



世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书



# 美国对外政策的政治学文献选读

READINGS IN THE POLITICS OF  
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

〔美〕 Jerel A. Rosati 编



北京大学出版社  
Peking University Press

# **Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy**

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Peking University Press  
Beijing

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Jerel A. Rosati: *Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy*

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ISBN: 0-15-505364-7

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**图书在版编目(CIP)数据**

美国对外政策的政治学文献选读/(美)罗赛蒂编. —北京:北京大学出版社, 2004. 12  
(世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书)

ISBN 7-301-08306-8

I. 美… II. 罗… III. 美国对外政策—文集—英文 IV. D871.20-53

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2004) 第 122805 号

书 名: 美国对外政策的政治学文献选读

(*Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy*)

著作责任者: [美] Jerel A. Rosati 编

责任编辑: 张盈盈

标准书号: ISBN 7-301-08306-8/D·1022

出版发行: 北京大学出版社

地 址: 北京市海淀区中关村北京大学校内 100871

网 址: <http://cbs.pku.edu.cn>

电 话: 邮购部 62752015 发行部 62750672 编辑部 62757785

电子信箱: [pl@pup.pku.edu.cn](mailto:pl@pup.pku.edu.cn)

排 版 者: 兴盛达打字服务社

印 刷 者: 涿州市星河印刷有限公司

经 销 者: 新华书店

787 毫米×960 毫米 16 开本 39.25 印张 1157 千字

2004 年 12 月第 1 版 2004 年 12 月第 1 次印刷

定 价: 63.00 元

# 《世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书》

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## 出版说明

引进和交流,是国际研究诸学科发展壮大所不可或缺的环节和纽带。没有引进和交流,学术就难以活跃,也不易创新。每一位从事世界政治与国际关系研究的学者、每一位学习世界政治与国际关系的学生,无不深感阅读外文原文文献的重要性,他们都深知,原文的报刊、教材和专著,是获取最新国际信息、最新理论论争、最新参考资料的必不可少的重要来源,而获得这样的原文文献的机会是不均等的,因此,他们极其渴望更为方便地直接接触到原文文献。而在目前不易直接在国内购买原版书籍的情况下,采取原版影印的方式引进国际上的优秀教材和专著是解决问题的一条捷径,如此就可以使国内普通读者方便地获得最有权威的原文读物,从而可以快速了解国外同行的教学和学术成果,为深入学习和研究、为开展有效的对外学术交流、也为国际关系诸学科在我国的创新和发展,打下更坚实的基础。

这套“世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书”,正是基于上述认识而组织出版的,并且得到了我国国际关系教学与科研领域最有权威的专家教授们的认可,他们分别来自于北京大学国际关系学院、复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院、中国人民大学国际关系学院、外交学院、清华大学国际问题研究所、中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所、中共中央党校战略研究所等单位,作为本套丛书的学术顾问,他们愿意向我国该学科及相关领域的广大学者和学生共同推荐这套丛书。

本丛书第一批先行选入几本经典文献选读性质的国外优秀教材,内容主要在国际关系理论方面,也包括国际政治经济学方面的优秀教材。它们皆可称为原文中的精品,值得研读和收藏,不仅如此,由于它们本身在国外的大学课堂里都是应用较广的教材和读物,所以特别适合作为我国国际关系与世界政治专业大学教学中的参考读物,甚至可以直接作为以外文授课的课堂教材。在每本书的前面,我们都邀请国内比较权威的专家学者撰写了精彩的导论,以指导读者更好地阅读和使用这些文献。

今后,我们会陆续推出更新、更好的原版教材和专著,希望广大读者提出宝贵意见和建议,尤其欢迎更多的专家学者向我们推荐适合引进的国外优秀教材和专著,以帮助我们完善这套丛书的出版,并最终形成一套完整的世界政治与国际关系及其相关学科适用的原文教学研究参考书系。

最后也要特别提醒读者,我们引进这套丛书,目的主要在于推动学术交流、促进学科发育、完善教学体系,而其著作者的出发点和指导思想、基本观点和结论等,则完全属于由读者加以认识、比较、讨论甚至批评的内容,均不代表北京大学出版社。

# 导 读

贾庆国

美国在世界上的巨大影响使美国的外交政策成为世人持续关注的一个焦点。美国外交政策到底是如何制定的？美国政府的哪些机构和部门在外交决策过程中起主要作用？美国行政当局和立法机构之间的相互关系是如何影响美国的外交决策的？美国的价值观、选举、利益团体和大众媒体对美国外交决策到底有何影响？这些都是那些希望了解美国外交决策的人需要认真思考的问题。

由美国南卡罗莱纳大学教授杰里尔·罗赛蒂(Jerel A. Rosati)主编的这本《美国对外政策的政治学文献选读》(*Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy*)收集了关于美国外交决策的论文和文章数十篇,这些文章从外交决策过程到外交决策机构,从行政当局在外交决策中的地位和作用到立法机构对外交决策的牵制和影响,从美国社会中不同团体的价值取向对外交决策的规范到不同利益团体的政治运作对外交决策的冲击,洋洋洒洒,数十万言,对美国外交决策进行了全面的介绍和分析。

该书共分两个主要部分:政府与外交政策制定过程和美国社会、国内政治对外交决策的影响。第一部分收入的文章涉及总统、国家安全委员会和主要外交决策人、外交机构、立法机构以及立法机构和行政当局之间的关系。第二部分收入的文章主要涉及美国公众的信仰、选举和利益团体政治、大众媒体等因素对外交决策的影响。

由于美国外交决策备受关注,介绍和分析美国外交决策的文章和书籍多如牛毛。尽管如此,纵观该书,我们仍可以发现以下几个特点:(1)系统全面;(2)多层次、多角度;(3)重点着墨于影响外交决策的政治因素;以及(4)通过两个历史案例说明和强调美国外交决策中的政治因素。

首先,编者收集的文章比较系统、全面地介绍和分析了美国外交决策的各个方面,其中包括美国总统、行政当局主要职能部门和国会在外交决策过程中的作用,总统、国会关系和宪法对外交决策的影响,公众舆论、选举政治、利益团体政治、大众媒体对外交政策的影响等等。

其次,编者收集的文章从多层次、多角度介绍和分析了美国外交的决策过程。从收集的文章的种类上看,既有发表在美国知名学术刊物(如《国际问题研究季刊》、《总统研究季刊》等)上理论性和学术性较强的文章,也有登在比较有影响的严肃报刊(如《纽约时报杂志》、《新共和》等)上的政论性文章;既有美国政府的解密文件,也有美国最高法院历史上裁决的案例;既有经典之作,也有新近的文章。从收集的文章的角度上看,既有关于

## 2 美国对外政策的政治学文献选读

美国政治制度安排制约美国外交决策的描述,也有对具体决策部门在外交决策过程中作用的解读;有从国家领导人个人风格解释美国外交决策的文章,也有从理念与现实之间的矛盾角度分析美国外交决策的论文。

再次,尽管该书系统全面、内容丰富,但编者仍努力做到重点突出,这主要表现在强调政治因素在美国外交决策中的作用。美国外交政策从来都是美国政府内外许多政治力量角逐的结果。由于政府行政当局领导人、部门、总统、国会、社会上各种利益团体在外交政策问题上的看法和利益不同,对政策的需求和偏好也很不一样,从各自的角度出发,它们都试图通过各种方法让美国政府制定符合自己的利益和愿望的政策,于是围绕着外交决策的政治争斗在所难免。从这个意义上讲,外交决策也是这些力量斗争和妥协的结果。编者选择重点着墨于外交决策中的政治因素,这反映出编者本人对外交决策过程中政治的作用的重视和偏好。

最后,编者通过美国外交史上的两个决策案例来说明和强调美国外交决策中存在的问题,以及美国国内围绕这些问题的思考。这两个决策案例一个是伊朗门事件,另外一个海湾战争。如关于伊朗门事件,肯尼思·夏普(Kenneth Sharpe)指出,美国政府对伊朗门事件的处理反映出美国外交中存在很多问题,其中比较突出的一个问题是国家安全的需要和民主监督的要求之间存在着深刻的矛盾。国家安全事务需要保密,而民主监督要求行政公开。在没有民主监督的情况下,政府就有可能利用国家安全事务保密的特点为所欲为,给国家利益带来伤害,正如在伊朗门事件和其他一些事件中所表现的那样。格雷格·伊斯特布鲁克(Gregg Easterbrook)对美国政府在第一次海湾战争中的表现的批评也很尖锐。他写道,美国在海湾战争中的胜利并不像媒体鼓吹的那样成功。首先,那场战争根本就是一场不对称的战争,美国的敌人不仅缺乏训练、装备极端落后、没有盟国支持,而且毫无斗志,战胜这样一个对手实在也没有什么值得感到骄傲和自豪的。其次,布什政府战后在处理库尔德人问题上失误很多,根本没有充分利用自己所处的优势地位在解决这个问题上发挥积极和建设性作用。最后,美国主流媒体在报道海湾战争过程中有好战之嫌,他们只关心美军的阵亡人数,对成千上万伊拉克人的死亡则避而不谈。总之,伊斯特布鲁克指出,美国决策者不能也不应当把海湾战争作为美国下一次战争的参考模式。

纵览全书,我认为这是一本学习和了解美国外交决策机制和过程非常有用的教科书或教学参考读物,相信读者阅后会有同感。

2004年8月

*To Karen*



# PREFACE

The purpose of this anthology, or collection of readings, is to provide students with information and knowledge that allows them to arrive at a strong understanding of the complex politics of U.S. foreign policy. The composition of this anthology is such that it can be used to accompany a textbook, replace a textbook entirely, or be used in conjunction with other books, as the instructor sees fit. Although the book is intended primarily for an undergraduate audience, the collection of readings is also suitable for graduate courses. A great deal of thought has gone into constructing this anthology based on the following ideas.

**First, the anthology provides a large selection of readings.** The intent is to include readings that provide comprehensive coverage of U.S. foreign policymaking and which maximizes choices for the instructor. The readings are basically organized into two major parts: first, beginning with the president, the focus is on governmental institutions and the policymaking process; this is followed by a focus on how the larger society and domestic politics affect the government and foreign policy process. I make no presumption that all of the readings are to be used. In fact, I assume that each instructor might use only a part of the whole, organized in the way each instructor deems best. This is the intent of a large-sized and versatile volume—to accommodate the preferences and tastes of different instructors and courses.

**Second, the anthology provides a diverse and kaleidoscopic set of readings.** In order to maximize student learning, it consists of a broad selection of material representing different genres of readings, thus providing different perspectives and interpretations from a variety of sources. Some of the readings are more scholarly (such as, in *International Studies Quarterly* or *Presidential Studies Quarterly*); others are more policy-oriented (such as, in *Foreign Policy* and *World Policy Journal*); others are more intellectual and journalistic in their orientation (such as, in *The New Republic* and *The New York Times Magazine*); and some are excerpts from original government documents (such as the National Security Act of 1947 or the *Curtiss-Wright* Supreme Court decision). Some are longer; some are shorter. Some are classics; others are more contemporary pieces. A diverse mixture of readings maximizes the acquisition of information, knowledge, and understanding of the politics of U.S. foreign policy, and should stimulate interest and readability.

**Third, the anthology includes readings that evoke a strong sense of the politics involved in the making of U.S. foreign policy.** Students need to have a feeling for and a comprehension of the politics involved in the foreign policy process, both within the government and throughout society. They need to learn who the players are and how they operate, interact, conflict, win, compromise, and lose. They need to understand the dynamics involved in the use of power, as well as the language of politics and the symbols invoked that make it such a political, complex, and messy process. The shorter, more intellectual and journalistic readings, in particular, provide such a perspective.

**Fourth, the anthology highlights the politics of two critical cases in the making of U.S. foreign policy.** The “case study” approach to teaching has grown in popularity and is a powerful teaching strategy. A number of readings interspersed throughout the volume revolve around two foreign policy cases: the “Iran–Contra affairs” and the “Persian Gulf War.” These cases lay the foundation for providing the equivalent of a case study approach, illustrating the complexity and dynamics of how U.S. foreign policy is made in a post-Vietnam political environment.

**Fifth, the readings are presented in a way that stimulates students to think about and address three broad themes in the politics of U.S. foreign policy.** Three themes have been particularly significant in attracting the interest of scholars and practitioners: (1) to what extent has “change” (and continuity) occurred in the foreign policy process over the years, especially since the Vietnam War and the end of the cold war; (2) to what extent is the “president able to lead and govern” foreign policy; and (3) to what extent are the “demands of democracy and those of national security” at odds with each other. These critical themes provide the foundation for students to synthesize the readings and acquire a powerful understanding of the politics of U.S. foreign policy.

**Finally, introductory comments precede each reading within the anthology.** The introductory comments, rather than those more commonly found in a book’s introductory chapter, are much more informative and valuable for readers’ learning. They place the work in historical and political context, provide a brief overview or summary, highlight significant issues and questions that are raised and addressed within the reading (as discussed above), and inform the reader about the author’s background. Such introductory comments set the stage for maximizing student learning about the politics of U.S. foreign policy.

I would like to thank David Tatom at Harcourt Brace for all his support and assistance, as always, throughout the project. I would also like to thank Michael Kuchinsky, Sten Rynning, and, in particular, David Cohen, graduate assistants at the University of South Carolina, whose work and creativity not only made this anthology possible, but also strengthened the volume from its original conception.

JEREL ROSATI  
1997

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# INTRODUCTION

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## POLICYMAKING IS POLITICS

1.

ROGER HILSMAN

### POLICY-MAKING IS POLITICS

*I*n this excerpt from his book *To Move a Nation*, originally written in 1964, Roger Hilsman provides a thoughtful introduction to the politics of U.S. foreign policy. He discusses some of the common perceptions that many Americans acquire regarding American politics that must be confronted and overcome if the politics of U.S. foreign policy is to be really understood. In this sense, Hilsman provides an introductory orientation for viewing and understanding the politics of U.S. foreign policy that will follow in the subsequent readings throughout this volume.

Many Americans tend to have a rather simple view of the foreign policy process: where foreign policy is defined and made at the top of the political hierarchy by the president. Hilsman reminds us that the U.S. foreign policy process is complex and messy—that the president does not make foreign policy alone. Many other individuals and institutions are involved within the government and throughout society in the foreign policy

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SOURCE: Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Delta, 1967), Chapter 1 abridged. Reprinted with the permission of Doubleday.

*process: presidential advisers, high-level officials within the executive branch, the bureaucracy, Congress, the courts, state and local governments, the public, political parties, interest groups and social movements, the media, and global actors. It is in this sense that the making of U.S. foreign policy is a complex process. It is also a complicated process because the variety of individuals and institutions that affect U.S. foreign policy do not stand still but they constantly interact and impact one another. In other words, the policymaking process is not static, but dynamic.*

*Many Americans also expect and hope that the making of American foreign policy should result in a rational process that is somehow above politics. From this perspective, politics is seen as a dirty word for it implies unsavory behavior in the political arena. Hilsman reminds us that the foreign policy process is very much a political process—that the nature of politics needs to be examined and understood for it is the essence of the foreign policy process. Bottom line, the politics of U.S. foreign policy involves competition among differently motivated individuals and groups, involves the flow of power and symbolism throughout government and society, and involves winners and losers. In other words, U.S. foreign policy tends to reflect the goals and priorities of those individuals and groups who are the most successful in influencing the political process within the government and throughout society. Such a foreign policy process may be more or less moral, depending on the type of value judgment that is made. Ultimately, however, the making of U.S. foreign policy is a political process inseparable from politics.*

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“Washington,” I remember Secretary of State Dean Rusk saying when one of our colleagues was cruelly and unfairly attacked in the press, “is an *evil town*.” It is, but not because the people who inhabit it are evil by nature, but because of the struggle that is inherent in the fact that the capital of a nation is the nerve center of the nation’s power. Where power is, there also are conflict and turmoil. Thus the reasons that Washington is the way it is lie deep in the heart of both the nature of the business of Washington and of the political and governmental process by which that business is carried out.

## DECISIONS

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The business of Washington is making decisions that move a nation, decisions about the direction American society should go and decisions about how and where and for what purposes the awesome power—economic, political, and military—of this, the world’s most powerful nation, shall be used. The decisions are about social security and medicare and labor laws and the rules for conducting business and manufacture. Or they are about moving a nation toward war or peace—a test ban treaty, intervening in Vietnam, the U.N. in the Congo, or Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Where the power to move a nation is, there also are the great decisions.



What is decided is policy. It is policy about problems and issues that may make or break powerful interests in our society—organized labor or the medical profession or the massive interests represented by the “military-industrial complex” that President Eisenhower warned about in his farewell address. Or it is policy that will cost American lives in some foreign jungle and result either in our continued survival and success as a nation or, conceivably, in our downfall in a nuclear holocaust that takes much of the rest of the world with us. In the business of Washington, the stakes are high.

## THE PROCESS OF POLICY-MAKING

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The nature and importance of the business done in Washington are obvious. The process by which that business is done and the nation is moved is more obscure.

As Americans, with our flair for the mechanical and love of efficiency combined with a moralistic Puritan heritage, we would like to think not only that policy-making is a conscious and deliberate act, one of analyzing problems and systematically examining grand alternatives in all their implications, but also that the alternative chosen is aimed at achieving overarching ends that serve a high moral purpose. Evidence that there is confusion about goals or evidence that the goals themselves may be competing or mutually incompatible is disquieting, and we hear repeated calls for a renewed national purpose, for a unifying ideology with an appeal abroad that will rival Communism, or for a national strategy that will fill both functions and set the guidelines for all of policy. As Americans, we think it only reasonable that the procedures for making national decisions should be orderly, with clear lines of responsibility and authority. We assume that what we call the “decisions” of government are in fact decisions—discrete acts, with recognizable beginnings and sharp, decisive endings. We like to think of policy as rationalized, in the economist’s sense of the word, with each step leading logically and economically to the next. We want to be able to find out who makes decisions, to feel that they are the proper, official, and authorized persons, and to know that the really big decisions will be made at the top, by the President and his principal advisers in the formal assemblage of the Cabinet or the National Security Council and with the Congress exercising its full and formal powers. And we feel that the entire decision-making process ought to be a dignified, even majestic progression, with each of the participants having roles and powers so well and precisely defined that they can be held accountable for their actions by their superiors and eventually by the electorate.

The reality, of course, is quite different. Put dramatically, it could be argued that few, if any, of the decisions of government are either decisive or final. Very often policy is the sum of a congeries of separate or only vaguely related actions. On other occasions, it is an uneasy, even internally inconsistent compromise among competing goals or an incompatible mixture of alternative means for achieving a single goal. There is no systematic and comprehensive study of all the implications of the grand alternatives—nor can there be. A government does not decide to inau-