



# 1980

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## BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR



ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, INC.

CHICAGO, TORONTO, LONDON, GENEVA, SYDNEY, TOKYO, MANILA, SEOUL

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

*The Britannica Book of the Year is published with the editorial advice  
of the faculties of the University of Chicago.*

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
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QUEUILLE—SYGMA

# CHINA'S FUTURE

*by Deng Xiaoping*

*The Party Vice-Chairman and Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China explains the background and reasons behind the Four Modernizations*

We are standing at another turning point in Chinese history. Last year, we launched a vast program that we have called the Four Modernizations: the modernization of China's industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. This program has aroused worldwide interest. And I should like to stress that it is related to the interests of all the world's peoples.

For us in China this is in a real sense a new revolution—a socialist revolution. The purpose of revolution, after all, is to liberate and develop the productive forces of a country. If a revolution is divorced from the development and modernization of production—on which the prosperity of any people depends—then the aim and goals of this revolution are mere empty words. We opposed China's old society because it oppressed people and held them back from developing the forces of production. The people of China chose socialism because they believed it would provide better conditions for developing China's productive energies. They felt that socialism could revitalize China, eliminate its poverty, and provide its people with a better and happier life.

Our view is very clear but it has not always been shared by everyone. For fully ten years the "gang of four" tried to edge China off its true course. They even had a slogan: "We would prefer a poor society under socialism to a rich society under capitalism." That is absurd!

We do not want capitalism, but we do want a prosperous socialist society. We believe that the socialist system is superior to capitalism. Its superiority, however, must be demonstrated.

The gang of four and Lin Biao put false choices before the Chinese people. They did incalculable harm to the social fabric and the economic system of China. The huge program of modernization that Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai had initiated was delayed for fully ten years by that kind of ultraleft politics.

Of course we had brief setbacks even before this. But in the early 1960s the gap between China's eco-

nomic level and that of the rest of the world was not that great. Beginning in the late '60s, however, the gap began to widen. Over the next 11 or 12 years it became even wider.

Besides this economic gap, we also had a critical political factor to contend with. For some years after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China was cut off from the rest of the world. We here were not responsible for this isolation. It was imposed on us from the outside by anti-Chinese feeling and, in particular, by forces opposed to Chinese socialism. Nonetheless, China was forcibly isolated from the rest of the world. Through the early '50s, we still received some support from the Soviet Union. But by the end of the decade, even that aid was terminated.

Toward the end of the '60s, world conditions began to change. Possibilities for opening up contacts between China and the rest of the world appeared. But then, for our own reasons, we isolated ourselves!

Today, however, we have learned to use this favourable international climate to accelerate our advance toward the Four Modernizations. Whether or not we can attain the goals we have set for ourselves is a large question in the minds of many. There are even skeptics among the Chinese people themselves, despite the confidence of the great majority. Foreign observers, in particular, question the grounds on which we base our confidence. Let me state, therefore, the four basic reasons for thinking we can achieve our goals.

*First:* China's vast area is rich in natural resources. Whether we speak of energy resources, minerals, ferrous or nonferrous metals, or rare earths, there are few natural resources that are not found in China. Once these resources are tapped, they will represent immense material power.

*Second:* During the past 30 years we did some stupid things. Despite such mistakes, we were able to lay the groundwork for China's agricultural, industrial, and technical development. In all these areas, we reached a jumping-off point for advancing to the Four Modernizations. The proliferation of ma-



An American technical expert (right) advising workers at a Chinese fertilizer plant.

chine tools is a good example. In the early '50s, Japan had 800,000 lathes. Now China has two million lathes of its own. If Japan could develop so swiftly over the past 20 years from a base of 800,000, why cannot China develop similarly from our base of two million?

Over the past 30 years we invested more than 600 billion yuan in capital construction. We built up an independent and fairly broad-based economy. Today we produce over 100 million tons of petroleum a year and 600 million tons of coal. In steel, our annual production exceeds 30 million tons—admittedly not as much as we had hoped. In any case, we are justified in saying that a material base exists for our Four Modernizations.

*Third:* The Chinese people are not stupid. Our great problem is to determine how to bring their inventive genius into full play. That is why we are calling for the emancipation of people's minds. For more than a decade Lin Biao and the gang of four put the Chinese people in mental straitjackets, stifling their native wisdom and creative talent. We are now restating the policy first set forth by Chairman Mao: "Let a hundred flowers bloom! Let a hundred schools of thought contend!" This is why we wish to strengthen democracy in our country.

In ancient times we Chinese made extraordinary

contributions to human progress. In modern times we have made all too few. Visitors to China can view all sorts of fascinating archaeological discoveries and admire great examples of ancient art. They see too few modern things. This is quite incompatible with China's position in the world. We must not only use our talents for China's modernization, but also contribute to the betterment of mankind.

*Fourth:* China has now adopted a policy of opening its doors to the world in a spirit of international cooperation. Of course we must rely primarily on our own resources and efforts, but modernization would be impeded if we rejected international cooperation. In no country has the process of modernization occurred in isolation. To accelerate China's modernization we must not only make use of the experience of other countries, we must also avail ourselves of foreign funding.

Thus, we have ample grounds for confidence in the Four Modernizations program. Our principles, our goals, our policies are clear. After smashing the gang of four in 1976, we had to devote considerable energy to dealing with the problems they left, but since 1978 we have at last been able to focus intently on the task of modernization.

We still have difficulties to meet and many complex questions to solve. There is, for example, the



## A Visit with Vice-Chairman Deng

by Frank Gibney

Deng Xiaoping is the driving force behind China's unprecedented program of modernization. Though he holds the posts of senior vice-premier, vice-chairman of the Communist Party, and not least of all chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, he is, strictly speaking, outranked by 55-year-old Premier Hua Guofeng, who is also chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and by 80-year-old Chief of State Ye Jianying. Nonetheless, it is 76-year-old Deng who has formulated China's policies for the next 20 years, and it is on him that China's nearly 1,000,000,000 people are relying for a better life.

For a man with such awesome responsibilities, Deng talks about his plans with an easy authority. He knows where he wants to go and has both the brain and the wit to explain the route well. Like many other good politicians, he also has the nice faculty of sailing into an objection or criticism almost before it is raised. He speaks quickly, smoking almost incessantly. His vitality even lends a certain warmth to the vast formal reception room in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, ornamented with large classical Chinese landscapes that have new hydroelectric projects peeking out from among the trees.

A resolute pragmatist, Deng is no respecter of precedents. To implement his plans, he has sought out the help of successful capitalist nations, notably the U.S. and Japan, because he is willing to play down ideology when it stands in the way of efficiency. Years ago Deng shocked party dogmatists with his now famous comment: "What does it matter if the cat is white or black, so long as it catches rats."

**Volatile Career.** Deng's return to power in his mid-70s is itself extraordinary. He was taken into custody at the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) and confined for nine years. It was a decade of mass arrests, forced-labour deportations, and vicious mob violence carried out by Chairman Mao's Red Guards. Education was totally disrupted for an entire generation. Deng was finally rehabilitated and made first vice-premier and a party vice-chairman, only to be denounced again and dismissed by ultraleftists for his "right deviationist policies." After the death of Mao Zedong and the imprisonment in October 1976 of the "gang of four" (one of whom was Mao's widow, Jiang Qing), Deng once again returned to power.

For a man who has had so many ups and downs, Deng exudes extraordinary confidence, and not without reason. Now that Mao and Zhou Enlai are gone, there is probably no one in China who can match Deng's experience and proven abilities. He made the Long March (1934-35) with Mao from southeast China to the northwest, and for years he was one of Mao's closest supporters. In 1956 he became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, a post previously held only by Mao himself, and in that capacity trained a whole generation of cadres. He also sometimes alludes

to the fact that he is the only person around who commanded all of China's regional armies.

It is Deng's mission to repair the damage done by the Cultural Revolution and restore the productive energies of a country that went into a kind of trance in the early '60s with its personality cult of Chairman Mao. As early as 1956, after Nikita Khrushchev detailed Stalin's crimes to the Soviet 20th party congress, Deng warned China's 8th party congress of the inherent dangers in "deification of the individual."

The new China envisioned by Deng must rely on persuasion, technology, and concrete incentives rather than on sheer power, sacred party texts, and rote repetition of Mao's "thoughts." But relaxation of controls has already sparked demands for complete democracy, the so-called Fifth Modernization. Deng, consequently, has the delicate task of leading the new revolution of modernization without permitting the new freedom to degenerate into bickering and factionalism.

**The Future.** Deng admits worries about the future as readily as he acknowledges China's past failures and blunders. To hear the leader of a great nation admit "we did many stupid things" is quite refreshing. He worries most about the succession of power and the lost generation that was almost destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. Unlike some of China's other recent party

XIAHUA NEWS AGENCY



Britannica's Frank Gibney conferring with Deng Xiaoping. An interpreter stands between them.

leaders, Deng's tastes are frugal. "I have the highest salary in the country and there are no more than ten like me," he told us, "and how much do you think that is—400 yuan a month [about \$250]—not enough to buy a car, only a bicycle."

One of Deng's greatest challenges is to provide sufficient incentives to motivate Chinese workers without disrupting the wage and price scales that have been virtually frozen for two decades. Another is to initiate orderly procedures to retire China's gerontocratic officials while training young successors. No one realizes better than Deng himself that he is racing against time. "If this thing up there," he says, pointing to his head, "if it just keeps functioning, I can go on for six more years. Then I will become a consultant or adviser. Vitality is bound to decrease. A man should know himself."

Frank Gibney, Vice-Chairman of the Britannica Board of Editors, was the founding president of TBS-Britannica, Tokyo.

basic matter of administration. Many of our government agencies are overstaffed, often with far more people than are needed. Restructuring these organs is not an easy job because the more modernized the economy becomes, the fewer people one needs. Yet we have so many people. Where will they go? What will they do? We also need a great deal of talent to master modern science and technology. Unfortunately a whole generation of youth was inadequately educated. Some lost an entire decade of schooling, thanks to the work of the gang of four. Many were influenced by the gang of four, but the great majority of them have come to realize the errors of the past. In fact, the whole April 5 movement, which opposed the gang of four, was launched by young people. Still these young people have been impeded from acquiring the technical and specialized skills that they need.

These factors make it necessary for us to follow, for quite some time, a policy that permits automation, mechanization, semimechanization, and manual operations to exist side by side. Gradually we will shift to full mechanization and automation. Even when we attain the goals we have now set, our per capita national income and level of consumption may still be much lower than those of the highly developed countries. The Chinese people will certainly not stop at that point, however. They will continue to take great strides forward, and eventually they will catch up to and surpass the highly developed countries.

Some of our managerial systems are in part a legacy of Soviet models. We did not travel the Soviet road to socialism in every respect. In China, for example, we allowed the existence of many political parties; and in our transformation of the national bourgeoisie, we bought their property rather than confiscating it. In China, therefore, this transformation was achieved smoothly. Chairman Mao advocated a lively political atmosphere in which there are "both democracy and centralism, discipline and freedom, unified will and personal ease of mind." This is quite different from the situation in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, I would say that in our economic system—especially regarding the management and organization of our enterprises—we were influenced a great deal by the Soviet Union.

In point of fact, the managerial skills of the capitalist countries, particularly various methods of developing science and technology, are part of mankind's common heritage. There is no reason why these managerial skills cannot be put to good use in a socialist China. But restructuring the national economy to accommodate such skills and techniques will not be easy.

We should like to expand the role of the market

economy as we develop further. This has led some to question whether China is moving in the direction of capitalism. We are not. It is incorrect to assume that a market economy can exist only under capitalism. Under socialism, a market economy can exist side by side with a planned production economy and they can be coordinated. If there are similarities between a market economy under socialism and under capitalism, there are also crucial differences. Under socialism, the market economy operates in the context of a two-sector system. Some means of production are owned by the nation as a whole, others are owned by collectives. Relations between the two sectors can be regulated by the market, but the common basis is still socialist ownership. By nature a socialist society is designed to enrich the whole population; an exploiting class will never arise.

Of course, if an enterprise in China is established with foreign capital, a new element is injected. Naturally the owners will be capitalists. But in other sectors of the economy, public ownership will predominate. Let me give you a vivid example of this. At the present time, former Chinese capitalists are still living in China. They still have their money and personal property. These capitalists have organized investment corporations to serve the state, but all the profits will go to the state.

Investments will be made in China also by overseas Chinese, and these will be structured on capitalist lines. But the great majority of these overseas Chinese are investing their money out of a desire to help the socialist motherland. In any case, no matter how much foreign capital is invested in China, the overall amount will still be relatively limited. In no way will it change our country's socialist system.

While we wish to emancipate people's minds, we must also restore the fine social traditions and socialist morality that existed for quite some time in the past. Indeed, if a visitor had come to China in 1964, he would have seen that the socialist morality of this country was very high. During some very difficult years before that, the Chinese people were still highly disciplined and took to heart the interests of the whole country.

After 1964, Lin Biao and the gang of four disrupted this high social morality. They almost destroyed it. In that period their supporters often cited the slogan: "To rebel is justified." This was used as an excuse for mass violence. "To rebel is justified," they said, means that you can beat people up, smash their houses and loot their possessions. What the gang of four preached was literally anarchy.

Even now some of our youth still bear traces of that poisonous influence. When we now call for developing and encouraging democracy, they inter-





Following the death of Mao Zedong, the Cultural Revolution came to an end and its leaders were overthrown. Above, a demonstration against the "gang of four" in Guangzhou (Canton).

pret this to mean anarchy. This happened in the case of the so-called Democracy Wall in Beijing. We may have made a mistake in allowing it to last for so long. For despite the good intentions of some of those dissidents, the wall had been used to manipulate public opinion with distorted rumours and outright falsehoods, even to the point of endangering national security. The wall came to be controlled by people who preferred troublemaking to working at their jobs. Foreigners who regarded the activities at Democracy Wall as a barometer of the political climate in China were quite deceived.

It is imperative, therefore, that while emphasizing socialist democracy we strengthen the application of socialist law. Nor will we tolerate any deterioration of the high standards we set in social relationships. For the Four Modernizations to succeed, we must maintain a political atmosphere of unity and tranquillity. After years of social turmoil, the Chinese people are determined not to let any kind of social disorder interfere with their efforts to achieve rapid material and social progress.

The problems China faces in its modernization program are indeed complex. As we move into the 1980s, it is hard to envisage the results of improvements two or three years hence. The prospects for the future depend in large part on how well we train our successors. I have passed my 75th birthday. People of my age should really be concerned about the

future. By that I mean, we must find good and reliable successors, so that once a succession takes place, new turmoil will not break out again. Our leadership is now of one mind. We are convinced that China will continue on its present course. This confidence is based on the feeling that our policies are in the greatest interest of the Chinese people and will contribute to humanity as a whole.

As for myself, I have already declared that by 1985 I shall become only an adviser or consultant. We are going to introduce a retirement system for our officials in China. If its application covers me personally, I will be happy to accept it.

As I see the shape of the future, an economically and militarily stronger China will play a vital role in restraining hegemonism and defending world peace. Moreover, the modernization of China will be an important factor in the whole world's prosperity. At present, the developed countries comprise only 1,000,000,000 people out of a world population of 3,600,000,000. Our own population is not far from 1,000,000,000. Thus, we can certainly expect the world economy to undergo a fundamental change when China modernizes. We hope the people in the developed countries will come to enjoy a still better life. We hope the people in the developing countries will become better off as soon as possible. China's modernization will certainly brighten both these prospects.

# THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE CHILD

*by Paul Harrison*



PAUL HARRISON