

CHINA'S NEW NATIONALISM
AND OTHER ESSAYS

BY

HARLEY FARNSWORTH MACNAIR, PH. D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT
IN ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY

THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LIMITED
SHANGHAI, CHINA

1925

PREFACE

It is not without hesitation that I publish in book form the papers appearing in this volume, and that I speak of them as essays. The term itself is a formidable one, smacking as it does of professional literature, while the subject of China is one on which authorities only are supposed to talk, — or at any rate to write.

Why, then, are these unassuming papers put out under the somewhat assuming title of Essays? The answer is, I can think of no other. On consulting a dictionary I find that an essay is described as "a discursive composition concerned with a particular subject, usually shorter and less methodical and finished than a treatise: a short disquisition." Now, that is exactly what these compositions are: they are short, they concern particular subjects, and they are certainly less methodical than a treatise. The great Bacon, writing to Prince Henry, said: "To write just treatises requireth leisure in the writer and leisure in the reader, . . . which is the cause

that hath made me choose to write certain brief notes, set down rather significantly than curiously, which I have called *Essays*. The word is late, but the thing is ancient." A less distinguished writer remarks that the essay "is not a formal siege, but a series of assaults, essays, or attempts upon it. It does not pursue its theme like a pointer, but goes hither and thither like a bird to find material for its nest, or a bee to get honey for its comb."

The topics here discussed are random ones on some of which *treatises* might be written by those learned enough to qualify. Some of them are in reply more or less directly to general, or at times specific, criticism of China and things Chinese. They are attempts at interpretation of certain aspects of old and new China, and were written primarily with two types of reader in mind, namely Chinese students and those foreigners who are not too well acquainted with modern China.

Most of the selections have appeared during the past three years in the *China Weekly Review*, to the editor of which thanks are due for permission to reprint

them. "The Modern Chinese Scholar" and "The Scholar as a Gentleman" are reprinted from the St. John's *Echo*. "Political Tendencies in China" first appeared as Chapter I of the "China Mission Year Book," 1923.

There is no pretense at authoritative discussion of any of the topics here touched upon. The writer alone is responsible for the material and the point of view of its presentation — no odium should attach, therefore, to the institution with which he is connected, for any ideas of which the reader may disapprove! All the material incorporated was prepared before the unfortunate series of events of the summer of 1925 began. As a result of these events and of the conditions which lay back of them, there is a keen interest the world over in the China question. It may be hoped, therefore, that such discussions as these will be welcomed as attempts at least to throw light on a few of the manifold aspects of the problems involved.

H. F. M.

CONTENTS

I.	CHINA'S NEW NATIONALISM .	I
II.	WANTED: AN INTERPRETER .	12
III.	SOME THOUGHTS ON ANTI-FOR- EIGNISM	20
IV.	ON FEELINGS OF RACIAL AND NATIONAL SUPERIORITY . .	36
V.	THE PROTECTION OF MISSION- ARIES	53
VI.	"SOME ASIAN VIEWS OF WHITE CULTURE"	68
VII.	THE PERENNIAL ATTACK ON THE RETURNED STUDENT .	86
VIII.	IDEALISM IN CHINESE POLITICS	99
IX.	ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA	112
X.	CHINA, AND THE MAN OF DES- TINY IDEA	121
XI.	AN ANALOGY IN STIMULANTS .	135
XII.	THE ABACUS MIND.	151
XIII.	A CYCLE OF CATHAY	155
XIV.	MAGELLANS OF THE AIR . . .	162
XV.	ARMISTICE DAY, 1923 . . .	168

	PAGE
XVI. A PARLOUS PARLIAMENT . .	178
XVII. THE BASIS OF AN AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA . . .	186
XVIII. THE RETURN OF THE INDEM- NITY FUNDS TO CHINA .	200
XIX. OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY — A MODERN APPLICATION .	207
XX. SOME CAUSES OF BANDITRY	215
XXI. THE REVERSE OF THE SHIELD	223
XXII. DR. KOO'S REPLY TO THE LINCHENG NOTE	248
XXIII. CHINESE VICTIMS AND JAPAN- ESE JUSTICE	259
XXIV. CONTRACT LABOR ON NAURU ISLAND	268
XXV. THE BACKGROUND OF ORI- ENTAL EXCLUSION . . .	275
XXVI. "THE FLOWERCANDLE WIFE"	290
XXVII. ADMISSION OF ADOPTED CHINESE INTO THE UNITED STATES	300
XXVIII. THE MODERN CHINESE SCHOL- AR	321
XXIX. THE SCHOLAR AS A GENTLE- MAN	340
XXX. FAMINE RELIEF AT WORK .	347

CONTENTS

xi

	PAGE
XXXI. PROFESSOR GILES ON CHAOS IN CHINA	366
XXXII. POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN CHINA	378

CHINA'S NEW NATIONALISM AND OTHER ESSAYS

CHINA'S NEW NATIONALISM

NOT since the appearance of the Europeans on the China coast during the first quarter of the sixteenth century has there been observable in this country the chaotic and confused conditions to be found at present. Wherever one goes, with whomever he talks, whatever he reads, he is brought face to face with confused pessimism or, more rarely, hesitant optimism. The newcomer knows not what to make of China, while the old China hand frankly admits his confusion, which is compounded with hopelessness of the future. China is often likened to a whirlpool whose ceaseless sucking currents draw toward its center all objects within a wide radius. There seems to be no cause for the motion, no object, and no constructive result.

Nor is China alone in such a condition. Turkey, which was until recently like China in its relation to foreign powers in that it, too, had the laws and practice of extra-territoriality imposed upon it, has been, since the close of the Great War, a sufferer internally and externally from many evils. In both countries much has recently been written concerning anti-foreign and anti-Western feelings. There is a distinct similarity of tone in the reports emanating from Turkey and China, and this is not surprising in as much as both countries are in the throes of a new nationalism.

It is not many years since the Chinese were considered by most Westerners to be almost, if not entirely, lacking in what is ordinarily called patriotism. Decatur's oft-quoted toast, "My Country — may she always be in the right — but, my Country, right or wrong!" finds no parallel in the history of China. On more than one occasion the anomalous state of affairs in China has permitted the people in one part of the country to maintain friendly relations with foreigners, while their confreres in another section of the land were waging

war upon the Western barbarians ; and the help actually rendered the foreigners by certain Chinese against their own countrymen has several times been a source of strength to the invader. This time, however, has evidently passed, and it is unlikely that such phenomena will ever recur ; most people will agree that it should not, for even an aggressive and bumptious spirit of nationalism is preferable to a spineless and jellylike spirit of cowardly acquiescence, or hopeless pessimism.

But what, after all, is nationalism, and how happens it that China should at so late a date be affected by it ? It may be stated at the outset that it is a mighty influence which was practically unknown to the ancients either of the East or the West. In a sense China may be ranked with Babylon and the Jewish state as one of the first of nations—a term used here not as synonymous with the word “ state ” or “ country,” but in the strictly root sense of similarity of interest through birth. In China there has long been a semiconscious bond of union based on a common ancestry evolving into an imperial state

from the stage of the tribe, clan, and family kinship. A few modern students, chiefly foreign-trained, have read into the teachings of China's sages ideas which never troubled the heads of those sages—ideas which would have been profoundly disturbing to the sages had they actually passed through their minds. Consider, for example, such an idea as that expressed by Confucius when he taught that “all within the Four Seas are brethren.” This maxim has been held to indicate that the great sage was an internationalist in the modern sense of the term, and consequently greatly in advance of his time. Far more likely is it that Confucius felt vaguely a sense of what moderns mean when they speak of nationalism. From an early time that spirit of narrow provincialism was present which has continued so deleteriously to influence China to the present day. Sages and wise men of the type of Confucius and Mencius must have felt that bond of social and moral culture and racial kinship which have for thousands of years subconsciously, unconsciously, and semiconsciously, in varying degrees at

different periods, worked to hold the Chinese together even as loosely as they have been held. It is more than possible that some such feeling as this moved Confucius in the face of provincially minded "small men" to utter the maxim mentioned above, a maxim full of meaning to the *Chün-tzū*, or Superior Man, so often referred to in Confucian thought.

So far has China during recent years developed a spirit of nationality that it is distinctly necessary to recognize its existence, and worth while attempting to analyze its channels of expression and future trend. It is safe to say that this spirit did not become at all self-conscious before the last decade of the nineteenth century. It may seem peculiar that the wars of China with England and France in the middle years of that century did not have this effect. To be sure, there was an anti-foreign sentiment aroused, but this was based rather upon the personal feelings of a few, and the feeling of racial superiority of the many, than upon the spirit of nationality itself. It is to be remembered, moreover, that an alien

dynasty was then ruling China, and humiliation of the Manchus in authority was not an unmixed evil in the minds of many Chinese. Anti-foreign feeling was mixed with anti-Manchu feeling to the diminution of both.

Irritation with Europeans, too, was rather different from the feelings aroused by Japanese aggression in the nineties; the feelings of contempt for the *wo-jên*, or dwarfs, of Japan, who were close neighbors and upon whom the Chinese had looked down with scorn for hundreds of years, were greater than those felt for the more mysterious and far distant dwellers of Europe and America, who were *Yang Kuei-tzŭ*, or Foreign Devils, to the common folk of China. Consequently the loss of face involved in the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5 was sufficient to stir slightly a feeling of pride not wholly unconnected with a spirit of nationalism.

A further step in this development may be noted in the waging of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5; here, for the first time, an Oriental people defeated a Western, or semi-Western, people. The result of such a struggle could scarcely help arousing

a self-conscious feeling of nationality throughout the East. This developed only slowly, however, until the convening of the Peace Congress at Paris following the European War of 1914-18. Nothing could have stung the Chinese into national sensibility so greatly as the decision of the peacemakers in reference to Shantung—but, it must be added, this decision would never have had the effect it did had not the Chinese people been started years earlier upon the road of nationalism. Certainly no such feeling was aroused by the loss of territories earlier to the English, French, Russians, Japanese, and Germans. It was not merely because Shantung is a “sacred province” that the furore was created, although such a claim could not fail to stir Western sentiment, but because the people of China were at last being drawn together by that feeling of a common interest along social and cultural, economic and political, religious and ethical, historical and ethnical lines, which, in whole or in part, go to make up that combination of feelings which is termed Nationalism.

In talking recently to a Western educator who has been in China a goodly number of years, we were surprised and amused to hear him express disgust with "all these student strikes, nationalism, and so forth." For nationalism especially he apparently had no use, but if we may say so, it struck us that he was not quite sure what nationalism means. One might have thought that he suspected it to be mixed up in some unhappy way with Bolshevism or other radical political theories. The thing that must strike one as peculiar in such a statement is not that this educator dislikes excitement among students, which leads to student strikes and helps no one except professional agitators, but that he should apparently fail to realize that modern education introduced into and maintained in China almost exclusively by Westerners, chiefly missionaries, is responsible more than any other one factor for the development of the feeling of nationalism in this country. Some one—probably a Frenchman—has said that it would be difficult to say which would distress and surprise an Englishman more,

a man who claimed not to approve of Christian principles or one who tried in good faith to practice them! Modern-trained Chinese have not been slow to make the same type of criticism of many Westerners in China at the present day. Critics of the type of the distinguished Mr. J. O. P. Bland—whose type is legion, but whose ability is rare—have for generations found fault with the Chinese for their unchanging ways; they have railed at their strange customs and devious methods. But now that a new type of Chinese has evolved, or is in process of evolution, the same critics continue to rail and wail, and pray Heaven for the return of the “good old-style honest Chinaman.”

The Westerner has been coming to China to establish schools and colleges for more than a century. European ideas of religion, social life, and political thought have been and are still being disseminated. The result of all this effort is bound to be the taking of some of these ideas seriously by some of the Chinese people. Is it not odd, therefore, that after teaching the Chinese our ideas of social and moral and

political development, we should feel indignant when they try, haltingly to be sure, to apply them? When we teach our opponents the secrets of our strength, we may be irritated, but we can hardly blame them for trying the principles upon us to see whether they will work. Personally, we have always blamed the man who was bitten by the viper warmed in his bosom, rather than the viper itself; the viper was acting in accordance with its nature, and the man ought to have known better. If Europeans do not wish the Chinese to profit from Western learning they ought not to give Western learning to them. In any case they ought not to be surprised and irritated when the lessons which they painstakingly teach are equally painstakingly acted upon by the pupil.

Nowadays the bandits of China are using guns manufactured in the West and sold in China by Westerners, to attack Westerners; returned students are letting their own people know that not all Westerners or Western countries are models to be followed by Orientals; the students of China and the leaders of the country are doing all they