



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

6

國家圖書館出版社

上海交通大學出版社



国家出版基金项目
NATIONAL PUBLICATION FOUNDATION

国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

6

 國家圖書館出版社
National Library of China Publishing House

 上海交通大學出版社
SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY PRESS

第六册目录

Case 19	永野修身(Nagano Osami)(二)	1
Case 20	东条英机(Tojo Hideki)(一)	213

INTERROGATION OF

NAGANO, OSAMI

Date and Time: 27 March 1946, 1400-1630 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : NAGANO, Osami
Mr. Valentine C. Hammack, Interrogator
2nd Lt. Eric Fleisher , Interpreter
Miss Leona Coberley , Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Mr. Hammack:

Mr. Hammack : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,
that you will truly and accurately in-
terpret and translate from English
into Japanese and from Japanese into
English, as may be required of you, in
this proceeding?

Lt. Fleisher : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hammack.

Q. Now, Admiral, I believe yesterday or the day before
you mentioned, or you stated that the Japanese Navy
started practicing on the Pearl Harbor plan some
time in the summer of 1941. That was correct, was
it not?

A. Yes, I believe the Fleet started training in the
summer as you say.

Q. Do you remember just about what month in the summer
of 1941, Admiral?

A. I don't remember too clearly but I am sure it was
some time in the summer.

Q. Would you say it was possibly some time in July,
1941?

File No. 19

Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami

A. Yes.

Q. As I have the details here, the experiments and training were held at Sukamo, Saiki, Kagoshima and Kenoyo. Is that correct?

A. Sukamo is a very suitable place for training and the Navy has consistently used it for such, but I believe the training of dive bombing and coming in low over the mountains which was utilized in the attack on Pearl Harbor was practiced at Kagoshima.

Q. And later in August of 1941, is it not a fact, Admiral, that the final plans were made at the Naval War College in Tokyo?

A. I believe preparations by the Naval War College were started in October and a considerable amount of research was done. The results were later given out to us, and that was how we first heard of the attack officially, and at that time the Commander of the Fleets put forth the plan which was later adopted.

Q. When you say, Admiral, that you later were first officially advised of the results, do you mean by that that you were advised of the results of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. After the results of the research of the Naval College had been put forth the Commander of the Fleets explained the Pearl Harbor plan.

Q. As a matter of fact, Admiral, the time in which the plans were perfected at the Naval War College was in late August and early September, 1941 rather than in October, was it not?

A. Do you mean the plan for the attack of Hawaii or the general research which was carried on by the Naval College?

Q. I refer to the time, Admiral, when the plans were perfected at the Naval War College in Tokyo, at which time various teams were made up such as the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team.

Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami

- A. I don't remember very well but I believe it may well have been toward the end of September.
- Q. And in these games at which the plans were perfected for the attack upon Pearl Harbor, Admiral, you acted as umpire, did you not?
- A. No, the head umpire was Admiral Yamamoto. I had no connection with the war games but I went to see the results when they were over.
- Q. And the results of the war games were also submitted to you for approval were they not, Admiral?
- A. I only heard of the results and all decisions were made by the Chief Umpire.
- Q. Well, Admiral, is it not a fact that you were the Chief Umpire and that you were assisted by Rear Admiral Chigin Fukatome, who was head of the First Section War Plans and Operations?
- A. The war games were umpired entirely by the Fleet as the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets is above, performing such tasks as umpiring. Fukatome may well have been present at the war games.
- Q. You mentioned yesterday, Admiral, that you had the ability to read English fairly well. That is correct, is it not?
- A. I can't say that I am an expert on this subject but as far as the Japanese are concerned it is far more easy to read it than to speak.
- Q. Admiral, I show you, referring to International Prosecution Section's Evidentiary Document No. 17A, having at the top the word "Secret" and the number 0168010 and below that in brackets the following: /Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest Pacific Area, Limited Distribution Translation Number 39 (Part VIII)/, dated 4 June 45, and direct your particular attention beginning with Page 3 of said document, and which page 3 is entitled Combined Fleet Ultra Secret Operation Order Number One,

**Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami**

Separate Volume Combined Fleet Operations in the war against the United States, Great Britain and The Netherlands and which page 3 I will now mark Exhibit A and ask you to examine the document beginning with said page 3 and ask you to state whether or not you are able to intelligently read the contents thereof in English.

Mr. Hammack: Let the record show that Admiral Nagano, beginning with page 3, examined the document at great length.

Q. Admiral, having examined the document, will you now state whether in view of the fact that its contents are in the English language you are able to read the same.

A. My knowledge of reading the English language is sufficient to enable me to read this English translation. As a Naval officer the vocabulary is familiar to me and I can understand this.

Q. Would you say, Admiral, that from your reading of the same the English translation from the Japanese is correct?

A. I do not know who translated this but I believe it must be correct.

Q. Now, Admiral, you have examined the document, will you state what it is?

A. Without looking at this more closely I cannot tell whether it was put out by the Combined Fleets or the General Staff.

Q. Would you say, Admiral, however, that the document examined by yourself was the plan put out by the Japanese Navy Department to be followed upon the outbreak of war upon the United States, Great Britain and The Netherlands?

A. The order is first put out by the General Staff and the Combined Fleet, for the purpose of executing it;--may I see it once more as I will have to look at it more closely to identify it--thus far it looks as though it were put out by the General Staff.

**Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Gsami**

Mr. Hamack: Let the record show that the Admiral again examined the document and made the following answer:

A. I think this has been put out by the General Staff.

Q. And as such are you familiar with that plan, Admiral?

A. Yes, I am familiar with its general contents but as to the details, I have forgotten them.

Q. As a matter of fact, Admiral, that volume, which I have marked Exhibit A, is the long range plan for war against the United States, Great Britain and The Netherlands as put out by the Naval General Staff, is it not?

A. Yes, that is correct?

Q. And does that plan of operations, referring to Exhibit A, contain therein the plans for the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral?

A. This contains the general plan but the individual action to be taken is entirely decided by the fleet.

Q. And the individual action to be taken in connection with Pearl Harbor was set up somewhat separately from what is contained in the general plan, designated as Exhibit A, is that not correct?

A. This put out by the General Staff stresses the objective to attack the American Fleet but the measure for attacking the American Fleet falls under the Department of the Fleets.

Q. Is it not true, however, Admiral, that a separate plan to attack Pearl Harbor was set up and established and apart from the general plans as set forth in Exhibit A?

A. As I said before, this statement mentions to "Attack the American Fleet," the plan for the attack of Pearl Harbor comes under the Fleet, no special order was necessary to carry through that plan as it comes under the department of this order to attack

Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami

the American Fleet in itself is understood by both the General Staff and the Fleet. According to the set-up of the Japanese Navy the General Staff puts forth the objective and the required intelligence. The Fleets carry out this, using their own discretion and the General Staff does not restrict them.

Q. Referring to Exhibit A, which you have identified, Admiral, I assume that the plan as set forth therein received your approval as the Chief of the Naval Staff?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. Now, Admiral, immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor certain orders were issued by yourself as Naval Chief of Staff, in connection with the same, to Admiral Yamamoto, is that not correct?

A. Do you mean the general orders put out before the orders put out by the General Staff?

Q. I mean certain orders put out by Admiral Nagano, as Chief of the Naval Staff, in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor, to Admiral Yamamoto.

A. I consider the orders I have just seen sufficient and I don't believe I put out any others.

Q. I will ask you, Admiral, to examine the document or a part thereof designated as International Prosecution Section's Evidentiary Document Number 1, beginning on page 14 as follows, "Flagship Hagato, Saeki Bay, 1 Nov 1941, Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order Number 1," which I will now mark Exhibit B and said Exhibit B to cover pages 14, 15, 16 and 17.

Mr. Hamaack: Let the record show that the Admiral read the pages above mentioned at great length, being assisted when in doubt as to any of the words by the interpreter, Lt. Eric W. Fleisher.

Q. Are you familiar with the order which you have just read, Admiral, the same being referred to as Exhibit B?

Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami

- A. I have never seen this order before and I believe that many parts of it were made up later. In this document the occupation of the Hawaiian Islands and the time scheduled is stated but we never knew of, or thought of the occupation of the Hawaiian Islands.
- Q. Would you say, Admiral, that the order is substantially correct insofar as the plans to attack Pearl Harbor were concerned?
- A. I would like to ask what "Y" Day means. I understand X-Day would be the day of attack?
- Q. It is my understanding, Admiral, that Y-Day was the day upon which the fleet movements would be made, and X-Day would be the day of the actual attack.
- A. There are a lot of things mentioned in here that would not be written in an order such as this. First of all, there were not air bases in Thailand. We never contemplated occupying Hawaii and such small things as letting the men have liberty from the Yokosuka Navy Base and the instructions as to what the Tatsuta Maru would do in the event of war would never appear in such an important order as this. Furthermore, it has tinges of politics which would not appear in a military order of this type.
- Q. However, Admiral, notwithstanding what you have just stated, it is a fact, is it not, that the substance of the order as read by your self does state the plans for the attack upon Pearl Harbor?
- A. Yes, I believe it is correct in general as to the Pearl Harbor attack. At the time this order is supposed to have been published the decision for Midway had not been made yet. We didn't think at all about occupying the Hawaiian Islands.
- Q. Now, Admiral, I show you a document, the same being International Prosecution Section's Evidentiary Document Number 6, and call your particular attention to certain orders contained therein beginning with a copy of an order entitled "Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section, Order One, 5 Nov 41,

Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami

from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to Cinc Combined Fleet Yamamoto, which order I will now mark Exhibit C and ask you to read the same and thereafter state whether or not it is correct.

A. It must be correct.

Q. The order which you have just read, Admiral, was issued by yourself, was it not?

A. Yes, it is an order I wrote subject to approval of the Emperor.

Q. And the order was issued in connection with preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor, was it not, Admiral?

A. It is a general order in which Pearl Harbor would be included.

Q. Now, Admiral, I will show you an order entitled, "Imperial Headquarters, Navy Staff Section, Directive 1, 9 Nov 41, from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to Cinc Combined Fleet Yamamoto," and which order I will mark Exhibit D, and will ask you to read the same and state whether or not it is correct.

Now, having read the order, Admiral, I ask you whether or not it was written by yourself?

A. I don't remember too clearly but I believe it must have been. I am going on the assumption that you translated it from something, that you did not get this from hearsay from some individual or a series of separate documents written up by individuals; I am going on the assumption that these are direct translations from the original documents in your possession.

Q. I will say this to you, Admiral, in all fairness to you, I must make this statement--I cannot at this time disclose to you where we received the contents of these various orders. It is our understanding that they were made up from copies of the orders issued

**Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami**

by yourself or if made up without the copies, it is our understanding and belief, because of the source from which we obtained the same, that if not literally correct, they are correct in substance.

A. The forms of these orders that you have just shown me do not correspond to the forms used that are used by us. The objective is brought forth in these orders but the form is different, perhaps it is the American way of writing them up as they express the objective but it is not how they were written in Japanese. This paragraph C should be contained in every other order in this little booklet. (Paragraph C referring to Exhibit C)

Q. Admiral, no attempt has been made to set up the order in the original form and has been included therein only the essentials of the order. Are we agreed on this, Admiral?

A. Yes, we are agreed.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, an order entitled "Imperial Headquarters, Navy Staff Section Order 5, 21 Nov 41, from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to Cinc Combined Fleet Yamamoto," and which order I will mark Exhibit E and ask you to read the same and state whether or not the order is correct in substance and further whether or not the order was issued by you as Navy Chief of Staff.

A. This corresponds with our form and I am sure it is the real thing.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, an order entitled "Imperial Headquarters, Navy Staff Section, Directive 5, 21 Nov 41," from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to Cinc Combined Fleet Yamamoto," and which order I will mark Exhibit F and ask you to read the same and state whether or not the order is correct in substance and further whether or not the order was issued by you as Navy Chief of Staff.

A. Yes, this is correct.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, an order entitled "Imperial

Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami

Headquarters, Navy Staff Section, and dated 1 Dec 41, from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to CinC Combined Fleet Yamamoto, and which order I will mark Exhibit G and ask you to read the same and state whether or not the order is correct in substance and further whether or not the order was issued by you as Navy Chief of Staff.

A. Yes, I believe this is correct.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, an order entitled, "Imperial Headquarters, Navy Staff Section Directive 9, 1 Dec 41, from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to CinC Combined Fleet Yamamoto, and which order I will mark Exhibit H and ask you to read the same and state whether or not the order is correct in substance and further whether or not the order was issued by you as Navy Chief of Staff.

A. Yes, I believe that is correct. I cannot say this from memory, I am answering this from virtue of reason that this can be nothing but correct.

Q. I now show you Admiral, an order entitled, "Imperial Headquarters, Navy Staff Section, Directive 12, 2 Dec 41, from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to CinC Combined Fleet Yamamoto, and which order I will mark Exhibit I and ask you to read the same and state whether or not the order is correct in substance and further whether or not the order was issued by you as Navy Chief of Staff.

A. I believe this is correct, too.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, an order entitled "Imperial Headquarters, Navy Staff Section, Verbal Directive, 2 Dec 41, from Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Osami to CinC Combined Fleet Yamamoto in person while Yamamoto was in Tokyo and which I will mark Exhibit J and ask you to read the same and state whether or not the order is correct in substance and further whether or not the order was issued verbally by you as Navy Chief of Staff.

A. That too is correct.

INTERROGATION OF

NAGANO, OSAMI

Date and Time: 28 March 1946, 1345-1630 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : NAGANO, Osami
Mr. Valentine C. Hammack, Interrogator
2nd Lt. Eric Fleisher ; Interpreter
Miss Leona Cokerley ; Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Mr. Hammack:

Mr. Hammack : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,
that you will truly and accurately in-
terpret and translate from English
into Japanese and from Japanese into
English, as may be required of you, in
this proceeding?

Lt. Fleisher : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hammack.

Q. Admiral, I show you, referring to International
Prosecution Section Evidentiary Document Number
Six and call your particular attention to said
orders contained therein beginning with a copy
of an order entitled "Combined Fleet Ultra-secret
Operation Order, Flagship Nagato, Hiroshima-Ban,
7 Nov 41, YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, Cinc Combined Fleet,"
which I will mark Exhibit K, and ask you to read
this order and state whether or not you are
familiar with the same.

A. This order is one put out by Admiral YAMAMOTO
to his subordinates.

Q. And relating to the preparations for the attack
on Pearl Harbor, is that not correct?

File No. 19

**Continuation of Interrogation of
HAGANO, Genji**

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, a copy of an order entitled "Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order, Flagship Nagato, Hiroshima-Wan, 22 Nov 41, YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, Cinc Combined Fleet," which I will now mark Exhibit L, and ask you to read this order and state whether or not you are familiar with the same.

A. I believe this is also an order of YAMAMOTO's.

Q. And covering the preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, a copy of an order entitled "Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order, Flagship Nagato, Hiroshima-Wan, 25 Nov 41," which I will now mark Exhibit M, and ask you to read this order and state whether or not you are familiar with the same.

A. It must be an order of YAMAMOTO's.

Q. And would you say, Admiral, that that order was issued in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

Q. I now show you, Admiral, a copy of an order entitled "Combined Fleet Telegraphic Dispatch Operation Order, Time of origin: Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41, Text: I-Day will be 8 December," and ask you if you recognize that as an order covering the attack on Pearl Harbor or designating the day for the same. I will mark this as Exhibit N.

A. This, also, must be YAMAMOTO's.

Q. Admiral, is it not a fact that this order here was issued by yourself?

Continuation of Interrogation of
NAGANO, Osami

- A. If this order was issued to me, it would be given directly to YAMAMOTO. If it was issued in general, it would be given by YAMAMOTO to his subordinates.
- Q. As I understand your answer, then, Admiral, had you already advised or had it already been determined by yourself as Navy Chief of Staff and Admiral YAMAMOTO that I-Day would be on the 8th of December, 1941?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. In other words you had already, previous to December 2, 1941, determined with Admiral YAMAMOTO that I-Day would be December 8, is that correct, Admiral?
- A. It was decided that should the American-Japanese relations not be settled by December 8, war would begin. The Cabinet, the Army and the Navy were aware of this.
- Q. And in order to make the matter entirely clear, as I understood your previous answer, arrangements had previously been made between yourself and Admiral YAMAMOTO that I-Day would be December 8, is that correct?
- A. I don't know whether it was before December 2 but it was determined some time before.
- Q. I now show you, Admiral, a copy of an order entitled "Task Force Ultra-secret Operation Order 1, Flagship Akagi, Kichikappu-Wan, 23 Nov 41, NAGUMO, Chuichi, Task Force Commander," which I will now mark Exhibit C, and ask you to read this order and state whether or not you are familiar with the same.
- A. I believe this must be an order put out by Admiral YAMAMOTO.
- Q. And relating to the final preparations for the attack upon Pearl Harbor?

**Continuation of Interrogation of
HAGANO, Osami**

A. Yes.

Q. I wish you would examine for me the chart on the next page and state from an examination of the same whether or not that it is a correct chart of the force making the attack on Pearl Harbor. I will mark this as Exhibit P.

A. I have forgotten it completely but I suppose it is right.

Q. From your recollection of the matter, Admiral, would you say that it is substantially correct?

A. Yes, I believe it is substantially correct.

Q. I now show you an order, Admiral, the same being on two pages, the heading of which is entitled "General" and which I will mark on each of the two pages Exhibit Q, and ask you to state from your knowledge of the Pearl Harbor operations whether the order as set forth here is substantially correct with the original which was issued.

A. This is indeed the order for procedure for attack on Pearl Harbor and I believe it was put out by the commander of the attacking force.

Q. Now, Admiral, you have stated that the order which you have just read was the general order covering the attack on Pearl Harbor. You recognize that as such, do you not, by virtue of your position as Navy Chief of Staff?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Admiral, I wish to go back with you in connection with the conferences that were held to determine whether or not any notice should be given the United States preceding the attack or if notice was to be given, the amount of time before the attack.

A. I don't believe that ever became a question in the liaison conferences.