




War and Intervention

ISSUES FOR CONTEMPORARY PEACE OPERATIONS

Michael V. Bhatia



Kumarian
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War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations

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Acronyms

2-MTW	Two-Multi-Theater War
AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ADF	Australian Defense Forces
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CSBA	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation Center (NATO)
C ⁴ ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CIVPOL	UN Civilian Police
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center (U.S.)
CNRT	National Council of Timorese Resistance
DARPA	Defence Advanced Research Policy Agency
DPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG	Military Observer Group (Liberia/Sierra Leone)
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERRF/ESDI	European Rapid Reaction Force/European Security Defense Identity
EU	European Union
FALINTIL	Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria)

FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FREITLIN	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo)
GAO	Government Accounting Office
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFOR	Implementation Force (former Yugoslavia)
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor (Australia)
IPTF	International Police Task Force (former Yugoslavia)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KLA/UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo (led by Ibrahim Rugova)
LIC	Low-Intensity Conflict
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MINURSO	UN Mission for a Referendum in the Western Sahara
MIPONUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MNF	Multinational Force (U.S.) (Lebanon/Haiti)
(M)OOTW	(Military) Operations Other Than War
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (led by dos Santos)
NLA	National Liberation Army (Macedonia)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council (U.S.)
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

OFDA/DART	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance/Disaster Assistance Response Team (U.S.)
OHR	Office of the High Representative (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (former CSCE)
P-5	Principle Five Members of UN Security Council with veto power (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States)
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PIC	Peace Implementation Council (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
PPK	Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (led by Hashim Thaci), later PSDK
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
SFOR	Stabilization Force (NATO)
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLA/SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (led by John Garang)
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSC	Small-Scale Contingency
TNI	Indonesian Armed Forces
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCPMB	Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (southern Serbia)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMSIL	UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone former UNOMSIL
UNAMET	UN Assistance Mission in East Timor
UNEF II	UN Emergency Force
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees

UNHCHR	UN High Commission for Human Rights
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (led by Jonas Savimbi)
UNITAF	Unified Task Force (U.S.-led intervention in Somalia)
UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMISSET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMO	UN Military Observers
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan
UNOSOM I/II	UN Operation in Somalia
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Western Irmium, and Baranja
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	UN Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization
UNU/WIDER	United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research (remove text citation)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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Introduction

AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT in the various forms of peace and humanitarian operations is a highly contentious issue. In a unique convergence of American national interest and UN politics, all examples of formal American ground intervention over the past decade have occurred with the authorization of the UN Security Council. Yet, whether called police actions, operations-other-than-war (OOTW), expeditionary operations, small-scale contingency operations, stability and support operations, or peace operations, ground deployments short of Major Theater War (MTW) are a continuous feature of American strategy.¹ Although not comparatively significant in size, these types of lower-level intervention reflect the most consistent use of American ground forces.² Moreover, these interventions occur no matter which party controls the White House.

A 1996 Congressional Research Services Report indicated that of the 234 occasions in which the U.S. Armed Forces were used abroad between 1798 and 1993, only five involved a formal declaration of war, with a number of other examples of major undeclared war.³ Within twenty years of independence the United States undertook its first foreign deployment overseas, with Jefferson's commitment in 1801 of a naval and marine contingent to confront piracy on the Barbary Coast. By the end of the century the American military had engaged in a war of territorial expansion against the Mexican government in the west and had amassed experience in the military government and occupation of foreign territory, most particularly in American Samoa, the Philippines, and Cuba. In the next century similar

interventions occurred in Haiti, Guatemala, far-eastern Russia during WWI, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Panama, and Grenada.⁴ Most notably, the U.S. Army established a military government structure to democratize and reconstruct post-WWII Germany and Japan.

And thus, although presented by certain policymakers as a historical aberration, peace operations are, instead, a contemporary manifestation of the continuous phenomenon of American ground intervention. It is a role that further derives from the United States' continued position as the sole global military power due to its advanced strategic mobility and power projection capabilities, from the continuous deployment of three carrier fleets to a global network of air and military bases. Further underscoring this fact, of the myriad intra- and extra-governmental defense reviews that emerged in 2001, all delivered at least a nod to peace operations, (M)OOTW, humanitarian intervention, or some other form of direct involvement in collapsed states. Although the relative weight given to these operations varies by study, statements include:

- Although not considered vital to the “national interest,” the Committee on America’s National Interest, convened by Harvard’s Kennedy School, listed the “prevention of genocide” and the “promotion of international rules of law” for the peaceful settlement of disputes as “extremely important,” and the discouraging of human rights abuses and the prevention and ending of conflicts as “important.”⁵
- “The United States will be called upon frequently to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances . . . with the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces” and needs to develop a military with “rapidly employable expeditionary/intervention capabilities” and “humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities.”⁶
- “The U.S. Military must prepare for . . . involvement in failed states and in response to non-state threats at (the) *discretion* of national command authorities, but *some* degree of involvement is inevitable” between 2001 and 2025.⁷
- The Army “should orient a significant part of its force structure . . . to peacekeeping operations,” as they “represent an enduring requirement” and “play an important role in policing democracy’s empire.”⁸

Following over a decade of substantial and extensive American military involvement, peace operations have passed from a position of strategic irrelevance to one of strategic importance. This book’s purpose is to provide a snapshot of the contemporary environment of peace operations, in terms of both war and intervention. Thus, this piece serves as part

research survey and part issue review, providing a general framework within which to understand peace operations while also permitting the reader to skip to specific areas of interest.

Aside from Chapter 2, which provides a brief introduction to UN peace operations and U.S. policy, this book seeks to answer two broad sets of questions:

- What are key characteristics of armed competitors in the current operational environment of peace operations, particularly in terms of their structure and organization, financing, access to military resources, and the tactical tools and methods applied by these movements? (Chapter 3, *The Operational Environment*)
- What are key recent developments in the dimensions and methods of intervention, particularly regarding the use of force, the adaptation of global militaries to peace operations and the emerging political, legal and economic components of intervention? (Chapter 4, *Contemporary Peace Operations*; Chapter 5, *The Military Dimension*).

By devoting equal space to war and intervention, this book bridges a noticeable gap in current peace operations literature. Far too often, academic and policy scholarship has not been founded on or accompanied by an analysis of the dynamics and characteristics of modern conflict. Similarly, many studies of modern war focus on a specific conflict but do not seek to apply the conclusions to either other conflicts or specify the implications for peace operations. Most immediately, an examination of war and intervention indicates the dizzying number of actors involved in the contemporary environment of peace operations, whether criminal, grass roots, religious, corporate, state, or non-state. Further, by addressing the dynamics of conflict, this book also examines the viability and necessary dimensions of an intervention force. The terror imposed by bands of militias, whether Serbian *Tiger*, Rwandan *interahamwe*, Indonesian *Aitarak*, or Haitian *tonton macoute*, has prompted a distorted estimation of their capabilities against a trained and formidable military intervention.

These two sections are further linked by an underlying focus on the nonmilitary aspects of conflict, competition, and intervention. I seek to assert continually that a fundamental aspect of the pre- and post-intervention environment of peace operations is not the direct exchange of hostilities between combatants. Instead, in certain contemporary conflicts, we not only see the continuance of conflict for economic and criminal motives, with the accompanying subordination of an armed movement's original political orientation, but also the increased use of a wide range of

additional coercive tactics. In notable cases armed movements have sought to avoid direct military confrontation, instead primarily applying force against civilians.

In their original conception, peace operations were not designed to address these types of conflict. Therefore, the shape of the contemporary conflict environment necessitates the further development of methods and tactics by the United Nations, the United States, and other associated actors. For an appropriately robust military intervention, the direct military threat presented by an armed competitor is primarily an issue during the initial stage of the intervention, with the remaining competitors then engaging in more subtle methods of military and political subversion. The absence of a military threat is largely due to the fact that recent peace operations have largely been for the benefit and with the support of the majority of the population, which stands in contrast to the previous motives for American intervention. Therefore, from the initial stage onward, the intervention must develop a unified political, economic, and social response to the crisis in order to counter attempts at subversion, silently undermine the armed competitor, and institute a sustainable peace.

The motivation for this piece largely originates from six years of research, writing, and fieldwork (East Timor, Kosovo, the Western Sahara, and later Afghanistan) in the area of humanitarianism, war, and peace operations. While seeking to include my own field observations, I have also sought to feature those academic works that best represent the dynamics I have witnessed on the ground. To link my three areas of early field experience, not only were the peace operations in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), East Timor (UNAMET/UNTAET), and Kosovo (UNMIK) deployed to address the question of the self-determination of peoples and territories, but a less aggressive variant of the Transitional Administrations instituted in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999 was initially proposed for the Western Sahara in 1991.

In the Western Sahara and the Sahrawi refugee camps in Saharan Algeria, during two separate field missions, I witnessed the use of a peace operation as a tool of conflict. MINURSO's deployment and the imposition of a cease-fire, without the accompanying resolution of the conflict through the continuously delayed referendum, facilitated Morocco's attempts at altering (demographically and strategically) the portions of the Western Sahara under its control. Yet, the centralized military and political structures of both the Moroccan government and army and of the Polisario/Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and the conventional military-military style of warfare, stand in direct contrast to my experiences with

the Indonesian army (TNI) sponsored militias in East Timor. There, in a manner replicated throughout the archipelago, militias were created, trained, funded, and directed by the Indonesian army in order to carry out a campaign of vengeful destruction, while also permitting the government to preserve its assertions of rogue elements and thus maintain plausible deniability.

The consequences of this campaign in East Timor, which were similar to those I would later witness in Kosovo, included forced exile and mass depopulation, the orchestrated destruction of homes and villages, and an indeterminate number of dead. It is believed that those responsible, in both Serbia and Indonesia, developed methods of concealing massacre victims in order to deter international prosecution.⁹ In both cases the initially deployed international missions (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Kosovo Verification Mission [KVM] and the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor [UNAMET]), unarmed and with limited mandates, withdrew upon the escalation of violence. The forms of international response were also notably similar: UN-sanctioned military intervention by a regional power or coalition (NATO and Australia); the arrival of a wide variety of international nongovernmental, bilateral, and for-profit organizations; and the deployment of a UN civilian presence provided with executive political authority and interim sovereignty, and responsible for the government of the respective territories.

In East Timor, upon my return soon after the Indonesian withdrawal, I witnessed a UN mission in transition, lacking in both the resources and the perspective necessary for the reconstruction, reconstitution, and interim governance of a territory shifting from occupation and massive devastation to independence. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor's (UNTAET) assertive mandate was not accompanied by an equally aggressive UN approach toward addressing the infant country's sizable problems. Arriving in Kosovo in the summer of 2000, I was able to develop an understanding of the longer-term effects of UN interim administration. Most immediately, I witnessed the settled legacy of decisions made in the initial stages of the operation, including the failure to prevent reverse ethnic cleansing and the resulting ethnic cantonization.¹⁰ This book is my first attempt at combining these and other field observations with the arguments and research of the broader academic and policy community. A research trip with the Overseas Development Institute to northern Pakistan and Afghanistan in summer 2001 provided the foundation for a brief assessment of the post-9/11 intervention in Afghanistan and war against terrorism at the conclusion of the book.