



国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

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June 12, 1947.

MEMORANDUM

TO: MR. F. S. TAVENNER, JR.
FROM: SOLIS HORWITZ
RE: HARADA MEMOIRS

PART 23, SECTION 2,
JUNE 5th, 1940.

Chapter 365

KONOYE stated that a great deal was being said and he believed they should proceed with caution. The reason the army was mentioned in the declaration was because KUHARA was in back of the army and KONOYE wanted to cover this up. He could not get together with that group.

YONAI and ARITA were quite concerned over the progress of negotiations over the China problem because the army itself was not settled.

June 7th

YARADA noted that KUHARA had visited YONAI and vigorously expressed his views but YONAI would not accept them and KUHARA had resigned as a councillor. He claims this is not a move to overthrow the government. It was feared that something would be done about Railways Minister MATSUNO who was in the cabinet as a representative of the KUHARA faction.

June 7th

HARADA called KONOYE and inquired whether he was going to form the new party regardless of ARIMA or NAGAI as announced. KONOYE said that he was troubled but he could not get along with KUHARA's group. It would seem as if he were being utilized to overthrow the government. ARITA had stated that the government was not concerned with what KUHARA did. They intended to keep MATSUNO.

June 8th

HARADA informed KIDO of the things he had heard the previous day and KIDO stated there would be a great trouble if the administration became shaky before the arrival and return of PU-YI. ISHIWATA stated that the patriotic elements of the right wing had united and are making strong anti-new party movements. The movements of SUETSUGU, HASHIMOTO and TATEKAWA were not very strong but the united action of the patriotic element was quite strong. They could not tell which was bad or good but they were to convey this situation to KONOYE. It would be odd for the administration to say anything directly.

CHAPTER 366

June 12th

KONOYE stated that ARIMA and NAGAI were doing as they pleased and

that it would be troublesome if he were to run away now. He was thinking of forming a new party by calling on the pure youths. The public's idea of the new party was different from his idea and he could not lead them.

HARADA told him that instead of saying such things he should excuse himself. But it seemed that KONOYE could not clearly state that he wished to be excused. HARADA warned him that the question of KONOYE resigning and forming a new party was exciting the public and if it resulted in overthrowing the cabinet, it would be unpleasant. KONOYE stated if he resigned as President of the Privy Council, it would be disastrous.

People seemed to think his resignation would be a bold move; as a matter of fact he did not like the job from the beginning and thought nothing of resigning. But it would be very troublesome if he resigned now.

HARADA spoke to MATSUOKA and KONOYE queried as to how MATSUOKA would do as foreign minister. HARADA warned him to do things cautiously after consulting with ARITA.

June 13th

ARITA thought that bringing in MATSUOKA would be dangerous but if it was unavoidable there was no other way.

June 15th

KIDO in response to HARADA's inquiry said that what he had so irresponsibly let go has finally become inflamed. Even if KONOYE called on the youths as he proposes no one would take him seriously. He should better resign quietly and plan for the time when he is to take over. He had told this to KONOYE.

June 16th

Home Affairs Minister KODOMA stated that he heard from KIDO confidentially, that KONOYE said he wished to resign as President of the Privy Council immediately before the arrival of the Manchurian Emperor. This was a very troublesome matter.

June 18th

YONAI told HARADA that someone had come and told him that since KIDO became the Lord Keeper he had been maneuvering together with KONOYE. The premier was very angry with KIDO. HARADA felt that KIDO had been an adviser to KONOYE on the new party movements and also had some connections with minority groups. Since he had become Lord Keeper he had clearly stated he would not participate in such matters but certain people were spreading propaganda.

HARADA spoke of this matter to the Imperial Household Minister and stated that he would explain to YONAI, ARITA and KODOMA that

KIDO had taken a different and cautious attitude since becoming Lord Keeper, and perhaps there was some influence from the Emperor.

June 19th

HAIRADA told KIDO what he had told the Household Minister, and that he intended to explain further. KIDO stated that before he left, KONOYE came and said he wanted to resign immediately and for KIDO to relay this to the administration, which KIDO did. KONOYE wanted to resign because of criticism from the Privy Council that it was not a good thing for its president to have connection with actual political problems. There was also opposition against the new party movement from a portion of the right wing. However, KONOYE himself did not want to remain in the position, he wanted to resign. Even if this is carried out it would probably end in failure. KIDO believed that KONOYE would never learn unless he met failure once.

Chapter 367, June 19th

YONAI asked KONOYE that even if his resignation was unavoidable he should set the proper time. But KONOYE replied that he wished to resign immediately before the arrival of PU-YI. KIDO stressed that they must make it clear that KONOYE's resignation had absolutely no meaning of overthrowing the cabinet. He thought it better if he resigned with the meaning that he wanted to think the matter over quietly.

June 20th

TANI stated that Japan had that day made a proposal to Germany and Italy. The proposal was the Japan had a deep interest, politically and economically in FIC and she wanted Germany and Italy to take a similar attitude in regard to the Rhine. Following this she would make a proposal to England and France. The proposal was made to the Italian and German ambassadors. They had also called the French ambassador and claimed that a large number of trucks were being sent to CHIANG Kai shek constantly through Hanoi and they demanded strict control. Japan was not considering taking FIC by means of military force but in case her demands were refused the use of force might be unavoidable. The matter would be studied further.

TANI also stated that the reason there had been no proposals to France was because America's attitude was not known to Japan, and Japan had been reserved. TANI stated that ample warning would be given concerning the Burma or aid to CHIANG route and further demands made. TANI stated that they were aware that a considerable amount of munitions was being sent to SHENANG CHUNGKING. This was learned by coded telegrams and it had become clear recently that this amounted to a great deal. The administration took this into consideration and made a strong proposal.

June 22nd

KONOYE clarified his intention to resign and wished to resign immediately. According to MATSUDAIRA, KONOYE had stated he would not take over the government immediately because it would take some time to form the new party. It did not seem to be KONOYE's intention to do anything about the cabinet immediately after his return from Kyoto.

June 22nd

YONAI seemed to be determined to promote HARADA to the presidency of the council in the event KONOYE resigned, despite the fact that HIRANUMA might expect it.

June 23rd

Due to the fact that KONOYE before he went on his trip had stated that regardless of his personal desire it was clear that there were plans to use him as a tool, and he would not resign. Yet in spite of this he had suddenly changed and was now saying he would resign. HARADA inquired the reason for this. KONOYE said he had met KIDO and the latter had told him it would be better for him to resign. He also thought there should be some preparations for later on since the present cabinet would not last very long.

KONOYE showed HARADA a statement which he had shown to ISHIWATA AND WHICH ISHIWATA had shown to YONAI and the latter is said to have agreed to it. The statement provided that everyone recognizes the need to decide upon a national unification political system. Therefore KONOYE should resign as president of the Privy Council and exert himself and do his best as a private citizen for the establishment of such a system. If the new party movement is for the establishment of such a new political system, that is fine. However if the movement is simply a change in existing political parties or is aimed at present political parties, he could not work together with them. The establishment of a true national unification system is a very difficult matter. The extremely important domestic and foreign situation demands the realization of such a system. These were the reasons why he was resigning.

KONOYE asked that HARADA explain the matter to SAIONJI and show him the statement. If SAIONJI should ask what was to be done later he was to say there was no use in saying anything, it should be left up to the Premier.

KIDO had told HARADA that the reason for KONOYE's desire to resign was some criticism from the advisers. Both HARADA and KIDO were worried that KONOYE's actions might give rise to the overthrow of the cabinet. Another of their fears was that KONOYE felt keenly the need for a national unification political system but the new party movements appeared quite different from his ideals. They had not been considering that KONOYE would lead the new party movements. KONOYE himself had been hoping for the YONAI cabinet to continue.

June 23rd

Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA advised that it was decided that HARADA would be promoted to the presidency of the Privy Council and wanted SAIONJI's opinion. SAIONJI concurred.

June 24th

ISHIWATA reported that KONOYE's resignation had been accepted and that HARADA had been proposed to the Emperor. The Installation Ceremonies would be held that day.

June 25th

KIDO stated that it seemed the Emperor was quite perplexed. KIDO had told the Emperor that he believed that HARA was quite narrow-minded but since YONAI requested his appointment, he must have a plan. Therefore, after YONAI had given his opinion the Emperor should approve if he assented. If he could not he should summon KIDO. After YONAI had gone, the Emperor asked whether MINAMI was going to become the Vice-President and KIDO had replied this was not very clear. KIDO told YONAI about this conversation in preparation and told him to include the matter of MINAMI. When YONAI was received the Emperor gave his assent and YONAI conveyed to the Emperor that MINAMI would not become the vice-president and the Emperor was quite relieved.

HARADA was told by HARA that YONAI had recommended KAWAI for vice-president while HARA had recommended Adm. SUZUKI. YONAI was quite reserved since SUZUKI was his naval superior. YONAI had finally acceded and SUZUKI was appointed.

June 28th

YONAI stated there were various movements and instead of coming from the front they seemed to be planned in the rear. He was thinking of exposing this when the opportunity presented itself and gather them up.

YONAI had already known of the rumors that KONOYE was being recommended; that NAGAI would become the Chief Cabinet Secretary, SHIRATORI the Foreign Minister and KOISO the Home Affairs Minister. YONAI stated he would remain silent and when the time came to act, he would.

KIDO recommended that there should be someone capable of assisting KONOYE and substitute for him in dealings with people. He thought GOTO Fumio was suitable.

ARITA stated he had been up all night preparing the script for a radio broadcast which he was to give that afternoon. When he discussed the matter with the Navy Minister YONAI and HATA, he told them that they should by means of newspapers or radio broadcasts give the public a general common sense view of diplomatic affairs without delving too deeply. They all agreed. He did not think it necessary to discuss the subject formally or officially and had not expected to give this speech today. He hardly thought it would be that afternoon until he saw the write up in the newspapers. Both the army and navy had said it was outrageous that ARITA should do this without consulting them. The army takes liberty in deciding important matters without any consultation but when something like this happened they caused a commotion. It was the trend of the time and he thought it inevitable. The vice-ministers met and after much consultation they reached an understanding and it was finally decided to do this broadcast this afternoon. If he was going to make any broadcasts he could not be too unscrupulous in his speech. Therefore he prepared his script without having slept.

SAKURAUCHI reported that YONAI was saying if he was sure of the formation of a better party and if it was necessary he would be willing to have KONOYE take his place.

June 28th

KONOYE also stated that he had told USHIBA the other day that he had never once used the words new party. The national unity political system should not only include the legislative body but also the administrative body and in a sense, the supreme command also. It was not merely a problem of the legislative organ. He thought the government should also take that problem into consideration. When he told USHIBA he had never used the words new party USHIBA left saying that KONOYE had caught him that time.

KONOYE also told ISHIWATA that if the government desired, he did not mind being the president of the new party.

HARADA noted that KONOYE was incapable of segregating the good and the bad groups. He had no competent man to assist him and HARADA thought that KONOYE probably wanted the government to regulate this.

June 30th

HARADA phoned ISHIWATA and YONAI and told them about the talk he had had with KONOYE and told them that KONOYE had said that consideration should be given to the establishment, purpose and materialization of the national unity political system and then organize a committee. If the government had that in mind KONOYE would be delighted to become its president. KONOYE stated he had no intention of overthrowing the cabinet.

CHAPTER 368-B

ARITA reported that KOBAYASHI had told him that KONOYE was having a difficult time with the new party and inquired whether it would not be possible for the government to organize a committee for the National Unity Political System ^{and KONOYE} to act in concert with the government.

July 1st

UCHIDA reported that SUMA, chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office was questioned by Kempei and then released. It seemed he had some connection with ARITA's radio broadcast. Before the questioning newspaper reports from various papers had been called in as witnesses.

HARADA immediately telephoned ARITA who was out. He then telephoned MATSUDAIRA and inquired about the situation and MATSUDAIRA stated he had heard from TANI that a Kempei 2nd lieutenant went to SUMA's place and told him they had some questions to ask and wanted him to come to the Kempei-tai Headquarters. They did not want it to be conspicuous so told him to drop in quietly while taking a walk.

SUMA went immediately to the headquarters where he saw the various reporters. The Kempei asked SUMA whether he had said that those three had written the article. SUMA said he did not recall making such a statement. There were twenty or thirty other reporters present besides these but they did not write up anything. The three newspaper reporters must have misunderstood it and written it up in the papers. Then SUMA returned immediately. The affair had become exaggerated. The young officers in the War Ministry, a faction in the General Staff Hqrs and the Rightists made it appear as if they would overthrow the cabinet. The situation was very delicate.

HARADA reported this to SAIONJI.

It appeared that with the prospect of the China Incident drawing to a close, the army did not want the YONAI cabinet which they disapproved, to take the credit. ARITA's statement of positive non-interference was so comprehensive that ARITA had said first what the army had wanted to say. The army was therefore very antagonistic towards ARITA and the tendency to overthrow the cabinet had become increasingly stronger.

ARITA stated that in his interview with HATA and YONAI, HATA ceaselessly said that there could be no peace and order in the War Ministry until SUMA was relieved from his post. HATA's attitude was very dubious.

YONAI had asked HATA if he had read SUMA's written testimony but HATA had not. YONAI told HATA that they must both study the matter and then meet again. ARITA stated that HATA's attitude was suspicious and he was thinking of seeing YONAI leisurely that day.

HARADA inquired from YONAI whether HATA's manner was mysterious. YONAI merely said that the matter would be settled that day. He seemed to be making up his mind. Some time ago YONAI had expressed his determination if they brought up something again he would disclose it to the public and take drastic steps. HARADA felt that the army's attitude was outrageous and unfair.

CHAPTER 369, June 3rd.

YONAI conferred with HATA. Some time later he conferred with HATA and ARITA and the Navy Minister at a four minister conference. As a result the Navy Minister explained that the combined statements of the Foreign Affairs and War Ministry were presented on the 5th. Things seemed settled on the surface. The militarists are saying that the responsibility lies on SUMA or ARITA, to somehow criticize the foreign policy and break up the cabinet. HARADA heard that the Kempeitai were even planning to take ISHIWATA and ARITA and make matters unpleasant for them.

Since the military faction resented HARADA's attitude, ISHIWATA cautioned him that he should stop shielding the government so openly.

July 4th

The Metropolitan Police phoned stating that an incident similar to the Feb. 26th Incident had occurred. It is said that the attack will begin at exactly 6 o'clock and they will send many policemen over. Although HARADA was in Oiso, the police said proper arrangements would be made. The police also wanted HARADA to leave Oiso as soon as possible. HARADA got up and with one of the policemen as a guard went to a friend's house in Ninomiya. However the situation became clear and the army did not go into action.

About 47 members of the MAEDA faction of the Shimpaitai had as their

first objective in assassination, YONAI, MAKINO, OKADA, MATSUDARA, IKEDA, and HARADA, the latter because he was the pro British messenger. The second objective was ARITA and MACHIDA and it was rumored that they had a third objective.

July 5th

The Home Affairs Minister informed HARADA that on the 4th most of the conspirators had been arrested and most of their weapons seized. Forth had been arrested and there were still seven or eight persons at large but there was nothing to worry about since most of these were unarmed. This was the Imperial Friends Riot Incident.

July 5th

HARADA told KIDO the army was useless and could hardly deal with the Incident until the cabinet changes. The situation had become critical. HARADA reported all this to SAIONJI. There were frequent broadcasts that if KONOYE returned on the 10th the army would immediately overthrow the cabinet and form a new one with the so-called new political party having KONOYE as its head. On the 1st, HARADA had inquired about this situation and KONOYE had said it was very complicated and could not make any preparations. Since it was so bothersome he was going to extend the date although he had said he was returning to Tokyo on the 10th.

July 9th

HARADA phoned KONOYE in Karuizawa. There was some misunderstanding regarding HARADA's conversation with YONAI and ARITA. YONAI had said that KONOYE had consented to take over the succeeding cabinet and to the political change. KONOYE had said this was nonsense that it was not so. He also said that the government was thinking of cooperating with the problem of the new order and had sent ISHIWATA to KONOYE but KONOYE had stated that it was absolutely unnecessary for him to meet ISHIWATA. For the first time, after speaking to KONOYE, it was clear that the story was an exaggerated rumor. KONOYE stated that if ISHIWATA should come he would be glad to see him.

Solis Horwitz

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Frank Tavenner

18 June 1947

From: Solie Horwitz

Subj: HARADA Memoirs, Part 24, Section I

Chapter 370

KIDO stated that Vice Minister of War ANAMI stated that the Military could not possibly be satisfied with the present cabinet. To change the foreign policy, he stated, a shake-up must take place. ARITA stated that he had spoken to ISHIWATA and YONAI about KONOYE's new political order and united government. They were both giving it considerable deliberation.

July 11, 1940

HARADA called ANAMI and asked him what he was insisting on. He replied that there was no consistency between foreign policy and military operations. To have them coincide the cabinet must be changed. He wished KONOYE would exert his efforts to this end. KONOYE called and stated that a courier from Colonel USUI of the General Staff had said that there were various rumors on a change in the government, but it is better for KONOYE to work for the national unity political system and be prudent about dabbling in the present political situation. He thought SHODA should take charge. KONOYE stated that SUZUKI was calling him persistently.

July 12, 1940

SUZUKI of the Asia Development Board told HARADA that the present cabinet would never do. His plan was to reduce the number of cabinet members to facilitate the progress of work. HARADA asked him to write out his plans and present them to KONOYE, and he thought he had done so. ISHIWATA reported that ANAMI and MUTO had stated that the present cabinet must amicably withdraw at any cost. Because diplomatic relations are going ahead satisfactorily due to the Four Ministers' Conference and other connections, they would say nothing more about foreign policy. To realize KONOYE's new political order they would like YONAI to withdraw. When HARADA disapproved they both said there was nothing to be done but force the resignation of HATA.

July 13, 1940

YONAI asked HATA if he knew about the visit of ANAMI and MUTO and HATA replied that he knew but their opinions were their own personally. HATA said that in the long run it was his personal opinion that the cabinet should resign. This was reported to HARADA by Navy Minister YOSHIDA. YOSHIDA was worried that KIDO was too deeply involved with the Army. HARADA explained that there was no such thing as MATSUDAIRA and KIDO joining in the overthrow of the cabinet. ISHIWATA stated that he wanted to negotiate with KONOYE on the new political order. HATA was sending disagreeable notes to YONAI.

HARADA spoke to SAIONJI on KIDO's plan for petitioning procedure for the succeeding cabinet; that is, convening a meeting of the Privy Councillors and all former Premiers. SAIONJI said he did not quite understand and HARADA thought he could not call it an assent. HARADA's plan was that on such an inquiry KIDO should first confer with SAIONJI at the Emperor's discretion. Because of SAIONJI's age, he should seek the advice of the President of the Privy Council and former Premiers and then confer with SAIONJI and submit his answer. The summons would be conveyed by the Grand Chamberlain at the Emperor's discretion. All present would deliberate in an informal meeting with the Lord Keeper delegated to see that unity of opinion was reached. If there was wide disagreement, the Lord Keeper was to confer with SAIONJI and give his opinion on his own responsibility. In contacting SAIONJI the Lord Keeper would send his chief secretary if things were not complicated. In case of need, he would go himself. It would be more convenient, if possible, that he not leave Tokyo. In the event of disunity with SAIONJI, the Lord Keeper would call back the group and seek settlement. It was a method whereby the Lord Keeper would answer. SAIONJI suggested that they leave the matter up to KIDO. YONAI reported that it was clearly evident that there are movements for the overthrow of the cabinet and he was not thinking of meeting KONOYE or of sending his secretary to meet him. HARADA spoke to ISHIWATA who promised to talk over the matter again with YONAI.

July 14, 1940

ISHIWATA stated that he had KODAMA and ARITA come to YONAI to study the matter at length. If YONAI meets KONOYE he will be called an advocate of totalitarianism. This would not be beneficial to KONOYE. It would be better if they did not meet. KONOYE's return should be left to his own judgment. HARADA reported this to KONOYE, who seemed somewhat disturbed.

July 15, 1940

Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA reported that relations between the government and Army were greatly aggravated and acute. KIDO reported that Prince KANIN's audience that day with the Emperor was in connection with the South Seas Operations. The Emperor asked KIDO if arrangements had been made with the government in connection with such operations. KIDO called ARITA, who stated it had been decided by the Four Ministers' Conference and recognized by the government.

July 16, 1940

MATSUDAIRA reported that at an Imperial audience because of divergence of opinion with HATA, YONAI wanted a new War Minister, but it was difficult to nominate a successor. YONAI had therefore reported his desire to resign. HATA had submitted his resignation. The previous day YONAI had told HATA that for several days the latter had maneuvered to overthrow the cabinet. He asked him to decide his attitude. He should resign if he wished, and not if he did not. HATA immediately resigned. Before HATA resigned, the young militarists, thinking to force his resignation, printed in the Asahi that HATA was going to resign that day.

KONOYE stated that even if he were to participate, it would not be possible to form a new political order. He had resigned from the Privy Council to form the new order and it would not be reasonable for him to be Premier at the time. The Army was responsible for the overthrow of the cabinet. He would like to see it take over. HARADA phoned OKADA and HIROTA, but the Army clique agreed with KONOYE. When things came to a showdown, it did not go the way KONOYE wanted.

July 17, 1940

The Lord Keeper held a meeting with the President of the Privy Council and former Premiers. HARADA went to see SAIONJI and told him that the Grand Chamberlain or the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper would come or phone. SAIONJI felt that for KONOYE to attempt politics on the basis of popularity would be of no avail. He did not wish to support him just to fail. He was unable to understand accurately what was going on in the world. He would be disloyal to give an answer under such circumstances and would like to be excused. He told this to the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper.

Chapter 371

The Lord Keeper reported to the Emperor that it would be unpleasant to seek SAIONJI's opinion further. It would be well to proceed. If SAIONJI had not thought it beneficial he would have said so because he knew KONOYE, but since he only said he did not know, he did not believe it was strong opposition. It was all right, therefore, to proceed. KONOYE was thereafter given the Imperial mandate and decided that night on the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers and called them together. He immediately scrutinized the basic national policy. If the three concur with KONOYE, they will begin organizing a cabinet. TOJO was recommended as successor to HATA. Since he was in Korea, he was ordered to return by plane, but he was delayed because of storms.

July 19, 1940

KONOYE met with the Navy, War and Foreign Ministers before the installation and they reached unity of opinion. MATSUOKA was to be Foreign Minister and YOSHIDA Navy Minister. The rest of the cabinet was to be appointed on the 20th.

July 20, 1940

KONOYE stated that because MATSUOKA came out as if he advocated a Japanese-American war, YOSHIDA was at first aghast. He was finally placated when MATSUOKA came out with moderate arguments. Coming out with something like this and scaring people is one of MATSUOKA's weak points. He intended to appoint HOSHINO as President of the Planning Board.

July 21, 1940

KONOYE told HARADA the names of his cabinet members and that evening they were installed in office.

July 22, 1940

SAIONJI pointed out by historical parallel that when a certain Chinese Emperor was carrying out good government and improving the nation, the Empress executed the learned scholars and carried on in a brutal manner, eventually completely destroying society. In a way the military could be likened to the Empress.

July 23, 1940

Chief Secretary TOLITA stated it would be best for KONOYE not to become entangled with the rightists. He indicated he himself would be completely responsible for their handling.

Chapter 372

July 24, 1940

YONAI suggested that in choosing a Premier they should include only those former Premiers who had been accorded treatment as former Premiers.

July 25, 1940

SAIONJI stated that he had heard KONOYE's broadcast and while he could understand most of what he said, he thought the context was filled with paradoxes. He could have done it more skillfully.

July 26, 1940

TANI stated that he had submitted his resignation. It was suggested that OHASHI would be the new Foreign Vice Minister and SHIRATORI and SAITO would probably become advisors to MATSUDAIRA (MATSUOKA).

July 27, 1940

KOBAYASHI, Minister of Commerce, stated he was much concerned because no plans had been made by the Planning Board. KISHI stated because libel had been considerably violent, considerable caution must be exercised. There were too many unfounded rumors.

Former Lord Keeper YUASA stated that he was concerned about MATSUOKA and YASUI in connection with the present condition of foreign and domestic affairs. He was likewise concerned about KONOYE and KIDO and thought they might be requesting amnesty by February. He was apprehensive of the right wing and the attitude of the government and the Lord Keeper on that. SHODA stated that this present Cabinet had organized the Manchukuo Kyowakai in Manchukuo and there were still Communists behind it. HARADA told him not to worry about it. TOJO stated he would do all that was possible. HARADA noted that looking over the situation at the Foreign Ministry it seemed certain that SHIRATORI and SAITO would be advisors and OHASHI Vice Minister. He heard this from KONOYE. He felt apprehensive over the Foreign Ministry organization, but felt it inevitable.

Chapter 373

HARADA noted that at the Four Ministers' Conference held between MONOYE, MATSUOKA, YOSHIDA and TOJO, while the cabinet was being organized, the fundamental policies for organizing the new cabinet were decided.

They had decided that in order to evolve a policy for disposing of the China Incident, the establishment and strengthening of war-time economy would be the basis of domestic and foreign policy. The government would assume leadership for all economic activities and its promotion to the utmost except in case of absolute need to the existence of the military forces to dispose of or assume leadership by itself.

Corresponding to the sudden changes in the world situation and to quickly establish a new order for East Asia, they planned to strengthen the axis with Germany and Italy. They must act in concert and carry out various other important policies. They must anticipate the best time in the world situation and not miss it; that is, as it concerns the method of strengthening the axis and its time for realization.

A non-aggression pact will be signed with Russia by Japan, Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia for five to ten years. Together with planning the immediate solution of pending questions, they would have sufficient military preparedness to cope with Russia during the period of the pact.

To include the English, French, Dutch and Portugal areas in the neighboring islands in the Orient within the new order, positive arrangements will be undertaken and Japan will try to exclude herself from international conferences on them.

Even though they will avoid unnecessary collisions with the United States as long as it concerns the establishment of the new order they were firmly determined to eliminate any interference by show of power, and expect realization of the policy.

HARADA also reported that at the liaison meeting between Grand Imperial Headquarters and the government, Grand Imperial Headquarters presented certain points. These points were that the Empire would improve its foreign situation by hastening the settlement of the China Incident, and at the same time will seize the most opportune time to solve the South Sea Island problem. In case the China Incident can not be disposed of yet the emphasis placed on the South Sea Islands by a change in policy will be decided on, considering various domestic and foreign situations. Preparation to cope with these items will be given the utmost hastening.

To dispose of the China Incident they would concentrate collective strength on political and military strategy, especially rejecting assistance by a third nation and will plan to exert all efforts for the prompt submission of Chungking. They would endeavor to further the South Seas policy by seizing the best time and using changes in the situation.

The objective of the foreign policy is to accelerate disposition of the China Incident and solving of the South Seas problem. Emphasis is placed first on policies toward Germany, Italy and Russia, especially on strengthening solidarity with Germany and Italy. They planned to make leaping adjustments in Russian relations. Toward the United States they would maintain justifiable contentions and a solemn attitude. While they would not refrain from boldly carrying out the policy necessary to the Empire, despite the inevitable aggravation which would accompany it, they would always heed the actions of the United States and plan to avoid increase of friction by going out of their way.

As to French Indo-China, they will expect complete cessation of assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. They must shoulder the replenishment of Japanese troops and recognize the use of airfields and passage of troops. They will try to acquire the raw materials necessary to Japan. With respect to Hongkong, along with cutting off the Burma route, they must go ahead on various construction jobs and first eradicate enemy sympathizers. In regard to the concessions, together with eradicating enemy sympathizers and withdrawal of belligerent troops, they would induce China to take back the concessions.

As to the Netherlands East Indies, they would first try to secure vital resources through diplomacy. If possible, they will act to annex former French and German possessions in view of strategic location through diplomacy. In other areas in the South Seas, through diplomacy, they plan to receive cooperation in construction projects.

At home they will accelerate the completion of a defensive nation while organizing and guiding the various government agencies. They anticipate realization of a powerful government, a comprehensive motion for a general mobilization law, war-time economy, accumulation of war materials, and increase of shipping with maximum effect on advance importation and special importation, the expansion of production and adjustment for repletion of armaments, and the raising of national morale and unification of public opinion.

Because of the importance of this document it was handed over for KONOYE and SAIONJI to see.

August 2-6, 1940

HARADA was called to testify in the SHIMPEITAI trial.

August 8, 1940

KIDO reported that MATSUOKA submitted a matter to the Emperor for two hours. Listening from the next room it seemed to KIDO that MATSUOKA was lecturing the Emperor. The Emperor later said that MATSUOKA gave him an introduction to foreign affairs. While his arguments were good, he thought their realization would be fairly difficult. Even KIDO was troubled by MATSUOKA.