The Global Agenda

Issues and Perspectives

Fifth Edition

CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR.

EUGENE R. WITTKOPF

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Together, Kegley and Wittkopf have coauthored and edited many texts, including *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, sixth edition (1997) and *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, fifth edition (1996).

PREFACE

There is no scientific antidote [to the atomic bomb], only education. You've got to change the way people think. I am not interested in disarmament talks between nations. . . . What I want to do is to disarm the mind. After that, everything else will automatically follow. The ultimate weapon for such mental disarmament is international education.

—Albert Einstein

On the threshold of the 21st century, with discussion centered throughout the world on the likely character of international affairs in the new millennium, there is much uncertainty. The many recently and rapidly unfolding trends observable have generated new issues, new cleavages, and a new international landscape. Nonetheless, both change and constancy alongside the prospect of revolutionary transformation are evident in contemporary international politics, and each of these can obscure from vision an accurate description of international realities. Perhaps this is why, in the wake of the Cold War, a consensus has not yet emerged about the defining character of world politics, even though the era of transition between the past epoch and the future one has understandably made for much speculation. Our period of history does not yet have a name or label, and in the absence of agreement about its properties, it has become conventional to postpone definitions by referring to it simply as "post–Cold War."

Whatever the international system's ultimate nature, the potential for great changes has opened up a Pandora's Box of new controversies and unfamiliar developments. Simultaneously, traditional controversies continue to color countries' relations. This condition presents an intellectual challenge because the study of contemporary international politics must consider the factors that produce change as well as those that promote continuities in relations among political actors on the global stage.

Because change is endemic to international politics, it is not surprising that many new issues on the global agenda and fresh perspectives on their analysis

have emerged since the fourth edition of this book was published. Our purpose in preparing a fifth edition is to provide a basis for making an informed assessment of international relations by bringing information up to date and by presenting current commentary on the dominant issues in contemporary international politics and the rival analytical perspectives constructed to understand them. But the overarching goals that motivated the first four editions remain: to make available to students what we, as editors, believe to be the best introductions to the issues that underlie contemporary world politics and to introduce the major analytical perspectives and organizing concepts that scholars have fashioned to make these issues comprehensible. It seems to us that, to a greater or lesser degree, coverage of both these elements is missing in standard texts (by design and necessity) and that a supplementary anthology is the logical place for them.

The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives categorizes essays into four "baskets" that build on the distinction between "high politics" (peace and security issues) and "low politics" (nonmilitary issues). The criteria that guided the selection of particular articles within each part and the rationale that underlies the organization of the book are made explicit in our introductions to each part. These introductions are further designed to help students connect individual essays to common themes.

The organization of the book is intended to capture the diversity of global issues and patterns of interaction that presently dominate the attention of world political actors and precipitate policy responses. This thematic organization allows treatment of the breadth of global issues and of the analytical perspectives that give them meaning, ranging from classic theoretical formulations to the newer analytical foci and concepts that have arisen to account for recent developments in world affairs. In preparing the volume in this manner, we have proceeded from the assumption that there is a need for educational materials that treat description and theoretical exposition in a balanced manner and expose a variety of normative interpretations without advocating any particular one.

Several people have contributed to the development of this book. We wish especially to acknowledge the contributions of Ole R. Holsti, Christopher C. Joyner, Jack S. Levy, Dennis Pirages, Donald J. Puchala, James N. Rosenau, Marvin Soroos, and Christina Payne. The helpful suggestions of a number of reviewers are also gratefully acknowledged: Peter D. Feaver, Duke University; Lloyd Jensen, Temple University; Douglas Lemke, Florida State University; Karrin Scapple, Southwest Missouri State University; Suisheng Zhao, Colby College. We additionally thank Jeannie Weingarth and Fernando Jimenez for their assistance. At McGraw-Hill we are indebted to Lyn Uhl, Bertrand W. Lummus, Fred Burns, Monica Freedman, Leslye Jackson, Stephanie Cappiello, and Robert Preskill for their support and professional assistance.

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PART ONE

ARMS AND INFLUENCE

The contemporary international political system began to acquire its present shape and definition more than three centuries ago, with the emergence of a state system in Europe after the highly destructive Thirty Years War. As the Westphalian treaties in 1648 brought that war to an end and as political, economic, and social intercourse grew among the states of Europe, new legal norms were embraced in an effort to regulate interstate behavior. The doctrine of state sovereignty, according to which no legal authority is higher than the state, emerged supreme. Thus the nascent international system was based on the right of states to control their internal affairs without interference from others and to manage their relations with other states with whom they collaborated or competed as they saw fit. Foremost in this system was the belief, reinforced by law, that the state possessed the right—indeed, the obligation—to take whatever measures it deemed necessary to ensure its preservation.

Although the international system and patterns of interaction among its political actors have changed profoundly since the birth of the state system, contemporary world politics remains significantly colored by its legacy: it continues to be conducted in an atmosphere of anarchy. As in the past, the system remains fragmented and decentralized, with no higher authority above nation-states, which, as the principal actors in world politics, remain free to behave toward one another as they choose.

This is not meant to imply either that states exercise their freedom with abandon or that they are unconstrained in the choices they make. The political, legal, moral, and circumstantial constraints on states' freedom of choice are formidable. Moreover, states' national interests are served best when states act in a manner that does not threaten the stability of their relations with others or of the global system that protects their autonomy. Hence, the international system, as the British political scientist Hedley Bull reminds us, may be an anarchical society, but it is one of "ordered anarchy" nonetheless.

The world has grown increasingly complex, interdependent, and "globalized" as contact, communication, and exchange have increased among the actors in the state system and as the number of nation-states and other non-state international actors has grown. Expanded interaction enlarges the range of potential mutually beneficial exchanges between and among transnational actors. But just as opportunities for cooperation have expanded, so have the possible sources of disagreement. That we live in an age of conflict is a cliché that contains elements of truth because differences of opinion and efforts to resolve disputes to one's advantage, often at the expense of others, are part of any long-term relationship. Thus, as the world has grown smaller and the barriers once provided by borders between states have eroded, the mutual dependence of transnational political actors on one another has grown and the number of potential rivalries, antagonisms, and disagreements has increased correspondingly. Friction and tension therefore appear to be endemic to international relations; the image of world politics conveyed in newspaper headlines does not suggest that a shrinking world will necessarily become a more peaceful one. Instead, even as memory of the Cold War from 1947 through 1989 fades, competition and conflict persist, as demonstrated by the ubiquitous eruption of ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and religious disputes throughout the world and the inability to prevent their outbreak in many flash points across the globe.

Given the persistent characteristics of contemporary world politics, the number of *issues* that are at any one time in dispute among nation-states and other global actors appears to have increased greatly. The multitude of disagreements and controversies renders the *global agenda*—the list of issues that force their way into consideration and command that they be addressed, peacefully or not—more crowded and complex. Because the responses that are made to address the issues on the global agenda shape our lives both today and into the future, it is appropriate that we direct attention to those matters that animate world politics and stimulate the attention and activities of decision makers. At the same time, as different state and nonstate actors view global political issues from widely varying vantage points, it is fitting that we remain sensitive to the various perceptual lenses through which the items on the global agenda are viewed. Accordingly, *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives* seeks to focus on the range of issues that dominates world politics as well as on the multitude of analytical and interpretive perspectives from which those issues are viewed.

The issues and perspectives discussed in *The Global Agenda* are grouped into four broad, somewhat overlapping, but analytically distinct issue areas: (1) arms and influence, (2) discord and collaboration, (3) politics and markets, and (4) ecology and politics. The first two issue areas deal with states' security interests, often referred to as matters of *high politics.* The latter two deal with the nonsecurity issues, often referred to as matters of *low politics,* on which world political actors increasingly have concentrated their attention. In all four issue areas, we seek to convey not only the range of issues now facing those responsible for political choices, but also the many vantage points from which they are typically viewed.

We begin in Part One with consideration of a series of issues appropriately subsumed under the collective rubric "Arms and Influence." As the term "high politics" suggests, the issues and perspectives treated here focus on the prospects for peace and security in a world of competitive nation-states armed with increasingly diverse arsenals of lethal and "nonlethal" weapons with which to coerce and/or destroy adversaries, or both.

ARMS AND INFLUENCE

It is often argued that states strive for power, security, and domination in a global environment punctuated by the threat of violence and death. This viewpoint flows naturally from the characteristics of the international political system, which continues to be marked by the absence of central institutions empowered to authoritatively manage and resolve conflict. Hence, preoccupation with preparations for defense becomes understandable, for the fear persists that one adversary might use force against another to realize its goals or to vent its frustrations, and the threat of separatist revolts and civil rebellions to sever minority populations from existing sovereign states has become a major concern. In such an environment, arms are widely perceived as useful not only to enhance security but also as a means to realize and extend one's influence. Hence, countries frequently see their interests best served by a search for power, by whatever means. Understandably, therefore, *power* and *influence* remain the core concepts in the study of world politics.

Appropriately, our first essay, "Power, Capability, and Influence in International Politics," by K. J. Holsti, provides a thoughtful discussion of the meaning of power, capability, and influence in the foreign policy behavior of states in contemporary world politics. The essay provides insights important not only for evaluating the subsequent essays in this book but also for evaluating the use to which these necessary but ambiguous terms are often incorporated into other interpretations of global issues. For almost invariably such discussions make reference, implicitly or explicitly, to the interrelationships among power, capability, and influence.

If the purpose of statecraft is the pursuit of political power, then a critical question is: What are the most appropriate means through which states might

rise to a position of prominence in the international hierarchy? In "From Military Strategy to Economic Strategy: The Rise of the 'Virtual State' and the New Paths to Global Influence," Richard Rosecrance provides a reinterpretation of the factors that are most likely to enable states to travel that path successfully in the future. Arguing that a technological revolution in knowledge and direct investment is underway, he contends that it is transforming the classical meanings of the nature of power, its sources, and the purposes and functions of the state. Whereas in the past the acquisition of military might for territorial conquest was habitually seen as the best path to national power and leadership over competitors, today the military struggle for territory no longer holds the promise that once was widely ascribed to it. Although the struggle for influence through arms clearly continues, the key to global power in the future will lie primarily in leadership in the new technologies rather than in the pursuit of territorial control by force; as Rosecrance puts it, "a nation's economic strategy is now at least as important as its military strategy; its ambassadors have become foreign trade and investment representatives."

Rosecrance predicts that global leadership is destined to pass to the states that recognize that territorial conquest is no longer a cost-efficient means to economic growth and political power, because with technology and globalization states can readily produce goods overseas for the foreign market. The "virtual state," "a state that has downsized its territorially based production capability," will lead internationally because it can better compete for a share of world trade. Hence, the rise of the virtual state presages the advent of an age in which the bases of and strategies for national power have been transformed. The thesis is disquieting that as territory is becoming passé, the dangers of armed conflict are declining and war over territory is becoming quaint. It challenges vested interests that have a stake in the continuation of preparations for war as a strategy for national power and prominence. For that reason, many find it threatening. And to maintain that virtual states investing in people rather than amassing land, capital, and labor "hold the competitive key to greater wealth in the 21st century" is to challenge the strategies on which most states historically have relied to gain wealth and stature.

At issue are basic controversies: *how* security can best be attained and welfare assured, and how people should most accurately conceive of the sources of global power in the future. Perhaps precisely because the world is rapidly changing, Rosecrance's provocative prescriptions about the most viable strategies to both national prosperity and international influence must be given serious attention. These questions deserve a high place on the global agenda because they concern choices regarding national strategies for development no policy maker can dare ignore.

The interpretation, predictions, and prescriptions advanced by Rosecrance are, of course, subject to theoretical and empirical questioning from other perspectives. In the next essay, "A Revolution in Warfare: The Changing Face of

Force," Eliot A. Cohen takes exception to the view that military force no longer plays a decisive role in world politics. He maintains that even with the end of the Cold War and the declining incidence of war between states, military capabilities will continue to matter greatly among the factors that will enable states to exercise international influence. Cohen avers that military power will continue to play a central, maybe even growing, role in international politics because the tools and techniques for waging war never stand still and the countries that succeed in their development are certain to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. He sees a revolution in military affairs underway that is as momentous as the revolutions produced by the railroad and airplane, and he claims that this new revolution is a result of developments in civilian society such as the information revolution and postindustrial capitalism. The creation of such revolutionary technologies as satellite imagery, smart bombs, and a variety of so-called nonlethal weapons that destroy and incapacitate their targets without killing, Cohen maintains, will transform the forms and conduct of combat and armies, even though personnel and politics, as always, will remain as crucial as technological innovation in the ways military power is translated in political influence on the world stage.

Cohen's thesis is compelling. However, the picture and prescriptions it presents must be interpreted in light of the changing relationship of arms to decisions regarding war and peace. Against the backdrop of revolutionary changes in the tools and techniques for waging war, careful consideration needs to be given to the sources or determinants of war. Because arms both threaten and protect, a congeries of rival hypotheses can be advanced about the causes of armed conflict and of peace in the 21st century. In "Towards a New Millennium: Structural Perspectives on the Causes of War," Jack S. Levy summarizes leading ideas embedded in the assumptions of contending theories to which we might refer to explain the role of force in world politics and the means to preserve peace.

Levy notes that the outbreak of war derives from a wide range of circumstantial and causal factors, some internal to individual states and many external to them, that combine to influence its occurrence. Focusing primarily on "systemic" or "structural" factors—attributes of the international system writ large—Levy reviews three major structural explanations for the continuing outbreak of war: (1) international anarchy and the security dilemma it creates, (2) theories of international equilibrium such as the balance of power and the questionable operation of a successful balance of power under the emerging conditions of multipolarity, and (3) "power transition" theories and their most important variant, "long cycle" theories. This review suggests that, because war clearly has multiple potential causes, it is difficult to control, inasmuch as control depends on a varied combination of tangible and intangible factors. Moreover, this reading selection warns that "the changing structures of power in international and regional systems that have influenced decisions for war or peace so often in the past will continue to play a central role in such decisions in the future."

Achieving international security is often confounded by changes in global conditions. One potential change underway that prompts fresh thinking is the growing evidence about a profoundly important long-term world political achievement: Since World War II the great powers have experienced the longest period of uninterrupted peace since the advent of the territorial state system in 1648. In this category of analysis, we can claim that the disappearance of wars between the great powers truly *has* transformed the character of international politics, without risking the accusation that the claim is exaggerated. However, whether weapons produced this remarkable outcome—or whether this long post–World War II peace occurred despite these weapons—deserves consideration.

In "The Obsolescence of Major War," John Mueller explores the policy and moral implications of this accomplishment, in which war between states has passed from a noble institution to one in which it is now widely regarded as illegal, immoral, and counterproductive. The steps to this global awakening are traced in his account, which sees the contribution of nuclear weapons as essentially irrelevant to the preservation of the long peace among the great powers that has persisted since World War II. Noting that although "war in the developed world . . . has not become impossible" and war in the Third World remains frequent and increasingly lethal, Mueller nonetheless sees hope for the future in the fact that "peoples and leaders in the developed world—where war was once endemic—have increasingly found war to be disgusting, ridiculous, and unwise." "If war begins in the minds of men, as the UNESCO Charter insists," then, Mueller maintains, "it can end there." That would indeed alter the way the world has conventionally thought about arms, influence, and peace. In such a world (Cohen's account of the revolutionary changes in military capabilities notwithstanding), the utility of armed force as an instrument of influence would be certain to command far less respect than in the past.

Nuclear weapons are doubtless the most lethal form of power and hence the most threatening instruments of influence. How to avoid their use has dominated strategic thinking ever since the atomic age began in 1945. *Deterrence*—preventing a potential adversary from launching a military attack—has dominated strategic thinking about nuclear weapons since their creation. The failure of deterrence, particularly in a war between nuclear powers, could, of course, ignite a global conflagration culminating in the destruction of humanity, which means that the entire world has a stake in the operation of a successful deterrent strategy.

For many years great faith was placed in the ability of nuclear weapons to keep the peace. Indeed, the most popular theory of the avoidance of general war since 1945 is the claim that nuclear weapons have made general war obsolete. But others endorse John Mueller's thesis that nuclear weapons are "essentially irrelevant" in the prevention of major war. As argued at length in his well-known 1989 book, *Retreat from Doomsday,* the growing aversion to war in general, in conjunction with the inhibiting fear of another major *conventional* war in particular, explain the obsolescence of war in the developed world.

Kenneth N. Waltz, a neorealist, disagrees. In "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," Waltz contends that nuclear weapons have had a pacifying impact on the course of world affairs since World War II. In a comprehensive review of thinking about nuclear weapons that outlines the evolution of nuclear doctrines, the efforts to construct a foolproof strategic defense, and efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament, Waltz advances the controversial conclusion that nuclear weapons have been "a tremendous force for peace" that "afford nations who possess them the possibility of security at reasonable cost." Without them, the post–World War II world would likely have been far less stable. But, Waltz warns, scholars and policy makers have not understood the true strategic implications of nuclear weaponry, with the result that the advantages of nuclear weapons have not been properly appreciated.

A key variable in the future of global peace is the possibility that the number of members of the "nuclear club" could increase dramatically in the future. This makes worldwide control over weapons of mass destruction at once imperative and at the same time increasingly difficult. As argued by former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Fred Charles Iklé in 1997, the "second coming of the nuclear age" is on the horizon. Thus managing *nuclear proliferation* is a major political issue.

In "The Changing Proliferation Threat," John F. Sopko shows why the complex nuclear issue has not receded in importance. The overwhelming deterrent forces that worked during the Cold War will not provide protection against the new military dangers the arms race poses on the threshold of the 21st century. Despite recent breakthroughs in the negotiated reduction of the superpowers' arsenals, many states and non-state actors have powerful incentives to join the nuclear club and are actively pursuing the development of nuclear capabilities. The proliferation threat has changed, Sopko shows, and for the worse. "Plans for making weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices, can now be accessed on the Internet, through catalogs, and at the local library." This ready availability of weaponry raises the stakes; the formidable array of new technologies for destruction puts control over the fate of millions in the possession of lunatics, fanatics, and terrorists throughout the globe who have no qualms about using them for their narrow and evil purposes.

The grim prospects for deterrence to safeguard civilization are exacerbated, Sopko warns, by the widespread presumption that aggressors will continue to abide by the doctrine of "no first use" of weapons of mass destruction. Wishful thinking about the low probability of a nuclear calamity has inhibited the great powers' planning for the international control of annihilating weapons. The strategic mindsets and theories of deterrence of the past half century are still being applied to the new threats; tactics have failed to keep pace with technology, and defense strategies have not changed to deal with the emergent proliferation threats. Because many "either do not believe that there is a new proliferation threat or consider it a low priority," Sopko warns that the dangers have escalated as "traditional Cold War approaches to nonproliferation do little to deter groups

or individuals bent on procuring crude weapons of mass destruction." Responding to these new challenges necessitates overcoming the conceptual, bureaucratic, intergovernmental and tactical barriers that are interfering with the peace-loving democracies' ability to effectively address these new kinds of threats. Inventorying the problems and prospects confronting the world community on this global issue, Sopko not only finds the existing obstacles to the further expansion of nuclear capabilities insufficient, but also insists that to contain their spread, far-reaching disarmament that shuts down test sites and devises solutions for the disposal of fissionable materials will be required. As the risks expand, the control of proliferation is destined, Sopko's reasoning suggests, to become a key issue on the 21st century global agenda.

Sopko is one among many proponents who advocate that meaningful steps can be taken to control the problem of the spread of weapons systems by building a comprehensive arms control regime. However, as noted, other analysts argue just the opposite: that weapons *increase* national security and that the most lethal arms deter their use. Nonetheless, and consistent with Sopko's thesis, new forms of violence—often referred to as "low-intensity conflict"—are unlikely to decline as the spread of these new instruments of destruction continues.

The widespread incidence of low-intensity violence draws attention to perhaps its most conspicuous and threatening form: international terrorism. In "Postmodern Terrorism," Walter Laqueur offers a timely and illuminating discussion of international terrorism, recent trends in its occurrence, its old and new causes, and its probable future impact. Laqueur doubts that this terrifying force can be brought under control in the new millennium, despite the recent decline in the frequency of acts of terrorism as they were practiced during the Cold War and in the years following its end. Accordingly, he contends that efforts to grapple with the terrorism of the future must begin with a sober account of its diverse purposes and changing character, and of the reasons why terrorism is likely to continue to be an issue of great importance in the politics within nations and in relations between them.

Laqueur's depiction of the terrorist of the future portrays a set of actors likely to remain, like the terrorists of the past, intent on achieving political objectives by the threat of violence. However, he sees the new terrorists as different from those of the past: less ideological, more likely to harbor ethnic grievances, perhaps fired by apocalyptic visions, and harder to distinguish from others outside the law. Armed with new weapons and experimenting with others, and willing to use them more indiscriminately, the "postmodern" future terrorists have at their disposal a wider range of methods, because now a political wing of a terrorist group can openly raise funds, run schools, and contest elections, and the loner with a grudge, who may be the computer hacker next door, can be included in the category of those who have turned to terror. At the other end of the scale, Lacqueur predicts, state-sponsored terrorism will take the place of warfare. He