leading (Manchukuo's) independence, and had nothing whatever to do with the breach of the Nine-Power Treaty".

SEANGHAI INCIDENT: Gives no reason, except to say it was "caused by a clash between our naval landing forces and Chinese armies".

HAILAR INCIDENT: Receiving report that some Japanese subjects in Province of HAILAR were killed or poisoned, the army took measures to evacuate Japanese through Russia, and then swept the opposing Chinese armies from HAILAR, thus restoring order.

CHINA INCIDENT: KOISO rejects any responsibility for the China Incident, since he at that time was commander of the Korean Army. Further, he advised against hasty action, after the July 7, 1937 Incident, when he dispatched the 20th Division from Korea to China on order from headquarters. He hinted to headquarters that in his view the action could not be limited by "so-called settlement on the spot" (use of superior force), and that other measures should be taken.

Again, in April of 1938 when put on the reserve list by ITAGAKI and TOJO, he told either HATA or SUGIYAMA that the Japanese Army should not be sent to HANKOW, since warfare there was difficult, and the campaign would become prolonged involving too many other questions. Also advocated a negotiated peace with China, and as Overseas Minister in KIRANUM. Cabinet opposed openly at a cabinet meeting in June 1939 the recognition and establishment of a separate WANG Ching-wei administration in China.

ADMINISTRATION OF KOREA AND POW'S: Plumped for equal rates of pay for Koreans, and lays difficulties to corrupt and wicked Korean minor officials, and small fry Japanese, especially policemen, whom they influenced. Inspected one small POW camp and found prisoners' food better than that served Japanese troops, though quarters were hastily constructed barracks.

ACTS AS PRIME MINISTER: KOISO was summoned by the Emperor to Tokyo to form a government cabinet after the resignation of Tojo government in July 1944. KOISO reports that KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, stated that the Imperial order for forming a cabinet was to be given to both KOISO and Admiral YONAI. At the start, KOISO emphasizes that he felt it absolutely necessary that the Premier be permitted to participate in conferences with the supreme commanders of the war so that the government administration could be coordinated with it. This issue came up continually during the period of his premiership in connection with the Army's refusal to allow KOISO to hold the additional portfolio of war minister.

KOISO's CABINET:

Foreign Minister	SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru
Finance Minister	ISHIWATA, Satoro
War Minister	SUGIYAMA, Gen
Naval Minister	YONAI, Mitsumasa
Interior Minister	ODATE, Shigeo
Educational Minister	NINOMIYA, Harushige
Justice Ministry	MITSUOKA, Hiromasa
Munition Minister	FUJIMURA, Ginjiro
Agriculture and Commerce Min.	SHIMADA, Toshio
Communication Minister	MEDA, Yonezo
National Welfare	HIROSE, Misatada
Ministers without Portfolio	MACHIDA, Chuji
	KODAMA, Hideo
	OGATA, Taketora

His Reasons for not Taking the Portfolio of War Minister:

1) KOISO states that so long as there was some other means by which the Premier could participate in the Supreme Command he did not press for additional duty.

2) The appointment of government personnel came to be of secondary importance in wartime as did the procurement of supplies for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces which was accomplished by the particular ministry.

KOISO points out that he regretted later his reasoning as he found that it was vitally important for the Premier to keep the portfolio of War Minister lest he not be permitted to directly take part in the Supreme Command.

The Missions of His Cabinet: Briefly, he states that the primary mission as he saw it was to carry on the war. To do so he enumerates three articles.

a) with regard to the supreme command to overcome the unfavorable warfare and to turn to offensive strategy, b) to assist the supreme command by "active manipulation" of wartime diplomacies and to investigate any feasible measures for bringing about a favorable termination to the war, c) in national affairs to develop all manpower and to further production of war supplies and foodstuffs for the winning of the war.

Problems Confronting Him as Premier: The major problem, KOISO states, was the lack of unity between the administration and the supreme command. With the approval of the Emperor, the "Supernost Command Conference" was inaugurated in which a small number of the highest officials of the government met with the supreme command to discuss war strategy with the aim of unifying administration. KOISO suspected the supreme command of a negative attitude towards pushing the war forward, and when the American armies landed at the Leyte Islands, he announced to the nation that it was the turning point of the war. Here KOISO states that he was led to believe by the supreme command that the Japanese operations at Leyte were successful. Later he reports that on the 19th of June 1945 the war minister SUGIYAMA told him that the Army had changed its mind and intended to take the offensive at Luzon Island instead of at Leyte. KOISO uses the above incident as an example of the lack of effective liaison between the government and the army. When KOISO finally obtained approval for the Premier to be present at all conferences of the supreme command, he was surprised to learn that the War and Navy Ministers were to be included also, since, he says, he had believed that they had been participating in the conferences all along.

KOISO dwells on the lack of unity between the Army and the Navy in the operations on OKINAWA, and the problem confronting him in obtaining authority to enforce the supreme command to act upon a fundamental course of war operation. He concluded that improvement in production could only be made if war funds could be used. Repeated experiences reinforced KOISO's belief that it was essential for the Premier in time of war to hold the War Minister's portfolio. His request was unacceptable to the Army chiefs, and for that reason KOISO resigned his leadership.

HIS DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES AS PRIME MINISTER: At the beginning of his relation of his diplomatic activities, KOISO explains his principle viewpoint concerning diplomacy in wartime. He believed in executing diplomatic measures with enemy countries such as U.S.A. and Great Britain and he proposed the replacement of the ambassador to the Soviet Union (SATO) with a more capable person, and to send another ambassador, such as Prince KONOYE to Switzerland and other European neutral countries. These plans were all for the purpose of terminating the war in favorable conditions to Japan, although such thinking was never talked about in conferences for fear of the grave consequences it would have on the public morale.

His Relations With Chungking: KOISO says that it was public knowledge that relations were dropped in the middle period of the TOJO Cabinet and the KONOYE Cabinet had officially declared that it would not confer with CHUNG Kwei-Shek. The Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU KOISO states, could not pursue relations with Chungking since he was more or less bound to support the Nanking regime.

His efforts to establish an Indonesian Government: KOISO says that the Indonesians of the Netherlands East Indies were anxious to be independent of Holland and that their frequent movements in that direction had always been severely suppressed by Holland. During the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies, he reports that great cooperation was evidenced by the Indonesians and hence Japan decided upon recognizing the establishment of self-government in Indonesia. KOISO says that the area of administration, the system of the organization, and the date of establishment of the government were under research at the time of the resignation of his cabinet.

The Problem of the Disposal of Indo-China: KOISO writes that the preceding TOJO Cabinet made an agreement with the authorities of Indo-China for the cooperative defence of that territory against the attack by a third power. He mentions the harmonious relationship his government had with the Vichy government and the change brought about under the De Gaulle government in the attitude of the French military and civil authorities who became increasingly unfriendly. Hence, his government decided on this line of action: to undertake the defense of Indo-China solely and to entrust the administration of the interior to the Annamese Government.

The MIU PIN Problem: KOISO first met MIU PIN, formerly Vice President of the New People's Association of China (Hsin Min Kwei), when the latter visited in Japan in 1939. KOISO reports that both of them agreed on the necessities of cooperation between Japan and China. MIU PIN was active in Chinese political and military affairs and participated in the China Civil War and according to KOISO tried to promote peace movements. Shortly after KOISO became Prime Minister, OGATA presented him with a statement from MIU PIN about a peace settlement between China and Japan. KOISO relates his complicated negotiations through his friend YAMAGATA who went to China to see MIU PIN and to arrange to bring MIU PIN and his short wave sets which MIU PIN operated in China and which KOISO explains enabled him to arrange for peace between the two governments. KOISO says that the opinions of MIU PIN represented the Chungking government and he summarized them as follows: (1) The problem of Manchuria should be disposed of separately and at a later date, (2) Japanese armies should be withdrawn from China completely, (3) Japan should take the high officials of the NANKING government to Japan for protection, (4) The Chungking government would open a provisional government in NANKING under the control of Chungking officials, (5) Chungking government would then come back to NANKING with three months, (6) Japan should negotiate peace with the U.S.A. and Great Britain. These arrangements of MIU PIN were shown to the Supreme Command by KOISO but they were met with distrust and disagreement. Nevertheless, MIU PIN was brought to Tokyo through KOISO's efforts but minus his radio sets which the military authorities at SHINGAI declined permission to be carried out of China. It seems that no additional information was obtained from MIU PIN other than the above listed because without his wireless sets, he had no means of getting intelligence. KOISO goes on to say that he suspected the Foreign Minister UHIGAKITSU of influencing the throne against the MIU PIN negotiations. He says that the Emperor summoned the Foreign, the War, and the Navy Ministers individually and asked their opinions and all of them answered negatively whereupon KOISO was ordered to send MIU PIN back to CHANGHAI. KOISO finished his relation of the MIU PIN problem by stating that it is still incomprehensible to him why his government did not have an ardent desire for the conclusion of peace with China.

Doc. No. 2965 - Page 8 - SUMMARY Cont'd

INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION: MOISE was faced with the ever present problem of obtaining enough authority to coordinate all phases of the war program and of satisfying the Supreme Command. He replaced various ministers and he explains his difficulties with the Naval Minister YONAI (his colleague in forming the Cabinet). The Synthetic Scheduling Bureau was an organization he set up within the Cabinet for the speedy coordination of war business. In this section he goes on to list new appointments that he made and personnel problems he had to solve.

Analysts: W.H. WAGNER and E.T. GARDEN

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 612 - SUPP

23 April 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Bound file, "Manchurian Confidential Daily Reports" (MAN MITSUDAI NIKKI)

Date: 1934 Original (x) Copy () Language:

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: IJG, Army Ministry, (HACHIOJI Dump)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TADA, Shun; KOISO, Kuniaki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Manchurian Military Aggression;
Japanese Control of Manchuria

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Main interest among file items is a lengthy report written by MajGen TADA, Shun, when he finished his two-year tour of duty as Head of the Counseling Section, Manchukuoan Military Administration. It is entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration".

It explains (1) what purpose the Counseling Section was organized for (pp 1-6), (2) How to Preserve the Peace (pp 8-14), (3) How to Set Up the Manchukuoan Army (pp 14-35), and describes (4) The Present Condition of the Military Administration of Manchukuo (pp 36-58), and (5) Future Plans (p 60).

So far as his part in utilizing Manchurian manpower and resources for war is concerned, TADA states: "Military operations used for conquering JEHOL Province in March, 1933, were the largest in scale that the Counselors of the Manchukuoan Military Administration had ever planned and guided, they involving 40,000 Manchurian-Mongolian men and eight million yen." (p 13)

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On the independence of Manchukuo he said: "The prerogative of Supreme Command of the Manchukuoan Army belongs to the Emperor of Manchukuo and forms corresponding to that of an independent state have been applied. But its motive force is controlled under the jurisdiction of the commander of the Kwantung Army -- actually and internally speaking. (p 37)

A summary and extract translation of Section 1, on the purpose of the Counseling Section, follows:

"As a provisional measure, it was necessary at that time to stabilize the Manchukuoan troops' feeling, especially to hold their loyalty to the Kwantung Army, by force. Therefore, I posted counselors and military instructors throughout Manchuria, the number of which was rather small then (they all were called Counselors later on) and ordered them to unify the troops' feeling with the might of the Kwantung Army in the background. I also perceived that the best way to hold the fate of the Manchukuoan Army in our hands and make them obey our order would be to hold money, manpower and weapons of war; and so, I planned to superintend the entire business of administration with regard to the Quartermasters Department, the section of personnel, and arms, and then to centralize the authority in these matters. (p 1)

In April, 1933, when the number of officers in actual services was doubled, I was able, with the addition of an increased number of ex-officers, to make the leaders net throughout the country an organic body, as I cherished long. Now, officers in actual services were called "Counselors", and ex-officers "Military Instructors", and I drew a consistent line of connection between them and their subordinates, thus strengthening the tie of the leaders net by tightening internal connections between those Japanese officers and military personnel posted at each Manchukuo detachment, government office and school." (p 2)

On Section 5. Future Plans (Extract):

In short, the center of gravity of our guidance will rest in our substantial hold on the Manchukuoan Army, and what we need is forcible control by a powerful and organic net of leaders, and firm hold on Manchukuoan troops feeling through a cooperative spirit. It will be important to build on this foundation all the policies and institutions.

Further, speaking of a few more concrete problems, it is important to create military police corps and re-organize M.P. Training Institutes, because the liaison between the leaders organic net and the cell of Japanese personnel should be intensified. Such matters as personnel,