



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

42

國家圖書館出版社

上海交通大學出版社



国家出版基金项目
NATIONAL PUBLICATION FOUNDATION

国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

42



國家圖書館出版社
National Library of China Publishing House



上海交通大学出版社
SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY PRESS

第四二册目录

Case 244	汉斯·H. G. 施塔莫(Hans H. G. Stahmer)	1
Case 245	埃里希·博尔茨(Erich Boltze)	301
Case 246	汉斯·乌尔里希·冯·马尔西塔勒(Hans Ulrich Von Marchtaler)	383
Case 247	大岛浩(Oshima Hiroshi)(一)	393

CASE NO. 244

14 Dec 1945

RE: HANS STAHLER,
former German Ambassador
to Nankin Government, China
and to Japan.

STATUS: Pending

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

1. Mr. Paul A. Beran of the United States Strategic Bomb Survey on 12 Dec 1945 advised that he had interrogated the above-named Hans Stahlmer, who is now under house arrest by the CIC Detachment in the Gohra Hotel at Hokame, Japan.

2. Stahlmer was German Ambassador to the Nankin Puppet Government in China from October 1941 until January 1943 when he became Ambassador to Japan. Prior to 1941 Stahlmer was in the German Foreign Office in Berlin and since 1938 was very active on the German Far East policy dealing with Japan and in fact concluded the Tripartite Agreement between Germany and Japan.

3. According to Mr. Beran, Stahlmer has some files detailing negotiations between his office and the German Foreign Office, including a number of cables which file should be very valuable.

4. It is agreed that Stahlmer should be interviewed very thoroughly as soon as possible to develop all dealings and supporting documentary evidence in his possession, in connection with the Tripartite Agreement, early plans and negotiations which were had between Germany and Japan leading up to the December 7th attack. Stahlmer speaks English and will have to be interrogated in great detail and be pinned down to specific answers in no uncertain terms.

5. Stahlmer should be able to furnish particularly valuable information regarding his dealings with and the activities of Matsuoka and Oshima, who are Class "A" war criminal suspects.

6. It is contemplated that Mr. Fihelly, Mr. Lowe and the undersigned will interrogate Stahlmer early next week.

COPIES: 3 File
1 Mr. Fihelly
1 Mr. Lowe
1 File on Matsuoka
1 File on Oshima

CASE NO.

SERIAL NO.

B. E. SACKETT
Lt. Col., Inf.

FILE NO. : 244

Report by L. H. Barnard

RE : Hans ~~STAHER~~ also known as
A. G. ~~STAHER~~

STATUS: Pending

DATE : 27 December 1945

A check sheet for Col. Stuart, CIS to Brig. Gen. Thorpe, dated 18 December 1945 carried the following information:

For the following reasons it is recommended that Mr. A. G. STAHER, former German Ambassador at present in Honorable custody at the Gora Hotel, be arrested and placed in Sugamo Prison as a probable war criminal and certainly a security threat to the policy of peaceful occupation of Japan as set forth by the Supreme Commander:

a. Reference is made to Washington radio WX 87535 from JCS to CINCAFPAC ADV, 8 December 1945, Para. 2f(1), "All nationals of Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Roumania, and Siam should be identified, registered, and may be interned or their activities curtailed as may be necessary under the circumstances. Diplomatic and Consular Officials of such countries except those identified as loyal to the cause of the United Nations should be taken into Honorable custody, held for investigation, and thereafter repatriated in accordance with the provisions of sub, sub paragraphs 2.....". Para. 2f(2) reads "Those non-Japanese Enemy Nationals who are known as agents or propagandists of Naziism and Fascism (including research experts, students, scientifically skilled persons, persons holding Administrative Posts in Commerce or Government, and all those who sought repatriation to Enemy Countries during the periods of hostilities) should be interned and, after confirmation and agreement by the appropriate authorities in their home countries, repatriated."

b. Dr. Erich BOLTZE, Minister-Counsellor of the former German Embassy and Herr H. von MARCHTALER, first secretary, both Career Diplomats, make the following statements:

- (1) STAHER joined the Nazi Party in 1929. Later he became a Major in the SS and still later a Major General in the NSFK.
- (2) Joined the von RIBBENTROP office in 1935 when it

COPIES: 3 File 244 ✓
3 File 245

was a section for the Foreign Affairs Office in the leadership of the Nazi Party.

- (3) Became one of the closest and most intimate of von RIBBENTROP'S advisors. He was initially charged with establishment of friendly relations with Germany and Great Britain, in which he failed as the British could not swallow his Nazi ideals.
- (4) In 1938 when von RIBBENTROP became Foreign Minister, STAHRER, not yet in the diplomatic service, remained on RIBBENTROP'S personal staff as his most influential advisor and aided his Chief in the pursuance of war policies. In the fall of this year, von RIBBENTROP opened negotiations for a military alliance with Japan, and STAHRER was the go-between to General OSHIMA, Military Attache in the Japanese Embassy in Berlin.
- (5) In 1940 von RIBBENTROP ordered STAHRER to Tokyo to conclude the Three-Powers-Pact with the Japanese Government represented by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. On his return to Berlin, STAHRER was appointed Ambassador-at-Large in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- (6) Both von RIBBENTROP and STAHRER hoped the Pact would make it easier to bring Japan into war on the side of Germany, and to further aid their ambitions, STAHRER was sent to Nanking as Ambassador to the Wang Ching-wei Government, created July 1941, and a puppet of Japan.
- (7) After one year as Ambassador at Nanking, STAHRER was appointed Ambassador to Japan because von RIBBENTROP wished to replace OTT by a man he could trust implicitly.
- (8) As successive Japanese cabinets had rejected STAHRER'S suggestions for an attack against Russia, he was in secret opposition to all of them, regarding only General TOJO and the radical nationalistic groups (such as Black Dragon) as most trustworthy, and established close relationship with them. When TOJO was forced to resign, STAHRER in a rage stated it would have been better if TOJO had proclaimed martial law and shot all his opponents.

(9) The majority of the Embassy Staff detested STAHER. He had shut himself off from them, working mainly with Colonel MEISINGER, SPALT, LOY, and other high-ranking Party Members. He always carried two pistols, and had a personal bodyguard of three. In April 1945, he told the diplomatic staff of the Embassy that he would personally shoot anyone of them who did not believe in German victory.

(10) Through MEISINGER, STAHER kept close contact with the Kempei-Tai, having them arrest many Germans he believed to be anti-Nazis.

c. Evidence points to STAHER being a fanatical Nazi high in the Party and right-hand man of FIEBENTROP, a war criminal now on trial for his life. Also as a member of the SS (Elite Guard), he was sworn to further the cause of the Fuehrer regardless of method or risk.

d. It is expected that confinement in Sugamo Prison before interrogation will facilitate the obtaining of information vital to the Allied cause.

Arrest of A. G. Stahmer

Legal Section
GHQ, SCAP

International Prosecution
Section

26 Dec 45

As the subject of the attached C/N is an individual whose prosecution is a matter of primary interest to your Section, your comments relating to his apprehension are requested.

1 Incl:

C/N fr Col Stuart to
General Thorpe

A. C. C., Colonel, JAGD
Chief, Legal Section _____

2. FROM: Internat'l Prosecution Section TO: Legal Section GHQ, SCAP Date 31 Dec 45

1. We concur in the basic recommendation of Colonel Stuart that A. G. Stahmer, former German Ambassador, be arrested and placed in Sugamo Prison as a probable war criminal.

1 Incl.

C/N fr Col Stuart to
General Thorpe

JOSEPH B. KEENAN
Chief of Section.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Basic letter No. 4070, Subject: Arrest of A. G. Stahmer, from Colonel Stuart, To: Brig. Gen. Thorpe, dated 18 Dec 45 (recommended that Mr. A. G. Stahmer, former German Ambassador be arrested. Also letter contained statements of Dr. Erich Boltze, Minister-Counselor of the Former German Embassy and Terr H. von Marchtaler, first secretary, both Career Diplomats.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION FILES

FILE NO.: 264

Report by D. L. Waldorf

RE : Hans Stahmer, also STATUS: Pending
known as A. G. Stahmer

DATE : 11 December 1946

I was informed this date by Lt. Colonel Davis, CIC, that Subject had been interned in Sugamo Prison at 2115, 9 January 1946 in accordance with recommendations made by Colonel Stuart, Commanding Officer, 441st CIC Detachment.

Lt. Bossert, S-1, Sugamo Prison, was contacted by phone, and asked in accordance with a request by Mr. McKinney whether or not subject had been interrogated since his confinement. Major Barnard was informed telephonically by Lt. Bossert, that subject was then being interrogated by CIC personnel. It was requested that subject not be made available to news men at this time in accordance with desires of CIC.

COPIES: 3 File 264

244-5

11 Jan 1946

FILE NO.: 244

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McKinney:

The daily prison report submitted by Sugamo Prison, dated 10 January 1946, reflects that Heinrich STAHMER, former German Ambassador to the United States, was incarcerated at Sugamo Prison at 2115 hours, 9 January 1946.

No release has been made to the Press concerning this matter and information has been verbally received from the CIS to the effect that no publicity is desired at the present time due to investigation which is being conducted by that organization in matters within their jurisdiction.

LEROY H. BARNARD,
Major, Inf.,
Executive Officer,
Inv. Div., I.P.S.

COPIES:

1 Mr. McKinney
3 File 244

FILE NO. : 244

Report by: L. H. Barnard
Major, Infantry

RE : H. Stahmer

DATE : 18 January 1946 STATUS: Pending

On 16 January 1946 Dr. Eugen Schnell was interviewed at his home at Aza Nakayamada 73, Noyori, near Kobe, Japan, by Mr. McKinney and Major L. H. Barnard, at which time he furnished the following information concerning STAHER:

"Regarding his background, STAHER is not a career diplomat. He comes from the business world in Hamburg. There are two families in Hamburg from which STAHER may come, but I am not sure from which particular one. They are Hansing and Company, run by Senator STAHER, who may be his father, but I am not sure of this. The other Hell and STAHER, run by Professor STAHER. Both are families with the highest reputations and not connected with the Nazis.

He came to Japan as a special envoy of Hitler in 1939 to make preparations for the Tripartite Pact. When STAHER arrived, OTT was acting as ambassador in Tokyo, and at this time, it was known that OTT should be relieved of his post.

STAHER was in Tokyo about two months, during which time he was decorated with the highest order, The Rising Sun, and preparing the ground work for the Tripartite Pact. He then went home and we heard nothing about STAHER until the end of 1943, or it could have been the spring of 1944. At that time he came back to the Orient, but to China, not to Tokyo. Rumors at that time indicated that OTT had been relieved from his post. It was further indicated that STAHER would become the German Ambassador to Tokyo.

His biggest and most acting assistant was Counsel General BALSER. He, BALSER, did all the work, making many propaganda speeches. BALSER was Counsel General in Kohe and Osaka.

Before STAHER took any action for the Nazis, the Japanese liaison matters had been very well prepared by OTT, Lieutenant General Hiroshi OSHIMA, Japanese Military Attache to Germany, Toshio SHIRATORI, former Ambassador to Rome, Counsel General

COPIES: 3 File 244
2 File 324
2 File 334
1 Mr. McKinney
1 Mr. Hyde

- 1 -

BALSER and Professor SATA, President of the German-Japanese Club. These men all worked together. (Efforts should be made to obtain copies of the Osaka Mainichi editions from 1940 to 1944, both in English and Japanese). It was the ultimate objective of this group to lay the ground work for the complete control of Asia by the Asiatics. Germany was cooperating with this scheme in order that they might shake hands at the Persian Gulf, thus completing the Berlin, Rome, Tokyo axis. STAHRMER was charged with the responsibility of carrying out this plan. The actual work in this connection in the Kobe-Osaka area fell upon BALSER.

Acting independently during this period was an individual named Staatsrat WOHLTAT, who had been educated in the United States and was the organizer of the Japanese war-time production, controller of all commerce between Japan and Germany and also controller of all German money in Japan.

WOHLTAT is probably residing in one of the hotels in the vicinity of Fujii at the present time. It is known that he accepted orders directly from Hitler for the furtherance of his activities and was not required to go through the chain of command at the German Embassy. A staff of approximately 150 persons in the Mitsui Bank in Tokyo were at his disposal. Indications are that he was in direct contact with the Japanese Minister of Finance and had much to do with the establishing of tax rates during the war period.

In his capacity of controller of commerce between Japan and Germany, much of it was carried on principally by submarine vessels. He had the final say on what articles were to be shipped and the granting of all permits for both imports and exports.

It has been rumored, but not substantiated, that STAHRMER's wife was of Jewish descent, and this may have been the reason for the quietness in which he operated in public. STAHRMER was subject to verbal attack by OTT because of the alleged Jewish ancestry of his wife.

It is possible that OTT fell into dissension with the Japanese because of his frank criticisms of the Japanese individuals and the Japanese Army. When OTT was finally relieved as Ambassador by STAHRMER, who was at this time in China on a mission for Hitler, STAHRMER was prepared in advance to take over OTT's job.

It was a radical change so far as the contact with the Japanese was concerned, in this change of ambassadors. OTT, who had been a soldier, had his principal contacts from the Japanese Military Clique, while STAHRER, a business man, made his principal contacts through Matsuoka, Ogura, Takaishi and Tsuda. Matsuoka was the former President of the Manchurian Railway, later Foreign Minister in Japan. Ogura was Chairman of the Board of Directors of Sumitomo. Tsuda was President of Kanegafuchi Spinning. Takaishi was Chairman of the Board of Directors of Osaka Mainichi.

STAHRER refrained from making public speeches, but apparently accomplished his propaganda missions through the medium of the Osaka Mainichi and through the particular guidance of BALSER, (Karl August BALSER. German Counsel General for Osaka and Kobe. Arrived in Japan about 1936 and was chief propagandist for the Nazi party and Chief of the Gestapo in the Kobe-Osaka area. He had frequent personal contact with the German Ambassador in Tokyo, who was then OTT. Further information can be found in Who's Who in Japan, 1939-40), SATO, TSUDA, TAKAISHI and Toshio SHIRATORI (Ambassador to Rome. Further information can be found in Who's Who in Japan, 1939-40).

On 24 December 1945 there appeared in the principal English language papers under a Tokyo date line a paid notice to all former Austrian citizens to the effect that those desiring of registering with the American authorities are requested to send within one week by registered mail all personal data, copy of proof of their former Austrian citizenship, time of residence in Japan and future plans to Mr. C. P. WALDBAUER at the Gora (Hakone) Gora Hotel. Dr. Schnell characterized WALDBAUER as the Lord Haw Haw of East Asia. Dr. Schnell stated that he does not personally know WALDBAUER, but it was the consensus of opinion of the Austrians in this area that he had accomplished an about face from his former position, and they believe him to have been strongly pro-German rather than Austrian prior to and during the war."

PENDING

FILE NO. 244

SERIAL NO.

FILE NO.: 330

Report by L. H. Barnard

RE : Josef Albert WEISINGER

DATE : 16 January 1946

STATUS: Pending

Inquiry at the file room resulted in information being furnished to the effect that no file had been opened on Josef Albert Weisinger, former Nazi Gestapo Chief in Japan. In view of the active part which he played in international politics, it is deemed advisable to open the case and obtain biographical background of this individual for such further consideration as may be deemed appropriate.

A clipping from the Nippon Times under date of 13 September 1945 indicated that Weisinger has been interviewed by Russell Brines of the Associate Press who has an extensive knowledge of the German activities in Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor but further indicated that the Germans had not been taken into the Japanese's confidence concerning the contemplated attack.

The above referred to clipping has been placed in the file in this matter.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS: Develop biographical background of WEISINGER.

PENDING.

COPIES: 3 File 330
1 File 6
2 File 244
1 Mr. McKinney

FILE NO.: 334

Report by L. H. Barnard

RE: Staatsrat WOHLTAT

STATUS: Pending

DATE: 18 January 1946

The OCCIO forwarded by informal memorandum the results of interrogation of Staatsrat WOHLTAT, which were as follows:

The interrogation of Herr Wohltat took place on 25 November 1945 in Karagushi, where Wohltat lives under the supervision of the CIC. The interrogation was conducted on behalf of the USSES by Mr. Paul A. Egan and Sgt. G. V. Perlmutter.

Herr Wohltat was an important German official in the field of foreign trade. In this capacity he directed most German trade negotiations with foreign countries and was an outstanding expert in clearing and barter agreements. In April 1941 Wohltat was dispatched to Japan as head of the German economic mission. The outbreak of the German-Russian war prevented him from returning to Germany. He was appointed consequently Chief of the permanent German economic delegation in Japan.

Extremely nervous in connection with war criminal trials and anxious to know whether the questioning to which he was subjected by the CIC implies that his indictment is contemplated, Wohltat refused to answer any specific questions. The following is the result of a rather informal conversation on Japanese problems.

1. The Sino-Japanese War developed into a hopeless stalemate. Japan did not have a chance to defeat China militarily nor could it expect to organize effective political control over that country. The Japanese armies stationed in China became increasingly demoralized. The Chinese resistance - largely passive - broke the backbone of the Japanese military. Black market activities, corruption of all kinds, close connection between the Nanking, Peking and Chungking Chinese created a general atmosphere which led rapidly to a dis-

COPIES: 3 File 334
2 File 225
2 File 244
1 Mr. McFinney
1 Mr. Hyde

integration of the Japanese hold on China. The Army groups entrenched in China regarded it as their sinecure, and consistently refused to give it up in favor of an unattractive future at home. There were no forces strong enough in Tokyo to force the military in Manchuria and China to alter their basic attitude.

2. The army, mainly if not exclusively, interested in China, regarded Russia as its primary enemy. A conclusive military defeat of Russia would eliminate Russia once and forever from East Asia and destroy the foundations of Chinese political resistance. Chiang would be forced to recognize Japan as the predominant power of Eastern Asia and would undertake to organize China under Japanese leadership.

3. The army was, therefore, well satisfied with the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Nevertheless, they did not plan to enter the war immediately. They would have preferred to wait until Russia's defeat in the west was certain and then deliver the coup de grace. End of 1942 was envisaged as a date for such a venture.

4. The Navy had no interest on the Continent of Asia. Its expansion plans pointed toward the South. The acquisition of secure sources of oil appeared to them as primary objective. The Navy leaders were for an understanding with Russia, against an alliance with Germany, and for negotiations with the U. S. The intermediate Navy command believed, however, that the conflagration in Europe, the downfall of France, and the Netherlands, offered an excellent opportunity to pick up some "real estate" in the South Pacific. The entrance into Southern Indo-China was not supposed to cause the repercussions which it actually had. After the American embargo on oil was promulgated, the Navy found itself in a desperate position. Its stocks would run out sooner or later and it would cease to be an important power factor. The war for oil was the Navy's war.

5. The civilian groups (particularly the Zaibatsu) were against war at this juncture. Among the Zaibatsu, Mitsui and Sumitomo were the most serious and enlightened groups. They would have liked to wait until it became clear which side would win the war. They would have Japan join the winning combination of power and exploit the war in the meantime to maximize their profits. This line of argument was discounted in view of the existing profound distrust towards the Germans. The Japanese political and military leadership believed that Japan had to secure bargaining objects for the coming peace conference rather than depend on Germany's good graces.

6. When the war against the U. S. broke out, the Japanese leadership assumed that the world conflict was drawing to a close; that Hitler was winning in Russia; and, that some global settlement would be negotiated very soon. After having inflicted a series of crushing defeats upon the U. S. forces, and in view of the impending defeat of England, they were certain that the U. S. would be ready for a negotiated peace.

7. As soon as it became obvious that the war against the U. S. as well as the European War would last long, Japan was basically doomed. Its shipping depended on about 50% on foreign bottoms.* These bottoms disappeared almost immediately. To handle the necessary one million tons of annual food imports, the essential raw materials, as well as urgent military traffic, exceeded by far the possibilities of the Japanese owned fleet.

(*) NOTE:

This information was checked by the interrogator. It is approximately accurate, as the following table shows:

Steam Vessels entered and cleared
from and to foreign countries by
nationalities

		<u>ENTERED</u>		<u>CLEARED</u>	
		<u>1938</u>		<u>1938</u>	
<u>NO.</u>	<u>1000 G. T.</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>1000 G. T.</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>1000 G. T.</u>
TOTAL	18,490	62,230	18,485	61,685	
JAPANESE...	11,456	36,659	11,537	36,318	

Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade
of Japan
December, 1939
(Department of Finance)

8. While Japan would have lost the war regardless of the blockage, the blockage accelerated the process mainly by depriving the people of essential food.