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

The U.S. Intelligence Community



Jeffrey T. Richelson

FOURTH EDITION

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Jeffrey T. Richelson

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PREFACE

This book represents an attempt to accomplish in one volume what could better be done in several. It attempts to provide a comprehensive and detailed order of battle of the U.S. intelligence community—to describe its collection and analysis organizations, their activities, and the management structure that is responsible for directing and supervising those organizations and activities.

Given the purpose of the book, I do not seek to evaluate the community's effectiveness in performing its varied tasks or to comment on the acceptability, wisdom, or morality of all of its activities. Those are important topics and require far more space than would be available here. In the concluding chapter I do address some of the issues and challenges facing America's intelligence community in the coming century.

The data used in this book come from a variety of sources—interviews; official documents (many of which were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act); books written by former intelligence officers, journalists, and academics; trade and technical publications; newspapers and magazines. The public literature on intelligence is vast and of varying quality, and I have done my best to sort the wheat from the chaff. I have also sought to incorporate the most recent available information at each stage of the production process, to minimize the inevitable discrepancies between the situation as described when the book went to press and the situation when it is actually read. In addition, I have identified sources to the maximum extent possible, while protecting the identities of those individuals who wish to remain anonymous.

The book's structure is largely the same as that of the third edition, with a few exceptions. I have eliminated the "Ocean Surveillance, Space Surveillance, and Nuclear Monitoring" chapter that appeared in the previous three editions. Some of the subjects discussed in that chapter can now be found in the imagery and signals intelligence chapters, particularly the SIGINT chapter. That change reflects the fact that much of the effort of Navy SIGINT assets is directed at targets on shore as well as at sea. Two new chapters—one on MASINT and the other wholly dedicated to space surveillance—focus on the other topics previously discussed in the single chapter. In addition, the internal structure of the chapter on analysis and estimates is based on the types of intelligence rather than on the entities that

produced it—reflecting the extent to which analytical products are read by varied consumers.

Two groups of individuals were instrumental in helping me write this book. The work of the freedom of information and public affairs officers who responded to my many hundreds of requests is greatly appreciated. A listing of specific individuals would include one or more from virtually every organization discussed in this book. Some may have been frustrated that supplying one set of requested documents only led to additional requests.

In addition, various journalists, researchers, and others have provided information, documents, suggestions, corrections, and assistance for various editions. Those who can be acknowledged publicly are: Steven Aftergood, Matthew Aid, William Arkin, Desmond Ball, Robert Bolin, William Burrows, Duncan Campbell, Dwayne Day, Seymour Hersh, David Morison, Jay Peterzell, John Pike, Joseph Pittera, John Prados, Owen Wilkes, Marshall Windmiller, Robert Windrem, and several members of the National Security Archive—Tom Blanton, Bill Burr, Kate Doyle, Michael Evans, and Peter Kornbluh.

I would also like to thank the National Security Archive for the multitude of ways in which it provided support and the Center for Defense Information for the use of its extensive library.

Jeffrey T. Richelson

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1

INTELLIGENCE

The United States government includes a substantial number of officials—individuals who make policy as well as ones who implement it—who require foreign intelligence to perform their duties. Only if those individuals are sufficiently informed about the state of the world and the likely consequences of policies and actions can they be expected to make intelligent decisions.

The individuals and institutions with the most prominent need for foreign intelligence are those concerned with making and implementing national security policy. Hence, the president and his national security adviser, the National Security Council (NSC) and its staff, the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military services are the most visible consumers of foreign intelligence. In 1995, the Under Secretary of State told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

> Everyday I need to know about the military and political developments in all corners of the former Yugoslavia, about the stability of the regime in North Korea, about the origins of the latest terrorist bomb in France, about the possible outcome of elections in Haiti or Russia, about potential starvation in the Sudan, and about Iran or Iraq's latest attempts to circumvent sanctions.[1]

In addition, policymakers with responsibilities in the areas of international economics, trade and technology transfer, energy, the environment, and public health may also require foreign intelligence. In the 1970s it became evident that foreign actions with respect to oil could have a dramatic impact on the well-being of the United States. In his role as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Edward Boland noted that "many believe . . . that energy and related economic problems can threaten us more deeply and affect our national security more rapidly than any change in the military picture short of war itself."[2]

Clearly, the availability of foreign energy resources as well as the stability of the dollar can be influenced by the actions of foreign governments and groups. Foreign actions concerning environmental matters are of importance to officials of the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As a result, the EPA requires intelligence regarding environmental accidents, foreign government compliance with international environmental obligations, and the status of environmentally sensitive areas. With respect to compliance, the EPA is interested in the disposal of nuclear wastes, illegal ocean dumping, and the smuggling of prohibited animals and animal products. Environmentally sensitive topics of concern to the EPA include tropical rain forest destruction, antarctic pollution sources, and arctic ice conditions.[3]

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is interested in foreign technology developments and foreign space programs and is also concerned with space debris that might threaten its manned and unmanned spacecraft. The Department of Agriculture has been concerned with foreign government compliance with negotiated agricultural agreements, the development of global trading blocks, agricultural production and supply, and food requirements of countries with chronic food deficits.[4]

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence can be defined as the "product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas."[5] Collection can be defined as the purposeful acquisition of any information that might be desired by an analyst, consumer, or operator. Collection activity can take any of several overlapping forms: open source collection, clandestine collection, human source collection, and technical collection.

Open source collection includes the acquisition of material in the public domain: radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, technical and scholarly journals, books, government reports, documents and other material to be found on the Internet, and reports by foreign service officers and defense attachés concerning public activities. The extent to which open source collection yields valuable information will vary greatly with the nature of the targeted society and the subject involved. The information might be collected by human sources—individuals who buy books and journals or observe military parades—or by technical means—recording television and radio programs.

Clandestine collection involves the acquisition of data that are not publicly available. As with open source collection, both human and technical resources may be employed. The traditional human spy may be employed to provide sensitive political, military, or economic information. Alternatively, technical collection systems can be used to photograph military installations, intercept a wide variety of communications and electronic signals, or detect the infrared, acoustic, and other signatures of weapons systems or events.

Great secrecy and sensitivity characterize human source clandestine collection. Although much technical collection is also clandestine, secrecy is not always as vital in technical collection as it is in human collection. Foreign nations are well

aware that the United States operates extensive space imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs. Even those nations capable of tracking the movements of U.S. spacecraft are limited in the denial and deception measures they can employ. As a result, the ability to effectively collect the required data does not always require secrecy with regard to the identity and location of the collection system. In contrast, a human asset whose identity becomes known to the foreign security service of the targeted nation will soon be arrested or become the channel for disinformation.

Analysis involves the integration of collected information—that is, raw intelligence from all sources—into finished intelligence. The finished intelligence product might be a simple statement of facts, an evaluation of the capabilities of another nation's military forces, or a projection of the likely course of political events in another nation.

Strictly speaking, intelligence activities involve only the collection and analysis of information and its transformation into intelligence; however, counterintelligence (CI) and covert action are intertwined with intelligence activity. Counterintelligence encompasses all information acquisition and activity designed to assess foreign intelligence and security services and neutralize hostile services. These activities involve clandestine and open source collection as well as analysis of information concerning the structure and operations of foreign services. Such collection and analysis, with respect to the technical collection activities of hostile services, can be employed to guide denial and deception operations. Counterintelligence may also involve the direct penetration and disruption of hostile intelligence activities.

Traditionally, covert action, also known as "special activities," includes any operation designed to influence foreign governments, persons, or events in support of the sponsoring government's foreign policy objectives, while keeping the sponsoring government's *support* of the operation secret. Whereas in clandestine collection the emphasis is on keeping the activity secret, in covert action it is on keeping the sponsorship secret.

There are several distinct types of covert action: black propaganda (propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one); gray propaganda (in which true sponsorship is not acknowledged); paramilitary or political actions designed to overthrow, undermine, or support a regime; paramilitary or political actions designed to counteract a regime's attempts to procure or develop advanced weaponry; support (aid, arms, training) of individuals or organizations (government components, political parties, labor unions, and publishing concerns); economic operations; disinformation; and assassination.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

It is important to put the collection and analysis activities conducted by various intelligence units into proper perspective—that is, to relate those activities to the