Urban and Regional Planning in an Age of Austerity

Edited by
Pierre Clavel
John Forester
William W. Goldsmith

PPS
PERGAMON
POLICY
STUDIES



ON URBAN AFFAIRS

Urban and Regional Planning in an Age of Austerity

Edited by
Pierre Clavel
John Forester
William W. Goldsmith

Pergamon Press
NEW YORK • OXFORD • TORONTO • SYDNEY • FRANKFURT • PARIS

Pergamon Press Offices:

U.S.A	Pergamon Press Inc., Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, New York 10523, U.S.A.
U.K.	Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall, Oxford OX3 0BW, England
CANADA	Pergamon of Canada Ltd., 150 Consumers Road, Willowdale, Ontario M2J 1P9, Canada
AUSTRALIA	Pergamon Press (Aust) Pty. Ltd., P.O. Box 544, Potts Point, NSW 2011, Australia
FRANCE	Pergamon Press SARL, 24 rue des Ecoles, 75240 Paris, Cedex 05, France
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	Pergamon Press GmbH, 6242 Kronberg/Taunus, Pferdstrasse 1, Federal Republic of Germany

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Urban and regional planning in an age of austerity.

(Pergamon policy studies)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Urban policy—United States—Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. City planning—United States—Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Regional economics—Addresses, essays, lectures. 4. Radicalism—United States—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Clavel, Pierre.
II. Forester, John, 1948- III. Goldsmith, William W.
HT167.U7 1980 309.2'12'0973 79-21416
ISBN 0-08-025539-6
ISBN 0-08-025540-X pbk.

Printed in the United States of America

Preface

Historically, planning has served mostly to benefit local, regional, and national business rather than the broader public. It was not always meant that way, but that has been its effect. It began in the United States in response to mushrooming urban problems, as part of a larger movement to reform city governments and take graft out of the hands of city hall. It was also, in part, a reaction to the public attention that social workers and writers such as Jacob Riis brought to slums and urban decay. Early city planning was in addition influenced by the Beaux Arts atmosphere that surrounded the Chicago Exposition of 1899. The early dominant figures in planning, for more than a half-century, were those interested in cleaning, straightening, beautifying and rationalizing the cities of America.

This kind of planning, this regard for the city as a physical mechanism with mechanical needs, suited downtown merchants, land developers, auto makers, and the construction industry. The best example of such planning was the dismantling of literally scores of profitable and popular municipal streetcar systems, whose demise made way for the more profitable sales of buses, autos, gasoline, and rubber tires.(1) The market-serving nature of planning, through massive subsidies for highway construction, suburbanization of industry and housing, and renewal of downtown business property, has been prevalent ever since. Under conditions of recession, planners are called upon to an even greater degree to forge weapons to serve private interests, to protect property and privileged neighborhoods.

At least a part of the planning profession has never been happy with sponsorship by powerful corporate interests. There has always been a radical minority and a probable majority who considered themselves "liberals" – while hoping to gain leverage within the existing political system through incremental means. These planners have had to face the problem of how best to conceive and organize an alternative position.

One strategy has been to move outside the established professional structures and work actively within the community to build political pressure and alternative centers of power. During the period of the 1960s and the great upheaval in the nation's ghetto communities, progressive city planners urged their colleagues to resist the large financial interests that dominate urban development and become instead advocates for the oppressed. Local groups, often staffed by "advocate planners," who either diverted time away from city hall or found federal funds available to neighborhoods, sprang up in cities to fight against housing demolition, highway construction, and inadequate programs for residential relocation.

At the national level these progressives, though often confronted with hostility or stony silence in official professional circles, formed an organization called Planners for Equal Opportunity (PEO) in the early 1960s, which served for a time to pull together many of the planner-activists within and outside of official agency jobs. By the mid-1960s, the idea of advocacy planning for disadvantaged groups had caught on with an influential segment of the profession. It was much discussed in journals, supported both academically and through urban internship and assistance units in many schools, and spread rapidly outside the profession – both to other professions and among urban activists who felt confined within formal planning circles. It was perhaps inevitable that the use of planners for direct contact with client groups became part of the official planning process, particularly in big cities. Formal participation requirements multiplied with the grant programs of the 1960s and early 1970s – first in housing and urban reconstruction, then in economic development, poverty, highway construction and environmental legislation; and many big city planning agencies established neighborhood planner units with at least the trappings of the advocacy model.

In the 1970s this activism had touched thousands of professionals, and many were evaluating the experience. On the one hand, cities were in worse shape than ever. Pluralist political processes had opened up, only to reveal deeper layers of resistance to the activists' programs. On the positive side, many more planners were sharply aware of these deeper, institutionally rooted issues than a decade earlier, and the overall level of sophistication had increased. One issue was how best to organize within and outside the profession. PEO had officially disbanded in 1976, but many of its members had participated in the formation of a new group, the Planners Network, in the summer of 1975. One of the Network's founding members, Chester Hartman, a planner and community activist in San Francisco, became the editor of the Planners Network newsletter, an irregularly published communications organ shared by about 1,000 planner-activists – mostly in the U.S. In various cities Network chapters held periodic forums and provided technical assistance for community groups. In general though, the Network was more an association of like-minded individuals than a functioning organization, largely at the members' own preference.

Network communication supported the proposition that, aside from an organization, conceptual advances were necessary before the Left within planning and urban movements could gain the necessary cohesion to move ahead politically. A number of developments outside of the planning profession suggested that this cohesion might be possible. In the academic disciplines, the well-organized Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) and other leftist organizations within geography, sociology, public administration, and political science, opened up new connections between the universities and working class and poor client groups. New radical groups among professionals and activists in such fields as housing and health sprang up, and established ones continued to thrive. The Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies, among other national organizations, began to explore alternatives to mainstream, that is, both liberal and conservative, urban policies. A new unity was being sought among political groups in the democratic Left, as indicated by the growth of the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, the New American Movement, the Progressive Alliance, and the Campaign for Economic Democracy. The radical Left was joining together with the working class Left in more effective alliances.

In this context, leftist academic planners began to think in terms of broader clienteles and new opportunities for their professional training programs. One element of this was the infusion of new personnel, in which persons with organizing experience made their way through Ph.D. programs and into planning faculties by the late 1970s. Another was the recognition by literally scores of planners who earlier had been touched by organizing and advocacy planning experience, of a need for a theory to guide city planning. The specific relevance of Marxist theory to their experiences and for formulating future planning roles also crystalized. By the end of the 1970s these developments were bearing fruit. A small conference at Rutgers University in 1977 was followed a year later by a somewhat larger gathering at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. At VPI the participants, after intense discussion about papers that were both theoretically penetrating and practice-oriented, became enthusiastic about the prospect of building a broader base among radical planners.(2) The papers that comprise this book were selected from a conference on planning theory and practice, held at Cornell University, in April 1979. The Cornell conference, which attracted some 300 academics, planning students, professional planners, and community activists, was organized around the three connected topics of this volume: economic conditions, emerging political coalitions, and new roles for planners. These themes were developed in a paper first drafted by Sander Kelman and then worked over by a group at Cornell (included as Chapter One of this volume.)

The ideas of emerging coalitions and "new roles" for planners were based on observation and involvement in planning practice as well as neighborhood, community, and labor organizing by persons who would not formally define themselves as planners. As we write this, in November, 1979, links between academics and practitioners, and between community and labor organizers, continue to develop. Planners

Network people organized a lively series of sessions at the annual meeting of the American Planning Association in Baltimore in October, have scheduled a series of regional conferences, and look forward to a more formal national organization.

At the Cornell conference, and in preparation of this book, we were assisted by many people. Pat Cross did the key work in coordinating all conference arrangements. Professor Barclay Jones and the Program in Urban and Regional Studies provided valuable advice and administrative support. The Department of City and Regional Planning and its Chairman, Sidney Saltzman, and the College of Architecture, Art and Planning and its Dean, Kermit C. Parsons, contributed materially and generously to the conference and the book. We thank, in particular, the staff of Left Sibley Hall – Verlaine Boyd, Cindy Coleman, and Jeff Coleman for substantial editing, Lynn Coffey, Helena Wood, and Donna Wiernicki for numerous administrative and secretarial services – and Susan Jacobs for the indexing.

We also thank the following scholars, whose research and discussion at the conference helped make this book possible: Jeff Armistead, Allen Baird, Larry Bennett, Joe Biber, Richard Bolan, Major Clark, Miguel Cordova, Chris Cotant, Paul Davidoff, Ernest Erber, Norman Fainstein, Susan Fainstein, Nancy Gilgosch, Richard Glance, Edward Greer, Bertram Gross, Britton Harris, Linda Hollis, David Houston, Frank Kendrick, Richard Klosterman, Jackie Leavitt, Charles Levine, Peter Marcuse, Robert Mier, John Nettleton, Paul Niebanck, Alan Rabinowitz, Thomas Reiner, D.A. Seni, Rick Simon, Kusum Singh, Judith Stoloff, Raymond Studer, Thomas Vietorisz, Robert Warren, and David Wilmoth.

Organizing and running the conference was in most respects a cooperative venture. Phil Snyder and Marian Howe helped us in Anabel Taylor Hall. Numerous members of the Department of City and Regional Planning and friends donated time and provided accomodations for conference participants: Lucia Andrade, Bill Baer, Denise Balkas, Christie and Jeff Barnes, Steve Brower, Michael Brown, Betsy Dietel, Kerry Dyer, Trina Eadie, Betty Falcao, Bob and Phyllis Fenneman, Sherry Fontaine, Paula Ford, Stephanie Foster, Glenn Gibbs, John Green, John Greenwald, Paul Gregory, Bob Grose, Steve Hall, Susan Hansen, Fran Helmstadter, Jim Himel, David Jacobs, Harvey Jacobs, Candy Kane, Brenda Kleysen, Kerry Korpi, Mano Kumarasuriyar, Jill Lawrence, Peter Lilienfield, Dick Lourie, Wendy Lovett, Betsy Lowe, David and Sandy Lyons, Laura Malakoff, Dwight Mengel, Tony Opalka, Paulo Penteado, Gerry Pfeffer, Michael Philips, Gary Pivo, Michael Raffe, Donna Shusterman, Amy South, Godfrey Spragge, Harry Sterling, Francesca Verdier, and Eric Won.

NOTES

(1) Bradford Snell, American Ground Transport, 1974.

(2) The papers presented were published in Harvey Goldstein and Sara Rosenberry, eds., The Structural Crisis of the 1970's and Beyond, 1978.

Contents

Preface vii

Chapter

1 NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR PLANNERS
Sander Kelman, Pierre Clavel, John Forester, and William W. Goldsmith 1

Part I – Regions, Corporations and the Economy

2 MARXISM AND REGIONAL POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION
William W. Goldsmith 23

3 REGIONALISM AND THE CAPITALIST STATE
Ann R. Markusen 31

4 THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF URBAN RENEWAL
Marc A. Weiss 53

5 HOUSING AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A MARXIST ANALYSIS
Michael E. Stone 81

Part II – Progressive Political Responses

6 REPRESSIVE VERSUS RECONSTRUCTIVE FORCES IN AUSTERITY PLANNING DOMAINS: THE CASE OF HEALTH
Louanne Kennedy and Robb Burlage 117

7 THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Harvey A. Goldstein 140

8 RISING RENTS AND RENT CONTROL: ISSUES IN URBAN REFORM
Peter Dreier, John Ingram Gilderbloom, and Richard P. Appelbaum 154

9 DEMOCRATIC PLANNING IN AUSTERITY: PRACTICES AND THEORY
Dudley J. Burton and M. Brian Murphy 177

10 OPPOSITION PLANNING
Pierre Clavel 206

11 A SOCIALIST HOUSING PROGRAM FOR THE UNITED STATES
Chester Hartman and Michael E. Stone 219

Part III – Opportunities for Planners

12 WORKING WITHIN THE STATE: THE ROLE OF THE PROGRESSIVE PLANNER
Joel Friedman, Judith Kossy, and Mitt Regan 251

13 SENSITIZING PLANNERS TO ORGANIZATION
Howell S. Baum 279

14 THINKING ABOUT PRACTICING PLANNING
Robert A. Beauregard 308

15 CRITICAL THEORY AND PLANNING PRACTICE
John Forester 326

16 TEACHING RADICAL PLANNING
Edward Bergman and Jean-Louis Sarbib 343

Bibliography 355

Index 381

About the Contributors 388

1 New Opportunities for Planners

Sander Kelman,
Pierre Clavel,
John Forester,
William W. Goldsmith

The context of planning in the United States is changing: fiscal crises and an unhealthy economy promise a decline in planning efforts focused upon growth of the market and federally funded programs. The demands planners will face in the coming years will be new ones. Many planners will be pressured to be hatchet men – streamlining programs and eliminating clients. If they are to resist, they will need to begin to work together with progressive political coalitions or territorial groups in opposition to threatened cutbacks. The skills required of planners will thus be different from those needed in the past. As progressive coalitions and organizations present special needs, planning education must change accordingly.

AUSTERITY: THE CONTEXT OF A WEAKENING ECONOMY

Since the end of World War II, comprehensive, goal-directed approaches have been eclipsed by planning oriented predominantly to enhance economic markets.(1) Two assumptions gave a certain plausibility to such planning. First, liberals and conservatives alike spoke of harnessing the resources of the private sector based on what they presumed was a basically stable, healthy, and growing economy. The country was seen to be gradually absorbing its "marginal" elements so that everyone, however gradually, would climb up the ladder of success.(2) Second, even skeptical, publicly minded planners could be market supporting as long as they thought that questions of redistribution would be solved by the trickle-down effect: let the private sector build houses for those who can afford them, for example, and everyone else will move until an equivalent unit opens up for those not able to afford new housing. However attractive these assumptions may have appeared a decade ago, they are no longer tenable.(3) Planning for the foreseeable future on the basis of these assumptions promises only failure. How, then, are we to understand the situation we face in the years ahead?

The process of growth of the American economy is very uneven. Cycles of expansion and recession or depression are frequent. Severe territorial inequalities persist. Recent booms and busts of the economy have greatly aggravated fiscal inadequacy in central cities, have resulted in decline in employment in large areas such as the Northeast and Midwest, and are related to massive transfer of manufacturing employment to areas outside the country. Future changes in the cycle are awaited with much trepidation.

Still more ominous than the short-term cyclical problems, Western economies today generate insufficient private investment to employ all, or nearly all, people actively seeking work. Thus even without cyclical aggravation, fiscal and unemployment problems appear to be with us for some time to come.

The Conventional Response: Austerity Policy

The reasons most commonly given for the failure of our economy to generate sufficient private investment are well known: taxes (to pay for social expenditures), interest rates (at which to finance investment) and wages are all too high; regulations of the use of land, of conditions at workplaces, and of pollution of the environment are too stringent. As a result, profits are too low to warrant the levels of domestic investment necessary to generate full employment without severe inflation. This interpretation underlies economic policy making in virtually all Western countries.(4)

What is significant for our purposes is that this explanation of insufficient investment, when coupled with a widespread attack on government spending, becomes an austerity policy. Such economic logic promises that an austerity policy will provide the national context for planning in the immediate and foreseeable future.

Why an austerity policy? If the problem of the national economy is seen as the absence of investment incentives, the prescribed solution will be to increase those incentives by lowering taxes (by lowering expenditures on social programs), thereby lowering pressure on money markets and thus interest rates; lowering wages (relative to prices) by maintaining high rates of unemployment indefinitely, and relaxing regulatory standards. The intended result, and ultimately perhaps, the real effect, may be to raise the anticipated return on domestic investment to create more employment. But the adjustment is paid for by wage earners and social service dependents, the presumed beneficiaries of the past 25 years' expansion. This is one way to interpret the significance of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court's ruling against OSHA factory inspections, and the Carter administration's reluctant position on the Humphrey-Hawkins bill.(5)

In a modern economy, a more pagan ritual would be difficult to imagine. Everyone depends upon income and the productivity of our collective labor for survival. Most people depend on employment for income, and on private productive investment for employment. Con-

sumer and government expenditures are relatively stable when compared to private investment, so the major fluctuations in employment come from fluctuations in private investment. And such investment, according to the dominant economic school, depends upon incentives: inadequate incentives=inadequate investment. When the incentives are not sufficient, so the argument goes, sacrifice is required on the part of those (generally working people) already most dependent for their livelihoods on the investment of the corporate sector.

This is more ideological than scientific. Through the inspiration of fear and awe, investment is assigned characteristics that it does not in fact have.(6) The requirement of the incentives listed above is not intrinsic to investment; it follows from the logic of a game in which the roles and powers of the players are unquestioned. Such incentives seem necessary only in the context of a situation in which powerful institutions not only intervene between the productive members of the population and what they produce, but also where a fitting payment is demanded in return for the "service" of withholding part of the annual product for privately directed investment.

The illusion that such incentives are necessary cuts two ways. First, it reinforces the willingness of the population to suffer regressive measures so that the economy may once again be "healthy," thus perpetuating a situation in which the productive members of the society are continually and structurally its victims. Second, the political and social consequences of such beliefs are debilitating and dependency-promoting. If the majority of Americans are to believe that services and social programs must be cut back and that they must suffer willingly so the economy may revive, the circumstances that have made planning necessary in the first place will never be altered. To alter this belief, a new diagnosis and therapy for the economic crisis will be necessary, in particular, a therapy that promises economic recovery without austerity. While the particulars of this program remain to be clearly defined, they would have to overcome the hegemony of private capital and involve a major national commitment to planned public investment. The misleading focus upon austerity, or more euphemistically, "creating necessary incentives for private investment," threatens to distract our attention from demands we need to face – as planners and citizens – in the years ahead.

NEW DEMANDS FOR PLANNING

The strategy for producing such a national commitment depends upon the existence of widespread political support. Fortunately, in the face of attempted national retrenchment, it is not likely that the legacy of the past twenty years of social action will be political silence. Instead one may expect a pendulum effect of workplace efforts and popular organizing, and a further proliferation of consumer, neighborhood, and environmental organizations, setting a potentially more progressive context for planning in the years ahead. Instead of the appeal to

expertise and the "end of ideology" that once promised to make such organizations obsolete, it is now apparent that conflicts among technical experts result in the political education of the public. Energy and health issues are common examples. Experts speak on both sides, and the message of the conflict is clear: resolution will be a matter of political debate, organization, and power.(7) The public's political sensibility no longer allows blind trust in expertise. Certainly no one coherent "consciousness" in any broad segment or class of our society has developed over the past 20 years; but a far greater familiarity with liberal political movements has. Two examples are the effects of the diverse environmentally focused groups and the politically educating character of the women's movement.

All of this means that the social and political context in which planners are working is changing. In the early 1970s, when Nixon dismantled the federal OEO effort, planners shifted their attention to community development block grants – and the politics and possibilities of local planning shifted too. Those possibilities are continuing to shift. Whatever degree of federally sanctioned austerity is forthcoming, planners can expect a continued, increasingly important response of local organizing efforts oriented to such issues as neighborhood preservation, municipal power, housing, locally controlled economic development, programs for the elderly, local tax reform, human rights, alternative technology, worker management, public land acquisition, redirection of energy use and production, environmental management, community health, occupational health and safety, and others.(8)

If planners are to do more than carry out austerity measures and reconcile the public to live with them, they must understand the changing context of their work and devise strategies, organizational forms, and skills accordingly. The Cleveland efforts reported by Krumholz and his associates may be increasingly typical:(9)

> In Cleveland experience indicates that planners can have considerable impact on public policy if they will do two things. First, they must become activists prepared for protracted participation and vocal intervention in the decision-making process. Too often, planners have been content to assume a passive role. Second, planners must offer something that decision-makers want and can relate to, not rhetoric but information, analysis, and policy recommendations which are relevant to decision-making. Local politicians must confront growing problems without adequate information, a long-range perspective, or even a clear idea of what they wish to achieve. This presents a great opportunity for the goal oriented activist agency. An agency must have patience, persistence, and the ability to attack on a variety of fronts. It must also seek out potential allies, including politicians, community groups, and other elements of the government bureaucracy, and show them how their interests are affected.

There have been many attempts to use federal resources to promote such local activity, including community owned or controlled enterprises.(10) Urban Development Action Grants, CETA, and Community Development Block Grant moneys have also been channeled to support wide ranges of local organizing activities and community groups. Proposals have even been made for such use of food stamp funds,(11) and, more ambitiously, for multibillion dollar pension funds.(12) There are coordinating lobbies and agencies serving these groups as well. Some of the most widely known are Massachusetts Fair Share, the Ohio Public Interest Campaign and other public interest groups, ACORN (now branched out from its beginnings in Arkansas), the National Training and Information Center, the National People's Action Coalition, and California's Campaign for Economic Democracy.(13) In addition, federal funds support the Center for Economic Development in Cambridge and the Research Center for Community Economic Development in Palo Alto, among others, to expand research and training in precisely these areas.

One of the most important nationwide organizations oriented along these lines is the National Conference of Alternative State and Local Public Policies, which held its fourth annual conference in 1978, attracting numerous state legislators, city council and union members as speakers.(14)

One illustration of the political interest that these movements have aroused is the 1978 sponsorship by 54 Congresspeople of a collection of policy papers (many related to urban policy) called the Federal Budget and Social Reconstruction, produced by the Institute for Policy Studies.(15) What this suggests is not bureaucratic entrenchment but the existence of an active, if diffuse, politically progressive population, organizers and organizations, with whom planners might ally themselves. Successful opposition to austerity will require these alliances to develop a reasonable and coherent economic recovery strategy, e.g., an aggressive commitment to a planned public investment program.

POLITICAL SKILLS FOR PLANNERS

As budgets contract there will be less money for comprehensive studies and large-scale model building. There will be less money for full-blown evaluation studies. There will be less money for elaborate plans detached from implementation. And with less money around, planning staffs will have to pay more attention to mobilizing community resources, building coalitions, organizing support for particular proposals, and organizing resistance to others in the everyday scramble of a local planning agency's work.

Krumholz clearly locates the planner's technical abilities within a context of necessary political skills.(16) We might call such planning "lobbying," but much more than this takes place. Planners do lobby decision makers and those close to them; they mobilize community groups to build their power; they selectively shape citizen participation

and access to information as they work through contracts, networks, and supporters to bring about policy changes. The planner's work is organizational, political, educational, interpersonal, and technical – all interwoven together.

This new pragmatic but critical role will be less rationalistic than the old comprehensive planning, more politically sensitive and astute than a market-centered model. Interorganizational politics will become increasingly the planner's province, as the divorce of planning from implementation becomes less tolerable. To be more pragmatic and effective planners will be increasingly involved in both business and politics. Questions of local resources, coalition building, bargaining and negotiation, mobilization and coordination will become more central.(17) As the federal presence becomes less innovative and direct and maintains instead an increasingly regulative posture, the planner's political and organizational skills become all the more important.

The demand planners face, then, is to formulate a political role encompassing their technical skills. Local constituencies will ask planners to avoid simply "smoothing out" cutback measures. Instead planners will need to support and foster local progressive organizations and broader coalitions through which a politically sensitive, critical and responsible public might act. All of this suggests the encouragement of planning in which organizing skills, responsive organizations, and democratic politics are primary,(18) and markets and incentives are secondary.

No less important than before, technical skills will need to be complemented by the political and organizational skills demanded by the present political-economic context. To reiterate, the demands calling for these skills will continue to be: 1) the necessary integration of democratic participation with technical analysis and review; 2) the mobilization rather than preemption of community skills and resources; 3) the cultivation and support of emerging progressive groups and coalitions; and 4) the interorganizational need for planners to work not only as technicians but also as skilled organizers. They must be capable of skilled, technical work, astute at working in complex organizations, pragmatic in their approach to local politics, and informed of and attentive to the national political economy.

KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNIQUE IN THE CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF PLANNING

Because, as we have argued, the context of planning in the U.S. is changing, many planners will be facing new demands in their professional practice. These expectations lead us to propose a shift in the form and content of planning education – toward the orientations, theoretical perspectives, skills, and fieldwork and case study experiences necessary to serve these changing demands. The institutions, organizations and clientele with which many planners must work today differ from those of the classical market context. Accordingly, new skills and new programs of study are called for.

Large public bureaucracies provide an important environment for contemporary planning practice. Unless planners understand these institutions and know what to expect from them, both they and their clients are likely to suffer. Exposure to administrative practices and theory in planning curricula will clarify how formally defined responsibilities coexist with networks of power, influence, and trusted contacts. Recognizing that bureaucracies are themselves in internal conflict over competing goals,(19) that they too are politically dependent upon others for support, information and cooperation – all this begins to suggest that there are indeed ways to work effectively with the larger public agencies.

Local consumer and community organizations tend to be young and not yet institutionalized. Planners must be able to anticipate and address the needs of these organizations – from block clubs to city-wide food cooperatives to regional environmental organizations, or regional coalitions and alliances such as the recently formed Appalachian Alliance.(20) Field experience and study of group mobilization and institutional development can be fruitful here.

Local organizations that strive to organize and provide services inevitably become entangled in vast webs of regulations. For example, a local housing organization encounters a whole structure of finance and regulatory machinery, both private and public, finds it useful to ally itself with other organizations similarly obstructed. In such a situation planners can serve to help others navigate the bureaucratic maze.

The progressive groups with whom planners may work are not always highly visible. Networks of progressive professionals within existing bureaucratic structures and individuals dispersed throughout community and neighborhood organizations can be effective in part precisely because they are invisible to the media and politically sensitive officials. To be effective, these invisible networks must be recognized, appreciated, and cultivated – not exposed.

Equally important to these areas of skill and knowledge will be the ability to relate to the development of national institutions that can support these local phenomena. The development of public banking, to cite one example, can scarcely operate at the local level, yet the form such a regional or national institution takes will be crucial to many progressive local efforts. Shifts in the form of the federal system are similarly important, as in the case of the development of revenue sharing and related block grant programs. Local planners have often been alert to these larger developments. But the transition from traditional to new local roles will require keener attention to both existing and potentially alternative national institutions and policies.

NOTES

(1) Local planners held steadfastly to the ideal of planning as an alternative vision, subordinated neither to market forces nor to existing power structures. Rexford Tugwell argued for this in its most extreme

form, but Jack Howard's famous defense of the independent planning commission also had a considerable following. Only with the development of the federal grant system in the 1960s, with the opportunity to get into local policy making directly, did planners drop this apparently independent stance in order to work where they thought the power lay. This shifting perception of opportunities moved planners away from the comprehensive planning position – a move justified also by an increasing sense of conflicting and contradictory political and economic interests of diverse segments of our society. Planning activities then became diffused into a rather fragmented program analysis set of tasks, in response to the proliferating availability of programs. See Clavel, "Planners and Citizen Boards," 1968. The literature is extensive. See, for example, Altshuler, The City Planning Process, 1965, Beauregard, "The Occupation of Planning: A View from The Census," 1976, and Hemmens, Bergman, and Moroney, "The Practitioners View of Social Planning," 1978. Most land-use planning has also been market-oriented. See Kravitz, "Mandarinism: Planning as Handmaiden to Conservative Politics," 1970 and Fitch, "Planning New York," 1977.

(2) This is a central tenet of liberal "development economics." See Goldsmith, "The War on Development," 1977.

(3) For examples of the weakness of such homeostatic, equilibration hypotheses, see Goldsmith, "Marxism and Regional Policy: An Introduction," this volume.

(4) In the central economies of the world market – e.g., the U.S. – official unemployment may stay at oppressive but apparently politically acceptable levels, between five and ten percent. In closely related peripheral areas it is higher – e.g., persistently about 20 percent in Puerto Rico, about 40 percent in Mexico. True unemployment and underemployment are higher still in all areas. See Vietorisz, Mier and Harrison, "Full Employment at Living Wages," 1975.

(5) Such an austerity policy may be more covert than explicit, taking its toll more by the omission of effective and progressive policies than by the commission of particular acts.

(6) This is fetishism in the most literal sense.

(7) See Kelman, "Toward the Political Economy of Medical Care," 1971.

(8) See also recent issues of journals such as Working Papers for a New Society, Self-Reliance, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, In These Times, Social Policy, among others.

(9) Krumholz, Cogger, Linner, "The Cleveland Policy Planning Report," 1975.