



# 国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to  
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,  
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

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## 第六七册目录

Case 450	对美英的关系( Relations with U. S. A. and British Commonwealth ) .....	1
Case 451	对荷兰和葡萄牙的关系( Relations with The Netherlands and Portugal ) .....	205
Case 453	若松只一( Wakamatsu Tadakazu ) .....	237
Case 454	笠木良明( Kasagi Ryomei ) .....	307
Case 455	总力战研究所( Total War Research Institute ) .....	317
Case 456	鸠山一郎( Hatoyama Ichiro ) .....	351
Case 457	河边虎四郎( Kawabe Torashiro ) .....	395
Case 458	德川义亲( Tokugawa Yoshichika ) .....	413
Case 459	苏联人的问讯( Russian Interrogations ) ( 一 ) .....	463

~~RESTRICTED~~

Case # 450

RELATIONS WITH U.S.A. and  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

File #450

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO  
By AFEB 11 21 1952 *cme*  
Date 11 21 1952  
Signature \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED

*Carl A. Rosenberg*  
MRJ GSC

~~RESTRICTED~~



**SUBJECT: Relations between Japan and the  
6 United States.**

The following information of evidentiary value was obtained from the file of IHO, Hiroya, Case No. 71.

**DETAILS:** As Minister of Agriculture and Forestry IHO, Hiroya, was present at the cabinet meeting of December 1, 1941 when TOJO sought cabinet approval of the decision to wage war against the United States. The entire cabinet voted its approval. IHO also attended the Imperial Conference held on December 1, 1941 which was substantially a repetition of the earlier cabinet meeting. There was no dissent when TOJO announced Japan's decision to attack the United States. The Imperial Conference was attended by the full cabinet, the chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy and the Chairman of the Privy Council.

SERIAL 21, Page 5.

Name of Interrogator: 1st Lt. F. E. Kennemer, Jr., USMC.  
Name of Briefer: 1st Lt. F. E. Kennemer, Jr., USMC.

**SUBJECT: Relations between Japan, United States of America, Philippines and British Commonwealth of Nations.**

The following information was obtained from the file of SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru, Case No. 407.

In essence SHIGEMITSU states that as Foreign Minister he merely served as a conduit for the messages which were prepared by the Information Bureau in the War Ministry. The duty of the Foreign Minister, SHIGEMITSU stated, was strictly limited to the transmittance of notes and notes of answer. "The prisoners of war in Japan are under the jurisdiction of this Bureau and the prisoners of war outside Japan are under the jurisdiction of the Area Commander.

SUZUKI, Kuyman, in the Foreign Office, handled these matters usually for Mr. SHIGEMITSU. He stated that each message or communication came to his attention and he followed it through. He stated that he "suspected" from the Swiss Minister that things were not satisfactory. He discussed these protests with the War Ministry, who in turn told him they had always done their best, denying the charges and protests and stating that "the prisoners of war" were treated quite well. Because of this SHIGEMITSU said that it was difficult to go beyond and that the treatment of the prisoners of war was out of his jurisdiction.

SHIGEMITSU stated that he talked to Premiers TOJO and KOISO about the protests and requests he received from the Swiss government, and that KOISO always approved his idea and never objected to proper treatment. He stated that SUZUKI and the Swiss Minister sometimes visited the Prisoner of War Camps and both handed in good reports.

He named General UYEMURA, Mikio (believed to be in Manchuria), General HAMABA, Hei (believed to have died in Burma), and General TAMURA, Hiroshi (believed to be now in Tokyo), as heads of the Information Bureau while he was in the Foreign Office. SHIGEMITSU stated he had never seen a Prisoner of War Camp. (19 March 1946, pp. 1-8; 20 March 1946, pp. 1-5).

The acceptance of the Geneva and Hauge Convention provisions "mutadis mutandis" was decided by the Army (TOJO) and Navy (SHIMADA) Ministers, in the first instance. They proposed it in the Cabinet. (19 March 1946, p. 3).

NAME OF INTERROGATOR E. M. Hyder

NAME OF BRIEFER E. M. Hyder

**EVIDENTIARY SUMMARY**

**9 May 1946**

**SUBJECT: Relations between Japan and U.S.A.** *gull*

The following information was obtained from the file of HIRIKIRI, Zenshi, Case No. 433. Interview dated 6 May 1946.

On Dec. 3, <sup>1941</sup> HIRIKIRI received the following wire from TOGO:

"Japanese-American negotiations steadily becoming worse. When the worst comes we shall notify you by means of weather forecast. East wind implies America, west wind implies England and north wind implies Russia."

Interrogator: R. M. Larsh, 1st Lt.  
Briefer : R. M. Larsh, 1st Lt.

**Subject 9: Relations Between Japan, U.S.A, Philippines and  
British Commonwealth of Nations**

The following information was obtained from the file of OKA,  
Takasumi, Case No. 37, Serial No. 37-11, page 10:

That at the Imperial Conference on the 1st or 2nd of December,  
at which he was present, the question of war with the United States  
was the main issue for discussion. That at that conference no one  
spoke up against going to war with the United States.

Interrogator: G. Hardin

Briefer: John F. Barry



INTERROGATION OF

IWAKURO, Hideo

Date and Time: 16 May 1946, 1000  
Place : War Ministry Bldg., Tokyo, Japan  
Present : IWAKURO, Hideo (Maj. General)  
MATSUZAKI, Takashi (Maj. Gen. IWAKURO's interpreter)  
Roy L. Morgan, Interrogator  
Ingeborg Nyden, Stenographer

- Q. General Iwakuro, I understand that you were sent to Washington by the War Ministry in 1941 to assist Ambassador NOMURA in negotiations between Japan and the United States. Is that correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. On what date did you leave Japan for the United States in 1941?
- A. March 6, 1941.
- Q. Prior to leaving Japan for the United States, did you receive instructions from the War Ministry?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who gave you your instructions?
- A. The order issued from Minister of War and the minor instructions given by Vice-Minister ANAMI and Gen. MUTO.
- Q. What were the instructions in the order given to you by Gen. TOJO? /
- A. To assist Ambassador NOMURA and to find a solution for peace of both countries.
- Q. Were there any further instructions that Gen. TOJO gave you?
- A. No more instructions.
- Q. Did you discuss your mission with TOJO personally?

(IWAKURO, 16 May 46 Cont'd)

- A. I haven't personally talked with Gen. TOJO.
- Q. You say that you also received instructions from Gen. MUTO?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you work for Gen. MUTO at the time that you were sent to the United States?
- A. I held post of Section Head under General MUTO.
- Q. What Section?
- A. Chief of GUNJIKU, that is, Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau.
- Q. Your title at that time was Colonel, I understand?
- A. Yes, I was.
- Q. What instructions did MUTO give you at that time?
- A. At that time we have two priests from the United States. These priests' names were Bishop WALSH and Father BROUT. They came here to carry secret mission of Mr. Frank WALKER and President ROOSEVELT, and to see the possibility of peaceful solution between both countries. General MUTO agreed entirely with them. When I left Japan those two people have gone back already to the United States. Then General MUTO instructed me when you arrive in United States to get contact with these people and work to find the peace solution between the both countries.
- Q. Did he give you any other instructions?
- A. That is all.
- Q. Did he tell you what he would consider successful negotiations?
- A. I believe the negotiations carried very smoothly prior to the war between the Russians and Germans broke out. After that we met difficulties. Since Japanese army landed in southern part of Indo-China, the degree of the difficulties were increased.
- Q. I think you misunderstood my question. I asked, Did MUTO tell you when he was giving you instructions what he expected the negotiations ---- ?
- A. He, himself, General MUTO, was just of a firm idea that Japan and the United States never fight - will never fight -- and British. Any sacrifices in this negotiation must be for the peaceful solution, that

(IWAKURA, 16 May 46 Cont'd)

was General NUTO's firm idea.

Q. Didn't he give you instructions as to what to obtain in an agreement for a successful negotiation?

A. In the first place, to bring the definite solution of China Incident and in the second place to make isolation position of Japan from the world's strifes.

Q. How did General NUTO expect you to bring a successful conclusion of the China Incident?

A. According to General NUTO's thinking, you know the third clause of the understanding between Japan and America. His opinion involved in that clause. His opinion was just the same as mentioned in the third clause of the understanding.

Q. Did NUTO tell you how he expected you to settle the China Incident?

A. We think the intermediation of the United States of America between Japan and China would bring a definite solution. To invite American as go-between between Japan and China.

Q. You mean to tell me that NUTO gave you instructions that in order to settle the China Incident that it would be satisfactory if the United States would mediate the dispute between China and Japan?

A. That was so.

Q. Did he give you any other instructions as to how far Japan would go as to concessions in mediating the dispute?

A. No more instructions.

Q. What did ANAMI tell you before you left?

A. My transfer to the United States was requested by Ambassador NOMURA and if you go to United States work hard just like his hands and feet, that is all.

Q. When you arrived in the United States, did you receive any further instructions from the War Ministry?

A. No further instructions I received from War Ministry.

Q. You received no further instructions from the War Ministry after you arrived in the United States?

(IWAKURA, 16 May 46 Cont'd)

A. No instructions. Absolutely.

Q. Did you receive any instructions from the Japanese Government while in the United States?

A. I didn't receive direct.

Q. You then received instructions indirectly?

A. All instructions and orders addressed to Ambassador NOMURA. Not for me.

Q. Did you receive instructions before you left Japan to contact MUTO or the War Ministry directly from Washington as to the progress of negotiations?

A. No instructions.

Q. Did you inform the War Minister directly as to the negotiations?

A. On the 15th of April I sent two telegrams addressed to the Chief of Staff (Sugiyama) and Minister of War, Gen. TOJO. I explained my wishes and request to make peaceful solution between Japan and United States according to the first understanding.

Q. What was the first understanding?

A. What I mentioned just now -- in the seven clauses.

Q. Did you inform them in your telegram how you hoped to reach such an understanding?

A. I asked to issue answer for this understanding as soon as possible. In the second place to raise and gather the public opinion to accept this understanding.

Q. Were you informed in the United States in your negotiations what America would agree to as to a peaceful settlement?

A. This was No. 1 understanding. Started 2nd April with Mr. IKAWA (Chief of secret KYO-DO Party) and myself and Father BROUT, and later on 15 April. At this period we have discussed this matter with Ambassador NOMURA and General ISODA and Capt. Ichiro YOKOYAMA regarding this matter, and I think Father BROUT had discussed the matter with Mr. Frank WALKER and also the Secretary of State Mr. HULL, and this report I believed reached President ROOSEVELT himself.

Q. What was the report? I don't think you understand. You are talking general terms and it is very difficult for me to understand these



(INAKURO, 16 May 46 Cont'd)

general terms. I want to know what your idea of the general agreement is? Wasn't the main thing taking the troops out of China?

- A. This understanding plan handed to Ambassador NOMURA by Mr. Hull on April 15. At that time Secretary of State Mr. HULL told Ambassador NOMURA that it is not better things to get initiative for the negotiations in America nor Japan. This plan was the private plan made up by three patriots and we would take up this plan as official.
- Q. You advised the War Minister of the negotiations to that date. Were you ever informed that you should contact the War Ministry directly or let this information go through regular channels by Ambassador NOMURA?
- A. This plan was reported by Ambassador NOMURA to Foreign Office Ministry, and contents of my telegram was asking to show cooperative attitude and cooperate to the Foreign Affairs Ministry.
- Q. Would you relate to me the conduct of negotiations from that time to the date you left the United States?
- A. I would like to explain the negotiations as a type and contents. I received answers for this plan from Tokyo 8th of May and from 8th of May until in August when I left the United States Ambassador NOMURA had met Mr. HULL 20 and several times regarding this matter. Seven or eight times I met Mr. HULL accompanied with Ambassador NOMURA. I made the clerical negotiations with Mr. Hamilton, then he was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the American State Department. The contention is when the seven problems are considered we find the three difficult clauses: first, the definition of idea of self-defense for the United States and Japan. The problem of Japanese army to be stationed in China after the solution of the China Incident. The different idea for the liberal free trade, or open door policy of the world. I will explain the first problem. The problems of the convoy system and the policy of aiding Great Britain, for Japan's side had a conception that these conduct was more than self-defense of the United States. And for the problems of the China Incident. We have mentioned the problems of self-defense for the China Incident but the United States did not agree to our opinion for this. This argument continued to the last moment as a deadlock. The second problem: The military force stationed in China after the solution of the China Incident. We have the two ideas, or two means, of force stationed in China. The first is Anti-Communist powers. We need the forces should be stationed in China. Second, to observe whether China will exercise the best items of the agreement of the peace between China and Japan.

(Interrogation adjourned until Monday, 20 May 46, 9 AM, when Mr. Ikawa will act as interpreter.)

Certificate of Interpreter

I, \_\_\_\_\_ (name) \_\_\_\_\_ (Rank) \_\_\_\_\_ (Serial Number)  
being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions  
and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to  
English respectively, and that the above transcription of such  
questions and answers, consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, is true and  
accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, \_\_\_\_\_, hereby certify that I acted  
as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I  
transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the  
transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge  
and belief.

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Ingeborg Nyden*

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) \_\_\_\_\_,  
and **Ray L. Morgan** \_\_\_\_\_,  
\_\_\_\_\_

certify that on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946, personally  
appeared before me (us) **16th May** \_\_\_\_\_  
and according to **IMAKURO, Hideo** \_\_\_\_\_, Interpreter,  
gave the foregoing **INTERVIEW, Tetsuo** \_\_\_\_\_, several questions set forth **for IMAKURO**  
therein.

\_\_\_\_\_  
War Ministry Bldg. Tokyo

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Ray L. Morgan*

\_\_\_\_\_  
17 May 1946

The original transcript of this interrogation will be found in our Exhibit File as Exhibit No. #967. The original shorthand notes of Miss Ingeborg Nyden on this interrogation will be found in our Exhibit File as Exhibit No. #968.

File No. #450

Serial No. #5

**SUBJECT:** Aggression against British Commonwealth of Nations.

**DETAILS:** A signed statement of SAWADA, Renzo, ex-ambassador to Burma, reveals the manner in which Japan accomplished its domination of Burma.

See file 405, serial 45.

**Interrogator and briefer:** Lt. McEwen.



SUBJECT: Relations between Japan and U. S.

The following information was obtained from the file of KAYA, Okinori, case no. 49.

DETAILS: File 49, serial 14, pp. 3, 4, 5 and 6 relate KAYA's memory of the cabinet sessions just prior to December 7, 1941. He said among other things it was of no use to oppose the wishes of the rest of the cabinet members in agreeing with TOJO's opinion that it was impossible to comply with Hull's note and that war was inevitable. No cabinet member opposed TOJO and by their silence approved his opinion. Later they all approved in writing.

File 49, serial 16, pp. 2, 3. When KAYA asked that no hasty action be taken concerning Hull's note, the military (TOJO or SUGIYAMA) or navy (NAGANO) said "we have no time to think over this problem very long, as time is short" and allowed one day for consideration. Defensive preparations for war were discussed.

On page 4 same file and serial TOJO is quoted as having said at the December 2 Imperial Conference, "Altho we have negotiated with America, Hull's note indicates that we will soon be at war. As a means of self defense we must reconcile ourselves that we will soon be at war."

File 49, serial 34, page 2. KAYA admits that at a liaison he and all of cabinet agreed with the military decision to wage war against the U.S. His excuse for not opposing was that he would have to resign and the cabinet might collapse. He thought that war was inevitable and that it was best to go to war at that time. He says further that if he resigned it would have weakened Japan's position financially, while if he remained there would be confidence in the financial situation and inflation could be avoided.

It was further decided that the means of carrying out the war should be left entirely up to the army and navy departments. In other words they could decide whether to attack the U.S. or await an attack.

Interrogator: Lt. Samuel F. Healey

Briefer: Lt. McEwen