

Strategy

GUOJI ZHANLÜE YU GUOJIA ANQUAN

国际战略与国家安全

——科学技术的视角

主编 李彬 吴日强

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序 言

李 彬

很多科学发现最终都转化为了新的军事技术。在过去的一个多世纪里,这种转化速度越来越快。抢先掌握新军事技术的国家可以借此获得更为强大的国防实力,更为有效地对抗其面临的安全威胁、改善其安全状况。问题是,一个国家国防实力的上升可能会引起其他国家的担心。其他国家会认为自身的国防实力被相对削弱,安全状况会因此下降。这些国家只好发展自己的军备以弥补被削弱的自身国防实力。最终结果是,对抢先掌握新军事技术的国家而言,它的总体安全状况不仅没有得到改善,反而更加恶化。这种现象就是安全困境(security dilemma)。更为具体地说,这就是新军事技术发展所导引的安全困境。20世纪中后期,这种新军事技术发展所导引的安全困境不断出现。第二次世界大战后期,美国率先获得核武器技术。“二战”结束后,对美国核力量深感忧虑的前苏联也开始发展核武器。此后,其他一些国家陆续跟进,直到现在仍有一些国家在顶着压力开发核武器,甚至一些非国家行为体也试图获得核武器。美国并未因为率先掌握核武器技术而建立起单方面的核垄断地位。50年代后期开始,美国和前苏联开始发展以核反核的反导技术。经过十年左右的较量,美苏双方认识到,这不过是新军事技术所导引的新一场安全困境。如果一方率先发展反弹道导弹,另一方必然发展更多进攻性导弹来弥补自身被削弱的核报复能力。这样,对率先发展反弹道导弹的一方而言,其安全环境反而会恶化。认识到这一点,美苏签署了《反弹道导弹条约》,限制全国性战略导弹防御系统。军事科技的飞速发展不断地把国家间关系引入这样的安全困境。通过各国合作性的努力,人们又不断地走出这些安全困境。

并不是所有的军事技术都会必然地导引出安全困境。按照一般攻防理论(见第一章),军事行动大致可以分为两类:第一,发动进攻以占领更大范围的土地;第二,实施防守以保有更大范围的土地。如果一项新军事技术更有利于发动进攻以扩大占领区,则这样的军事技术更容易引起安全困境。如果一项新军事技术更有利于防守已经占领的地区,则这样的技术就不那么容易引起安全困境。例如,提高军事运输能力对进攻方更为有利,因此,这样的技术发展就容易引起安全困境。在

严重的情况下,安全困境甚至可能演变为战争。值得指出的是,按照一般攻防理论,一个通过战争扩大占领范围的国家需要抵消对手的战略进攻能力,因此,战略进攻导弹是有利于防御的因素。也就是说,进攻性导弹对防御贡献更大,而防御性导弹对进攻贡献更大。

一般攻防理论从实力结构出发研究国家间关系,因此是一种结构现实主义。该理论将安全作为国家的目的,因此是防御性现实主义。该理论认为,安全困境不是必然的,是视情况而出现的,因此是一种乐观现实主义。根据这样的理论,如果国家间通过合作,达成共识,将军事技术发展重点限制在有利于防守上,则安全困境是可以避免的。按照这样的思路,人类应该通过合作,找到避免安全困境的途径。这种思路体现了军备控制的精髓:通过合作性措施来追求国家安全目标,避免安全困境,实现国际稳定。

清华大学国际问题研究所军备控制项目(课题组)一直坚持这样的研究思路和特色,本书的各章都体现了这种研究思路。具体来说,就是考察紧迫的国际安全现象,从技术深层挖掘安全困境的成因,并找出合作性的措施,为走出安全困境、实现国际稳定提供理由和建议。

第一章至第四章都是从技术角度考察可能形成安全困境的国际局面,提出走出困境的理由和途径。第一章对美国所引领的新军事变革进行了分析,考察目前正在出现的各项新军事技术对攻防关系的影响。根据分析,我们了解到,移动军事通讯、运输及远程后勤保障等技术能力正在全面发展。这显然有利于发动进攻的一方调配兵力,实现快速机动。这种有利于进攻方的技术变化可能使得今后一段时间,国际上更容易出现安全困境,战争风险也更大。这一章指出了当前军事技术发展可能导致国际安全关系不稳定发展的隐忧,人们需要给予关注,并采取措施加以规避,以推动国际安全关系的稳定。第二章具体讨论导弹攻防发展的经济后果问题。“冷战”结束后,美国以对付新导弹威胁为理由发展导弹防御。问题是,美国部署的导弹防御系统也覆盖了一些核武器国家,这势必会引起这些国家的担心。如果中美双方竞相增加进攻性导弹数量和反导拦截器的数量,这会给双方带来怎样的经济后果呢?第二章的技术与经济计算表明,考虑到攻防费用的差别以及双方经济能力的差别,任何一方都难以在数量竞争中明显领先。数量上水涨船高对双方的经济都是不利的。这一结果提示我们,中美双方需要在战略导弹攻防问题上进行更多的磋商,找到对双方都有利的合作性解决方案。第三章从技术角度考察美国计划在东欧部署的导弹防御系统。分析表明,东欧反导系统可以与阿拉斯加系统组合成双层拦截,明显增大对俄罗斯的安全威胁。美国可以通过限制系统的技术特征和改变系统的部署地点两种方式来规避与俄罗斯的安全困境,从而实

现既满足美国对伊朗导弹的安全关切,又避免俄罗斯的强烈反应。这一分析为美俄在反导问题上走出安全困境提供了技术层面的建议。第四章也是从技术角度来考察外空战可能的后果。外空技术是极具挑战性的高新技术。从这个角度来看,拥有技术优势的一方似乎更容易赢得外空战。这一章的分析指出,打赢外空战是不可能的,外空战不可能有胜利者。其原因在于,外空战所产生的空间碎片可能摧毁所有各方在外空中的财产,拥有技术优势的一方也无法避免受到外空碎片的伤害。认识到这一点,世界各国就不应该因为准备外空战而陷入新的安全困境。最明智的措施是缔结一项外空非武器化条约,排除外空战的可能。

本书第五章和第六章从非传统安全视角讨论对外政策与国家间关系。第五章从中日石油贸易关系来考察日本对中国东海石油开采的态度。当中国向日本大量出口石油的时候,中国石油对日本石油进口多元化具有重大意义,日本对此感到满足。当时日本不仅不介意中国在东海进行石油勘探,而且日本自己也不屑于在东海日本一侧进行勘探。等到中国逐渐成为石油净进口国、停止对日本石油出口之后,日本开始对中国在东海中国一侧进行的石油开采进行批评。这说明,中日之间需要在石油问题上寻找新的共同利益。中国和日本同属石油净进口国,在稳定油价、保护石油运输畅通等方面的确有很多共同利益。中日可以在这些共同利益的基础上,找到新的合作点。第六章考察中国的石油安全政策。通过考察可以发现,与石油运输安全相比,中国更重视供应安全。石油运输安全更多地与传统安全相联系,石油供应安全更多地与非传统安全相联系。由此可以发现,在石油问题上,中国政府的关注点更多地在于非传统安全上。这体现了中国政府新安全观中重视非传统安全的特点。

第七章至第九章从微观角度考察国家间的安全关系。第七章着重考察美国安全专家对中国核武器问题的看法。不管这些看法是否符合事实,它们都会影响美国政府的核相关政策。分析和考察表明,美国学者对中国现有核力量的判断差别并不大,但是,他们对中国未来核力量、核战略走向的判断差别却很大。认为中国核力量会急剧增长的美国专家往往倾向于支持对中国采取强硬政策,持相反观点的学者则有更多的合作兴趣。这显示,为了促进中美在核问题上的合作与稳定,我国需要将重点放在阐明未来核政策上面。第八章考察美国工业行会对美国出口管制的影响。出口管制不仅涉及国家间的安全关系,而且涉及国家间的经济关系,是安全领域政治经济学的重要课题。该章从微观角度讨论了影响美国对外安全与经济政策的国内政治因素,提出了通过经济交往实现中美合作与稳定的思路。第九章讨论了中美在军备控制领域第二轨道交流中的一个具体案例,详细考察了两国科学家之间的交流如何帮助中美两国协调《全面禁止核试验条约》谈判过程中的立

场。这是一个非常独特的视角,对了解中美关系的复杂性有很大的帮助。

第十章和第十一章都是从技术角度考察国际机制对国际稳定的作用。国际机制是国际多边合作的重要形式,对于促进国际安全与稳定有着重要作用。第十章对美国与日本等国家的反导技术合作进行技术评估,考察这些合作是否符合既有国际机制的规定。结论是,其中一些合作违反了美国自己所推动的《导弹技术控制机制》。这样的研究有助于帮助美国认识反导技术扩散对国际机制的伤害。第十一章试图为外空领域建立信心措施(confidence building measures)寻找恰当的组织机构。我国长期致力于推进外空军控,一旦这项努力取得进展,就需要选择或建立适当的国际组织来负责外空军备控制的落实。这项研究从技术能力和组织能力两个角度对国际电信组织进行考察,以确定该组织是否有能力承担这些国际机制的实施工作。这项研究可以帮助我们考虑未来外空军控机制的运行特点。

本书的研究思路和方法属于国际安全研究中的一个重要领域。近些年国内这一领域的研究有了长足的发展,国家政策需求也越来越大。正是在这样的背景下,我们研究小组在这一领域进行了系列性的研究工作。本书所收入的研究成果表明我们的研究逐渐走向成熟,并具有以下一些特点。

第一,这些研究以中国的安全关切作为出发点。随着中国经济的高速发展,中国对外政策逐渐成为国际上的关注重点。国际学术界针对中国提出了很多疑问,例如,一些国际机制是否应该接受中国参加?对这些疑问的讨论和回答,总的来说仍属于外部视角。本研究完全从中国视角来考察国际机制问题,例如,既有国际机制是否得到了其创始国的尊重和遵守?如何建立符合中国利益的国际机制?这样的讨论是对中国安全关切的表达,也有助于我们独立地、平等地参与国际交流。第二,本书的研究大多以技术论证为依据。这种技术与政策相结合的分析能够提供一些精致的、可操作的政策评价和建议。例如,反导与外空相关的安全困境,其后果是怎样的?如何规避这些安全困境?这种定量的、技术性的分析和建议比较容易与实际政策结合,也比较容易在国际交流中达成共识,建立认识共同体(epistemic community)。第三,本书的研究基本上都采用微观视角,挖掘国际安全互动中的微观因素,例如,考察特殊群体对于国际安全问题的独特看法以及作为等。这种微观研究方法有助于分析一些原本非常重要但是可能会被忽略的国际安全因素。

作为新建立的 985 清华大学科学技术与社会发展创新基地的一部分,清华大学国际问题研究所在最近一些年开展了一系列科学与国际安全的相关研究,科学技术与国际安全课题组并因此获得 2007 年清华大学“先进集体”称号。本书的内容是这一基地研究成果的一部分,反映了文理交叉的新学科特色。

本书的编者和各章作者都是或者曾经是清华大学国际问题研究所军备控制研

究课题组的成员。该课题组在过去几年得到了 The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation 的资助。编者之一(吴日强)作为清华大学国际问题研究所的访问学者,其资助主要来自这一项目;我们组织的一些学术活动与培训活动的资助也来自该项目。本书编者和作者对此表示感谢。

编者感谢清华大学国际问题研究所的同事、同学以及与我们进行学术交流的中外学者,他们的评论和讨论深化了我们的研究。

本书部分章节曾在一些会议和杂志上发表过,收入本书时做了一些修改和删节。本书的编者和作者希望本书能够为中国国际关系和对外政策的决策者、研究人员和学生们提供一个较为新颖的研究视角和一些独特的分析结果,并希望这本书能够有助于他们的研究和学习。

Preface

Li Bin

Many scientific discoveries are eventually transformed into new military technologies. This transformation has accelerated during the last century. A country that first acquires a new military technology has the capacity to build up greater military strength vis-à-vis its adversaries and thus more effectively avoid security threats. The central quandary lies in the fact that a rise in military strength of one country may elicit concerns from others. These countries may feel that by comparison their military strengths have been weakened and their security situations worsened. They develop their own armaments to compensate for their relative loss of military strength. As a result, the security of the country that first acquired the new military technology worsens instead of improves. This phenomenon is called the security dilemma, or the security dilemma induced by new military technology. In the last half a century, security dilemmas brought on by innovations in military technology have repeatedly occurred.

As one example, the United States first acquired nuclear weapons technology near the end of World War Two. Following the war, the Soviet Union, worried about US nuclear superiority, began to develop its own nuclear weapons. A number of other countries later followed suit developing their own nuclear capability. Even today, some countries are facing substantial international pressure against their own alleged efforts to establish nuclear weapons capabilities, and some non-state actors may also be making their own inroads into nuclear technology. Thus, the United States failed to establish a nuclear monopoly, even though it was the first to acquire nuclear weapons.

In the late 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union began to develop nuclear Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs). After a competition that ensued for over ten years, the two countries faced a new security dilemma. If one side developed ABMs, then the other side would be forced to develop more offensive missiles to compensate

for its retaliatory capability weakened by the ABMs. The security of the country that deploys ABMs would thereby worsen. Based on this understanding, the United States and Soviet Union concluded the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to constrain nation-wide strategic-capable ballistic missile defense systems.

This brief overview reveals that military technological development repeatedly pushed relations among countries into security dilemmas and yet peoples of the world have the capacity to seek cooperative solutions. In actuality, however, it is far from certain that all new military technologies will elicit a security dilemma. According to the general theory of offense-defense (see chapter I), military actions can be divided into two categories: The first is to conquer a larger piece of land by offense and the second is to retain as much land as possible by defense. If a new military technology favors offense, that is to say conquers more land, it will more likely induce a security dilemma. If the technology favors defense, that is to say retains more land, it is less likely to induce a security dilemma. For example, the improvement of military transportation helps the offensive side more than the defensive side, so this technology is more likely to trigger a security dilemma. This dilemma could develop into a war. It is evident that an entity, which wants to conquer more land, must deny the strategic retaliatory capability of its rival. According to the general theory of offense-defense, strategic offensive weapons are an element in favor of defense. In other words, strategic offensive weapons contribute more to defense, while strategic defensive weapons contribute more to offense.

The theory of offense-defense evaluates the relations between various countries by examining their force structures, so the theory is a kind of structural realism. The theory asserts that security is the goal of all countries, so it belongs to defensive realism. The theory also maintains that the security dilemma is not a necessary outcome of international security relations, so overall it remains an optimistic theory. According to this theory, the security dilemma may be avoided if countries restrict their military developments to defensive systems. Following this idea, peoples of the world should seek solutions to avoid the security dilemma through cooperation. This is exactly the spirit of arms control; countries reach their security goals through cooperation and thus achieve international stability.

The Arms Control Program at Tsinghua University's Institute of International Studies has been following the above idea in its research, leading to the chapters in

this book. All the chapters examine urgent international security issues, explore the technical pros and cons of the security dilemmas in these issues, seek cooperative solutions, and offer paths to realize international stability.

The first four chapters use a technological framework to explore international situations which may elicit a security dilemma and offer reasons and paths for their cooperative solutions. Chapter I analyzes the military transformation led by the United States and assesses the impact of new military technology on the balance of offense to defense. The analysis of this chapter points out that the development of military transportation, long-distance logistics, mobile communications, and so on are beneficial to the offensive side for rapid mobility and military redeployment. The technological change in favor of the offense may increase the likelihood of the development of a security dilemma and war in the near future. This chapter raises concerns over international instability caused by new military technology and suggests that more attention should be paid to this issue.

Chapter II discusses the economic consequences of a competition between offensive and defensive missiles. After the Cold War, the United States began to develop missile defense to address its concern over new missile threats. The problem that has developed from this strategy is that US missile defense systems also threaten other nuclear weapon states and therefore heighten the security concerns of these states. If China and the United States in turn increase the numbers of offensive and defensive missiles, what would be the economic consequences of such competition? The technical and economic calculations in the chapter show that neither side can easily win such quantitative competition, in light of the difference in the costs of offense and defense and the difference in the economic capacity of the two countries. Any buildup would be economically harmful to both sides. The result suggests that China and the United States require more dialogue on missile defense issues to seek a cooperative solution.

Chapter III offers a technical analysis about the proposed US missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Calculations in the chapter reflect that the missile defense system in Eastern Europe may add a new layer to the system in Alaska and poses a new threat to Russia's deterrent. The United States could offer constraints over the technical characteristics of the system or new location of the system to mitigate its security dilemma with Russia. If the United States chooses to do so, the new missile

defense system on the one hand would be able to deal with any long-range missile threat from Iran, and on the other hand would not be likely to elicit a strong reaction from Russia. The technical analysis of the chapter tries to suggest a path for the United States and Russia to avoid the security dilemma arising from missile defense.

Chapter IV offers a technical analysis of the possible consequences of a space war. At the surface, it would appear that a country which possesses technological superiority in space has a better chance of winning a space war, as space-related advances constitute a new form of advanced technology. But the analysis in the chapter indicates that it is impossible for any country to win a space war. The rationale being that the debris generated in the war could destroy the properties of all parties, including the one who has technical superiority. This understanding reminds us that countries in the world should not create a new security dilemma in preparation for a space war. Instead, under such conditions it would be more prudent to conclude a treaty on non-weaponization of space to diminish the potential for a space war.

Chapters V and VI discuss issues in foreign policy and international relations focusing on non-traditional security. Chapter V addresses Japan's attitudes toward China's oil exploration in East China Sea by examining oil trade relations between the two countries. When China exported a significant amount of oil to Japan, it relieved Japan's reliance on traditional sources of oil. Japan was satisfied with this arrangement and did not express concern regarding China's prospecting for oil in the East China Sea, much less make its own investments in prospecting for oil in this same region. After China became an oil importer and halted oil sales to Japan, Japan began to criticize China's oil activities in the East China Sea. This indicates that China and Japan need to seek new common interests on oil issues. As net importers of oil, China and Japan possess and should cooperate on a number of common interests, such as stabilizing oil prices and protecting oil transportation.

Chapter VI analyzes China's oil policy and finds out that China pays more attention to oil supply rather than to oil transportation. Oil transportation is of greater relevance to traditional security, while oil supply is of greater relevance to nontraditional security. This phenomenon suggests that the Chinese government pays more attention to nontraditional security on oil issues and is consistent with China's new security theory.

Chapters VII through IX discuss international security relations from a micro

perspective. Chapter VII explores the perceptions of American security experts about China's nuclear policy. These perceptions have a tangible impact on the nuclear policy of the United States. This chapter finds that US perceptions of the current Chinese nuclear capability are relatively similar, while perceptions about future Chinese nuclear strategy and capability are extremely diverse. American experts who predict a quick growth of the Chinese nuclear force tend to support a tough China policy, while the experts who suggest different options express more interest in cooperation. This observation suggests that China should focus more on the transparency of future nuclear policy to promote cooperation and stability between China and the United States on nuclear issues.

Chapter VIII explores the roles of American industrial organizations in shaping US export control policy and practice. Export control is an important subject of international political economics (IPE) in the security arena because it is relevant to both economic and security relations among countries. This chapter takes a micro approach to discuss some domestic factors that may influence US foreign policy and offers some ideas about the stabilizing role of economic exchanges in Sino-US relations.

Chapter IX examines a case of track-two dialogue on arms control between China and the United States. The case study traces the process by which exchanges between Chinese and American scientists facilitated coordination between the two countries in the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This study takes a new perspective that is extremely beneficial to understanding the complexity of Sino-US relations.

Chapters X and XI discuss the stabilizing role of international institutions from a technical perspective. International institutions are important multilateral cooperation mechanisms and are essential to realizing world security and stability. Chapter X conducts a technical assessment of US-Japanese cooperation on missile defense and offers a judgment as to whether or not this cooperation is consistent with existing international institutions. The conclusion is that some US-Japanese missile defense-related cooperation violates the Missile Technology Control Regime promoted by the United States.

Chapter XI attempts to draw a blueprint for creating an international organization that will facilitate the establishment of confidence building measures in outer space. China has made numerous appeals to promote arms control in outer space. If

such efforts are to be realized, an international organization will be needed to implement such an agreement. This chapter further examines the technical and organizational capabilities of the International Telecommunication Union to see if it has the ability to succeed in implementing arms control in space.

It is an important and special school of strategic studies to seek cooperative and stabilizing solutions from a technological perspective. As a result of increasing policy demands, the research of this school in China has made great achievements in recent years. Our Program has conducted a series of research projects that follows the ideas of this school. This book serves as an indicator of the maturation of this kind research at our Program and is constituted by the following characteristics. First, the entirety of research contained within this book uses Chinese perspectives to address China's security concerns. During the last two decades, China's foreign policy has become a global focus, in large part due to the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. The international academic circle has raised many questions about China, for example, whether or not China should be allowed to join in existing international institutions. The answers to such questions are generally derived from foreign perspectives rather than from Chinese viewpoints. The research contained in this book analyzes international institutions from the point of view of Chinese scholars. The questions addressed include, "Are founding members of existing international institutions abiding by their international obligations?" and "How should new international institutions be built to meet the interests of China?" These discussions express China's security concerns and facilitate Chinese independent participation in international exchanges as participants of equal standing.

Second, most research in this book explores topics through the lens of technological evidence. The combination of technical and policy analyses offers concrete and operational policy assessments and recommendations. For example, research in the book explains the consequences of security dilemmas on space and missile defense issues and offers methods of avoiding such crises. These quantitative and technical analyses can be relatively easily incorporated into policy practice and understood in international exchanges for building an epistemic community.

Third, all research in the book takes micro views to observe finer elements of international security interactions. For example, some research in the book examines the unique positions and behaviors of special groups on international security issues.

This methodology of employing a micro view of international relations reveals some important factors in international security that may otherwise be neglected.

As part of the “Innovation Base of 985 Science, Technology and Social Development at Tsinghua University”, the Institute of International Studies has conducted serial research on science and international security in recent years. The Working Group on Science and International Security therefore received the title of “Advanced Group” of Tsinghua University in 2007. This book contains a segment of the research results produced by the Institute on this topic and is multidisciplinary by nature.

The editors of the book and the authors of the chapters are or were members of the Arms Control Program at Tsinghua University. The Program has received grants from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The main financial support of one editor, Wu Riqiang, comes from these grants. Some of our research, academic exchanges and training programs also emerge from such grants. The editors and authors are extremely grateful to The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for its ongoing support.

The editors wish to thank our colleagues and students at the Institute of International Studies and the Chinese and foreign scholars with whom we have spoken for their comments and discussions that have greatly assisted in improving and broadening the scope of our research.

Some chapters of the book have been published within periodicals or at conferences and have undergone thorough revisions before inclusion in this book. The editors and authors hope that the book offers an innovative research methodology and some unique research conclusions for decision makers, researchers and students in international relations for conducting their own future research.

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