



# 国际检察局讯问记录

Numerical Case Files Relating to  
Particular Incidents and Suspected War Criminals,  
International Prosecution Section (1945-1947)

国家图书馆 上海交通大学 编

68

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Interrogation  
4 Sep 46 - Second Day

Prosecutor: Colonel IVANOV.

Interpreter: FASHEVSKI.

Witness: KAWABE, Torochiro (河辺虎四郎).

- Q: The photostatic copy shown to you yesterday is a copy of what you wrote in April 1934, but to whom did you send it?
- A: I do not fully remember that document, but judging from the nature of this document, I believe it was sent to either the Assistant Chief of General Staff or to the Chief of the General Staff.
- Q: Was that report an ordinary report or a special report?
- A: Are you asking whether the document was prepared in a special secret code?
- Q: No, not exactly. Were the contents of the document considered important?
- A: I am not certain of this either, but as we did not have any periodical dispatches, I imagine it was sent specially with some official documents. Perhaps it was delivered by some person who chanced to be on his way to TOKYO. Nevertheless, I do not remember accurately the document.
- Q: And, was that document concerned with a problem of utmost importance?
- A: Yes, I sent that document as an important personal opinion.
- Q: Did the General Staff Headquarters ask for your opinion regarding the problem in this document?
- A: No, I do not believe they did. I think I forwarded my opinions of my own accord.
- Q: In addition, you sent the following suggestions to the Japanese General Staff Headquarters.

They were; JAPAN must be careful about the commitments when concluding a pact with RUSSIA because of the neutral relations between RUSSIA and JAPAN and that an invasion of RUSSIA must be considered in the plan to construct railroads.

Did the Japanese General Staff Headquarters accept the above suggestions?

- A: I do not remember receiving any word saying that my suggestions were approved or that they would be used.



Q: Did you receive any answer in regard to your suggestions?

A: I do not know.

Q: Did you not feel that the General Staff Headquarters probably would accept your suggestions since there were no objections?

A: If I were to relate my impressions of that time; TOKYO very seldom notified us of what actions were being taken regarding our opinions and suggestions that we had sent from overseas. It was a well known fact, and we felt very dissatisfied with this system. They sent word that the suggestions and opinions had been received, but nothing was said about them being approved or disapproved. Therefore, actually we did not know what TOKYO thought of our suggestions and opinions.

Q: Actually, the Japanese Government did put in to effect your suggestions. For instance, the Japanese Government did establish many large cities in MANCHURIA on a strategical basis. There are other examples, and considering them, I believe that the Japanese Government did use your suggestions.

A: Judging from the individual results and from what the Japanese Army did, my suggestions were accepted and used. However, it cannot be regarded that the Japanese Army based their plans entirely on my suggestions.

Q: We are not interested in what you said or what the others said. Do you acknowledge the fact that your two suggestions, which we are talking about now, were put into effect.

A: Yes, I do.

Q: In that report, you referred to methods to be used against RUSSIA. You stated that a war between RUSSIA and JAPAN was inevitable and that in such an event, taking positive offensive would be unwise judging from RUSSIA's fighting power. Taking these things into consideration, did you not suggest in your conclusion that, for example, it would be better not to sign a non-aggression pact with RUSSIA?

A: No, that is not so. You can find that out by reading the document thoroughly. I have written here that "it is best to strike now judging from RUSSIA's fighting power, but this is not advisable from the standpoint of foreign relations". Therefore, I thought that the non-aggression pact should be concluded so that it would allow diplomatic elasticity.

Q: Did the Japanese Government and you reject the proposal for a non-aggression pact?

A: I do not know the true causes of the Japanese Government for the rejection of the proposal. However, the general attitude of the people, including myself, towards RUSSIA was that precautions were always necessary against Russian proposals and that RUSSIA could not be trusted. This was the general feeling at that time, and there was absolutely no faith in RUSSIA. And therefore, even if a non-aggression pact was proposed it was doubted that a true non-aggressive state could exist between RUSSIA and JAPAN.

Therefore, it was everyone's feeling that it was better to wait awhile, and although not exactly rejecting the proposal, it was better not to conclude the pact immediately. Everyone felt that important matters should be given careful consideration. My opinion was the same as the people's. However, I do not know the reason for the Government's rejection of the proposal.

- Q: The following has been made clear by this document. That is, the Japanese General Staff and you rejected the proposal because of the conclusion that a war between RUSSIA and JAPAN was inevitable. Wasn't there the feeling that to sign the pact would be restricting one's own activities?
- A: What I said about the relationships between RUSSIA and JAPAN being critical did not mean that we had intentions of striking immediately. It is true that the earnest development of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA by JAPAN at that time was, as you already know, to develop MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA as basis against RUSSIA. RUSSIA was reinforcing her military preparations against JAPAN. Perhaps these facts would make war between JAPAN and RUSSIA inevitable. Therefore, I deemed it necessary to send troops to meet the Russian reinforcements. A non-aggression pact would prevent military preparations. Therefore, I believed that war shouldn't be waged immediately.
- Q: Your present story contradicts what you have written in this document. In the report, you state that a non-aggression pact was not advisable because a war between JAPAN and RUSSIA was inevitable. Following the conclusion that a future war between RUSSIA and JAPAN was inevitable, you failed to make any definite policy. Do you think that your motives were just in opposing the non-aggression pact?
- A: I believed that my predictions for the future were correct. However, the question of immediately concluding a non-aggression pact depended on the faith and trust in the Russian Government. For example, it is true that I did not have confidence in the Soviet Government so much as to conclude a non-aggression pact with it because of the international relationships at that time. This was being neutral. I thought it would be better to possess free attitude from a diplomatic standpoint.
- Q: There is a close relation between the conclusion that a war between RUSSIA and JAPAN was inevitable and the opinion that it is better not to complete the non-aggression pact. Item B proves this point. That is, the idea that a railroad system in MANCHURIA is necessary from the standpoint of making preparations for a war with RUSSIA. The plan for the construction of a railroad system proves the relation between the problem of a war, and the non-aggression pact.
- A: I understand what you mean. This Item B has a direct bearing on the fact that a war between RUSSIA and JAPAN was inevitable. This points out the fact that such a condition might develop so the problems within MANCHURIA must be regarded with the consideration of a future war with RUSSIA. However, at that time it did not mean that it would have immediate bearing on diplomatic problems. I would like to add one more thing. If such incidents

as the recalling of the American Ambassador from MOSCOW had not occurred while I was in MOSCOW, and if my confidence in RUSSIA was greater, I might have suggested the concluding of the non-aggression pact. I have thus related conscientiously as to whether or not the pact had any value.

- Q: What you have just said is contradictory to the contents of this document. In the concluding part of this document, you have said something in your own words that is not clearly understood. In this case, we shall let it stand that it was necessary for JAPAN to prepare for war against ENGLAND, AMERICA, and RUSSIA. But did you mean in what you have just related that JAPAN was looking for differences among ENGLAND, AMERICA, and RUSSIA, and were Japan's military preparations against these three nations completed by this time? Were the military preparations chiefly against RUSSIA?
- A: I do not fully understand the questions, and it may be that my explanations were insufficient but I wish to have you understand that I have no intentions whatsoever of evading the questions. As I have written here, at that time JAPAN and her Army lacked strength. Therefore, I wanted to say that it was better not to further complicate foreign relations. In my opinion, I thought that a war against RUSSIA in the far future was inevitable, and if we weren't careful AMERICA and CHINA would be our foes also. Therefore, it was necessary to attain our full power immediately. This was the natural international trend. For this purpose, I thought that it was best not to interfere with RUSSIA and also best not to use White Russians and that we must make preparations in NORTH MANCHURIA discreetly. This is what I meant to say. The strained relations with AMERICA, which I mentioned previously, were only mentioned as an example. The fact that the leading powers did not trust RUSSIA ruled my mind, and I deemed it necessary to be cautious of RUSSIA.
- Q: I understood. You proposed to the Japanese General Staff Headquarters the utilization of White Russians in MANCHURIA. Did you intend to use them in the event of a war?
- A: It was my opinion that it would be advisable to conduct the necessary investigations of the White Russians as we may use them in the event of a war.
- Q: Did you intend to use them in the war against RUSSIA?
- A: I thought that we might have to use them.
- Q: Do you know anything about the use of White Russians by JAPAN as spies in preparation for war against RUSSIA?
- A: I heard a little about this. Although it was a rumor, I heard that there was such an agency being formed in MANCHURIA.
- Q: In JAPAN's preparation for war against RUSSIA, what areas did JAPAN intend to occupy?
- A: I do not know because that would be in the line of operational plans of the General Staff Headquarters. Therefore, I cannot make a true and definite statement to this. As I explained yesterday, the only time I had any con-

nections with operational plans was before the Manchurian Incident and that did not go as far as to include the occupation of RUSSIA. After that I had no connections with operation plans.

- Q: While you were in office your position was Assistant Chief of the General Staff. Therefore, you should have knowledge of what territorial ambitions JAPAN had in RUSSIA. Moreover, I believe that you should have had some interest in JAPAN's territorial ambitions even after you were Assistant Chief of the General Staff.
- A: When I became the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, we had no intentions whatsoever of occupying RUSSIA. As a matter of fact, the problem was how far back we should retreat in MANCHURIA in the event that RUSSIA should start a war. As far as advancing into RUSSIA, it was not considered. As to the statement that I should have had interest in JAPAN's territorial ambitions in RUSSIA after being the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, I do not think that there is time to explain to you thoroughly and truthfully. However, due to my interest in the problem, I was an army air commander in MANCHURIA. Frankly, I was very much absorbed in conducting investigations of the Russian air fields in the Maritime Area. The fact that the Russians actually possessed that area was a handicap to JAPAN. Therefore, I have no knowledge of the details of the plans.
- Q: I fully understand. Did you hear rumors while you were in MANCHURIA? Were they concerning operational plans?
- A: I did not hear anything pertaining to operational plans. I was ordered by the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army to conduct an investigation of the Maritime Area. This had nothing to do with operational plans.
- Q: Did the Japanese General Staff Headquarters attempt to occupy the Maritime Area by taking advantage of that pretext?
- A: I cannot say yes to that question because I have no grounds.
- Q: When you were in Section One of the General Staff Headquarters, weren't you familiar with the operational plans?
- A: That was after the occupation of MANCHURIA. I did hear something to that effect after the occupation.
- Q: You must know through the operational plans, that the Japanese General Staff Headquarters intended to take the Russian Maritime Area and some other places.
- A: When I was again assigned to the General Staff Headquarters after the time I was there at the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, it was the time when the CHINA Incident had started, and I was solely concerned with the disposition of the CHINA Incident. Therefore, in regard to the Manchurian Incident, I was planning an anti-Comintern pact. Otherwise, the situation in CHINA would be grave. The problem was one of defense with the whole of MANCHURIA rather than the occupation of RUSSIA. It was more important than war against RUSSIA or CHINA.



- Q: Which was considered more important, the war against RUSSIA or the war against CHINA?
- A: Do you mean whether I have heard anything about which country we were going to war with first, RUSSIA or CHINA?
- Q: I am referring to the years 1936 and 1937. In those years, with which country did JAPAN intend to go to war first? Against CHINA?
- A: 1936 and 1937 is the 13th year of SHOWA (TN 21st 13th year of SHOWA is 1938.) I was here (TN probably in TOKYO, General Staff Headquarters). I did not attend conferences on such fundamental issues, nor do I recall ever having attended any. However, when I actually participated in the planning of operations, the problem was how to aid MANCHURIA from CHINA in event of a Russian invasion. In other words, the problem was whether to stop the war in CHINA and divert the troops to MANCHURIA or just to send supplies into MANCHURIA from CHINA. I did not participate in the basic planning before the war on such subjects as to strike RUSSIA first and then CHINA or vice versa. I cannot answer your question. I do not know anything about it.
- Q: The Colonel is asking about the time before the CHINA Incident. At that time, JAPAN was not at war with CHINA. What were the methods used before the CHINA Incident? Which was it, a war with RUSSIA or CHINA?
- A: As I have said before, I did not participate in the basic planning. In other words, I did not attend any conferences on fundamental problems.
- Q: According to this document, you had direct connections with the basic problems. Your present answer is contradictory and cannot be accepted by the Colonel. Please reconsider the question carefully.
- A: It was in March 1937 when I became a department head in the General Staff Headquarters. The outbreak of the CHINA Incident was in July 1937, which means a period of four months between these dates. During this period, I did not hear of anything regarding which country we were to strike first. It is true I was connected with the national policies of JAPAN. At any rate, this period, as you already know, was the period the General Staff Headquarters in TOKYO strove to strengthen greatly the national economy by four year plans or five year plans and without going to war with any nation. I had connections with such problems, even in the details. However, there was no such thing as the sequence of making war.
- Q: Just about that time, was there a question between the General Staff Headquarters and the KWANGTUNG Army Headquarters as to the country that JAPAN was going to wage war? Whether it was to be war with RUSSIA or CHINA? Whether a war against CHINA first and then with RUSSIA after smoothing out foreign relations?
- A: Between the General Staff Headquarters and the KWANGTUNG Army Headquarters?
- Q: Was such a problem discussed by the General Staff Headquarters and by the KWANGTUNG Army Headquarters?

- A: I do not think so, not at that time. I think the problem was never brought up.

When I first reported for duty at the General Staff Headquarters, my section chief Major General ICHIHARA (石原) told me that JAPAN, for quite sometime, must be cautious in her relations with other nations and must not make any overt moves. We must increase the home production, for example, like the Five Year Plan of RUSSIA or the Four Year Plan of GERMANY. Home affairs should be disposed of with this thought in mind. Do not think of foreign affairs. I selected you for this purpose knowing that you are of that disposition.

- Q: Did Major General ICHIHARA say that to you?

- A: Yes. He repeatedly told me that he selected me for that purpose. I was wholeheartedly of the same idea and replied that I would comply. I believe that he did not mention anything about wars, at least nothing that I can recall. When I reported for duty, Major General ICHIHARA told me that JAPAN, for the time being, was not looking for any war and that it was necessary for JAPAN to copy RUSSIA's Five Year Plan and GERMANY's Four Year Plan and materialize some plans resembling the above. He also told me that he selected me as his subordinate for the execution of the above plan because I had the same conceptions that he had.

- Q: When you reported for duty, did he mention anything pertaining to wars?

- A: No, he did not. He only said that his intentions were to execute the aforementioned plan. I would like to say something. That is, I hate to be regarded as a liar. I am unable to answer your questions because I do not know the answers. Therefore, if there is any evidence, please show it to me. It is very difficult for me to have you think that I am lying. I am not lying and am only relating what I am able to recall.

- Q: On 16 Apr 32, what did Lieutenant Colonel KAMEA report to you pertaining to the period for the preparation of war against RUSSIA on orders of Lieutenant Colonel KASABARA of the General Staff Headquarters?

- A: The answer to this is in yesterday's photostatic copy. I received a report that it would be completed by 1934.

- Q: Was that the decision of the General Staff Headquarters? Does it mean that military preparations for war against RUSSIA were to be completed by 1934?

- A: Yes, I believe so.

- Q: Were the special preparations for war against RUSSIA made by this decision of the General Staff Headquarters?

- A: Yes.

- Q: What was the purpose of the war against RUSSIA?

- A: I cannot say definitely because I did not participate in the planning. However, after all, I believe it simply meant that the international situation

would naturally bring both countries together and starting from an incident in MANCHURIA, JAPAN would attack RUSSIA. I don't think that plans were made with any definite aims. That was my impression at that time.

Q: You said in your answer that you were not sure. But what were the aims in case a war broke out in the above manner?

A: That would be to repulse and smash the Russian forces. However, in order to accomplish this, attempts were made to prepare for war because of the extreme weakness of the Japanese Government.

Q: What is meant by "to repulse"? Does "to smash" mean to repulse the Russian forces from the Far Eastern Area, or to repulse up to what point, territorially speaking?

A: I do not know to what point "to repulse" meant in the aim because I did not participate in formulating the plans.

Q: What was meant by "to repulse"?

A: I believe it meant to fight persistently until the termination of the war.

Q: To annihilate and to repulse the enemy troops are some of the aims in any war. These aims are common in all wars. There should be some other much more important aims and duties. Were there any aims or duties of this sort? What was the aim?

A: As I have said before, I cannot make an answer as to what the aims were just by judging from the conclusions. I just received some information.

Q: Your answers have been frank and truthful. If you continue to make truthful and accurate answers, this interrogation will not take long.

A: I will relate truthfully whatever I know, but I refuse to comment on things based on conclusions, of which I have no knowledge, because it will go against my conscience.

Q: I will show you the document later, but according to this document, KASAHARA informed you that a war with RUSSIA was necessary for the strengthening of MANCHURIA. What was the meaning behind this information?

A: Then was this? I interpreted it to mean that a war against RUSSIA would clarify MANCHURIA's position concerning RUSSIA. I did not interpret it to mean that a war against RUSSIA was advisable. I will repeat it again. I took it to mean that in order to strengthen MANCHURIA for the benefit of JAPAN, a victorious war over RUSSIA was necessary.

Q: The strengthening of MANCHURIA's position? Did it mean that? What goals had to be gained and what things had to be executed for the future results against RUSSIA?

A: That is the strengthening of MANCHURIA.

Q: At the time, were there any intentions to establish a state like MANCHURIA in the Maritime Area or in the Far Eastern Area? And were there any intentions of placing White Russians in the leading positions in the new state?

A: I do not know anything whatsoever about that.

(Interrogation recessed for lunch.)

Q: This document was sent to you on 5 Oct 32 from the General Staff Headquarters. Have you seen this document before?

A: Yes, I probably have seen it.

Q: What is the nature of this document?

A: It contains the instructions pertaining to the espionage plans. It says, "you are to receive instructions from the military attache to the Japanese Embassy in FRANCE, and you are to read the instructions pertaining to the espionage plans at MOSCOW which are in the possession of Lieutenant Colonel TSUCHIHASHI (土橋)." (土橋)

Q: Did you read it in MOSCOW?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: From whom did you receive this?

A: From the Assistant Chief of the General Staff MAZAKI (真崎). (真崎)

Q: Was it sent directly to you?

A: I received instructions from MAZAKI in FRANCE to proceed to MOSCOW and read the instructions which were in the hands of TSUCHIHASHI, and espionage was to be conducted under the direction of the military attache in FRANCE. The name is, MAZAKI, Jinsaburo.

Q: Did MAZAKI send those instructions to the military attache in FRANCE?

A: Yes.

Q: When was that?

A: On 5 Oct 32.

Q: Did you receive this? (Shows a copy of a document.)

A: No. Isn't it No. 406? I am not sure.

Q: Where did you receive this document?

A: I received it in MOSCOW.



Q: Was this document also sent to FRANCE?

A: My explanation of this document was insufficient. There was a separate espionage plan that TSUCHIBASHI had and it was to be delivered to the military attache in FRANCE. I was to read this in MOSCOW. The one sent to FRANCE was a separate document. It is true that I received this document in MOSCOW, but I handed back the espionage plans to TSUCHIBASHI after reading them. After this, TSUCHIBASHI left for PARIS via WARSAW. The other was from MARAFA instructing me to read the plans in MOSCOW. So, the original went to PARIS.

Q: Your name appears in the document. Does that mean that you passed it on to the next Japanese military attache after reading it?

A: No, that isn't so. TSUCHIBASHI was acting as a messenger for KURITA (TN meaning unknown) proceeding from JAPAN to PARIS. TSUCHIBASHI was carrying instructions for me to read the plans while he was on the way to PARIS.

Q: Did you receive the espionage plans with the instructions?

A: Yes, I believe I did, for the purpose of reading them.

Q: What were the chief actions to be taken against RUSSIA, according to the espionage plans?

A: I cannot say definitely because it is from memory. I believe there were provisions pertaining to the White Russians in PARIS with the Japanese military attache as the center of activities.

Q: Were the plans made along the line of being for or against RUSSIA?

A: Yes, it was made along that line.

Q: What relation did the dispositions of the espionage plans have in regard to time? Was it for war, peace, or before the outbreak of war?

A: I believe it was a peacetime investigation with war taken into consideration. I believe this matter was to prepare a close investigation and a maintenance of liaison.

Q: Was there anything in the plans pertaining to the actions to be taken in the event of a war against CHINA?

A: I don't think there were any, but I am not sure. I don't think the document went that far.

Q: Please write the following statement on the back of the document and sign it. This is the photostatic copy of the instructions I received in 1932 from MARAFA, Jinsaburo, Assistant Chief of the General Staff. It was delivered to me by Lieutenant Colonel TSUCHIBASHI. (MARAFU signs)

The document shown to you is a copy of the instructions on the dispositions in the espionage plans sent to MARAFU, Heijuro, ( 笠井平十郎 ) Japanese military attache in FRANCE, from His Imperial Highness KOTONOHE,

Chief of the General Staff. Did you read it?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: What were the contents?

A: First of all, it is an order to the Japanese military attache in TURKEY in regard to the espionage plans given to KASAI, Heijuro. Secondly, KASAI, Heijuro was to formulate necessary plans and report on it to the Chief of the General Staff by the end of April 1933. Thirdly, he was also to report the necessary expenditures for the purpose, together with the above report.

Q: The dispositions are only those in the articles, isn't it? Was this also brought by TSUCHIBASHI?

A: Yes.

Q: The document was sent to PARIS via WARSAW and BERLIN after you read it, wasn't it? Was it forwarded to the military attache in FRANCE?

A: Yes. BERLIN-----? No, this is wrong. This is the copy. The original was sent to PARIS.

Q: You must make the appropriate statement on the back of the document. This is a photostatic copy of the copy I made of the instructions dated 8 Oct 32 given to KASAI, Heijuro, Japanese military attache in FRANCE by Prince KOTONITO, Chief of the General Staff. I made the copy after having read the instructions. (These are instructions given to the Japanese military attache in FRANCE pertaining to the espionage plans.)

Q: The instructions issued by Prince KOTONITO are included in this photostatic copy. Do you recognize it?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: Is it in your own handwriting?

A: No, it is not in my handwriting. I believe it is the handwriting of my assistant. This is a copy and not the original. If it were my assistant, I don't believe it was YAMAOKA. Then that leaves only IRI (イリ) and TANAKA (田中), but it might have been at some other time.

Q: Don't you know whose handwriting it is?

A: No, because it is written very stiffly. It was copied in MOSCOW.

Q: Did you write only your name in your own handwriting?

A: Yes.

Q: There is another one of yours.

A: I signed it to signify that I had read it, which was copied by someone else. It may have been YAMAOKA judging from the penmanship. However, it is a very

plain handwriting and no penmanship characteristics can be noticed. Yesterday's was very noticeable.

I believe that TANAKA was my assistant in October, but I am not sure.

Q: When was this? I mean when did you see it?

A: In October 1932, I did not remember the day.

Q: Please sign it again. This photostatic copy is a copy of the copy made of the original espionage plans. The essentials of this espionage plan were attached to the instructions dated 8 Oct 32 by Prince KOTOMITSU, Chief of the General Staff. The copy was made by my assistant YAMAOKA in MOSCOW. On the first sheet is my signature which I wrote in 1932. (KAWABE signs). I am certain that it was YAMAOKA, I believe TANAKA was not there at that time.

Q: This document consists of 12 pages. What are the contents?

A: The first document consists of orders based upon the assignments to be given to the military attaches in the various countries according to the particulars of the espionage plans. This was in 1933, January 22nd? This is in BERLIN. Notice how many times it has been erased and rewritten. That is why I believe that it is not the actual, final, and decisive order, but a manuscript for this purpose. However, I cannot say definitely.

Q: Is this your signature?

A: Yes, it is. (KAWABE signs, three sheets).

Q: Who wrote that document? Isn't it in your handwriting?

A: No, it isn't. However, I did write in some places. My opinion as to the revisions is in my handwriting. This is the same also.

Q: By what instructions did you make those assignments?

A: No, that is not so. KASAI, Heijuro was my commanding officer. The instructions were from KASAI to me and the other attaches. I believe it was for the purpose of gathering opinions. I also believe that they were the ones gathered by the assistant in BERLIN, and not I. At that time, we were asked whether they were suitable as orders to issue to the military attaches in the various countries. Therefore, I attached my opinion and sent it to FRANCE. However, I am not sure.

Q: Were those assignments included in all the instructions?

A: There were all kinds of drafts. The military attache in FRANCE gathered these drafts from BERLIN, MOSCOW, etc, and studied them closely.

Q: Was your opinion attached to the end of the draft, used by the military attache in FRANCE?

A: I do not remember whether it was included or not because it was a small and unimportant opinion.

Q: In drawing up the draft, did you receive instructions from Prince KOTOMITSU?

A: Yes, that was the basis.

Q: Please state that on the back. Was that written by your assistant?

A: Yes.

Q: Please go ahead.

A: I had direct connection in the drawing of this document. This is a photostatic copy of the assignments to be given the military attaches in various countries based on the essentials of the espionage plans. There are additions in my own handwriting on the fourth, sixth, and seventh pages. The rest is in the handwriting of my assistant, YAMAGUCHI. (KAWANE signs)

End

(4 Sep 46 - Second Day)  
Recorded by SMO, Kazuko



ん

(昭三二、九、四)(第三日)

検査 伊ワフ大佐  
通譯 バニコフスキー  
證人 河邊虎四郎

# 証 問

問、あなたに昨日示した字真ごしは一九四年四月に書いたものですが、誰に送りましたか、

答 私に判然、その書類を憶えておませんが、その書類の性質上から従って、考へれば、参謀次長か、總長宛だったと思ひます。

その書類は普通の通報でありましたか、或ひは特別な通報でありましたか、

特別な暗号であつたといふのですか、

いや、その書類の内容が重要なものでありましたか、

これに私は確實に憶えておませんが、定期的なものではあるまいから、特別に父が公女

に批したのではないと思ひます。何か、下波東市に行くとあるところの人に批したと思ひますが、判然には憶えておません。

それ、その書類は最も重要な問題に關する書類でありましたか、