BRITISH NAVAL POWER IN THE EAST 1794–1805

The Command of Admiral Peter Rainier

PETER A. WARD



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THE BOYDELL PRESS

First published 2013
The Boydell Press, Woodbridge

ISBN 978-1-84383-848-7

The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd
PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK
and of Boydell & Brewer Inc.
668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620-2731, USA
website: www.boydellandbrewer.com

A CIP catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea for writing this book developed over several years. With hindsight, however, it appears to have followed a straightforward and logical path. An early interest in the not always harmonious relationship between the Royal Navy and the East India Company Maritime Service led to the discovery of the Bombay Diaries at Exeter University. These transcripts of the documents of the Bombay Presidency of the East India Company, during the late eighteenth–early nineteenth centuries, illustrated the action and reaction of the navy's response to Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1798. As most writers had concentrated on activities in the Mediterranean, this seemed an opportunity to redress the balance, at least partially, in my MA dissertation. The success of the navy and East India Company forces in thwarting French ambitions in the Red Sea led to an appreciation of the naval commander-in-chief at the time, Peter Rainier.

Further study of this seaman led to an understanding of his managerial and logistical skills, his ability to work with the officers and officials of the East India Company, his understanding of the strategic issues facing such a large arena during wartime, his talent as a leader of combined operations, and his unsurpassed knowledge of the region. And it became apparent that he put these attributes to good effect. During his unequalled eleven years on station, against strong French forces, trade grew rapidly, both within Asia and between Asia and Europe. This helped finance the war at home. His territorial conquests, carried out in conjunction with Company forces, moved the centre of the station eastwards as the trade with China overtook that with India. He established a logistical network across the station which enabled the navy to operate at optimum effectiveness and he worked so closely with the Governor General, his officers and officials, that by the time he returned to England in 1805, the future of the subcontinent was assuredly to be that of a British colony, even if it were administered by a joint stock company. It therefore became clear to me that Admiral Rainier's achievements would be an excellent subject for a PhD thesis. I hope that this book, based on the research I carried out at Exeter University, will give a wider exposure to this much underestimated admiral.

After an Introduction which describes the circumstances and environment, Chapter 1 explores the early life and career of Rainier up to his assuming command of the East Indies Station in 1794. The following two chapters explore the key roles played by the navy and East India Company and how Rainier ensured that they worked well together. Chapter 4 explains the importance, to both the navy and the Company, of communications and intelligence to the successful management of war on a station so vast and so far from Britain. Major successes of British arms, increased trade and territorial expansion form the basis of Chapters 5 and 6. The enormous challenges of maintaining an effective naval operation across the station are illustrated in Chapter 7. There has been too little appreciation of how effective Rainier was in establishing this logistics structure, without which British arms would not have been so successful. Finally, the concluding chapter integrates all the achievements of Admiral Rainier and the East India Company. It demonstrates that this key period, in this distant territory, had a crucial impact on the future of the British Empire.

I owe much to my supervisor, Dr Michael Duffy, without whose encouragement, gentle guidance and profound perception, the assignment would never have been completed. Support at Exeter University has also come at crucial times from Professor Jeremy Black, Dr Gareth Cole and Commander Bob Wilson RN. Dr Margaret Makepeace, at the British Library Asia, Pacific and Africa Department, has been especially helpful in bringing the key issues into focus, especially the key role played by the East India Company. Their deep knowledge has been shared with me unstintingly.

Thanks must also be given to the many external bodies to which I have turned for information, especially the British Optometrists Society, who kindly allowed me to reproduce their painting of Admiral Rainier, and the owners of the private Blair Adam Family records at Kinross in Scotland.

Without Fiona Twitchen's patience, knowledge and understanding of the relevant software this manuscript would never have reached the publisher. Much credit is due to her. I am also indebted to Julie Snook FBCartS for creating the book's excellent maps.

I also owe an enormous debt to my wife, Gwenda. Her ability to help me put the stresses and strains of writing a thesis into perspective and to motivate me in the darker days, when the light at the end of the tunnel seemed so far away, has been critical. Her fine command of the English language has also been much in evidence in the many re-writes that have taken place.

ABBREVIATIONS

ADM	Admiralty
B.L.	British Library
B.P.P.	British Parliamentary Papers
KEI	Keith Papers
MM	*Mariner's Mirror*
N.A.S.	National Archive of Scotland
N.L.S.	National Library of Scotland
N.M.M	National Maritime Museum
RAI	Rainier Papers, National Maritime Museum
T.N.A.	The National Archives, Kew
U.K.H.O.	United Kingdom Hydrographic Office

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Seven Years War in 1763 found Britain the pre-eminent European colonial power. Its main rivals, France and Spain, had little hope of ever controlling North America, the Caribbean, India, and the major sea-going trade routes. Yet, in this position of power lay the seeds of events which would affect the entire world for the next two hundred years. The loss of Britain's American colonies and the rising influence of British power in India were the next steps in that progression.

India

The army of the English East Indian Company (henceforth the 'Company'), under the command of Robert Clive and assisted by naval and military elements of the Crown, had defeated the Nawab of Bengal. By 1765, the Company was effectively the ruler of his entire province. After the initial shock brought about by the sheer scale of Clive's victories during the Seven Years War, the government realised that a joint stock company now controlled the lives of millions of Indians. The complexities of so doing were hidden from the political elite in London, looking through a fog created by the myths of vast wealth, exotic cultures, wonderful art and literature. The actual business of government fell to the small number of Britons who went out to India. The Directors of the East India Company in London were still focused on trade; they did not want to rule vast tracts of India; trade alone would bring huge profits into the Company's coffers. Unfortunately they were wrong. The costs of government were far greater than imagined. The Company was sucked into the maelstrom of Indian diplomacy and politics which only those officials *in situ* could understand. The game in which the Company was now occupied required vast amounts of money to provide military power to protect its possessions. Between the 1760s and 1793 there were seven distinct wars on the Indian subcontinent affecting Britain. The result was that the hoped for inflow of Indian wealth to British government coffers did not occur.

The steady decline of the Mughal emperor's power did not occasion revolution and chaos but rather an evolution to smaller, more controllable territories, both Hindu and Muslim, which still owed at least nominal allegiance to the emperor. This change in tenure from one subsidiary power to another was not unusual in eighteenth-century India. By attacking Calcutta, the major British base in India, the Nawab of Bengal had brought an unwitting and unwilling foreign trading company into the perilous game of Indian power politics: together with its possessions in the Carnatic, the Company was now one of several important subsidiary powers owing allegiance to the emperor.

The four major powers which had benefited most from the decline of central rule were the Afghans and Sikhs in the far north, the Marathas in north and central India and Mysore to the south. At this stage the last two were the powers most immediately threatening British power. Each had powerful armies which could move quickly to attack the Company's possessions. To make matters more serious, France, which had been smarting from the losses it had incurred in 1763, saw these successful Indian states as suitable vehicles with which to strike back at Britain. France began a programme of placing its army officers in key positions in the Indian armies of its allies. It encouraged diplomatic ties between France and Mysore and sent military stores to assist in the build-up of Mysore and the forces of the Maratha Confederacy.

France was only too happy to see Britain in conflict in India. Pondicherry, its main base on the subcontinent, could not be defended easily; it therefore no longer had a viable power base on the Indian mainland from which it could attack British interests. But France possessed the island of Mauritius, 2,500 miles from the coast of India. From here privateers and national warships could raid both the merchant shipping between Europe and the Far East as well as the burgeoning Country Trade, as the intra-region commerce was called. But French finances were in a parlous state after the American Revolution and it could not afford heavy military investment in India. It therefore saw that the most hopeful route to attack Britain was by a combination of commerce raiding and alliance with those Indian states which felt threatened by British power.

In the 1790s, Tipu, the Sultan of Mysore, had hoped, and indeed expected, French assistance against Britain but was frustrated by British naval power. Limited French resources meant the little he received was ineffectual. The final event of the conflict, the storming of Tipu's capital of Seringapatam by British troops and the killing of Tipu in 1799, meant the end of Mysore and the transfer of its power to the Company. Britain's wars against the Marathas followed a similar pattern. In 1805 military success led to the acquisition of large amounts of territory. But not until the Third War (1817–18), were the Marathas finally defeated. These wars meant that the Company was unable to send home the expected vast amounts of Indian treasure as the cost of fighting, and maintaining war readiness, was even greater than the revenue it raised from its taxes and alliances with its Indian allies.

The East India Company

The unique situation whereby British India was ruled by a joint stock company meant that in London there was little understanding, and no experience, as to what was the best method of organising Indian government. There was a strong belief that vast amounts of Indian treasure would flood into Britain and that the Company's officials and military officers were making fortunes through private trade and corruption. Not only did the expected flood of treasure fail to appear, but the Company fell into severe financial difficulty. It was realised that there was too much lining of private pockets at the expense of the official trade and that the cost of administering and defending British possessions was more than expected. Yet this phenomenon was not altogether bad. The money made locally was then lent to the Company and other merchants in return for bills payable in London. Thus the actual specie remained in India where it supported increasing Country Trade and helped to finance the tea purchases in Canton.

Concerns over the management of the Company led to the 1784 Pitt India Act which established a Board of Control, whose responsibility was the overall policy direction of Britain's Indian possessions. It left the administration of India to the Company. In return the government would guarantee its financial stability. The Board's President, Henry Dundas, established a workable *modus operandi*, the result of which was a much closer and more effective relationship between the government and the Company's Court of Directors. One result of British spending was the enhanced reputation of British arms amongst Indian troops. They were paid well and regularly, a practice uncommon amongst indigenous armies; this was the price for superior professional management. Up to this time the Company had three major independent centres of government in India: Calcutta, viewed as the most important, Madras, and Bombay, which was the most junior. Each was ruled by a president in council and had its own military forces. Given the enormous distances between them, they all had their local issues. Unfortunately this meant that they tended to put their own particular concerns above those of British India as a whole. Consequently it was very difficult to establish a common strategy and this led to serious problems during the American Revolution. As a result, the India Act emphasised the role of the Governor General in Calcutta, clearly positioning the other two presidencies of Madras and Bombay as subordinate.

Trade

The three major colonial markets in the eighteenth century were, in descending order, the West Indies, North America and Asia. As their importance to the

British economy grew, their relative importance did not change. However, the significance of Asia lay not merely in the volumes of trade, but in its content: tea, calico, indigo, spices, and saltpetre being of great importance. Additionally, precious metals, jewels, art, sent home by wealthy British individuals, added value to the British economy. Moreover, whilst never sufficient to cover all military costs, the revenue generated within Asia, which did not return to Britain, contributed enormously to the financing of the Company's wars of territorial expansion. Another unique factor of the Britain–Asia trade was that it occurred under the monopoly of the Company; no other person or company could carry goods between the two destinations.

The value to Britain of this Asian commerce was not lost on the government. Any threats to its continuance were taken seriously. In war this meant the dispatch of warships to protect British interests, and British vessels were crucial to the operations of every Indian conflict from 1745 onwards.

Britain's trade with India received a boost following the successes of the Seven Years War. The major markets were, naturally, India and China. Demand for British manufactures was insufficient to pay for the products imported into Britain and large amounts of silver had to be exported to the Far East to pay for them. By the 1790s the value of imports from China, primarily tea, exceeded those from India. This trade was mainly financed by the transfer of silver to Canton. The imbalance of trade with India itself was by then largely financed by both the revenues and taxes generated locally and the cash flows into Britain from the remittance of wealth generated by individual Europeans working on the subcontinent.

The trade also meant that more shipping used the Straits of Malacca, the shortest route between Bengal and China. In order to protect that trade from piracy, the Company obtained the island of Penang from its Sultan, following negotiations with the merchant adventurer, Captain Francis Light. Although a Company establishment, the nascent naval base thus created was to be of great benefit to the navy in the coming French Wars. It was a sign that the movement of goods between China and India was increasingly important. With the death of Tipu and the chaos caused by the French Revolution, British trade and possessions in the region appeared safe; so safe that, in 1794, Rear Admiral Cornwallis, the Governor General's brother, felt able to return to England, leaving no naval vessels at all in the East Indies. This was a move too far for both the British government and the Company and, early the following year, Commodore Peter Rainier was appointed to lead a small squadron back to the waters he knew so well.

The presence of European merchants, working closely with indigenous Indian bankers, merchants and shipbuilders, under the protection of a British civil administration, the Company's military forces and the Royal Navy, greatly stimulated trade between India, Southeast Asia and China. There were severe disruptions to this commerce during wartime, but Britain's acquisition of Ceylon, Malacca, and the Dutch Spice Islands opened up new avenues of trade. This gave both royal and merchant navy officers wider experience of navigation in the difficult waters previously barred to them by the embargo rigorously enforced by the Dutch authorities.

The Royal Navy

The British government never felt the need to have a strong naval squadron in the East Indies during peacetime; it was too expensive. Instead it relied on intelligence from France to ascertain when, if, and how much France was planning to increase its capabilities in India. It would then send out sufficient of its own reinforcements to counter them. This was not a fool-proof plan as it depended on the quality of the intelligence and the weather not thwarting the Royal Navy's watchful eyes. In peacetime, India could rely on the Bombay Marine, its own little navy consisting of a brace of small frigates and several lesser vessels. Their duties were primarily anti-pirate expeditions, convoy escort, surveying, and mail delivery. They would be effective against small privateers but against larger vessels the Company's solution was to increase the guns of a number of its East Indiamen. They could be given the fire-power of a 36–40 gun frigate. Nevertheless, the Bombay Marine allowed the Royal Navy not to worry about trade protection against privateers and pirates throughout its war against France during the American Revolution.

Of vital importance to sea power in the region was the Bombay Dockyard, owned by the Company. Its dry dock, initially constructed in 1750, had, by 1773, been enlarged to take three large Indiamen or third rate warships. It was the only dry dock available to the Royal Navy outside Britain. During the northeast monsoon, when the east coast of India was too dangerous for naval campaigning, many warships were to be found in Bombay rectifying the depredations of the activities of the summer months.

The period between 1763 and 1777 was punctuated by diplomatic tussles between Britain and France over the latter's support of its Indian allies. The number of British warships varied between none and a squadron of three third rates and one fourth rate. However the worldwide demand for warships following the uprising of the American colonists and the French declaration of war in 1778 meant that Britain had insufficient ships. Following the sending of French navy reinforcements to the East Indies, this was especially the case in Indian waters. There was a clear opportunity for France to attack British interests on the subcontinent.

In 1779 Rear Admiral Sir Edward Hughes was appointed the Flag Officer East Indies. This was a key event. Hughes would fight five fleet actions against perhaps the most aggressive French admiral ever, Baillie Suffren, at a time when British power in India was under extreme threat; and one of his officers was the newly promoted Captain Rainier of the *Burford* (70). As commander-in-chief himself in the next war, Rainier was to apply much of what he learned under Hughes. And there was much to be learned: the danger of French-Indian alliances, the vulnerability of Madras to attack from Mysore, the importance of good logistics for victuals and naval supplies, the importance of Trincomalee as a naval base, the rapidity with which crews fell ill, the dangers of having poor relationships with the three independent presidencies, and the benefits of good relationships with the senior army commander.

Although there have been no biographies of Hughes, he was an extremely important character in Indian history. Against such a powerful and aggressive opponent as Suffren, he was the only man who could have lost India in an afternoon. Sea power was vital to the future of British presence, especially given the land wars against Mysore and the Marathas. During the American Revolution, the navy convoyed British troops and their supplies around the Indian coast whilst denying the same facility to the French.

The brilliant tactical aggression of Suffren was not balanced by the same level of management skill. He was never able to elicit the same flair from his captains. Consequently the early ship superiority he had could never overcome the more traditionally led, but highly trained, British squadron. Over the five actions, fought hard with heavy casualties, neither side lost a single ship to sinking or capture. This was more detrimental to France than Britain because, as the war continued, more and more British naval reinforcements arrived, ensuring Hughes could no longer be overwhelmed by Suffren. It was clear that the French administrative systems were not as efficient as those of Britain. France did not as readily provide men, supplies, and ships. Together, Hughes and army commander-in-chief Sir Eyre Coote were successful to such an extent that, by 1783, the French threat had been eradicated.

The period of European peace between 1783 and 1793 saw the role of the East Indies squadron reduced to one of deterrence against French intrigues. The chaos following the Revolution initially allowed France to give little attention to India. But the British government could be sure that, at some stage, the energy liberated by revolutionary France would be directed towards India. It had to decide what naval resources should be sent to protect British interests in the East Indies.

One

THE EARLY YEARS

The Global Situation in 1793–4

The French Wars of 1793 to 1815 were fought on a global scale. The attempt of revolutionary and imperial France to become the pre-eminent power in Europe eventually failed due to the fluid permutations of the continental powers of Russia, Austria, Prussia and Spain combining with the colonial and industrial power of Britain. Naturally the conflict centred on Europe, but the colonial aspirations of Britain and France, together with the declining powers of Spain and the Netherlands, and the rising power of the United States, meant that the conflict spread to all parts of the globe. And the resources provided by the East Indies were essential to enable Britain to sustain these long and exhaustive wars. Rainier had been placed and kept in a key position to protect these resources.

The role played by Britain in the downfall of Napoleon was primarily naval and financial as its navy was by far the biggest in the world and its army comparatively tiny when compared with the manpower that could be put into the field by the continental powers.[1] The incipient industrial revolution gave Britain enormous wealth, which it realised through trade with other countries. Naturally the naval efforts were concentrated around the shores of Britain and the coast of Western Europe. England and Ireland had to be protected from invasion; the rapidly expanding seaborne trade of Britain had to be protected as it came to, and left, European waters; the British army had to be transported to wherever it could most effectively damage the interests of France; support had to be sent, unhindered, to Britain's far-flung colonies and, equally, succour sent by France to its colonies should, wherever possible,

1 R. Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807–1816* (New Haven, CT, 1996), p. 379, N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649–1815* (London, 2004), pp. 579–80.

be frustrated. The trade with the East Indies played an increasing part in this wealth creation throughout the war,[2] and it had to be protected. In the previous two wars France had sent large naval squadrons to India to try to wrest control of that trade from Britain.[3] There was nothing to alter the view that it would do so again, which made the British government anxious about how it should defend its Indian interests.

The greatest numbers of Royal Naval vessels were maintained in the Western Approaches, the English Channel, and the Mediterranean, where they could most effectively carry out the functions described above. The importance of the Baltic Sea as a source of naval supplies, and as a route to Russia after Napoleon's invasion of that country, led to a concentration of naval power developing there in the later years of the war. The western reaches of the Atlantic saw British forces attack French West Indian colonies and later defend Canada whilst at the same time attack the United States during the War of 1812–15. The effective application in South America of liberal democratic views was hindered by Portugal being an ally of Britain after 1807 and Spain an ally from 1793 to 1795 and after 1808. Britain clearly could not attack Spanish and Portuguese colonies when they were British allies. Therefore, apart from the Guiana campaigns of 1795–6 and 1803–4 and Montevideo and Buenos Aires 1806–7, naval activity in South America was minor. Efforts in Africa centred on taking the Dutch colony of the Cape, twice, which leads us finally to explore the role and importance of the navy in the East Indies and Far East.

Previously, Britain had maintained a small squadron primarily for trade protection and to watch for any French moves against its possessions in the region. Although at war with Britain from 1795 to 1796, the Spanish and Dutch colonies showed little belligerence, but they did allow their bases to be used by the more combative French. As the situation at home absorbed all their efforts, the French had little ability to reinforce their possessions in the Far East. Yet, as the war progressed and France became more successful, its attack on Egypt was widely seen as the precursor to an attack on India. Portugal remained an ally throughout the wars. In some ways this was a disadvantage to Britain. Without British protection, the Portuguese colony of Goa could easily be taken by the French. But the Goan authorities would not accept direct British support. This had therefore to be provided indirectly without upsetting Portuguese sensibilities. Consequently, apart from several notable single ship actions, there were no major battles on the station. Indeed the only minor battle was a defeat for the Royal Navy (Grand Port in 1810) and the moves to extend British control over India by Governor General Wellesley were largely hidden from the government.

2 See Appendix 4, Trade Statistics.

3 Sir H.W. Richmond, *The Navy in India 1763–1783* (London, 1931).

Britain's first plan in 1793 was for a naval force under Rear Admiral Gardner to capture Mauritius. When this was achieved he would move on to be the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) East Indies. Then it was realised that French energies were being concentrated in Europe. British troops were needed to take advantage of opportunities offered by Royalist risings in the Vendée and at Toulon. The Mauritius expedition was deferred, though it was still hoped that it might be revived at a later date. Suddenly India was seen as a backwater, as exemplified by the C-in-C, Rear Admiral Cornwallis, leaving the station in January 1794 entirely bereft of any British warships even though he knew war had been declared.[4] This was too risky, even for the Admiralty, which felt that India's naval defence should at least rest on the shoulders of a senior captain leading a small squadron. If the situation in India grew more dangerous, naval reinforcements could be sent out to India under a more senior flag officer who could assume overall command. And threats did arise: in 1795 from Dutch colonies in the East following the French occupation of the Netherlands; in 1796 with the dispatch of a French naval squadron to Mauritius; and in 1798 with the French invasion of Egypt.

These threats had to be taken seriously. The trade and consequent revenue was vital to the British economy. John Bruce wrote in 1793:

> The importance to the government and revenues of the British possessions in Asia, will readily be admitted, if we consider the extent of the British provinces, the number of the inhabitants, or the actual amount of the revenues. The importance of the trade will become obvious, if we advert to the tonnage which it employs, to its forming one of the most considerable branches of our foreign navigation, to the quantity of British manufactures exported to the East, to the relation between the revenues of India and the trade, to the materials which the Public derive from the imports.[5]

Exports to India and China, including private trade, amounted to £1,500,000 p.a. Privately owned wealth was repatriated to Britain at an estimated value of £1,000,000 p.a. The duty on imported tea raised more than £1,000,000 each year out of a total government revenue of £18,732,000 in 1794.[6] The tonnage of ships employed by the East India Company was 81,000, requiring the service of 7,000 seamen.[7] Almost the entire amount of saltpetre used

4 The National Archives, Admiralty Papers (hereafter T.N.A., ADM) 1/167, Cornwallis to Admiralty, 21 April 1794.

5 John Bruce, *Historical Views of plans, for the Government of British India and the regulation of trade to the East Indies* (London, 1793), pp. 272–3.

6 B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 388.

7 Henry Dundas, *Substance of the Speech of the Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas on the British government and trade in the East Indies, April 23rd 1793* (London, 1793), pp. 6 and 29. It is worth noting that Joseph Cotton, an Indiaman Commander, wrote in 1798 that the required tonnage for the Eastern trade was 50,000 tons and that there was 30,000 tons of merchant shipping

in the manufacture of gunpowder came from India.[8] Indigo was another product for which Britain was dependent on India since the loss of the American colonies and the move away from its production in the West Indies.[9]

And there was an added benefit; not only did Britain gain from the import of Asian goods but from re-exporting them also: 'from whence other articles, paying duties, are brought in exchange … the commerce of the country is considerably invigorated'.[10] The British government could not take risks with the resources and income generated in the Far East.

Understanding the challenges of commanding the East Indies Station also required an appreciation of the Company and its role in India. During the period of Rainier's command, 1794–1805, trade between Britain and the East Indies, including China, was a monopoly of the Company. But the energy of private merchants, both Indian and European, and their increasing wealth, needed an outlet. This was found in the Country Trade, carried out within the vast 30 million plus square miles that constituted the East Indies Station, between India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and China. This trade, and that between Asia and Europe, needed protecting.

The successes of the Royal Navy in battle, especially during the French Wars, have led naval historians traditionally to concentrate on those admirals, such as Nelson, who won famous victories. With the Far Eastern trade being so important to British finances, the flag officer's role was primarily one of trade protection – the main threat coming from warships and privateers operating out of Mauritius. This function required considerable managerial and administrative expertise. Consequently the naval war in this region has largely been ignored by naval historians.

However, recently, there has been a movement towards appreciating the management and organisation skills required to control large numbers of ships and men over broad expanses of sea, even if these admirals fought no major battles. Such admirals receiving attention are Admirals Keith and Saumarez.[11] C. Northcote Parkinson is the only historian to give full attention to Rainier's period of command in the East Indies in his book *War in the Eastern Seas 1794–1815*.[12] However, with the more modern appreciation of 'managerial admirals', he has more recently been joined by C. Wilkinson

belonging to Bengal residents employed in the Country Trade. *A Review of the shipping systems on the East India Company with suggestions for its improvement to secure the continuance of the carrying trade* (London, 1798), pp. 23 and 42.

8 C.N. Parkinson, *Trade in the Eastern Seas* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 78.

9 J.R. Ward, 'The Industrial Revolution and British Imperialism 1750–1850', *Economic History Review*, vol. 47, no. 1 (February 1994), p. 48.

10 Parkinson, *Trade in the Eastern Seas*, p. 331.

11 K.D. McCranie, *Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon* (Gainesville, FL, 2006); T. Voelcker, *Admiral Saumarez versus Napoleon: The Baltic 1807–12* (Woodbridge, 2008).

12 C.N. Parkinson, *War in the Eastern Seas 1794–1815* (London, 1954).