



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

64

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RESTRICTED

Case # 434

YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi

File #434

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MRS GSC

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INTERROGATION OF

YOSHIZAWA , Kenkechi

DATE: 1 March 1946

INTERROGATOR: Mr. John F. Barry

INTERROGATION OF
YOSHIKAWA, Kenkichi

Date and Time: 1 March 1946, 1000-1400 hours.

Place : Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : Kenkichi YOSHIKAWA
Mr. John F. Barry, Interrogator

The following questions and answers took place in English.
No interpreter was necessary.

Questions by Mr. Barry:

Q. What position did you hold about September 18, 1931?

A. I was Japanese Ambassador to France until about
December 27, 1931.

Q. When did you learn about the Mukden Incident?

A. On September 19, 1931, I learned about the Mukden
Incident. An urgent message came to Geneva. At that
time I was living in a rented house there. The Japanese
office was at the Metropole and I heard about it from
them. I did not receive any official message.

Q. What information did you receive?

A. That Chinese troops had broken the South Manchurian
Railroad near Mukden. Our residents were exposed to a
dangerous position. Japanese troops took necessary
steps to prevent trouble. Japanese government took
steps to prevent aggravation. Japanese troops were
withdrawn to the railway zone.

Q. Who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time?

A. Baron SHIDEHARA.

Q. When did you return to Tokyo?

A. When the IWAKAI Cabinet was formed in December I left
Paris and arrived in Japan on January 14, 1932.

YOSHIKAWA, Kenkechi, 1 Mar 46

Q. Are you familiar with the Lytton Commission?

A. Yes, and the Commission arrived in Japan 1942, when I was in Tokyo. 3

Q. What was the situation in Manchuria at that time?

A. There was still fighting going on here and there.

Q. Did you subsequently read the Lytton Commission report?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the report accurate?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Did you have any Cabinet discussions about the situation at that time?

A. Our military was trying to establish a government and the local Chinese also cooperated. Some of the local population wanted to form a government and so a government was formed with Mr. Henry Pu-yi as chief executive. I think it was about March 1932.

Q. Did INUKAI favor the new Manchurian Empire?

A. Prime Minister INUKAI was not inclined. His views were that the Chinese people cannot be divided. They may be amalgamated in due course. On my part, I took the position that if we allowed the formation of a separate country, the Western powers shall oppose it. One day I sent for General ISHIHARA--influential officer on the staff of the Kwantung Army, one of the strong supporters of the formation of Manchukuo. I asked him whether the formation of the Manchurian Empire could be delayed. This was between February 15 and 28, 1932, when the General was back from Port Arthur. He said, "Impossible now--every possible preparation had been made already." Perhaps he said the truth. In that way the Manchurian Empire was established. Mr. Henry Pu-yi was made the Emperor.

Q. Was ARAKI in favor of establishing the Manchurian Government?

A. Of course. The general staff was at the back of ARAKI. One day I went to the residence of ARAKI and found there the leaders of the general staff, General MASAKI, Vice Chief of the General Staff, Vice Minister of War General KOISO, and some others from both the General Staff and War Office. This was some day in February 1932.

YOSHIZAWA, Kenkechi, 1 Mar 46

Q. What happened there?

A. I suggested delay in formation of the Manchurian Empire. My effort did not succeed.

Q. Who opposed your plan?

A. The military. All of them opposed it. War Minister ARAKI, KOISO and MASAKI.

Q. What was the reason for opposition to delay?

A. I can't recall the remarks but the consensus of opinion was for early formation of the Manchurian Empire. During my stay in office we sent General MUTO--I'm not sure about this part--as first Ambassador to Manchuria and concurrently as Commandant of the Kwantung Army, about April or May of 1932. General KOISO was appointed Chief of Staff of General MUTO, as Commandant of the Kwantung Army. They were first Japanese representatives.

Q. Who were some of ARAKI's supporters in the expansion in Manchuria?

A. The military in general held the same opinion and a large number of civilian people who had nationalistic tendency.

Q. What was your opinion as to Manchuria and Japan?

A. Manchuria was necessary for us politically and strategically. However, my views have not changed toward China in 30 years. I was not in favor of separation of Manchuria from China. I was always in favor of having China as a friend and I still hold that view. HORTOYAMA agreed with me on the conduct of foreign policy.

Q. What other positions did you hold in the government after 1932?

A. The first of July, 1932 I was selected to the House of Peers and remained there to August of 1945 when I became Privy Counsel. I am still Privy Counsel except that I will resign because of the purge directive. In the second KONGYŌ Cabinet I became Ambassador to Batavia.

Q. How long did you remain there?

A. I remained there six months. I want to tell you how I was appointed. MATSUOKU approached me on the 4th of November, 1940 to take the position. I wanted to go to Batavia without Ambassador's title. On the 24th of November MATSUOKU said that the Dutch being very bureaucratic, I would have to go with the title of Ambassador. On 26 November I accepted.

YOSHIZAWA, Kenkechi, 1 Mar 46

Q. What was your mission there?

A. I went there to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Dutch. It included allowing Japanese to go in there under a quota system and to allow Japanese physicians there and other commercial purposes. On June 17, 1941, I was about to enter into a successful treaty with the Dutch representative, Governor General Von Starekenberg, when I was instructed by telegram to return home. I sent a telegram to MATSUOKU saying formal agreement would be consummated--why should I discontinue? I got an answer--Leave Batavia. Later I learned that the Japanese Government announced my mission down there as ending in a rupture.

Q. Were your negotiations successful?

A. Yes, very successful. I was just about to conclude formal agreement when I was called home.

(Adjourned at 1400 hours)

Certificate of Interpreter

I, _____, _____
(name) (Serial Number)
being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of _____ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, _____ hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Certificate of Interrogator.

I (we) _____,
and _____,

certify that on _____ day of _____, 1946, personally appeared before us (us) _____, and according to _____, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

~~Place~~ _____
Place

~~Date~~ _____
Date

INTERROGATION OF

- YOSHIZAKA, Kenjiro -

DATE: 14 March 1946

INTERROGATOR: Mr. John F. Hurry

**INTERVIEW OF
KIMIKAZU KIMURA**

Date and Time: 14 March 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours.
Place: Room 753, Keiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.
Present: Kimikazu KIMURA
Mr. John F. Barry, Interrogator

The following interrogation took place in English. No interpreter was necessary.

Questions by Mr. Barry:

Q. Tell me again about your mission to Batavia.

A. Specifically, it was to make a commercial treaty.

Q. What are some of the details of the mission?

A. My predecessor, KIMURA, was at that time Minister of Commerce. He was sent to Batavia to negotiate economic agreements with the Dutch. After a stay of forty days, he came back and refused to go again. I was approached by the government to succeed him. I accepted the request on condition that I should not be given any title as Special Envoy as KIMURA did. I strongly insisted on this. Finally, I proceeded to the Netherlands Indies about 26 December 1940. I arrived and immediately started negotiations.

Q. What specific instructions did MATSUOKA give you?

A. To conclude an agreement on the subjects of: (1) entry of Japanese into the Dutch East Indies, (2) permission for Japanese doctors to carry on their business, (3) importation and exportation of merchandise of both Japanese and Netherlands Indies origin, (4) Japanese immigration to be on a quota system. The Dutch were conservative on the immigration question. We wanted to send several hundred a year.

Our request for exportation of petroleum came first, rubber, tin, linseed oil, and several kinds of minerals, and a concession of oil fields. I was hurrying up negotiations as I wished to return home as quickly as possible.

YOSHIZAWA, Kankeshi, 14 March 1946

A. (continued)

In the month of June, the negotiations began to materialize, when I was ordered home by discontinuing the negotiations. On June 16 both parties came to an agreement on the occasion of my visit to the Governor-General on the subjects like the exchange of merchandise and exportation of oil, amounting to 1,800,000 tons per year, from the Netherlands East Indies to Japan; thirty-five other raw materials, including rubber, tin, et cetera. These were contained in an agreement, although verbal, by the Governor-General Von Starchenberg, a sincere man I trusted. Besides that, oil fields in Manghalihat - that concession of oil fields I obtained through the exchange of notes between my oil representative, one of the members of my staff, and the Director of the Economic Department of the Government at Batavia. Agreement was also reached on immigration, doctors, and exchange of commodities.

I asked by wire from the Tokyo Government whether my negotiations were to be considered as a rupture. The answer said "No," that it was a discontinuance. So, I left Batavia about the 27th of June and arrived in Tokyo on July 10. When I was looking at the development of the various policies adopted by the Government since that time, the Government seemed to regard my negotiations at Batavia as ending in rupture, and the word "rupture" is used in the diary issued by the Foreign Office on June 16, 1941. For these reasons, I entertained a suspicion that the Government endeavored to impress upon the public that the negotiations at Batavia ended in rupture, but this is against the facts.

Q. Had you been sending messages back to the Foreign Office showing your negotiations were successful?

A. Yes. They should have known. When I returned, I asked for an interview with MATSUOKA as I wished to report and complain, but he did not appoint a date. He refused on the grounds of ill health. If I could have seen him, I would, of course, reported to him every detail with regard to the negotiations which were successfully done.

Q. Did you tell anyone in the Government or Foreign Office of the true facts?

A. On several occasions I was able to tell the development of the negotiations - not only to my friends but also to government quarters. But, nevertheless, in the opening address to the Diet by Prime Minister TOJO about January 22 or 23, he had a passage in the speech that said it ended in failure.

YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi, 14 March 1946

Q. Did the newspaper call you up?

A. Yes. I gave them the true facts. They could not write the truth.

Q. Did MATSUOKA distort your report?

A. MATSUOKA, whom I know for many years, was friendly with the military. The whole policy was started by them. Not only MATSUOKA, but everyone in the Government service was in harmony with the militarist policy. Otherwise they couldn't keep their positions.

(Adjourned at 1600 hours)

INTERROGATION OF

YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi

DATE: 4 March 1946

**INTERROGATORS: Mr. John F. Barry
Lt. James McEwan**

INTERROGATION OF

YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi

Date and Time: 4 March 1946, 1000-1215 and 1430-1630 hours.

Place : Room 753, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : Kenkichi YOSHIZAWA
Mr. John F. Barry, Interrogator
Lt. James McKwan, Interrogator

The following questions and answers took place in English.
No interpreter was necessary.

Questions by Mr. Barry:

Q. After you arrived from Batavia in July, 1941, what was your next government position?

A. In August I was approached by the Foreign Minister TOYODA through Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to go to French Indo-China as special Ambassador. The message came through him because I was at Kikusawa. I asked for an interview with the three Ministers--the Foreign Minister, Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy--together. And the government arranged the interview on the 25th of July. I came down on the 24th and called up the Foreign Minister's official residence on the 25th at 11 o'clock. I made the request for the interview with the three Ministers because I was afraid that I should be unable to carry out my duties upon my arrival on the spot unless the Army and Navy officers would obey my orders after my assumption of office there. There were Army and Navy officers there and civil officers, officials who were all carrying out their own policies and it was the intention of the government to have a special ambassador at the top to control everything. Our government wanted to import from Indo-China a number of merchandises, including rice and other cereals. I, of course, knew the Army and Navy officers would not be controlled by me so easily but I should be foolish to go to Indo-China without an assurance of the three Ministers. The assurance that I would have complete control was given by the three Ministers and I acceded to their request to go. After my arrival in Indo-China at Hanoi on November 8, 1941, I

A. (cont'd)

established my office there and branch office at Saigon and started my business. As I imagined before my departure from Tokyo, I found at once the military and navy officers could not be controlled so easily because military and naval attaches attached to my mission had dual capacities, that is, in addition to belonging to my mission they were under the command of the army and of the navy commander in Indo-China. The naval officer attached to me was the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet stationed near Indo-China. He was at sea when I arrived. The first one was Admiral HIROTA--he was replaced by another man the following year, I forget his successor--it was in 1942. The army officer at time of my arrival attached to my mission was General Choh--he was then colonel. Choh later raised to Major General--he was my military assistant. At the same time he was one of the assistants of the Commander-in-Chief there. These military and naval officers reported nothing to me of things military or naval, they were outside my scope, and I realized at once my mission was not an easy one, as I had already imagined in Tokyo. I continued to be in Indo-China for two years and was determined to leave the position at the beginning of the year before last, 1944, when I happened to return to Tokyo for two months to attend the House of Peers of which I was a member for many years. I took that occasion to ask the two ministers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (SHIGEMITSU) and the Minister of The Greater Asia, a very short lived department, which was organized in 1943.

Q. What was this Greater Asia Ministry?

A. It was to deal with matters relating to East Asia--namely, China, Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Dutch East Indies and the islands in the Pacific.

Q. What was its specific purpose?

A. The TOJO Cabinet decided to form a sphere of co-prosperity made up of the countries situated in the Pacific--made after the fashion of Hitler in Germany. As Rumania and Hungary and satellites of Germany, called "Lebensraum," on the part of Japan TOJO set up a "Lebensraum" in the Pacific. At the time I spoke to the two ministers at the beginning of 1944, that is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Greater Asia, I told them I wished to resign my post and after a stay of two months in Tokyo I left for my post and