



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

8

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GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

CASE FILE #20

(Evidential Facts Adduced From His Interrogations)

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Interrogation by: John W. Fihelly

Briefed by : John W. Fihelly

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

(Evidential Facts Adduced From His Interrogations)

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Interrogation by: John W. Fihelly

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POLITICAL STRUCTURE

6 February 1946, Ser. #46

P. 1 Prime Minister and other Ministers composed the Cabinet and had the right to speak. Three others always attended meetings in an advisory capacity, namely, the Cabinet Secretary, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, and the Director of the Bureau of Legislation. A fourth official attended on certain occasions, namely, the President of the Cabinet Information Board.

P. 2 Most of the duties of the latter officer had to do with the dissemination of information to the press. He sometimes also collected intelligence information from the police.

At the cabinet meetings, there was no voting, matters being discussed until there was unanimous consent. If there was opposition on an important matter, the Minister or Ministers opposing it would resign, or there would be a mass resignation. Those Ministers attending cabinet meetings attended not as administrative heads of bureaus but as Ministers of State and were jointly responsible for advising the Throne.

There were certain ways in which the Emperor was advised of the Cabinet's decision. One was by a report to the Throne through either the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned; secondly, through securing permission of the Emperor. The proposal or bill was in this case taken up with the Emperor. After the matter had been presented

to the Emperor, he would discuss it with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal before the Imperial Seal was affixed.

P. 3 The Emperor never attended cabinet meetings, but did attend Imperial Conferences, which were held with important Ministers of State and, in cases involving the military command, the army and navy Chiefs of Staff also attended and the President of the Privy Council.

There was no provision in the Constitution or in law for Imperial Conferences. They came about as a matter of custom. Accordingly, the Imperial Conferences had no responsibility as such. Those attending had responsibility in their individual official capacities and not as a member of the Imperial Conference. The custom of holding these Conferences went back as far as the Russo-Japanese War.

P. 4 The Imperial Conferences could be requested by the Prime Minister, one of the Chiefs of Staff, or by a Minister of State, if the matter were important enough.

The Prime Minister acted as presiding officer.

Matters were not officially decided at Imperial Conferences but, after discussion there, they were again taken up at a cabinet meeting where official action was taken.

Although the Emperor attended, he did not officially approve or disapprove action taken. Rarely the Emperor said anything at all and only on one occasion during the American-Japanese negotiations did he say anything. There were two or three Imperial Conferences held in 1941.

If a decision was not reached, the matter would go back to the cabinet for a decision or to the army or navy for a decision in matters of command, after which it was again presented directly to the Emperor.

The Ministers of State advised the Emperor on matters within their sphere. The Chiefs of Staff advised on matters of military command.

There were meetings from time to time of a Liaison Conference. These Liaison Conferences were attended by the Chiefs of Staff, important Cabinet officials, such as the Premier, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, President of the Cabinet Planning Board, and other Ministers of State as appropriate.

P. 5 Request for an Imperial Conference would be brought up at a Liaison Conference.

11 February 1946, Ser. #53

P. 2 Witness was asked if Imperial Conferences were called only on military matters, to which he replied, "As I explained the other day, it was the matters which lay between the sphere of civil authority

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"and the sphere of military authority that gave rise to Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conference meetings. Purely military proposals submitted to the Emperor by the War Minister were, if important, usually referred by him to the Supreme War Council for study and recommendations. The Navy had a similar set-up. According to the regulations, there was one Supreme War Council, but, by usage, army matters had come to be handled by the army part of it and navy matters by the navy part of it".

13 March 1946, Ser. #112

Witness gave information as to the structure and purpose of the Privy Council on Pages 2 and 3; as to the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals on Pages 4 and 6; as to the Supreme War Council on Page 4.

P. 5 - 6 Witness states as follows: "As War Minister, I was not a member of the Supreme Command, but I was a participant. I was concerned with military administration but not with the conduct of operations or tactics. I was not a member of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, I was, along with the Chiefs of Staff, a member of the Supreme War Council.

"I am saying what follows here, not by way of excuse or to avoid responsibility because I hate the idea of trying to avoid responsibility. I wish to take full responsibility, but this is only

"a factual explanation of a real situation in order to assist you in your investigation. When Prince KONOYE was Premier, it was very, very difficult for him because of the fact that his sphere of authority included only the civil sphere. When I became Premier, since I was concurrently War Minister, I had, in addition, a voice in purely military matters, to wit: in military administration. When I became Chief of Staff on 22 February 1944, soon after the fall of the Mariannas, I had an additional segment of authority in regard to purely military affairs. In fact after that, only the purely Naval matters were outside of my authority. As Premier, I had full responsibility for civil affairs; as War Minister, I had the additional military function of military administration; as Chief of Staff, I had the further High Command functions of operations and tactics.

"This whole matter of the actual system in Japan is basic to the understanding of such things as the China Incident and the matters in southern Indo-China that we have talked about. At the first, the government policy in regard to the China Incident was that of localization. However, due to the fact of the independence of the High Command, the fighting kept spreading as they strove for victory. Premier Konoye had a terrible time.

"One other thing, I think is important: Under the Japanese system, the Emperor was assisted by the following officials: Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; the Lord Chamberlain; and the Imperial Household Minister. He also had a Chief Aide-de-Camp. The Lord Privy Seal was the Emperor's advisor on matters relating to civil affairs. The Grand Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister ~~had~~ no direct connection with either the civil government or the Supreme Command. The Grand Chamberlain was adjutant to His Majesty; as such, he had a variety of duties. However, neither he nor the Imperial Household Minister had any direct connection with either the civil government or the High Command. This was particularly true in the case of the former, since he was a civil official and not a military man. The Emperor's Aide-de-Camp, being a full general, had some unofficial access to the Supreme Command, but, under the government system itself, he had actually no authority for direct liaison.

"The Emperor did confer directly with the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, this body was not very active since most of ~~the~~ members were of advanced years. Therefore, in practice, the Emperor was in a difficult position. He had no one on his staff to help him on High Command matters. When the Premier and the various cabinet members reported to the Emperor on civil matters, he could

"consult the Lord Privy Seal. When the Chiefs of Staff reported to him in regard to command problems, he had no body to consult except the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals.

"The responsibility of the Premier and the Foreign, War, and Navy Ministers, and the President of the Planning Board, together with the Chiefs of Staff, for advice to the Emperor, through the instrumentality of the Liaison Conferences and the Imperial Conferences, was of tremendous importance. To return to the China Incident, for example - the Government policy was a policy of non-enlargement of the Incident; nevertheless, because of the fact that the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was, in fact, enlarged and the civil government was powerless to prevent it. "

A very simple, but illustrative, chart follows Page 6 of the interrogation. This chart was drawn by the witness and was most helpful in his explanation of the over-lapping spheres between the civil and military authorities.

7 February 1946, Ser. #47

P. 3 - 4 Witness states that "Under the Japanese Constitution, the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff are responsible solely to the Emperor in matters of strategy and evaluation of the probable advantages and disadvantages of warfare. The Ministers of State, that is to say, the Premier and the Cabinet Members, are responsible to the

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"Emperor for other governmental functions. The Ministers of State have no right to interfere with the conduct of military affairs nor have the Chiefs of Staff the right to interfere in civil matters... ..In Japan, you might say that the two spheres of military command and civil government over-lap. Matters of purely military importance are no functions of the civil government; matters of purely civil importance are no function of the military command. However, the over-lapping area, which includes such matters as foreign policy and decisions to go to war for example, present problems which in practice are taken up by the Liaison Conference. For example, the strategic war plans are a matter of pure strategy and were not known to the Cabinet Members. I did not even know them myself".

14 March 1946, Ser. #109

Witness, on Pages 1, 2, and 3, gave further information as to the structure and purpose of Imperial Headquarters. He also states its defects. He explains the difference between Imperial Headquarters and the Supreme War Council.

P. 4 Witness stated that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal did not attend nor have a vote at the Privy Council meetings. Imperial Headquarters was in the Liaison Conferences.

P. 4 - 5 Witness stated that Liaison Conferences started about the time of the second KONOYE Cabinet, that there was no justification in law for them, and that therefore, their decisions were not official.

Witness stated that, generally speaking, the Cabinet always approved what the Liaison Conference decided, adding, as a practical matter, they agreed and did not say anything. Witness stated that the Japanese Constitution dated from 1890, the time of Prince ITO, and that the Constitution provided for the over-lapping spheres of influence which gave the military the power which it continued to exert and use to control the government.

P. 5 Witness explained in detail how the Supreme Command was able to move troops to and into Indo-China without any authorization from the civil government and stated, "Well, on the one hand, the Japanese-American negotiations were under way. On the other hand, Imperial Headquarters kept moving troops and supplies from Formosa by ship to southern China and into northern Indo-China in order to win. This was something which could give rise to misunderstandings, but, because the movement of troops and military supplies was the sole province of the Supreme Command, the civil government could say nothing. It was a different situation with regard to southern Indo-China. There, the troops were moved in on a basis of the joint defense agreement: since this involved the civil government, it could not be done by the Supreme Command alone. However, troops could be moved from central China into south China and even into the north part of French Indo-China at that time under the proper authority and at the convenience of the Supreme Command. This, of course, refers to the Army; a similar situation existed with regard to the Navy."

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P. 6 Witness explained the various army and navy orders which were signed by the Emperor, and how and when the personnel of each could be moved without any specific authorization from the Emperor. As to the former, he stated, "The Navy set-up was very different from the Army. I was not responsible for the Navy set-up, of course, and I may be possibly in error about it, but, generally speaking, all orders went from the Navy General Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and from him to the commanders of the various fleets which composed it. Army orders went from the Army section of Imperial Headquarters to the Supreme Commander of the forces in China who had a number of Army commanders under him, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to the commander in north Indo-China, or to the six commanders in Japan proper, Korea, and Formosa. Troop movements within the Kwantung Army, within the Chinese area under the control of the Supreme Commander there, or within northern Indo-China, could be controlled by the three commanders involved, but movements of troops from one of these areas to the other, or to or from the mainland of Japan, Formosa, or Korea, had to be by command of the Army section of Imperial Headquarters".

As to the latter, witness stated, "The Army and the Navy were different in that respect. If a division was moved, the Emperor's approval would be obtained, except, of course, for movements within the commands such as I have outlined. This is different in the Navy.

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"Since the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet was in charge of all naval forces, he could operate a good deal without specific approval. I had very little direct relation with the Navy, and I don't want to speak as one bearing responsibility on such matters".

P. 7 Witness stated that practically all orders requested by the Chiefs of Staff were signed by the Emperor.

Following Page 7 appears a chart which was drawn and approved by the witness, explaining the structure of Imperial Headquarters.

15 March 1946, Ser. #113

More data was given by the witness with respect to Liaison Conferences on Pages 1 and 2.

Witness stated that all Imperial Conferences held in 1941 were preceded by Liaison Conferences where decisions had been made.

19 March 1946, Ser. #119

P. 1 - 2 Witness explains how the "Four-" and "Five-Minister" conferences grew into the Liaison Conferences. (Premier, War, Navy, Foreign Ministers, and later the Finance Minister.)

P. 2 - 3 Witness also explains the good and bad points of the power which the Supreme Command exercised.

P. 3 - 4 Witness was asked the following questions, to which he made the following answers:

"Q Do you not realize that the position in which Japan finds herself today was due largely to the independence of the Supreme Command?

"A To speak plainly, it was a big cause. Actually, it was, but in the trials I don't want to emphasize that too much. What I do want to plead is that we, as subjects, I and the Chiefs of Staff, did not discharge our responsibilities to the Emperor. It is not the Emperor's responsibility. The civil ministers ought to have understood the problems of command and the Chiefs of Staff ought to have understood the civil problems. All ought to have cooperated in discharging their responsibilities to the Emperor.

"Q In what respects did you and the Chiefs of Staff not fulfill your responsibilities to the Emperor?

"A Men use systems; men should not be used by systems. This is an important principle. If I and the other men had fully understood this, the Supreme Command should have taken account of the political aspect of things and adjusted military operations accordingly. We should have risen above the system in which we found ourselves, but we did not. It was the men who were at fault.