


Jost
&
Hyde

Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time

Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time: A Reader



Edited by Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde

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Prologue

At mid-century E. R. Curtius, adverting to the study of rhetoric in his magisterial *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, boldly pronounced not only that “as an independent subject, it has long since vanished from the curriculum” but that “in our culture, rhetoric has no place.”¹ Only a few years later, related sentiments were expressed by the Oxford scholar C. S. Lewis. Lewis was, among other things, a Renaissance specialist for whom the modern ignorance of rhetoric as a subject of study presented the single greatest obstacle to our properly approaching the literature of the distant past.² For Lewis, as for Curtius, the ancient system of rhetorical *topoi*, speech genres, levels and types of style, and so on had long ago “penetrated all literary genres,” becoming the “common denominator” (*ELLM* 70) of European literature, even its very foundation (despised by many as a “cellar”; *ELLM* 79), whose classical and medieval sources needed to be understood for an appreciation of the Western literary legacy. Certainly neither Curtius nor Lewis was seeking to reintroduce rhetoric as an independent university pursuit, although both possessed the literary historian’s knowledge of the once-pervasive influence of rhetoric across the liberal arts curriculum. Nevertheless, while the ancient

coin of rhetoric may always have been valued by a knowledgeable few, rhetoric itself was considered by most to have gone out of circulation long before, to have become effaced, ineffective, above all anachronistic—which is to say backward, out of its proper time.

Half a century after Curtius's assessment, the fortunes of rhetoric have so been reversed that another Renaissance scholar, Richard Lanham, has observed that "during the last twenty years, rhetoric has moved from the periphery to the center of our intellectual focus."³ Arm in arm with what we have come to know as the art of interpretation—or hermeneutics—rhetoric enables a new understanding of understanding as well as new modes of comprehension and exchange between familiar and distant texts, across intellectual boundaries, and into foreign literatures, new curricula, and changing canons. The title of this book, accordingly, can be understood as virtually tautological, for ours is a time in which rhetoric and hermeneutics have achieved a parallel influence and momentum (if not always willing acceptance) across the academic horizon. Indeed, in light of the massive social, cultural, intellectual, and economic conflicts defining both the modern and postmodern age, it can no longer occasion much surprise that these two disciplines should have inspired and continue to inspire such widespread and diverse response. After all, both rhetoric and hermeneutics thrive, each in its own way, on the conflicts of interpretations and opinions that now enliven every field of endeavor in or out of academe. They thrive as well on a practical "being-in-the-world" (as Heidegger calls it) that for some is skeptical and resistant and for others receptive—filled with anxiety, to be sure, but filled also with, in Richard Bernstein's words, "a perennial impulse of wonder."⁴ Our aim in this volume is to show the novice and expert alike what some versions of contemporary rhetoric and hermeneutics look like and to propose how the two can be thought of together, for each not only presupposes but extends and corrects the other.

In spite of the flourishing of sophisticated debates in monographs and journals over the definition and scope of each of these terms, no one until now has initiated a dialogue between thinkers interested in both rhetoric and hermeneutics. Such a dialogue seeks to clarify the points of contact and separation of the two and their common principles, problems, and aims, as well as their different means and strategies. Hermeneutics has become in our time variously a philosophical, literary, and critical problematic. It is at once a problem of method, broadly conceived (hermeneutic phenomenology, reader-response criticism), of philosophic claims to truth (the interpretive nature of human being), and of the skeptical resistance to both method and truth (the epistemological instability of being, language, self, and so on, or the exposure of the threat of systematic, ideological distortion in our communication).⁵ Herme-

neutics did not always command such scope; it evolved (in a nonteleological way, as Jean Grondin has noted)⁶ from a chiefly exegetical concern with the Bible, a concern that first extended to all texts, then to all problems of understanding in the so-called human sciences, and finally to the philosophic concern with understanding and interpretation as such. These methodological and philosophical views were developed over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries chiefly by German thinkers—Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer—partly in response to the philosophical totalizations of Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel and Edmund Husserl. Having appropriated parts of this tradition and corrected some of its errors, contemporary hermeneutics provides revolutionary directions for study not only in philosophy but across the disciplines, and, in our view, it promises further insights and possibilities, particularly as it is drawn into closer discussion with rhetoric.

As for rhetoric, it was, again, Curtius who noted (with scholarly understatement) that “Germans appear to have an innate distrust of it” (*ELLM* 62)—a remark that perfectly captures Kant’s and Hegel’s dismissive comments about rhetorical topics and tropes but that is misleading when it comes to Gadamer’s later recognition of the vast common ground between our two subjects: “I would like to see more recognition of the fact that this is the realm hermeneutics shares with rhetoric: the realm of arguments that are convincing (which is not the same as logically compelling). It is the realm of practice and humanity in general.”⁷ Gadamer’s allusion here to the realm of practice and humanity in general suggests the genuinely daunting scope of rhetoric and hermeneutics. It is a realm, however, whose range is entirely consistent with Roman and Renaissance conceptions of rhetoric and increasingly so with philosophical, literary, and critical conceptions of hermeneutics, reminding us that neither rhetoric nor hermeneutics can ever be a strictly proprietary project. Rather, each is intrinsically a transdisciplinary effort whose most creative work may lie not behind us but in the present and future, especially as rhetoric and hermeneutics come to be better understood as mutually constitutive enterprises.

Most readers interested in a book like this will affirm the centrality of rhetoric and hermeneutics to human *praxis*. But they will also admit the difficulties involved in identifying just what these contested concepts mean. As editors, we have tried to avoid both a dogmatic imposition of definitions on the one hand and a laxity of conception on the other. We do not suppose that our readers are experts in either field, nor that they (any more than our contributors!) can or should be expected to agree about how best to define *rhetoric* or *hermeneutics*. In fact, in these two disciplines conceived in their fuller forms, such attempts at essentialist definitions have already been ruled out by the dis-

ciplines themselves. Our practice has rather been to use both terms as rhetorical topics of invention—that is, as indeterminate concepts whose intellectual histories and uses can be employed to suggest new lines of inquiry. This openness avoids philosophically unwarranted ontologizing or reifying of the terms' meanings as well as a flat-footed collapsing of either term into the other.

Indeed, even those theologians (e.g., Schleiermacher, Bultmann), philosophers and critical thinkers (e.g., Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas, Lacan, Foucault), and more “literary” thinkers and critics (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Burke, Derrida, de Man) who explicitly use or invoke the two disciplines and their histories cannot offer ready answers about what the disciplines entail and how they might be thought of together. In Kierkegaard, for example, all rhetoric or public speaking, “all persuasiveness, all bargaining, all direct attention by means of one’s own person,”⁸ is consistently consigned to the junk heap of public opinion and manipulation—in other words, convicted of the age-old charge of pandering to the masses. And yet throughout Kierkegaard’s work, one finds elaborate and thoughtful theory and practice of indirect communication and truth as subjectivity. In word and deed if not in name, then, Kierkegaard throws rhetorical persuasion and hermeneutic interpretation into passionate embrace. Historically, this and similar disorienting maneuvers make for a complex, even fragmented narrative for our two disciplines, a complexity far beyond any neat summary to which our essays could (or perhaps should) aspire. Nevertheless, as a way of moving closer here to defining topically (or pragmatically) the two concepts, we offer a further line of thinking that illustrates how the relations between rhetoric and hermeneutics have been obscured. Because the title of this book directs attention to the importance of time (and timing) in rhetoric and hermeneutics, let us turn briefly to Heidegger’s account of time as a way of indicating the unforeseen advantages that might be gained by thinking about rhetoric and hermeneutics together.

In *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Theodore Kisiel recounts Heidegger’s gradual breakthrough, over approximately twelve years, to a new conception of time. This new account not only organizes but grounds Heidegger’s entire transcendental analysis of *Dasein*,⁹ Kisiel, retrieving Heidegger’s 1922–23 terminology, designates it “the kairology of Being.”¹⁰

As students of philosophical hermeneutics are aware, Heidegger’s profound innovation challenges the adequacy of our everyday notion of time as *chronos*, the strict succession of punctual “nows” that fade as if eternally into the past and the future. In stark contrast, Heidegger reveals temporality as the very structure of human being or, more accurately, of the ontological structure

of human being as “care” (*Sorge*)—that which enables us to respond to (or rather toward) our own possibilities. The *toward* in this formulation signals the ontological priority of the future against any mythic punctilious present in Heidegger’s account of temporality; it is futural “possibility” that constitutes our “anticipation” and that activates our ongoing “retrieval”—or, as Gadamer and Ricoeur put it, our “appropriation”—of the past. In this way, our present is always already (primordially) endowed with both the past and the future in the project of our possibilities. Thus Kisiel: “A new and different sense of time concentrated on the moment which is at once my unique lifetime. How? By ‘at once’ (equiprimordially) forerunning the possibility of my death and repeating the possibility of my birth (heredity, inheritance, heritage).”¹¹ Time or “temporality” as *kairos*, therefore, which Heidegger derives chiefly from the early Christian concern with the “fullness of time”—the Second Coming as an existential rather than neutral or objectively given moment—is configured not as a horizontal forced march but as a self-appropriating circle of understanding and care.

Now, the point here is that what remains lurking in Kisiel’s account of Heidegger’s *kairology* of Being is the fact that *kairos*, as students of rhetoric are aware, is a vintage rhetorical concept deriving from pre-Socratic drama, philosophy, and oratory, particularly that of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and (implicitly) Gorgias. In Greek drama and literature *kairos* embraced various meanings: brevity, proportion or moderation (as in Hesiod’s “Observe good measure, and proportion [*kairos*] is the best of all things”), what is suited to the moment, the expedient, effective, correct, or appropriate.¹² In later rhetorical theory *kairos* was elaborated as the “appropriate” (*to prepon*), “decorum” (e.g. in Cicero), and Renaissance-humanist *sprezzaturra*, all three of which involve the orator’s practical ability to adapt to circumstances and audiences without relying on theoretical rules.¹³ Originally, however, *kairos* referred to the principle and power (*dunamis*) by which the opportune moment calls forth an intuitive, appropriate response from the rhetor (instead of the rhetor initiating an action after conscious assessment of the situation). It is a power of invention or discovery (*heuresis*) irreducible to calculation and logic that ends the stasis of contending *logoi* at the critical moment in which decision and action are demanded. As such *kairos* remains beyond the control of the rhetor, coming rather as a gift or even magic (*goetia*). In short, the emphasis falls on *kairos* as receptivity; in later theory it falls on *to prepon* and decorum as artful activity.

To be sure, Kisiel shows that Heidegger himself is not unaware of the link between rhetoric and *kairos*, at least as this link appears in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. Given his task of tracking Heidegger, however, who seems never to have mentioned (for example) Pythagoras or Gorgias in his courses or in his writings in

the twenties, it is understandable that Kisiel would not speculate on possible connections to these thinkers. Still, the fact remains that potentially interesting but unseen affiliations hold between the pre-Socratics and Heidegger, especially regarding Heidegger's own considerable emphasis on "listening to" and hearing the call of conscience (in *Being and Time*) and the call of Being and of language (in his later writings). This would seem to resemble Gorgias's stress on rhetorical invention as a power that one receives, chiefly by listening and hearing rather than by speaking.¹⁴ More important, on such an angle of approach we conceivably gain a perspective by which to measure how selectively (and perhaps unwittingly) Heidegger has drawn from the rhetorical tradition of *kairos* to inform his own philosophical hermeneutics. Whether the objection voiced by many to the later Heidegger is correct—that a kind of quietist passivity threatens to preclude practical thought and action—nevertheless, an active passivity is quite familiar to the early, and foreign to the later, *kairotic* tradition of rhetoric. This passivity diminished as *kairos* developed in Aristotle and Cicero, who emphasized enthymematic probabilities, civic responsibilities, the rhetor as agent, topics as agency, and invention as a human initiative. Thus Kisiel (selectively) notes: "Almost perversely, Heidegger's interest in rhetoric gravitates toward [hearing], in which speaking has its end. For speaking finds its completion in the communication, in being received or accepted by the auditor who undergoes or 'suffers' the speech. A seemingly marginal topic, the 'suffering' and resulting 'passion' (Gr. *pathos*) of the listener, is made central."¹⁵ In fact, this gravitation to hearing retrieves Gorgias's invaluable contribution to the history and theory of rhetoric and hermeneutics, although at the same time it risks losing the active involvement of speaker in the rhetorical situation.

Dimly and from afar, then, rhetorical reverberations of the hermeneutic of time as *kairos* suggest what otherwise specialist attention to hermeneutics alone, or to rhetoric alone, conceals: namely, that our very being-in-the-world is inseparably hermeneutical and rhetorical in complex ways and that a multifaceted speaking as well as listening constitutes our situation. Our own time is an epoch of corporate capitalism and technologism, of vulgarization and breakdown. But it is also a time of deep reflection on linguistic interpretation: on persuasion, "conversion" across paradigms or worldviews, propaganda, and more invidious forms of deception and power, as well as on forms of the electronic word and the new multimedia. It is, accordingly, a time in which we need both to listen to and to discuss what Gadamer calls the "deep inner convergence" between rhetoric and hermeneutics.¹⁶ David Tracy makes this same point in his chapter in this volume: "It now seems clear that hermeneuti-

cal thinkers must both acknowledge and engage rhetorical theories and vice versa.”¹⁷ What in turn seems called for (appropriate to) such a time, therefore, what has seemed fitting to the editors and authors involved in this book, is the need to open up new *topoi* for debate and discussion, new connections and extensions that have not yet been brought fully to light. For Aristotle, dialectic was “critical” (*Metaph.* 1004b 17–27), while its “counterpart,” rhetoric, was exploratory and “inventional” in its use of topics to investigate and determine a given matter. To many of the contributors to this volume, the task at hand now includes identifying hermeneutics (in its modern forms) as a further counterpart to rhetoric and rhetoric to hermeneutics and seeing both as features or dimensions of all thought and language, not only as the special methods or abilities of political *praxis*. In this way this book is meant to encourage the general drift of thinking about the relations of rhetoric and hermeneutics, and particularly to provide some of the signposts by which those identified with one discipline can make their way to and within its counterpart.

In other ways as well the book is intended to remind us that rhetoric and hermeneutics are themselves supremely *kairotic*, that is, temporal, situated, and motivated enterprises. In this regard our appropriation of each discipline by means of the chapters in this book is itself limited and motivated in two obvious ways. First, we sought scholars working in several different disciplines, and we are confident that we have located those whose chapters represent some of the most interesting and provocative work being done today. Second, our editorial effort is itself temporal because historical, a product of our own “effective historical consciousness” (Gadamer) behind or in addition to our authors’ own divergent heritages. In our introduction, and in our selection of the chapters that follow, we have been guided by an implicit faith in or acknowledgment of a middle way between the so-called metaphysics of presence and the *mise-en-abîme* that is asserted by some to be its only alternative and by a rhetorical concern with conscience and possibility as found, for example, in Heidegger and Levinas as the place of places. Within the limits of our choices and commitments, we believe that these chapters, both in how our authors interpret and argue and in what they discuss, profitably reflect on, even as they reflect, contemporary preoccupations.

Of course, we recognize that the reassuring phrase “our time” threatens to become a self-deceiving shibboleth, for it is in fact a deeply problematic expression. What value is the appeal to “our,” some will ask, if it does not directly, aggressively, even single-mindedly feature the oppressed and marginalized, the non-Western, the colonized, women, children—in a word, the Other? We are aware that what the term *our* in the title designates is potentially paradoxical. What “we” seem to share in this time, what is common to us, is our sense of

fracture and incommensurability, precisely a lack of common places and possibly a diminishing common interest in discovering them. In addressing this plight as an opportunity for action, however, our authors do bridge some of our shared gaps and *aporias* without trying to minimize or deny them. In this way they seek to reconstitute themselves, and their readers, without recourse to fix-it-all theories or damn-it-all skepticisms.

In fact, this metaphor of bridging is employed by Gadamer and others to define hermeneutics: “Hermeneutics may be defined as the attempt to overcome [the] distance in areas where empathy [is] hard and agreement not easily reached. There is always a gap that must be bridged.”¹⁸ Less figuratively, we propose to follow Gerald Bruns’s exemplary practice of calling hermeneutics “a family of questions about what happens in the understanding of anything, not just of texts but of how things are.”¹⁹ Such a move allows for both a familiar typology of hermeneutics—as “method, philosophy, and critique”—as well as for the scope of its historical manifestations (classical, Enlightenment, romantic, modern, postmodern).²⁰ As philosophy, hermeneutics interprets not only human being but being in all its manifestations as interpretive understanding (uncovering “as-structures,” i.e., seeing something-as-something, “seeing-as”); hermeneutics discusses what it is to reveal *die Sache selbst* beyond the reach, as Richard Bernstein has put it, of both an impossible objectivism and a vicious relativism (although no one has shown exactly how this is accomplished). As method, hermeneutics codifies the more or less indeterminate rules and procedures of the interpretation of texts and text analogues, transferring Gadamer’s insights into the work of art to the understanding of history and all texts. And as social critique, hermeneutics offers a means of challenging the manifest content of all messages; hermeneutics claims to be able to police its own claims to truth, maximizing the possibilities for freedom from distortion (although the issues involved, for example, in the Gadamer-Habermas debate have hardly been resolved).

Following Bruns, we can also think of rhetoric as comprising a family of questions about what is involved in influencing oneself and others regarding (the interpretation of) any indeterminate matter.²¹ Precisely because rhetoric operates within the realm of the indeterminate, it is characterized by a fundamental instability, the “play” within its scope of possibilities for meaning and action that Richard Lanham rather awkwardly calls a “bi-stable oscillation.”²² In other words, the rhetorician ranges between the poles of conflicting possibilities for argument and appeal and aims at what Robert Frost calls “a momentary [which is to say timely, *kairotic*] stay against confusion.” In rhetoric this play repeats itself in all of rhetoric’s features. The rhetorical topic, for example, is equivocal, or two-termed, or contradicted by another topic, and it is

always itself a standing indeterminacy. The rhetorical trope upsets the literal proposition, decenters conceptual argument, and calls into question empirical fact and rational first principle. Argument occurs on either side of a question, stabilizing a position, but only for a moment, until it starts up all over again. From style to substance and back to style, from word to world, theory to practice, *sic et non*, a continuum of possibilities blurring into and constituting each other—word unto world without end.

Unfortunately, even in our hyper-rhetorical times, many promoters of rhetoric and hermeneutics would transform this play among situated (*weltliche*) possibilities, this movement between movement and stasis, into either a “free play” of (non)positions said to be merely arbitrary and fictional or into a totalitarian politics of power whose options are reduced to coercion and will. In our view this alternative is false and barren, although certainly both whim and power are part of, and limits to, rhetoric. Instead, what is characteristic about the rhetorician is her ability deliberately to choose an *appropriate* stance, achieved in part, without doubt, by listening to the situation—now given more to open-endedness and indeterminacy, now to closure and decision, *as the particular case requires*. Too often this situated competence is enslaved to uniquely nonrhetorical interests, fascinations, fashions, and agendas. Our own stay against this confusion acknowledges the deeper rhetorical truths of deconstruction while joining with Cornel West in his assessment of our contemporary situation: “In this world-weary period of pervasive cynicisms, nihilisms, terrorisms, and possible extermination, there is a longing for norms and values that can make a difference, a yearning for principled resistance and struggle that can change our desperate plight.”²³

Above all, both rhetoric and hermeneutics occupy the realm of the nonexpert and nontheoretical, as Victoria Kahn explains in Chapter 7. This is the field of everyday action and thought, the contested premises of our shifting home. Expert theory of any kind isolates aspects of this field for special treatment, building its structures of observations, ideas, rules, and laws, but always at the risk of leaving behind those myriad indeterminate parts that combine to make up the whole man or woman, the whole action or event or situation or story or life, however much we argue about its character and shape and significance, and however much such wholes are riddled with gaps, *aporias*, and absences. Rhetoric, like hermeneutics, returns us to this contested and finite whole of everyday existence, in comparison with which all theory, though far-reaching and powerful in its appropriate uses, is existentially thin and feeble.

In our time hopeful signs are emerging. Gradually we are recognizing that rhetoric and hermeneutics offer the means for a renovated liberal education—a distinctly rhetorical *paideia* (in Lanham’s phrase) whose value inheres

not in theory, nor in a fixed canon, nor in excessive worry over lack of consensus on what is taught, nor even, as Mark Turner urges, in the common cognitive structures of our pervasive metaphorizing.²⁴ Rather, rhetorical education inheres in how we understand and interpret the indeterminate wholes of our practical lives, those concrete indeterminacies whose interpretations are aided by theory only when that theory cleaves to the matrix of shared, if contested, everyday beliefs, values, experiences, emotions, events, metaphors, images, and narratives with which rhetoric and hermeneutics are uniquely concerned. We need to concentrate on what we are conflicted about and how we become conflicted about such things. In our view this orientation to “how” is cultivated chiefly by rhetorical and hermeneutic training in interpretation and persuasion; it is stabilized (for the moment) in our varied understandings of our own and others’ dynamic traditions. In our time, accordingly, rhetoric and hermeneutics should be understood to range from specific arts whose handbooks articulate rules and strategies of invention, address, and application to the broadest possible conceptions of rhetoricality (in Bender and Wellbery’s phrase) and rhetoricity (in Charles Altieri’s) as dimensions of human existence.²⁵ Like Lanham and others in our time, we believe—pace Curtius and Lewis—that rhetoric and hermeneutics can reclaim not only their former exalted place in a liberal-arts curriculum but also the nonfoundational grounds of the curriculum itself, of the whole curriculum as a shifting panorama of everyday, indeterminate wholes requiring our interpretations and identifications. Indeed, we believe that only rhetoric and hermeneutics, properly redefined, can show how the principled subject-matter disciplines presuppose the nonexpert realm of *praxis* and practical reasoning and how they must, in the beginning and in the end, be responsible to them. This is the overall orientation of the chapters that follow.

The introduction is broadly designed to locate the major themes explored more deeply in the subsequent chapters. Roughly parallel with the division of the introduction, the book is divided into four sections. This scheme provides sites for rhetoric and hermeneutics to interact with and influence each other. Part I locates different versions of or approaches to the rhetorical and hermeneutic situation and the competences required by them. Part II suggests ways to think about those competences as matters for both invention and application, including ways to think about these terms as mutually implicative. Part II naturally leads to Part III in the way that topics naturally lead to arguments and their premises and further suggests that arguments and narratives (like topics and tropes) presuppose one another in various ways. On the surface Part IV correlates less closely with the fourth section of our introduction. But at a deeper level each investigates where the “possibility of morality” resides.

Particularly in our own time, rhetoric and hermeneutics have been concerned with the importance of conversation in our everyday lives, a truth that was brought home to us again and again in the course of this work through talks with Joel Weinsheimer. From the beginning Joel offered encouragement, support, and practical wisdom, which we are pleased to acknowledge here. We also thank John Campbell of the University of Washington, Richard Harvey Brown of the University of Maryland, Ed Block, Jr., of Marquette University, and Wendy Olmsted of the University of Chicago for their thoughtful readings of the introduction. Finally, we express our gratitude to our manuscript editor, Susan Laity, for her unfailing good sense in matters of style and *dispositio*.

No less essential to rhetoric and hermeneutics are the disposition of charity and the attitude of play. Our families provided both, encouraging us to do this work but requesting us on occasion to stop—for which gifts, among many others, we thank them.

NOTES

- 1 E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953; rpt. 1990), 62. Hereafter cited in the text as *ELLM*.
- 2 C. S. Lewis, *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 61.
- 3 Richard Lanham, *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology and the Arts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 71.
- 4 Richard Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 28.
- 5 There are numerous, widely available anthologies and other collections in hermeneutics across the disciplines; most contain useful bibliographies. For helpful overviews of the historical and intellectual ranges of hermeneutics, see Gerald L. Bruns, *Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), Jean Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 170–228. For some specifically literary uses, see William V. Spanos, ed., *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Toward a Postmodern Literary Hermeneutic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).
- 6 Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, 3.
- 7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960); *Truth and Method*, 2d rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1993), 568. For a helpful bibliography of rhetorical scholarship, see Winifred Brynati Horner, ed., *The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric*, rev. ed. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990).
- 8 Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 221.

- 9 *Dasein* is a term of art that does exact, useful work for Heidegger, but which we can render here as "human being."
- 10 Theodore Kiesel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 421.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 438.
- 12 See William H. Race, "The Word [*Kairos*] in Greek Drama," in *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, ed. Douglas E. Gerber, vol. 3 (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 197–213. Other helpful works include Mario Untersteiner, *The Sophists*, trans. Kathleen Freeman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954); G. B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Jacqueline De Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), and *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Edward Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), esp. 73–74; Dale L. Sullivan, "Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 78 (1992), 317–32; and Eric E. White, *Katronomia: On the Will-to-Invent* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Given its provenance in rhetoric, it is significant that *kairos* does not appear in F. E. Peters's historical lexicon, *Greek Philosophical Terms* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), for the constellation of values it elevates—time, contingency, invention, adaptation to audience and occasion, persuasion—are just the values philosophers from Plato to Hegel have resisted.
- 13 On *sprezzaturra* see Victoria Kahn, "Humanism and the Resistance to Theory," Chapter 7, this volume. See also Lanham, *Electronic Word*, 148. For a different approach to the term, see Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 46–50.
- 14 This line of thought is pursued in interesting ways by Stanley Cavell in *The Senses of Walden* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, expanded edition), 88: "Walden, in its emphasis upon listening and answering, outlines an epistemology of conscience."
- 15 Kiesel, *Genesis*, 296–97.
- 16 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," in *Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects*, ed. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 55.
- 17 David Tracy, "Charity, Obscurity, Clarity: Augustine's Search for Rhetoric and Hermeneutics," Chapter 12, this volume.
- 18 Gadamer, "Hermeneutics of Suspicion," 57. Heidegger glosses *hermeneuein* as "the exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message": Martin Heidegger, "Dialogue with a Japanese," in Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 29.
- 19 Gerald L. Bruns, "On the Tragedy of Hermeneutical Experience," Chapter 3, this volume.

- 20 See Josef Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique* (London: Routledge, 1980).
- 21 In *Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 7, George Kennedy has something like this in mind when he writes: "Rhetoric, in the most general sense, is the energy inherent in emotion and thought, transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their decisions or action."
- 22 Lanham, *Electronic Word*, 82.
- 23 Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 4. Cf. Henry Staten, *Wittgenstein and Derrida* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 126–27: "If there is any skepticism in Derrida, it is a moral not an epistemological skepticism—not a doubt about the possibility of morality but about an idealized picture of sincerity that takes insufficient account of the windings and twistings of fear and desire, weakness and lust, sadism and masochism and the will to power, in the mind of the most sincere man." For compatible accounts, see Richard Bernstein, *The New Constellation*; Christopher Norris, *Derrida* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); and Drucilla Cornell, *The Philosophy of the Limit* (New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, 1992).
- 24 Lanham, *Electronic Word*, esp. chaps. 4 and 7; Mark Turner, *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). For related accounts see Walter Jost, *Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), esp. chap. 6: "'A Comprehensive View': The Role of Rhetoric in Liberal Education"; and David Bromwich, *Politics By Other Means: Higher Education and Group Thinking* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), esp. chap. 4.
- 25 John Bender and David E. Wellbery, eds., *The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory, Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Charles Altieri, "Rhetorics, Rhetoricity, and the Sonnet as Performance," *Tennessee Studies in Literature* 25 (1980): 1–23. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Rhetoric and Hermeneutics," Chapter 1, this volume.

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