



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

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KIDO, Marquis, keep of Privy Seal:

Case # 5
Serial 1

Interview with Russell Brines A. P. on Sept. 24 quoted below:

1500 24/9 KIDO opened Emperor had no prior knowledge Pearl Harbor Attack. although realized war imminent adding he likewise uniformed learning finally thru radio broadcasts at private home stop Court routine brought out first day war continued quote with nothing unusual occurring unquote

1500 KIDO said he personally hasn't seen Roosevelt's Peace Plea but opened Tojo who then premier delivered it palace and Emperor ignored it on Tojo's advice stop Kido however received November twenty six memorandum will quote aye shock unquote

Requote eye had hoped Washington Conference might fruitful stop but state dept memorandum which stipulated removal Japanese troops China and other requirements made clear the conferences had gone backward. requote eye submitted memorandum to Emperor stop at that time eye gave no advice him unquote but others reiterated Kido's previous advice quote that it would be unwise for Emperor to oppose rising tide war with Japan unquote stop advised militants too powerful for Japan to comply with state dept. requirements for withdrawal troops China.

Kido and Tojo then seeing Emperor separately and Kido said didn't know details Tojo's advice on who other principal advisers were but Kido himself had no arguments with Tojo or clashes of opinion when they chanced meet.

Fifth 1500 24/9 Many well informed Japanese say Kido one closest henchmen certain militarist including Tojo during war and its preludes and one strongest members current oligarchy seek to prolong rule.

John B. Kennedy
Major GP

CASE NO. 5

RE : KIDO, Keichi

STATUS : PENDING

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES: On 5 Dec. 45 the following report was obtained from the files of CIS.

Marquis KIDO (Keichi) was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture July 1869, son of Marquis KIDO Takamasa. He married a sister of Count KODAMA Hideo. This proved an excellent marriage, on political grounds at least, for the Kodama family is influential and wealthy, and the Count has held high diplomatic and Cabinet positions.

Perhaps the political heritage of his family was more responsible than any other factor for Marquis KIDO's successful career. His grandfather was the famous KIDO Kein, one of the inner circle of political strategists who successfully plotted the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1867-8. KIDO came from the powerful clan of Choshu which together with Satsuma and Tosa were the leading clans in the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

It is quite apparent from a study of the memoirs and diaries of that period that KIDO Kein had the keenest brain in that talented circle of political advisers to the Meiji Emperor, and his influence was definitely of a liberal nature. He was opposed, for instance, to attempts by jingoist factions to launch a war against Korea; he also advised the government against permitting army officers to hold concurrently a position in the government. KIDO Kein died while still at the height of his mental powers in 1878 leaving a gap in the camp of the more moderate liberal counselors which was never filled. This political heritage of the present Marquis KIDO has been sketched at some length for undoubtedly it has played an important part in KIDO's career and probably also was a factor in his selection as Keeper of the Lord Privy Seal.

After graduating from Kyoto Imperial University in politics in 1915 KIDO's career was that of an industrious and highly successful professional bureaucrat. After filling increasingly important positions in the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce he became chief secretary to the Lord Privy Seal. He received his first Cabinet ap-

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pointment during the first KONOYE Government when he served part time as Minister of Education and part time as Welfare Minister. (General ARAKI also served as Minister of Education in the first KONOYE Cabinet.)

He became Home Minister in the HIRANUMA Government (January 1939 to August 1939). It was during this period that a distinctly reactionary and nationalistic attitude became apparent in KIDO although that tendency must have long been latent. For instance, during his tenure of office as Home Minister, obviously inspired demonstrations were staged, chiefly against Britain. At times they were of so menacing a nature that the British Embassy had to protest to the Japanese Government. As Home Minister it would have been KIDO's duty to check such demonstrations which would have been easy with tight Japanese police control, but it was apparent that these demonstrations were at least tacitly encouraged by the government. In this particular question the Japanese Government refused to curb the demonstrations saying that to do so would be to create large scale violence. The above rather minor consideration of KIDO's policies as Home Minister is not so important in itself but is rather a clue to his political sympathies.

His associations with Baron HIRANUMA is also indicative of his reactionary attitude. HIRANUMA is undoubtedly the most venerable and influential leader of the "feudal" reactionary bureaucrats in Japan. He was one time head of the KOKUHONSHA (Society for the Foundation of the State) which exerted a strongly conservative if not fascist influence among the senior members of the bureaucracy, Zaibatsu, and Court circles. HIRANUMA has been stubbornly opposed even to the liberal constitutionalism of the West and is an ardent supporter of the more mystical concepts of Imperial absolutism. Thus when HIRANUMA, who has a long career in the higher bureaucracy, chose KIDO for Home Minister, it was a significant indication of HIRANUMA's trust and confidence in KIDO's political views, particularly at that time of international and domestic tension.

YUASA Kurahei, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, retired in the spring of 1940 and was succeeded in June by Marquis KIDO. During the incumbency of YUASA the post was rich in honors and dignity rather than potent in political affairs. Holding the Imperial Seals which made laws and appointments valid, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal scarcely surpassed the Minister of the Imperial Household in political influence and was certainly less important than the President of the Privy Council. YUASA was a taciturn, retiring scholar of constitutional history whose background and position was sufficient to make him an object of suspicion to Army extremists but whose political authority was never so pre-eminent as to make him a favorite target of their lethal hostility. His retirement hardly created a ripple in the Japanese political world.

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When KIDO took this office in the summer of 1940 he soon made of it the key position in the hierarchy of the Japanese bureaucracy. Prince SAIONJI, last of the Genro (Elder Statesmen), died in the fall of 1940. It had been customary for the Genro to advise the Emperor after the fall of each Cabinet as to the succeeding Premier. These Elder Statesmen who had filled the position of closest advisers to the Meiji Emperors by an unwritten understanding were not to be perpetuated, particularly since their position was extra-constitutional and giving rise to considerable criticism. SAIONJI, as the lone surviving Genro, had long been in a position to advise the Emperor in his choice of first Minister.

KIDO, just recently made Lord Privy Seal, and himself a protege of SAIONJI, quickly filled the political vacuum created by the latter's death. After the fall of a Cabinet all the living ex-Premiers meet to discuss the question of a new Prime Minister (in this capacity they are called Jushin or Senior Ministers). KIDO presides over their deliberations and exercises an intangible but undoubtedly heavy authority since he has to take final responsibility for the choice he recommends to the Emperor. Thus, it is not quite fair to say that KIDO alone chooses the Prime Minister but he more than any one individual exercises greater influence in this selection. The fact that he exercised this power throughout the war years and particularly his choice of TOJO as Premier in the fall of 1941 makes his political responsibility for the events of this period exceedingly heavy.

From reports of those in a position to know, it is reasonably well established that KIDO was one of the first of the important political figures to decide on surrender. Once his mind was made up on that issue he exercised very considerable influence to persuade the Emperor and his advisers that surrender was necessary. His decision in this matter and his consistency in carrying it out are quite typical of KIDO. He is a man of quick, perceptive mind and, in contrast to his friend and former patron KONOYE, once his mind is made up he acts quickly. His personality is far more obscure than that of KONOYE and other contemporary Japanese political figures both because he did not hold prominent positions before 1940, and because later his position as Lord Privy Seal with the close association to the Throne makes it difficult if not impossible for the press to gain easy access to him. We get a glimpse of KIDO as an energetic, bustling little man with an excellent mind, orderly rather than brilliant. His influence in the last few years has definitely been weighted in favor of militarism and extreme nationalism.

Although he was originally a protege of KONOYE's and has remained close to him, there is evidence now that a rift is appearing between them. In this connection it is noteworthy that in the new publication "Shinsei" (New Life) there appeared an article which sharply attacks KIDO by a certain IWABUCHI Tatsuo. (This article appears in full translation as Annex 2 to this memorandum). IWABUCHI is quite a capable newspaper man who is one of

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the KONOYE ceteris. This attack would thus suggest that KONOYE, who has a strong instinct for self-preservation and the winning side, has decided that KIDO is no longer a healthy political figure with whom to be closely associated. Unlike KONOYE, also, who has twisted and turned to explain away the unhappy records in his career, KIDO in a press interview given in September to an American journalist quite frankly accepted the responsibility for the major decisions of 1941. This is mentioned not in any mitigating sense but simply as an illustration of the more forthright and decisive quality of KIDO's character as compared to KONOYE's.

KIDO's responsibility for Japanese policy during the last five years is as unequivocal and clear as that of any one statesman. The fact that he is the closest adviser to the Emperor makes the point so obvious that it need not be labored. Yet the fact that he is the closest adviser to the Emperor has until the recent press attack mentioned above shielded him from open criticism. There is no reason, however, why a man of his record should continue to occupy an influential position during the period of allied occupation. Accordingly, as with KONOYE, it is recommended that the Japanese Government compel him to resign his present position as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and inhibit him from occupying in the future any public position.

James J. Gaine Jr.
JAMES J. GAINE JR.
Capt. Inf.

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CASE NO : 5

SERIAL NO : 3

4

13 December 1945

CASE NO. 5

RE: KIDO, Koichi Marquis

STATUS: Pending

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

Born July 1889, son of Marquis Takamasa Kido, Grandson of Koin Kido, leader of Meiji Restoration. Married Tsuru, sister of Count Hideo Kodama.

Nov. '37 - May '38 - Education Minister, 1st Konoye Cabinet

Jan. '38 - Jan '39 - Welfare Minister of 1st Konoye Cabinet

Jan. - Aug. '39 - Home Minister of Hiranuma Cabinet

June '40 - Appointed Lord Keeper of Privy Seal.

Address: 62 Shinsoka - Machi, Akasaka-Ku - Tokyo

Described by Hugh Byos in 1937 as a nationalist and reformist, but a practical minded statesman who in emergencies would tend to adopt a conservative course. Popular aristocrat and friend of Prince Konoye. An official 1940 report stated that he held progressive views and was acceptable to the Army.

The post of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal is that of chief political advisor to the Emperor and is of key importance in Japanese political structure. As Lord Keeper of Privy Seal, Kido acts as Emperor's go-between with Jushin who indicate their choice for appointment as Premier.

Following from an interview with Guy de la Chevalerie, Oct. 5, 1942: Kido, important advisor near the throne, like Count Matsudaira and the Emperor himself, is almost certainly personally opposed to present Japanese policy, and therefore might at some future date be an important factor in any peace movement; is listed by source as one of many liberal Japanese who opposes the present war as a suicidal policy but feel that they now have no other choice but to support the war effort."

Following from a resident in Japan 20 years; President of Privy Council, very prominent in government affairs, is less extreme than Military Party.

COPIES 3 File

CASE NO. : 5

SERIAL NO.: 4

Following from an anonymous letter to the chief of staff: Lord Chamberlain Kido, member of Kasumijama Club Members, person with exclusive rights and privileges, assembled in Kasumijama Club at Tora-No-Mon every Monday to discuss politics and make plans for maintaining individual power.

A former secretary of the Jap Embassy interrogated in the U. S. A. reports Kido as one of a group of Jap statesmen likely to cooperate with the Allies.

From Tolischus - on 16 July 41 when Matsuoka refused Konoyes request to resign, he was visited by Marquis Kido and under that pressure he yielded.

Source of the following unknown. Taken from a card listing the organization. Probably from an ONI publication: Marquis Koichi Kido is a member of Shin Be Ha a group (including Konoye, Hiranuma and Okada) favoring cooperation with the United States.

Following from "Emperor of Japan", Page 10 Collation Section PWB, OMS, GHQ, AFPAC, Spec Report No. 4: dtd 22 July 45: "Hirohito's most intimate counselors in the Imperial Household, nobles like Marquis Kido (Lord Keeper of Privy Seal) - - - were denounced by Chauvinistic young officers for being bad influences to the throne, in the early 1930's."

From Domei, 5 Oct. 45, CCD Comment Sheet, 10 Oct. '45 "Revealing that For. Min Shigeru Yoshida at 5 o'clock this afternoon visited Gen. MacArthur Headquarters to make reports and secure the Headquarter's understanding on the resignation of the Prince Higoshi-Kuni Cabinet, these circles pointed out the necessity on the part of Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal, one other elder statesman to sound out the intention of the Allied authorities before starting selection of a new Premier." Underlined portions were deleted.

James J. Gaine, Jr.
James J. Gaine, Jr.
Capt. Inf.

CASE # 5
SER # 4

22 DEC 1945

(Detach and surrender)

RECEIPT NO. 4

1720
(Time)

21 December 1945
(Date)

Received Kino Koichi MARQUIS
who has been returned
to Sugamo Prison and placed in my
custody.

R. L. J. J. J. J.
1st Lt. Col.

File 5-
Ser 5

Exhibit No. 1

REPORT

FILE NO. 5

RE: KIDO, Koichi (Marquis)

REPORT BY: J. B. ALEXANDER

DATE: 22 Dec., 1945

STATUS : PENDING

The undersigned delivered KIDO, Koichi (Marquis) to the officer of the Guard at Sugamo Prison, R. T. Townsend, 1st Lt., CAC, at 1720 hours 21 December 1945 in the presence of :

Fred H. Uyehara, 2nd Lt. Inf., International Pros. Sec.
Robert R. Crookshank, 1st Lt., CMP, 720 MP Bn.
S/Sgt Leonard Rice, 720 MP Bn.

Receipt No. 4, the original of which is attached as Exhibit No. 1 was received from Lt. Townsend.

PENDING

REPORT

FILE NO. : 5

Report by LeRoy H.
Barnard

RE : Marquis KIDO

DATE : 3 January 1946

STATUS: Pending

On 21 December 1945, Marquis KIDO was removed from Sugamo Prison to Hatori House in Tokyo where the following interrogation was conducted:

"INTERROGATION OF MARQUIS KIDO

December 21, 1945
Hatori House
2:00 p.m.

PRESENT: Mr. Fihelly; Colonel Sackett; Mr. Higgins; Mr. Sackett;
Mr. Lowe

COLONEL SACKETT: Among the Army, who were those that wanted the war in the Army group?

A. Within the Army, a group inside the Bureau of Military Affairs headed at that time by Colonel - Major General Kenryo Sato. That group was the most belligerent group.

Q. What was their theory? Why did they want war?

A. Sato's group in the Bureau of Military Affairs became allied with the Navy people represented by such men as Ishikawa and Yamaki, and also the main question was the question of oil. In order to go down to the South East Indies and gain control over their raw materials there. The Army was also concerned with the question of oil.

Q. Who else besides Ishikawa and Yamaki were in that group in the Navy that wanted - which war is it you speak about? The war with the United States, or the China war?

A. The war with the United States.

Q. What were the names of some of the other people in that group in the Navy that wanted that war for the same reasons?

A. Since I had no direct contact with such people because of my position, I don't remember the names, but those inside the Bureau of Naval Affairs within the Navy, the younger officers were the most belligerent ones.

Q. Who were the most belligerent officers in the Army General Staff at that time? Who wanted war?

A. Major General Akira Muto. He is now in the Philippines.

Q. What was his job at that time?

A. He was in the Bureau of Military Affairs.

Q. Of the Army General Staff?

A. No. The Bureau of Military Affairs in the Ministry of the Army.

Q. He was under Tojo?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he the next man under Tojo?

A. No. There is a Vice-Minister.

Q. What other people were in that Military Affairs Bureau, besides the Vice-Minister, who were in favor of war? The names?

A. Muto and Sato, which I mentioned earlier, were the most outstanding ones I remember.

Q. Where was Sato? Was he in the Minister of War's office too?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, how about the general officers? The officers of the General Staff?

A. As I remember, the General Staff in general were positively in favor of the war. If we go back to the records of the names, I could perhaps point out some, but at present, I don't remember the names of these younger officers in control.

Q. How about Lieutenant General Suzuki?

A. The one that became the president of the Planning Board?

Q. Yes.

A. He was maintaining the war against the United States can be successful.

Q. He was President of the Planning Board in about the middle of 1941? Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. And remained as President of the Planning Board until about the middle of 1942? Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, the Planning Board had to approve the policy of going to war with the United States, isn't that right?

A. No, the Planning Board was not in a position to approve the plans, but they were rather in the position to survey the aspect of raw materials in case of the conduct of the war with the United States and to supply various studies.

Q. That is the Planning Board of the Cabinet you are talking about?

A. Yes.

Q. Who else was on that Planning Board at that time?

A. Among the younger ones, such men as Hidoto Mori and Sako Mizu.

Q. Were they representing other branches of the government, or was that their only position?

A. I think they were not representing other ministries, but they were officials of the Planning Board Proper.

Q. Did you meet with the Planning Board as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal? Did you talk to them or have conferences with them?

A. No.

Q. Did they seek advice, either General Suzuki or any other members of the Board? Did they see you for advice or guidance in making recommendations to the Emperor?

A. Once in awhile.

Q. What was the subject of their views or positions that they wanted to take up with the Emperor?

A. The views and position?

Q. Views or their positions? In other words, what did they want to get across to the Emperor?

A. Mainly on the question of raw materials, such as iron, steel, and oil and also on the question of shipbuilding, which was one of the most vital questions at the beginning of the war with Japan.

MR. FIEHELLY: Was it material for war that they were discussing with you?

A. Yes.

Q. With the United States?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you know officially, that is, in the position that you were holding, what the views of these respective officers were? How did you come to learn officially - not hearsay - How did you come to learn as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal what the views of these men who were pushing for war were?

A. Mainly through the Prime Minister Tojo. The General Staff kept themselves rather mum about their plans.

Q. How often did these men discuss with you the matter of material necessary for war with the United States.

A. I remember only about two times. Twice.

Q. What was the approximate date of that? In other words, how long before war actually broke out?

A. About two months before the outbreak of the war. After the formation of the Tojo Cabinet. The Kanoye Cabinet had more emphasis upon the negotiations.

Q. At the time these men discussed it with him, had it been determined by the group who were the aggressive group, including Tojo, that there was going to be war with the United States as soon as they could get the necessary materials?

A. I think at first when Tojo's cabinet was formed in the middle of October there was an Imperial command to reconsider the question, and I believe most of these people were sincerely concerned about the question of reconsideration.

Q. Reconsider what question?

A. Whether to have war with the United States.

Q. Who had said there was going to be a war with the United States that the question had to be reconsidered?

A. Originally consideration of the war came in September during the Kanoye cabinet.

Q. From whom?

A. The Cabinet and the General Staff both together came to the understanding that if negotiations with the United States were not to be successful, they were going to have a war with the United States.

Q. Which cabinet?

A. The Kanoye Cabinet.

COLONEL SACKET: Was that the Imperial conference of September 2, 1941? Is that when they decided that?

A. The September 6th conference.

Q. Who was at that conference?

A. The members present?

Q. Yes.

A. The Prime Minister.

Q. The Prime Minister who was then Prince Kanoye?

A. Yes. And the head of the Army General Staff.

Q. Who was he?

A. Sigiamo. And also head of the Navy Staff, Nigano. And President of the Board - Planning Board. Lieutenant General Suzuki. And Foreign Minister. I am not quite sure about the Foreign Minister.

Q. The Foreign Minister must have been there. Who was the Foreign Minister?

A. Tiojo.

Q. He stayed as Foreign Minister?

A. No, he was changed.

MR. FIDELLY: Was the Emperor present?

A. Yes.

COLONEL SACKETT: And you were present?

A. No, I wasn't present.

MR. FIHELLY: As it was reported to him by those who were present, those who did report it, what was his understanding of what took place there?

COLONEL SACKETT: As an individual, not as an official, how did he understand that?

A. The main line was that we shall continue the negotiations and if we do not succeed in settling the negotiations by about the 10th of October, during the first ten days of October, then we shall make up our mind to start a war with the United States. That is connected with the over-throw of the Kanoye cabinet.

MR. FIHELLY: Was Kanoye in favor of the war?

A. Yes. He was in favor of that decision.

Q. Was the decision unanimous? Did all of those present vote for that?

A. I am not quite sure whether it was unanimous or not, but at this conference the Emperor read that plan which says in a general way that he hopes for the peace of the world and he asked the members who were present to reconsider this decision.

Q. How many were present at this meeting in all, without going into detail, the number who were present?

A. I have named those, about five or six, and other than those there was the head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy and the Army and Secretary General of the Cabinet.

COLONEL SACKETT: What were their names?

A. Secretary General Kenge Tomita.

Q. He was Secretary General of the Kanoye Cabinet?

A. Yes.

Q. That is the Secretary General of the Privy Counsel?

A. No, it is the Cabinet Secretary. Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.

Q. Is he still alive?

A. Yes, he is alive.

Q. What were the other names?

A. Akira Muto from the Army and Oka (?) from the Navy.

Q. What was his first name?

A. I don't remember the first name.

Q. And the group that was there as it was reported to you, who among the group pushed for the decision that if the negotiations were not successful by the 10th of October they would go to war against the United States? Which of those men pushed that - advanced that theory and then the others agreed?

A. Mainly people from the Navy.

- 5 -