

# **TO PRESERVE THE REPUBLIC**

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**United States  
Foreign Policy**



**Frederick H. Hartmann  
Robert L. Wendzel**

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Macmillan Publishing Company,  
New York

Collier Macmillan Publishers  
London

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Printed in the United States of America

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Macmillan Publishing Company  
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022

Collier Macmillan Canada, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Hartmann, Frederick H.  
To preserve the Republic.

Includes index.

I. United States—Foreign relations—1945—

I. Wendzel, Robert L.,      II. Title.

JX1417.H37 1985      327.73      84-5708

ISBN 0-02-351300-4

Printing: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Year: 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3

ISBN 0-02-351300-4

# PREFACE

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Many books on American foreign policy are preoccupied with the internal or domestic American political process. Some of these examine in detail the swing from a Nixon to a Carter, from a Carter to a Reagan, as these swings produce divergent interpretations by administrations of America's role in foreign affairs. Others of these look minutely at the (internal) bureaucratic process by which decisions are reached or at American interest groups as they try to influence policy—such as limiting the imports of Japanese autos or foreign steel. Both such emphases are desirable—the question is one of degree, and what gets left out if these emphases take up too much of the available space. The question is also one of the impression it may leave on the student: that the fundamental and really only important problem of foreign policy is making up our minds what *we* want to do.

There is, of course, also a world out there beyond the American frontiers, a world composed in nation-state terms of about one hundred sixty sovereign entities. Each is affected by what the United States does; most have some effect individually on what the United States decides to do. Certainly collectively, as a state system, they have to be taken into account. Yet the tendencies of this nation-state system are rarely taken adequately into account in the usual book on U.S. foreign policy. Partly this lack may occur because it is extremely difficult to portray American foreign policy in its real complexity. That complexity includes not only how the American internal or domestic political process influences the nature and scope of policy, or how the American governmental (bureaucratic) process results in one emphasis over another. It includes also how nations far from American norms and values approach problems in which the United States is involved and how foreign nations generally, as a system, behave. It includes, clearly, some adequate discussion of the ways in which American conditions and American experiences differ from the norm and have, for better or worse, given us a rather unusual set of lenses through which Americans contemplate foreign policy problems in the first place.

Gathering all of this into one book of modest size is a difficult challenge. It certainly tapped both our skills, not only in extent of coverage but also in balancing all these emphases. But we have nonetheless attempted exactly that. Believing as we do that the American way of thinking about foreign policy, especially as it derives from the U.S. national experience, requires a strong initial emphasis, we have devoted Part One to the American cultural background within the context of a set of conceptual tools by which the validity and utility of American attitudes toward foreign policy can be assessed. (These conceptual tools are applied systematically later to the problems and issues facing the United States.)

Part Two then looks at how Washington makes foreign policy, including an assessment of both bureaucratic politics and interest groups, together with an analysis of how the executive branch and Congress affect foreign policy. Part Two culminates in a description of the national security system.

In Part Three, building on this background, we have two connected purposes in mind: to give a résumé of American experience by looking at the foreign policy record, and also evaluating that record through the use of our conceptual tools. Part Three, in chronological terms, brings us roughly to the Vietnam conflict and the era of détente.

In Part Four we begin to look systematically at the alternatives we can choose among to resolve the main contemporary American foreign policy problems, and what their major advantages and disadvantages are, given the nature of the world in which those problems arise and the nature of the American outlook and interests. We begin with the fundamental relationship to the Soviet Union, then look at divided Europe in this perspective, the prospects for stability in Asia, the problems of bringing peace to the troubled Middle East, and the problems of the United States in dealing with Africa and Latin America.

Having looked at the regional problems we turn in the final chapter of Part Four to the overarching, functional problems now confronting the United States (as well as the rest of the world) as the consequence of technological change and an altering world environment. Here we look at such problems as the uses of space and of the seas, problems involving terrorism, and problems involving the availability of energy and resources. These are the most complicated problems for U.S. policy of any—which is why we left them to last.

Part Five then concludes with a final chapter, summing up the problems and issues, and recommending responses.

To achieve these objectives in these five parts we have deliberately and systematically varied both focus and pace. Especially on focus, there is always an important trade-off. “Close-up” gives detail but blurs the overall perspective by eliminating the setting. And vice versa. So in Part One we have been concerned with the large perspectives: the broad viewpoints, the major influences, the overall setting in which policy must be designed. There we have noted the historical alternation of periods of policy consensus (such as pre-Vietnam) with periods of dissension (such as now, since Vietnam). Part Two moves our “camera” much closer as we look at the tremendous, detailed activity associated with the implementation of policy. We take care there to show the subtle ways in which the bureaucracy changes its functioning when there is or is not a foreign policy consensus. Part Three again takes a large view of events, examining the history of U.S. policy from the special perspective of how well we have handled our problems in dealing with security issues but covering much ground in little space. Parts Four and Five take a mid-range focus, specific as to problems and issues, but not so immersed in detail as to jeopardize a sense of relationships between problems—*interlinked* problems, as we call them there. The pace is, accordingly, slower to permit full and accurate appraisal.

These changes in focus and pace should be kept in mind, for particular generalizations will seem more or less meaningful as the focus changes. Examine the tragedy of Vietnam very close up and you get a strong sense of inevitability about the sequence. But stand way back and what strikes you is a sense of wonder that anyone would consider it worth the effort there.

To sum up, in this book foreign policy is systematically examined from three perspectives that can best be explained by continuing our camera analogy. We already mentioned *focus and pace*. We have varied our focus from macro to micro as the material dictated, much as a zoom lens would do, looking at the policy scene closer up (more bureaucratic detail) or further away (the overall conceptual approach to the problem), speeding the action or slowing it down for detail. We have also *changed our lens* as necessary from one capable of showing the United States as the center of the universe, looking out on the rest of the world, to one capable of giving a moon-view or systems perspective (with the United States as one nation among many). We have also taken our “pictures” *under various degrees of consensus* (showing the contrast between a policy time when “everyone” knows what the problem is and concentrates on handling it, and a time when the big debate is over defining the problem to be handled).

In writing this book we have used parts of two chapters from a book written by one of us

some years ago and now out of print. We did not think we could improve upon what was first published in *The New Age of American Foreign Policy*.

Certain parts of the manuscript were read by specialists, for their advice. We wish to thank, in particular, Professor Nathaniel Davis, now of Harvey Mudd College, the Associated Colleges of Claremont, but formerly Director-General of the Foreign Service and Assistant Secretary of State. Also, Professor Jon L. Jacobson, the University of Oregon, for comments on the law of the sea and the open oceans regime.

**Frederick H. Hartmann**  
**Robert L. Wendzel**

# GLOSSARY

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*The following terms are used in a specific and technical sense in this book. They are cross-referenced.*

- Alternatives** Term used to describe the choices available in deciding foreign policy issues. (See also *Issues* and *Problems*.)
- Analyze Capability Available** Step three of four operational steps in the implementation of policy.
- Cardinal Principles** Four principles useful in the design of policy. They are (1) past-future linkages, (2) third-party influences, (3) counterbalancing national interests, (4) the conservation of enemies.
- Choose Orientation** Step four of four operational steps in the implementation of policy.
- Cold War** Name for period of high tension between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II and until at least the Sino-Soviet split of 1963; the period before détente.
- Concept** First of three policy parts, the intellectual analysis of likely outcomes; important to phase 1 of policy (its design).
- Consensus Periods** Periods in foreign policy when substantial agreement exists on the problems faced and the issues to be resolved.
- Conservation of Enemies** One of the four cardinal principles. It reminds us of the importance of controlling the amount of enmity confronted, through adjustments in policy, thereby keeping danger to a safer level.
- Content** Second of three policy parts; reflects results of phase 1 of policy; forms substance of what is implemented in phase 2; consists of national interests chosen.
- Counterbalancing National Interests** One of the four cardinal principles. It calls attention to the nature of important choices of national interests in foreign policy, each alternative interest having advantages and disadvantages but only one of which will be chosen as the content of policy, the other alternative being "shelved." From a systems perspective, the term is used to examine sets of bilateral relations in a multilateral context, showing how various rearrangements such as the "China card" are implicit in the "shelved" interests in the system.
- Design** Phase 1 of policy, in which plans made reflect the conception of the problem (reflect the perspective of the decision makers) and lead to choice of policy contents. Involves first and second of three policy parts.
- Détente** Period after the playing of the "China card"; three-sided relations begin for the United States, Russia, and China.
- Dissension Periods** Periods when substantial conceptual agreement does not exist on foreign policy.



**“Domino Effect”** Theory that the loss of one nation to aggression makes resistance by others progressively less. A presumed snowball effect occurs.

**Determine Objectives** Step two of four in policy implementation.

**Exterior Environment** The world outside United States frontiers.

**Foreign Policy** As pieces, has two phases and three parts. As goals, focused on preserving the Republic—its values, way of life, material prosperity, and, above all, its security.

**“Free World”** A term popular in the United States, especially in the Cold War period of policy consensus, used to distinguish non-Communist states and to refer to them as a group. Used very loosely for “democratic.”

**Idealism** As it affects American approaches to policy: a fixed method for problem solving; a belief in law and principle as applied both to domestic and international affairs.

**Identify Actors** Step one of four in policy implementation.

**Implementation** Phase 2 of foreign policy. Involves second and third of three policy parts.

**Issues** Term used for responses made to problems faced. Issues involve choices between (among) alternative foreign policy contents in decision making.

**National Interests** During debates over policy content, items put forward as proposed content. In this sense, “claims” on policy. Once debate is over and the decision is made, the chosen items form policy content (become the “official” national interests).

**Operational Steps** Four steps in policy implementation: (1) identifying the actors, (2) determining their objectives, (3) analyzing the capability available, and (4) choosing an orientation (i.e., degree and kind of involvement or commitment required).

**Overarching Problems** Fundamental questions (problems) in foreign policy of universal relevance.

**Past-Future Linkages** One of the four cardinal principles. It calls attention to the fact that the perception of what will happen in the future is linked to one’s understanding of the past.

**Phase 1 of Policy** Design, leading to content.

**Phase 2 of Policy** Content, implemented.

**Policy Process** A three-part process: concept, content, implementation.

**Policy’s Three Parts** Concept, content, implementation.

**Policy’s Two Phases** Design and implementation.

**Power** Used as a measure of resources. Used also as a measure of threat.

**Power Problem** Power as threat; those states whose attack is feared or against which military plans are made.

**Pragmatism** As it affects American policy: involves open-mindedness and flexibility in approaching potential problem solutions.

**Problems** Fundamental questions faced in foreign policy, to which some response is necessary.

**Sovereign** Independent; a state able to make its own decisions.

**System-Wide Tendencies** Generalized behavior of states (such as the balance of power).

**Tension Level** The degree of expectation of conflict.

**Third-Party Influences** One of four cardinal principles. It calls attention to the fact that problems and issues cannot be bilaterally resolved in a multilateral world; that neighbors are important.



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# PART ONE

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## **The Intellectual Framework and the Cultural Background**

