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外文華語
29

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◎第一四五本 封面
(cover of no.145)

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(a selected page of no.145)

* 292. "Das Gedanken des heutigen Käffchen sind in jeder Epoche die Komödien der Zukunft." 8 of Vico, *Soliloqua Nuova*, 18218 (Copy Ricciard, p.455). "Gli uomini di tutte le antiche età erano così, dappo avanti con animo 193

293. Mill, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*: "God must be believed in before he can be passed over or renounced".⁸ 294. To Hill it seems absurd that anyone could suppose that unless the belief be logically inferred from a subject capable of being in your head, it cannot be the result of reason".⁹ Cicero, *De Divinatione* I, 3, 3, "had the ancients, in my judgment, established such practices rather under consideration of experience than of the dictates of reason" (*Atque haec, ut 295 arbitror, veteris et rerum maiorum eventus mortali quam statuere deo prevaricatum*).¹⁰ 297. In other countries, Mill is perfectly willing of the social importance of non-logical actions... e.g. On behalf of Nero, there is an asocial class, a large portion of the morality of the Empire emanating from class interests & its political class superiority".¹¹ 298. Echo of Leo Tolstoy's writing to so with logical experimental science & the worship of Russia may depend on a person with simple religious cult, Tolstoyism.¹² excepted. 312. Non-logical actions are regarded as tricks I do not by some individuals for sleek...¹³ 313. Even Polybius, speaker of the religion of the Romans as originally in deliberate article (*Historiae*, VI, 56, 8-12, of 194, *Ab urbe condita*, I, 19, 4). 314. Similarly Montaigne in *Dissertation sur la politesse des Romains dans la Religion*...¹⁴ Neither Tolstoy & Montaigne had not a spontaneous development of non-logical conduct. 316.¹⁵ We rarely find Tolstoy...¹⁶ Romantico sentito un perfetto e commosso finalmente sufficiente come niente pura", i.e. the primitive experience o'new chosed in emotional

◎第一四六本 內文
(a selected page of no.146)

◎第一四六本 封面
(cover of no.146)

8月前史詩女優，歌劇女伶，林氏時代內記31
of French Dépêche (Godeaux's Batonnié), musicista francese.

appresentati qui alcuni versi sotto il nome del Scenografo, a tutti parve molto eccellenti, e furono ben dati con le maraviglie ed esclamazioni; poi, seppe darsi per cose che erano di un altro, per essere subito la reputazione, e parvero men che mediocre. ^{shot pasti composta} 8. E cantandosi pur in presenza della signora Duchesne un nottetto, non piacque man ni fa stimato per bene, finchè non si sappò che quella era composizione di l'ospinello de Pisa.¹⁰ Non vi riuscì che tenendo voi al di fuori mollesce d'ore, dicendo talor che e' a peccatissime, talor insipidissime? E questo perché a voi era fa, suoco i di quelli che altri diceva i che e' an di voi...; e poi ancora che fu scoperto l'errore, per modo alcuno non tollerante credere: tanto fermamente era confusa nella mente nostra quella falsa opinione, la qual però delle altrui parole nasceva. 9. 336. Alcuna volta, quando fu quello a far arguzie e facili, in presenza d'onorate dame, e appena quelle maledisse, si mettono a dire sordidezze e diorose parole; e questo più le ragione ell'opere, tanto più si denegron Cortegiani, e tuttavia ridono, e grottoni da sé di cosa bella vista, come lor pare avere... 10. Spesso s'urtaano giù per le scale, si fanno di legno e di mattoni l'um l'alto nelle Remi, mattoni pugni di polvere negli occhi, fiamme d'acqua i morti addio se ne fanno o giù di qualche posta a tavola fisi, minestre, saperi, zuppe, tutte si stanno nel cortile, e poi ridono, e chi di queste cose se ne farà più, quello fa meglio. C'aglioni e più galante in ciò stampa s'affoga, e dagli ampi grandi gatti gran ghe...¹¹

40

* A l'ent de la cour de France des "mains du roi" jusqu'à Louis XIV en
comptant par Boileau, Sat. I le jeu que Louis XIV fonda quelque temps. pp.
** et supra 1 p. 152 Xo 14. 1588 Urk. 245. Rij 246

les noms, les années s'éclairent mutuellement. "Je m'y perds, disent-ils, et je
n'y comprends rien; il ne sait que de faire qu'ils sabordent et qu'ils se
fassent." Je vous dis, moi, que j'y vois clair et que j'y comprends tout. Ils
se sont parlés

87. Il ne semble que j'ou sollicite pour les autres à la confiance d'un homme
232 d'un homme qui demande justice, et j'en parlant on en ajoute pour
soi-même ou à l'embaras et la peine de celui qui demande à celle.

97. Dans cent ans, le monde abîmera encore un peu entier; ce sera le
même théâtre et les mêmes déceptions; ce ne seront plus les mêmes acteurs.
Tout ce qui se déroule sur une grande scène, pour ce qui s'atteste et se dés-
coper, sera en écho. Tous auront disparu de depuis la scène. Il s'avance
233 déjà sur le théâtre plusieurs hommes qui vont jouer dans une même
face les mêmes rôles; ils s'envahiront à leur tour; et ceux qui ne
sont pas encore, un jour ne seront plus; de nouveaux acteurs ont pris leur
place. quel bon à faire sur un personnage de comédie! *

101. Le rôle dérisoire de la province; la cour dérisoire de la ville, et jadis
de la cour. Un esprit bien pris à la cour le joli de la noblesse et de
la retraite. **

Ch. IX. Des Grands

1. La présentation du peuple en farces des Grands est au contraire, et l'entraîneur,
pour leur geste, leur visage, leur ton de voix et leurs manières, si gêne-
237 ale que, si ils s'enviraient à être bons, cela irait à l'idiotie.

3. Je leur [les grands] offre leurs faveurs chères, leurs richesses amoule-
238 ment, leurs chiens, leurs chevaux, leurs singes, leurs nains, leurs
gousses et leurs plattans; mais je leur enlève le bonheur d'avoir et

CONTENTS

No. 145

1. Qian's Table of Contents	3
2. Stray Notes	4
3. J. N. Findlay, <i>Hegel: A Re-Examination</i>	5
4. Franz Grillparzer, <i>Gesammelte Werke</i>	18
5. Wilhelm Wundt, <i>Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie</i>	19
<i>Bd. I</i>	19
<i>Bd. III</i>	24
6. Vilfredo Pareto, <i>A Treatise on General Sociology, Vol. I</i>	33
7. Chaïm Perelman, <i>The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument</i>	78
8. Vilfredo Pareto, <i>A Treatise on General Sociology, Vol. II</i>	86
9. Edmondo de Amicis, <i>Cuore</i>	123
10. G. W. F. Hegel, <i>Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte</i>	136
11. Edward Bullough (ed.), <i>Cambridge Readings in Italian Literature</i>	151
12. Philip Massinger, <i>Plays</i>	176
<i>The Unnatural Combat</i>	176
<i>The Fatal Dowry</i>	179
13. John Berger, <i>G.</i>	182
14. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, <i>Don Giovanni</i>	184
15. Mme de Staël (Germaine de Staël-Holstein), <i>De l'Allemagne</i>	209
16. Prosper Mérimée, <i>Romans et Nouvelles</i>	235
17. Marcel Proust, <i>À la Recherche du Temps Perdu</i>	318
<i>Du Côté de chez Swann</i>	318
<i>À L'Ombre des Jeunes Filles en Fleur</i>	382
18. Raymond Aron, "Interpreting Pareto" (<i>Encounter</i> 1976)	401
19. Stray Notes	403

No. 146

1. Qian's Table of Contents	407
2. Baldassare Castiglione, <i>Il Libro del Cortegiano</i>	409
3. Hugh Trevor-Roper, <i>Hermit of Peking: The Hidden Life of Sir Edmund Backhouse</i>	448
4. Donald Hall, <i>The Oxford Book of American Literary Anecdotes</i>	466
5. René Wellek, <i>A History of Modern Criticism</i>	507
<i>Vol. V, English Criticism, 1900—1950</i>	507

Vol. VI, American Criticism 1900—1950	547
6. Felix Pryor, <i>The Faber Book of Letters</i>	586


No. 147

1. Qian's Table of Contents	601
2. Stray Notes	602
3. Jean de La Bruyère, <i>Les Caractères</i>	603
4. J. J. Rousseau, <i>Emile</i>	667
5. Jean-François Revel, <i>La Cabale des Dévots: Pourquoi des Philosophes?</i>	671
6. Marcus Fabius Quintilian, <i>Institutio Oratoria</i>	691
7. Iris Murdoch, <i>The Black Prince</i>	739
8. G. W. F. Hegel, <i>System und Geschichte der Philosophie</i>	740
9. Immanuel Kant, <i>Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht</i> (to be continued) ...	757
10. Jean de La Bruyère, <i>Les Caractères</i>	791
11. Kingsley Amis, <i>Ending Up</i>	792
Author Index	793
Title Index	794

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10. John Berger, G.
11. Mozart, Don Giovanni.
12. Jérôme de Stael, De l'Allemagne
13. Merimée, Romans et Nouvelles.
14. Marcel Proust, A la Recherche du Temps perdu, I.

Findlay, p. 330 on "The Coming of Reason". T.H.S., June 11, 1976, p. 708 on the British opium traffic to reverse the adverse balance of trade with China. "The straw German missionary Karl Grätzlaff played an important role, on the grounds that the 'traffic would tend ultimately to the introduction of the gospel.' A most notable American missionary referred to English naval forces as 'God's fleet' & spoke of opium & thirty-two pirates as 'the instruments of the Divine will'."

Rosenberg on Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship on 1 Jan. 1933: "On this day, it can be finally said, Nagel died" (New Statesman, 18 Feb. 1977, p. 219).

Festmäte Fall" Marginalia, II Band V, III, S. "Nekrologie des Zwecke." Albert L. Girard,

Marginalia, u. Wundt, III, 5. "Neurotique des Zwecke". Alden L. Griswold,
Art for Art's Sake, pp. xxviii: "Technique, the inevitable companion
of art, early turns into its enemy. If it grows over-conscious, it
becomes dynamical"; pp. 231-2: "We have in our organism a sizeable
amount of chalk, iron, water; put a bit of chalk, a lump of iron,
a pocket of water, are diseased conditions. Similarly, technique,
information, ideas & ideals ^{as} are elements of strength if they
are duly integrated; they become morbid symptom if they are
to human alien matter imbedded in the tissue of flesh. As Ortega y Gasset
described it, a work of art may hold much 'Sociology in solution'".

^{in Germany}
Dirksen, Lampe's Studies in Rebellion, p. 74: "What Belinsky found in Hegel was the worship of the power of history, which turns every actual historical moment into an ideal, & which Modern man has vulgarized in the delectable practice of 'adapting himself to circumstances': whatever happens is inevitable in virtue of 'historical necessity'!"

But P.A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Santayana, p.11: "That which repelled me in Hegel, Brown, etc. was the survival of a sort of forced optimism & fulfilment of a dream, by which a cruel & nasty world was nevertheless set up as the model of man, what ought to be. The duty of an honest moralist would have been rather to disbelieve, Jaish, in this mixed reality, the part, however small, that could be loved & chosen from the remnant, however large, which was to be rejected & denounced." p.58. George Eliot has Adam Bede declare: "Evil come out of it!... That doesn't alter the' evil

8) Vauvenargues: "La clarté est la forme joc des philosophes", cf. D. H. F. & C. (Jean Paul, Vorlesungen über Ästhetik, § 45) pp. 105-106 (A. Thibauder, Réflexions sur la critique, p. 168).

J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination

9) a brief but rounded account. To provide a guiding thread through the tortuous intricacies of Hegel's principal writings.¹⁸ Germany has fitted him into an uncontested place in its historic culture, high in the centre with Kant & above all Jünger & party. France has excelled all previous Hegelian studies in the objectivity, the scholarship & the illumination of M. Jean Hyppolite's excellent translation & commentary Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel. Despite his condemnation of Hegel, Kierkegaard's views might have come straight from one of Hegel's own phenomenological studies.¹⁹ The wanton obscurity of his language Hegel only acquired a tolerably lucid style after he had been lecturing for some years at Heidelberg & Berlin, & by then his 2 greatest philosophical works — The Phenomenology of Spirit & The Science of Logic had been written. The absurd charge that Hegel was responsible almost solely for the atrocities of Hitlerism.²⁰ The Hegelian Absolute is What is entirely present (das durchaus Gezeignete), What is on hand & actual, not something over & above them or behind them (etwas darüber und hinter). It is not realized in a supramundane consciousness, nor in a timeless comprehensive vision, but in the creative activities & products of the artist, the poet & worship of the religious person, & the systematic insights of the philosopher.²¹ The Philosophy of Nature makes it plain that Hegel believed in the existence of natural objects long before the advent of life & consciousness in the world.²² There is as much materialism in Hegel as in Marx — just as there is certainly a strong strain of teleological idealism in Marx.²³ The purpose of Hegel is to see notions as embodying half-formed tendencies sometimes conflicting which other notion will bring out into the open. Self-contingency is not necessarily negating & self-stultifying.²⁴ The Marx contemporary says: "I hate that talk o' people, as if there was a way o' makin' amends for everytig'

*G. Müller: "Die Vernunft ist nur der durch die Phantasie erweiterte Verstand" (Gesam. Werke, ed. E. Rödiger & A. Sauer, II, 144)

importance of Hegel lies in his recognition of the "open texture," the nuclear corners of all living action, the fact that they imply more than they clearly express, & in the further fact that it is natural for them to move or develop in certain ways as soon as they are subjected to unwanted pressures.²⁷ While modern thought ascribes to the freezing & exaggerating of tendencies implicit in current usage to the Misunderstanding by philosophers of the fluid forms of our language, Hegel ascribes it to the "Understanding", the faculty of hard & fast abstract thought, which he opposes to the more fluid "Reason".²⁸ Wittgenstein: "Philosophy is a battle against the petrification of our understanding through the instruments of our speech" (Philosophical Investigations, I, 109). Hegel: "The battle of Reason consists in this, to overcome the rigidity which the Understanding has brought in" (Wallace, tr. of the Lesser Logic as the logic of Hegel, p. 67).²⁹ In the Christian story of the Incarnation, Passion & Resurrection of Christ Hegel comes to see the ^{phenomenology} in Baillie, 1893, central theme: "But the living Spirit is not one that shuns death & keeps clear of destruction; it endures its death, & in death maintains its being".³⁰ Posterty owes a debt to the students on whose notes the published lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Fine Art & the History of Philosophy: they show us Hegel unhampered by the formidable ledgers of his written style.³¹ He dislikes preliminary statements of initial presuppositions. The principles of his philosophy must, he holds, emerge in its systematic development: they must be its outcome rather than its foundation. The

Hegel's obiter dictum on Man's generative organs in Hegel Heine's Ludwig Boerne, Buch IV of Hegel, *Philosophie des Geistes*, 1897

* of Schelling on "Subject-objectivity" & "Self-deception" ^{of the creative student, without any knowledge of the direction & goal of his reasoning, is lost in the great waste of repetitive explanations." 38} Spirit is the only reality, but it must content itself with something seemingly alien, in order to see through its self-deception, to become aware that it is the only reality. And the Creation & Rebirth aside of this strange deception is ³⁹ moreover necessary to Spirit, which could have no reality without it. "Spirit" means both the object & the subject of "self-consciousness". It is what I refer to by the pronoun "I", what I am aware of. When... I am not merely absorbed in my commerce with definite objects, but am also aware of myself as active in dealing with them.

⁴⁸ There is no page from past philosophy on which Hegel sets so much store as on Fichte's account of the divine thought as a Vōno's vōnoeus or thinking on thinking. It is quoted at length at the end of the Encyclopædia. He quotes with approval Meister Eckhart: "The eye with which God sees me, is the eye with which I see Him," ⁴⁹ my eye & His eye are one. In the meeting of Justice I am weighed in God & He in me. If God were not, I should not be, & if I were not, He too would not be" (*Phil. of Religion*, I, p. 228). Kant's "transcendental self-consciousness" is undoubtedly an ancestor of Hegel's Spirit, but it is from Fichtel's Ego that the Hegelian notion of Spirit principally derives. ⁵⁰ The Ego points objects as a resultant environment (*Anstoss*) because it requires resistance (*Anstoss*) to elicit its own activities *

⁵⁰ The kind of thought characteristic of a deductive system is the Understanding, a thought distinguished by great fixity & definiteness of notions. It cuts off

the corners of our ideas, all the fine penumbra by which they shade into other ideas, or imply them without plainly including them: it also checks the tendency of our ideas & principles to shift & transform themselves into other ideas & principles when faced with unwanted cases or questions. Having cut out other ideas in this manner, it proceeds to play various neat games with them which are entirely successful just because their counters are in standard shapes, & fit perfectly into each other. The depreciation of Understanding goes back to Kant. The Sciences & practical arts all involve understanding in their initial abstractions, & would be impossible without it. They must deal with their subject-matter from a peculiar, single stand-point, & must dismiss all other considerations as irrelevant.⁶¹ Understanding is for Hegel the principle of all bourgeois virtues, the faculty that makes a man stick to the duties of his calling. "The cultivated man is not satisfied with enough nebulous & indefinite, but strives on objects in their definiteness, whereas the uncultivated man vacillates hither & thither." (Hegel, p. 145) In Phenomenology (Brillie, p. 93) there is a passage in which Hegel even waxes typical in praise of the Understanding with its "amazing power of the negative" in separating "the merely accidental". Understanding is the beginning of philosophy.⁶² Philosophy, having separated off aspects from the continuum of the unanalysed, must again allow these aspects to "pass over into one another".⁶³ Moore's emphatic quotation from Butler, "Every thing is what it is & NOT another thing"— prepared to put an end to the "identities in difference" & the "organicunities" of the British idealists—is a typical expression

*中庸

of Understanding. The dialectical aspect of thought is the self-supersession of the fixed determinations of the Understanding; "Their inwardly tendency to go out of themselves" (Wallace, p. 147). One-sided abstractions demand to be complemented by alternative abstractions which are often as anti-theoretical as complementary. Dialectic becomes a reflective shuffling to & fro between notions known to be interdependent & correlative.⁶⁵ Hegel attributes dialectical process to "the world", to the heavenly bodies & political affairs (Wallace, pp. 148-50). Contradiction is the motive force of the world, & it is absurd to say that contradictions are unthinkable (Wallace, p. 223).⁶⁶ Dialectic is only a "moment" in philosophical thinking. If it overcomes the hard-&-fast notions & fixed presuppositions of the Understanding, it must itself be overcome in the higher thought of Reason or "Speculative Thought", which succeeds in uniting or reconciling apparently contradictory notions. If the Understanding has separated off & opposed plainly such pairs of concepts as "What appears to the senses" & "What exists in reality"; "What pertains to something intrinsically" & "What pertains to something in relation to other things", etc., then the function of Reason is to integrate such notions into newunities, where will be shown to require each other to be necessary conditions of each other.⁶⁷ The Speculative or reasonable attitude in philosophy marks a thinking return to the unthinkable reasonableness of ordinary speech, as this had been before it was disrupted & fixed by the action of the Understanding. As Farabito's content goes, the reasonable is so little the exclusive property of philosophy that it is rather present in all human beings" (Wallace, pp. 152-3).⁶⁸ The disharmonies & contradictions are overcome only

* These occur in groups of three, the 3rd category being in a sense a combination of the two previous ones, e.g. "Anticipation" combines "Reality" & "Negation" of T. K. Seung, Structuration & Hermeneutics, pp. 10-14 on the Confusion of "Binary distinction (contradiction) & primary opposition" (Contradiction in Heidegger, Hegel, Levinas, etc.).
 in the sense that they are seen to be necessary conditions of a reasonable result, & so, in a sense, not overcome at all.⁶⁸ We are reminded of those photographs in which several successive Ballet-positions are projected on the same film. Reason sees together what in Dialectic are separate & incompatible. A dialectical rhythm essentially involves a triplity of stages.⁶⁹ Hegel thinks it was one of the main merits of Kant to have rediscovered this ancient thinking & to have used it in drawing up his list of categories. Fichte had already seen the triadic scheme into Kant & located these relations in a series of three-fold movements (thesis, antithesis & synthesis). The terms "thesis", "antithesis" & "synthesis", so frequently used in expositions of Hegel's doctrine, are in fact not frequently used by Hegel: they are much characteristic of Fichte.⁷⁰ The triads of Hegel's system vary vastly in their make-up. In some the second member of the triad is the direct & obvious contrary of the first (e.g. Being vs Nothing, Essence vs Appearance); in others the opposition is of a much less extreme character (e.g. Whole & its Parts). In some triads the 3rd member is an obvious choice as mediating between the other two (e.g. Measure synthesises Individual & Universal);⁷¹ in other cases the third member is merely one of the three in which the first two members could be united (e.g. Ground is said to mediate Identity with Difference). In yet other cases the reconciling functions of the third member are not at all obvious (e.g. Teleology reconciles the Mechanical & the Chemical, or the Unhappy (the worldliness emerges out of Scepticism & Scepticism). There are many more triads in which the 3rd member emerges out of the 2nd member alone.