




World Community and Indo-Pak Relations

**ALSO INCLUDES
INDO-PAK TRADE RELATIONS AND
EFFORTS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE**



Edited by

VERINDER GROVER ■ RANJANA ARORA

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WORLD COMMUNITY AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS

Also includes Indo-Pak Trade Relations and Efforts towards Lasting Peace

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
WORLD COMMUNITY AND INDO-PAK RELATIONS

Also includes Indo-Pak Trade Relations and Efforts towards Lasting Peace

"We consider it to be in our interest to improve relations with our neighbours . . . we have chosen to pursue a policy that is asymmetrical . . . means that while dealing with our neighbours we are willing to do more for them than they can do for us. Such a policy, which some people have called the Gujral Doctrine, is based on certain principles that require mutual understanding and agreement."

—I.K. GUJRAL

(Speaking at the Asia Society dinner in New York on September 23, 1997)



Preface

Ever since the birth of Pakistan, the relations between India and Pakistan had been far from friendly as both the countries felt threatened by each other. The story of Indo-Pak relations has been mainly a story of conflict. It was expected that the Simla Pact of July 1, 1972 would usher in a new era in the Indo-Pak relations. Although Simla Pact did not include any formal undertaking for war avoidance, it, however, pledged to normalise relations and settle disputes peacefully.

The Simla Pact remained a non-starter. Even today, after 25 years of this agreement, there is no sign of any rapprochement. Threat of war looms large and even there is irresponsible talk of the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has, for the last 8 years unleashed low-cost proxy war against India by training and financing terrorist outfits to kill innocent people, create terror and destroy property in Kashmir, Punjab and some other parts of India. Such activities create animosity and not friendly relations. In fact, Pakistan is waging war against India in all but name.

India's desire to live in peace with Pakistan has not been reciprocated. Recently, India's Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister of Pakistan have made sincere efforts to come to some settlement but army's vice-like hold over Pakistan's governmental machinery has aborted these attempts. Under the present international situation, it is imperative, and in the interests of both India and Pakistan, that they must pursue the path of peace and friendship and turn away from conflict and war. This confirms to highest interests of the people of the two countries. For this, both the countries will have to undertake deliberate and conscious transformation of their respective psyches, though gradually. But the results would be very profitable to both the countries.

The present volume is divided into five parts. Part I deals with the Indo-Pakistan Relations and the World Community; Part II throws light on the Indo-Pakistan Trade Relations; Part III examines initial years of Indo-Pakistan Relations; Part IV discusses the Indo-Pak relations during the recent years; Part V contains

articles wishing a peaceful settlement of all the issues between the two neighbours.

This anthology is a systematic piecing together of articles contributed by scholars and specialists to the various journals of national and international repute. Our special thanks are due to *The Journal of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis*, *Third World Impact*, *Asian Studies*, *India Quarterly*, *International Studies*, *Punjab Journal of Politics*, *South Asian Studies*, *Pakistan Horizon*, *Regional Studies (Pakistan)*, *Mainstream*, *Dawn* (Karachi), *Parlance*, *Foreign Affairs Reports*, *International Studies*, *Indian Journal of Political Science*, *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, *The Hindustan Times*, *World Focus* and the *Parlance*. We express our deep sense of appreciation to all the contributors for their scholarly papers and gratitude to the various librarians and eminent scholars in the field who extended their cooperation to us.

New Delhi

VERINDER GROVER
RANJANA ARORA



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PART 1

Indo-Pakistan Relations and the World Community

Indo-Pak Relations and Major Powers

T. KARKI HUSSAIN*

There is no getting away from the reality that external factors have played a major role in the Indian sub-continent. In this context, both India and Pakistan became involved with outside powers on issues which have remained essentially bilateral, Kashmir was internationalised by the two protagonists, to be followed by Pakistan's acceptance of Western military aid and membership of US-sponsored military pacts. This move was severely condemned by the Indian leaders on the premise that it had inducted cold war in the region. Later, however, when Indian defences were found inadequate against the relative Chinese power, India also made maximum effort to secure external assistance. Pakistan reacted by going one step further. it not only mocked at India's *volte face* but also accused the Western powers of making Asians fight Asians.¹

In the subsequent period the pattern remained consistent, though there were brief yet significant deviations in between. During the Sino-Indian border war and upto the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1965, India received military aid and considerable diplomatic support from the United States, especially with regard to China. At Tashkent, the US-Soviet interests seemed to converge on the need for peace and reconciliation between India and Pakistan and the Americans demonstrated full concurrence with the Soviet initiative in that direction. However, the interregnum of parity between India and Pakistan and what appeared to the Pakistani leadership as even US preference of India to Pakistan ended shortly afterwards. With the US leaning once again in Pakistan's favour by resuming its flow of arms, the latter recovered its earlier place as an important element in the American policies in South Asia. The calculations behind the US shift were mainly made on: (1) its understanding of the nature and scope of Chinese foreign policy objectives, and (2) Pakistan's credential as a communication-link between China and United States.

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This period coincided with some alterations in the Soviet behaviour toward Pakistan. The Soviet Union tried to establish relations with Pakistan by offering to it, beside other material aids, arms assistance also. On Kashmir, their line changed from total endorsement of the Indian position to what may tantamount to a neutral posture. These gestures indicated that the Soviets were reappraising the power-position in the South Asian region in the light of their external requirements and their assessment of the domestic developments in India and Pakistan. The images created by better internal and external performance of the Ayub leadership in comparison to that of crisis-ridden India also contributed to these shifts in policy.

On the Soviet side, also, the parity phase was shortlived. China continued to remain the crucial element in Soviet diplomacy in Asia. It was in reality a three-cornered confrontation, i.e. China against the Soviet Union, India against China, and Pakistan against India. Unable either to undermine China's equation with Pakistan or to reconcile its own differences with China, the Soviet Union found it expedient to reconsider India as a vital instrument of its regional strategy. The climax came with the new developments in Sino-American relations which clinched the Soviet alliance with India. This was concretised both in a 20-year Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in August 1971 and the Soviet support to India during the Indo-Pak hostilities four months later.

Chinese policies towards the Indian sub-continent developed rather differently from those of the two major powers. Though mutually wary of each other (due to conflicting border claims and Tibet), India and China were able to establish close ties symbolising the spirit of resurgent Asian nationalism. At the same time China and Pakistan maintained correct relations despite the latter's membership of the SEATO. Throughout this historic period, China carefully refrained from interfering in disputes between India and Pakistan, notably Kashmir. The collapse of Panchsheel in the wake of the rebellion in Tibet and the subsequent border conflict made China turn hostile toward India. China manifested its antagonism by charging that India was colluding with the two super-powers. By now China's policy towards the smaller nations in the context of super-power hegemony began to crystallize. By 1965, Pakistan became a focal point of China's new approach to international problems. By befriending it, China derived maximum advantage *vis-a-vis* India. At the same time it could play up Pakistan as a truly sovereign nation-state safeguarding its interests against big power machinations. This line was most pronounced during the Bangladesh development even when China's ideological inconsistency (in the sense that it opposed an armed struggle for national liberation) became most glaring. China remained a strong critic of Indian action in Bangladesh and a firm advocate of Pakistan's integrity. When President Bhutto visited China shortly after assuming power, the Chinese leaders strongly condemned the "naked aggression committed by India against Pakistan and the occupation of Pakistan's territory by its blatant defiance of international law, the UN Charter and the Bandung principles."²

II

In the light of the outline sketched above, it is easy to understand the qualitative change that has come about in South Asia since the December war in 1971. India's victory and the dismemberment of Pakistan have drastically reduced the latter's military capacity at least for the time being. Moreover, by successfully intervening on behalf of the liberation struggle of Bangladesh, India has asserted the right to act unilaterally in a situation which gravely affected its security. The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state and its recognition by others in quick succession, have on the other hand helped to legitimise India's action which had initially aroused the misgivings among the members of the UN General Assembly. The swiftness of India's victory also confronted the outside powers with a *fait accompli*. Notwithstanding its rigidly anti-India bias, as exposed by the Anderson paper,³ the Nixon administration accepted the changed reality in South Asia by extending formal recognition to Bangladesh by May 1972. In doing so, it is logical to presume that it had weighed the possible repercussions of its action on Pakistan against the obvious advantage of establishing its presence in a country where the Soviet and Indian influence had already become extensive.

From the point of view of China, the break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of a new state in the sub-continent caused initially a lot of embarrassment. The Chinese were realistic enough to understand that an attitude of total denial of the existence of Bangladesh would come as a poor consolation to Pakistan. On the other hand, a less rigid attitude in this regard might possibly prevent India and the Soviet Union from attaining a dominant position in Bangladesh. It could thus be argued that the emergent power balance in South Asia had made both China and the United States realize the limits to which they could influence the developments in the region. To this extent, India's primary position in the area has been assured and it is natural for India to want both its neighbours and the external powers to recognize this position.

The most formidable task in this direction would be to convince Pakistan about India's good intentions, notwithstanding the results of the war. It would appear that Pakistan's military defeat has brought about a sombre mood which may contribute to the new line of thinking that a policy of dependence on external powers solely to wrest concession from India may not take it too far. Presumably, the erstwhile military regime in Rawalpindi escalated the war in the hope that either the Chinese or the Americans would come to its assistance at the most crucial stage. The fact that this hope was not fulfilled may have impressed the Pakistanis—at least for a time—about the limited capacity of foreign powers to influence events in their favour.

Secondly, the very fact that the East Pakistanis, constituting over 55 per cent of the population, decided to sever connection and establish a separate state of their own must have come as a traumatic experience to Pakistan. For it symbolizes not only the collapse of a theocratic state but also the end of an illusion that a policy of perpetual confrontation with India was indispensable for its survival. The Bhutto regime, therefore, faces the problem of keeping together