SELECTED READINGS OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS

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CONTENT

1. B. Malinowski

Phatic Communion

Excerpt from B. Malinowski, 'The problem of meaning in primitive languages', supplement to C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923.

So far, I have dealt mainly with the simplest problems of meaning, those associated with the definition of single words and with the lexicographical task of bringing home to a European reader the vocabulary of a strange tongue. And the main result of our analysis was that it is impossible to translate words of a primitive language or of one widely different from our own, without giving a detailed account of the culture of its users and thus providing the common measure necessary for a translation. But though an ethnographic background is indispensable for a scientific treatment of a language, it is by no means sufficient, and the problem of meaning needs a special theory of its own. I shall try to show that, looking at language from the ethnographic perspective and using our conception of *context of situation*, we shall be able to give an outline of a semantic theory, useful in the work on Primitive Linguistics, and throwing some light on human language in general.

First of all, let us try, from our standpoint, to form a view of the nature of language. The lack of a clear and precise view of linguistic function and of the nature of meaning, has been, I believe, the cause of the relative sterility of much otherwise excellent linguistic theorizing. The direct manner in which Ogden and Richards face this fundamental problem and the excellent argument by which they solve it, constitute the permanent value of their work.

The earlier study of a native text has demonstrated that an utterance becomes comprehensive only when we interpret it by its context of situation. The analysis of this context should give us a glimpse of a group of savages bound by reciprocal ties of interests and ambitions, of emotional appeal and response. There was boastful reference to competitive trading activities, to ceremonial overseas expeditions, to a complex of sentiments, ambitions and ideas known to the group of speakers and hearers through their being steeped in tribal tradition and having been themselves actors in such events as those described in the narrative. Instead of giving a narrative I could have adduced linguistic samples still more deeply and directly embedded in the context of situation.

Take for instance language spoken by a group of natives engaged in one of their fundamental pursuits in search of subsistence – hunting, fishing, tilling the soil; or else in one of those activities, in which a savage tribe express some essentially human forms of energy – war, play or sport, ceremonial performance or artistic display such as dancing or singing. The actors in any such scene are all following a purposeful activity, are all set on a definite aim; they all have to act in a concerted manner according to certain rules established by custom and tradition. In this, speech is the necessary means of communion; it is the one indispensable instrument for creating the ties of the moment without which unified social action is impossible.

Let us now consider what would be the type of talk passing between people thus acting, what would be the manner of its use. To make it quite concrete at first, let us follow up a party of fishermen on a coral lagoon, spying for a shoal of fish, trying to imprison them in an enclosure of large nets, and to drive them into small net-bags – an example which I am choosing also because of my personal familiarity with the procedure (Malinowski, 1918).

The canoes glide slowly and noiselessly, punted by men especially good at this task and always used for it. Other experts who know the bottom of the lagoon, with its plant and animal life, are on the lookout for fish. One of them sights the quarry. Customary signs, or sounds or words are uttered. Sometimes a sentence full of technical references to the channels or patches on the lagoon has to be spoken; sometimes when the shoal is near and the task of trapping is simple, a conventional cry is uttered not too loudly. Then, the whole fleet stops and ranges itself – every canoe and every man in it performing his appointed task – according to a customary routine. But, of course, the men, as they act, utter now and then a sound expressing keenness in the pursuit or impatience at some technical difficulty, joy of achievement or disappointment at failure. Again, a word of command is passed here and there, a technical expression or explanation which serves to harmonize their behaviour towards other men. The whole group act in a concerted manner, determined by old tribal tradition and perfectly familiar to the actors through life-long experience. Some men in the canoes cast the wide encircling nets into the water, other plunge, and wading through the shallow lagoon, drive the fish into the nets. Others again stand by with the small nets, ready to catch the fish. An animated scene, full of movement follows, and now that the fish are in their power the fishermen speak loudly, and give vent to their feelings. Short, telling exclamations fly about, which might be rendered by such words as: *Pull in, Let go, Shift further, Lift the net*; or again technical expressions completely untranslatable except by minute description of the instruments used, and of the mode of action.

All the language used during such a pursuit is full of technical terms, short references to surroundings, rapid indications of change – all based on customary types of behaviour, well-known to the participants from personal experience. Each utterance is essentially bound up with the context of situation and with the aim of the pursuit, whether it be the short indications about the movements of the quarry, or references to statements about the surroundings, or the expression of feeling and passion inexorably bound up with behaviour, or words of command, or correlation of action. The structure of all this linguistic material is inextricably mixed up with, and dependent upon, the course of the activity in which the utterances are embedded. The vocabulary, the meaning of the particular words used in their characteristic technicality is not less subordinate to action. For technical language, in matters of practical pursuit, acquires its meaning only through personal participation in this type of pursuit. It has to be learned, not through reflection but through action.

Had we taken any other example than fishing, we would have reached similar results. The study of any form of speech used in connection with vital work would reveal the same grammatical and lexical peculiarities: the dependence of the meaning of each word upon practical experience, and of the structure of each utterance upon the momentary situation in which it is spoken. Thus the consideration of linguistic uses associated with any practical pursuit, leads us to the conclusion that language in its primitive forms ought to be regarded and studied against the background of human activities and as a mode of human behaviour in practical matters. We have to realize that language originally, among primitive, non-civilized peoples was never used as a mere mirror of reflected thought. The manner in which I am using it now, in writing these words, the manner in which the author of a book, or a papyrus or a hewn inscription has to use it, is a very far-fetched and derivative function of language. In this, language becomes a condensed piece of reflection, a record of fact or thought. In its primitive uses, language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece of human behaviour. It is a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection.

These conclusions have been reached on an example in which language is used by people engaged in practical work, in which utterances are embedded in action. This conclusion might be questioned by an objection that there are also other linguistic uses even among primitive peoples who are debarred from writing or any means of external fixation of linguistic texts. Yet even they, it might be urged, have fixed texts in their songs, sayings, myths and legends, and most important, in their ritual and magical formulae. Are our conclusions about the nature of language correct, when faced with this use of speech; can our views remain unaltered when, from

speech in action, we turn our attention to free narrative or to the use of language in pure social intercourse; when the object of talk is not to achieve some aim but the exchange of words almost as an end in itself?

Anyone who has followed our analysis of speech in action and compares it with [. . .] narrative texts [. . .], will be convinced that the present conclusions apply to narrative speech as well. When incidents are told or discussed among a group of listeners, there is, first, the situation of that moment made up of the respective social, intellectual and emotional attitudes of those present. Within this situation, the narrative creates new bonds and sentiments by the emotional appeal of the words. In the narrative quoted, the boasting of a man to a mixed audience of several visitors and strangers produces feelings of pride or mortification, of triumph or envy. In every case, narrative speech as found in primitive communities is primarily a mode of social action rather than a mere reflection of thought.

A narrative is associated also indirectly with one situation to which it refers – in our text with a performance of competitive sailing. In this relation, the words of a tale are significant because of previous experiences of the listeners; and their meaning depends on the context of the situation referred to, not to the same degree but in the same manner as in the speech of action. The difference in degree is important; narrative speech is derived in its function, and it refers to action only indirectly, but the way in which it acquires its meaning can only be understood from the direct function of speech in action. To use the terminology of this work: the referential function of a narrative is subordinate to its social and emotive function, as classified by Ogden and Richards.

The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration. When a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip quite unconnected with what they are doing – it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function. Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation. The meaning of any utterance cannot be connected with the speaker's or hearer's behaviour, with the purpose of what they are doing.

A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing room, fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant. Inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things – all such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought. It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing

a common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse; and where it purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly spurious on one side. What is the *raison d'être*, therefore, of such phrases as *How do you do? Ah, here you are. Where do you come from? Nice day today* – all of which serve in one society or another as formulae of greeting or approach?

I think that, in discussing the function of speech in mere sociabilities, we come to one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society. There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company. Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity, all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man.[1]

Now speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous. The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy. To the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes, taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but indirectly a bad character. This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule. The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship, which is consummated only by the breaking of bread and the communion of food. The modern English expression, *Nice day today* or the Melanesian phrase, *Whence comest thou?* are needed to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence.

After the first formula, there comes a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious. Such gossip, as found in primitive societies, differs only a little from our own. Always the same emphasis of affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy. Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak. For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement. But though the hearing

1. I avoid on purpose the use of the expression herd-instinct, for I believe that the tendency in question cannot strictly be called an instinct. Moreover the term herd-instinct has been misused in a recent sociological work which has, however, become sufficiently popular to establish its views on this subject with the general reader.

given to such utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of roles.

There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use – *phatic communion* I am tempted to call it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention – a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words. Let us look at it from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language. Are words in phatic communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought.

But can we regard it as a mode of action? And in what relation does it stand to our crucial conception of context of situation? It is obvious that the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking. But what can be considered as *situation* when a number of people aimlessly gossip together? It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people. But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip. The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically. Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other. Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action.

I should like to add at once that though the examples discussed were taken from savage life, we could find among ourselves exact parallels to every type of linguistic use so far discussed. The binding tissue of words which unites the crew of a ship in bad weather, the verbal concomitants of a company of soldiers in action, the technical language running parallel to some practical work or sporting pursuit – all these resemble essentially the primitive uses of speech by man in action and our discussion could have been equally well conducted on a modern example. I have chosen the above from a savage community, because I wanted to emphasize that such and no other is the nature of *primitive* speech.

Again in pure sociabilities and gossip we use language exactly as savages do and our talk becomes the 'phatic communion' analysed above, which serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas. 'Throughout the Western world it is

agreed that people must meet frequently, and that it is not only agreeable to talk, but that it is a matter of common courtesy to say something even when there is hardly anything to say' (Ogden and Richards, 1923, p. 11). Indeed there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate. As long as there are words to exchange, phatic communion brings savage and civilized alike into the pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse.

It is only in certain very special uses among a civilized community and only in its highest uses that language is employed to frame and express thoughts. In poetic and literary production, language is made to embody human feelings and passions, to render in a subtle and convincing manner certain inner states and processes of mind. In works of science and philosophy, highly developed types of speech are used to control ideas and to make them common property of civilized mankind.

Even in this function, however, it is not correct to regard language as a mere residuum of reflective thought. And the conception of speech as serving to translate the inner processes of the speaker to the hearer is one-sided and gives us, even with regard to the most highly developed and specialized uses of speech, only a partial and certainly not the most relevant view.

To restate the main position arrived at in this section we can say that language in its primitive function and original form has an essentially pragmatic character; that it is a mode of behaviour, an indispensable element of concerted human action. And negatively: that to regard it as a means for the embodiment or expression of thought is to take a one-sided view of one of its most derivative and specialized functions.

References

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2. J. A. Fishman

The Relationship between Micro- and Macro-Sociolinguistics in the Study of Who Speaks What Language to Whom and When

A revision of J. A. Fishman, 'Who speaks what language to whom and when', *La Linguistique*, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 67–88

The analysis of multilingual settings

Multilingual speech communities differ from each other in so many ways that every student of societal multilingualism must grapple with the problem of how best to systematize or organize the manifold differences that are readily recognizable. This paper is directed to a formal consideration of several descriptive and analytic variables which may contribute to an understanding of *who* speaks *what* language to *whom* and *when* in those speech communities that are characterized by widespread, and relatively stable, multilingualism. It deals primarily with 'within-group (or intra-group) multilingualism' rather than with 'between-group (or intergroup) multilingualism', that is, with those multilingual settings in which a single population makes use of two (or more) 'languages' or varieties of the 'same language' for internal communicative purposes (Fishman, 1967). As a result of this limitation mastery or control of *mother tongue* and *other tongue* (or, more generally, of the various languages or varieties constituting the speech community's linguistic repertoire (Gumperz, 1962) may be ruled out as an operative variable since the members of many speech networks could communicate with each other quite easily in any of the available codes or subcodes. It seems clear, however, that habitual language choice in multilingual speech communities or speech networks is far from being a random matter of momentary inclination, even under those circumstances when it could very well function as such from a purely probabilistic point of view (Lieberson, 1964). 'Proper' usage dictates that only *one* of the theoretically co-available languages or varieties *will* be chosen by particular classes of *interlocutors* on particular kinds of *occasions* to discuss particular kinds of *topics*.

What are the most appropriate parameters in terms of which these choice-patterns can be described in order to attain both factual accuracy and theoretical parsimony, and in order to facilitate the integration of small-group and large-group research rather than its further needless polarization? If we can solve the problem of how to describe language choice in stable within-group bilingual settings (where the limits of language

mastery do not intrude), we can then more profitably turn (or return) to the problem of choice determinants in less stable settings such as those characterizing immigrant–host relationships and between-group multilingual settings more generally (Fishman, 1964).

A hypothetical example

American students are so accustomed to bilingualism as a 'vanishing phenomenon', as a temporary dislocation from a presumably more normal state of affairs characterized by 'one man, one language', that an example of stable intragroup bilingualism may help to start off our discussion in a more naturalistic and less bookish vein.

A government functionary in Brussels arrives home after stopping off at his club for a drink. He *generally* speaks standard French in his office, standard Dutch at his club and a distinctly local variant of Flemish at home.[1] In each instance he identifies himself with a different speech network to which he belongs, wants to belong, and from which he seeks acceptance. All of these networks – and more – are included in his overarching speech community, even though each is more commonly associated with one variety than with another. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find occasions at the office, in which he speaks or is spoken to in one or another variety of Flemish. There are also occasions at the club when he speaks or is addressed in French; finally, there are occasions at home when he communicates in standard Dutch or even French.

Our hypothetical government functionary is most likely to give and get Flemish at the office when he bumps into another functionary who hails from the very same Flemish-speaking town. The two of them grew up together and went to school together. Their respective sets of parents strike them as being similarly 'kind-but-old-fashioned'. In short, they share many common experiences and points of view (or think they do, or pretend they do) and therefore they tend to speak to each other in the language which represents for them the intimacy that they share. The two do not cease being government functionaries when they speak Flemish to each other; they simply prefer to treat each other as intimates rather than as functionaries. However, the careful observer will also note that the two do not speak Flemish to each other invariably. When they speak about world affairs, or the worlds of art and literature, not to mention the world of government, they tend to switch into French (or to reveal far more

1. This example may be replaced by any one of a number of others: Standard German, Schwytzertütsch and Romansch (in parts of Switzerland); Hebrew, English and Yiddish in Israel; Riksmaal, Landsmaal and more local dialectal variants of the latter in Norway; Standard German, Plattdeutsch and Danish in Schleswig; French, Standard German and German dialect in Luxembourg, etc.

French lexical, phonological or even grammatical influence in their Flemish), even though (for the sake of our didactic argument) the mood of intimacy and familiarity remains clearly evident throughout.

Thus, our overall problem is twofold: (*1*) to recognize and describe whatever higher-order regularities there may be in choosing among the several varieties that constitute the repertoire of a multilingual speech community and (*2*) nevertheless, to provide the interpersonal fluctuation (lower-order societal patterning) that remains even when higher-order societal patterning is established.

Topic

The fact that two individuals who usually speak to each other primarily in *X* nevertheless switch to *Y* (or vacillate more noticeably between *X* and *Y*) when discussing certain topics leads us to consider topic *per se* as a regulator of language use in multilingual settings.

The implication of topical regulation of language choice is that certain topics are somehow handled 'better', or more appropriately, in one language than in another in particular multilingual contexts. However, this greater appropriateness may reflect or may be brought about by several different but mutually reinforcing factors. Thus, some multilingual speakers may 'acquire the habit' of speaking about topic *x* in language X, partially because that is the language in which they were *trained* to deal with this topic (e.g. they received their university training in economics in French), partially because *they* (*and their interlocutors*) may *lack the specialized terms* for a satisfying discussion of *x* in language Y[2] partially because *language* Y *itself may currently lack as exact or as many terms* for handling topic *x* as those currently possessed by language X, and partially because *it is considered strange* or inappropriate to discuss *x* in language Y. The very multiplicity of sources of topical regulation suggests that *topic* may not in itself be a convenient analytic variable when language choice is considered from the point of view of the larger societal patterns and sociolinguistic norms of a multilingual setting, no matter how fruitful it may be at the level of face-to-face interaction *per se*. What *would* be helpful for larger societal investigations and for inter-societal comparisons is an understanding of how topics reflect or imply regularities which pertain to

2. This effect has been noted even in normally monolingual settings, such as those obtaining among American intellectuals, many of whom feel obliged to use French or German words in conjunction with particular professional topics. English lexical influence on the language of immigrants in the United States has also often been explained on topical grounds. The importance of topical determinants is discussed by Haugen (1953, 1956) and Weinreich (1953), and, more recently, by Gumperz (1962) and Susan Ervin (1964). It is implied as a 'pressure' exerted upon 'contacts' in Mackey's description of bilingualism (1962).

the major spheres of activity in any society under consideration. We may be able to discover the latter if we inquire *why* a significant number of people in a particular multilingual setting, at a particular time, have received certain kinds of training in one language rather than in another; or *what it reveals* about a particular multilingual setting if language X *is* actually less capable of coping with topic *x* than is language Y. Does it not reveal more than merely a topic-language relationship at the level of face-to-face encounters? Does it not reveal that certain socio-culturally *recognized spheres of activity* are, at least temporarily, under the sway of one language or variety (and, therefore, perhaps under the control of certain speech networks) rather than others? Thus, while topic is doubtlessly a crucial consideration in understanding language-choice variance in our two hypothetical government functionaries, *we must seek a means of examining and relating their individual, momentary choices to relatively stable patterns of choice that exist in their multilingual setting as a whole.*

Domains of language behavior

The concept of domains of language behavior seems to have received its first partial elaboration from students of language maintenance and language shift among *Auslandsdeutsche* in pre-World War Two multilingual settings.[3] German settlers were in contact with many different non-German-speaking populations in various types of contact settings and were exposed to various kinds of socio-cultural change processes. In attempting to chart and compare the fortunes of the German language under such varying circumstances Schmidt-Rohr (1932) seems to have been the first to suggest that *dominance configurations* needed to be established to reveal the overall-status of language choice in various domains of behavior. The domains recommended by Schmidt-Rohr were the following nine: the family, the playground and street, the school (subdivided into language of instruction, subject of instruction, and language of recess and entertainment), the church, literature, the press, the military, the courts and the governmental administration. Subsequently, other investigators either added additional domains (e.g. Mak, 1935, who nevertheless followed Schmidt-Rohr in overlooking the work-sphere as a domain), or found that fewer domains were sufficient in particular multilingual settings (e.g. Frey, 1945, who required only home, school and church in his analysis of Amish 'triple talk'). However, what is more interesting is that Schmidt-Rohr's domains bear a striking similarity to those 'generally

3. The study of language maintenance and language shift is concerned with the relationship between change or stability in habitual language use, on the one hand, and ongoing psychological, social or cultural processes of change and stability, on the other hand (Fishman, 1964, 1966; Nahirny and Fishman, 1965).

termed' spheres of activity which have more recently been independently advanced by others interested in the study of acculturation, intergroup relations, and bilingualism (e.g. Dohrenwend and Smith, 1962).

Domains are defined, regardless of their number,[4] in terms of *institutional contexts* or *socio-ecological co-occurrences*. They attempt to designate the *major clusters of interaction situations that occur in particular multilingual settings*. Domains enable us to understand that *language choice* and *topic*, appropriate though they may be for analyses of individual behavior at the level of face-to-face verbal encounters, are, as we suggested above, related to widespread socio-cultural norms and expectations. By recognizing the existence of domains, it becomes possible to contrast the language of topics for individuals, or particular sub-populations, with the language of domains for a larger part, if not the whole, of the population.

The appropriate designation and definition of domains of language behavior obviously calls for considerable insight into the socio-cultural dynamics of particular multilingual speech communities at particular periods in their history. Schmidt-Rohr's domains reflect not only multilingual settings in which a large number of spheres of activity, even those that pertain to governmental functions, are theoretically open to both or all of the languages present, but also those multilingual settings in which such permissiveness is at least sought by a sizeable number of interested parties. Quite different domains might be appropriate if one were to study habitual language use among children in these very same settings. Certainly, immigrant–host contexts, in which only the language of the host society is recognized for governmental functions, would require other and perhaps fewer domains, particularly if younger generations constantly leave the immigrant society and enter the host society. Finally, the domains of language behavior may differ from setting to setting not only in terms of number and designation, but also in terms of level. Thus, in studying acculturating populations in Arizona, Barker, who studied bilingual Spanish Americans (1947) and Barber, who studied trilingual Yaqui Indians (1952), formulated domains at the level of *socio-psychological analysis*: intimate, informal, formal and intergroup. Interestingly enough, the domains defined in this fashion were then identified with domains at the *societal-institutional level* mentioned above. The 'formal' domain, e.g., was found to coincide with religious-ceremonial activities; the

4. We can safely reject the implication encountered in certain discussions of domains, that there must be an invariant set of domains applicable to all multilingual settings. If language behavior is reflective of socio-cultural patterning, as is now widely accepted, then different kinds of multilingual speech communities should benefit from analyses in terms of different domains of language use, whether defined intuitively, theoretically, or empirically.

'intergroup' domain consisted of economic and recreational activities as well as interactions with governmental—legal authority, etc. The interrelationship between domains of language behavior defined at a societal-institutional level and domains defined at a socio-psychological level (the latter being somewhat similar to situational analyses discussed earlier) may enable us to study language choice in multilingual settings in newer and more fruitful ways.

The 'governmental administration' domain is a social nexus which brings people together *primarily* for a certain *cluster of purposes*. Furthermore, it brings them together *primarily* for a certain set of role-relations (discussed below) and in a delimited environment. Thus, domain is a socio-cultural construct abstracted from topics of communication, relationships between communicators, and locales of communication, in accord with the institutions of a society and the spheres of activity of a speech community, in such a way that *individual behavior and social patterns can be distinguished from each other and yet related to each other.*[5] The domain is a higher-order abstraction or summarization which is arrived at from a detailed study of the face-to-face interactions in which language choice is embedded. Of the many factors contributing to and subsumed under the domain concept, some are more important and more accessible to careful measurement than others. One of these, topic, has already been discussed. Two others, role-relation and locale remain to be discussed. Role-relations may be of value to us in accounting for the fact that our two hypothetical governmental functionaries, who usually speak an informal variant of Flemish to each other at the office, except when they talk about technical, professional or sophisticated 'cultural' matters, are themselves not entirely alike in this respect. One of the two tends to slip into French more frequently than the other. It would not be surprising to discover that he is the supervisor of the other.

Domains and role-relations

In many studies of multilingual behavior the family domain has proved to be a very crucial one. Multilingualism often begins in the family and depends upon it for encouragement if not for protection. In other cases, multilingualism withdraws into the family domain after it has been displaced from other domains in which it was previously encountered. Little wonder then that many investigators, beginning with Braunshausen several years ago (1928), have differentiated *within* the family domain in terms of

5. For a discussion of the differences and similarities between 'functions of language behavior' and 'domains of language behavior' see Fishman, 1964. 'Functions' stand closer to socio-psychological analysis, for they abstract their constituents in terms of individual motivation, rather than in terms of societal institutions.

'speakers'. However, two different approaches have been followed in connection with such differentiation. Braunshausen (and, much more recently, Mackey, 1962; 1965; 1966) have merely specified family 'members': father, mother, child, domestic, governess and tutor, etc. Gross, on the other hand, has specified *dyads* within the family (1951): grandfather to grandmother, grandmother to grandfather, grandfather to father, grandmother to father, grandfather to mother, grandmother to mother, grandfather to child, grandmother to child, father to mother, mother to father, etc. The difference between these two approaches is quite considerable. Not only does the second approach recognize that interacting members of a family (as well as the participants in most other domains of language behavior) are *hearers* as well as *speakers* (i.e., that there may be a distinction between multilingual *comprehension* and multilingual *production*), but it also recognizes that their language behavior may be more than merely a matter of individual preference or facility but also a matter of *role-relations*. In certain societies particular behaviors (including language behaviors) are *expected* (if not required) of *particular individuals vis-à-vis each other* (Goodenough, 1965).

The family domain is hardly unique with respect to its differentiability into role-relations. Each domain can be differentiated into role-relations that are specifically crucial or typical of it in particular societies at particular times. The religious domain (in those societies where religion can be differentiated from folkways more generally) may reveal such role relations as cleric–cleric, cleric–parishioner, parishioner–cleric, and parishioner–parishioner. Similarly, pupil–teacher, buyer–seller, employer–employee, judge–petitioner, all refer to specific role-relations in other domains. It would certainly seem desirable to describe and analyse language use or language choice in a particular multilingual setting in terms of the crucial role-relations within the specific domains considered to be most revealing for that setting.[6] The distinction between own-group-interlocutor and other-group-interlocutor may also be provided for in this way when intergroup bilingualism becomes the focus of inquiry.

Domains and locales

Ervin (1964) and Gumperz (1964) have presented many examples of the importance of locale as a determining component of situational analysis.

6. These remarks are not intended to imply that *all* role—relation differences are necessarily related to language-choice differences. This almost certainly is *not* the case. Just which role-relation differences *are* related to language-choice differences (and under what circumstances) is a matter for empirical determination within each multilingual setting, as well as at different points in time within the same setting. In general, the verification of significantly different clusters of allo-roles (as well as allo-topics and allo-locales) (see below) is a prerequisite for the empirical formulation of domains.

If one meets one's clergyman at the race track the impact of the locale on the topics and role-relationships that normally obtain is likely to be quite noticeable. However, we must also note that domains too are locale-related in the sense that most major social institutions are associated with a very few primary locales. Just as topical appropriateness in face-to-face language choice is indicative of larger scale societal patterns, and just as role appropriateness in face-to-face language choice is similarly indicative, so the locale constraints and local appropriatenesses that obtain in face-to-face language choice have their large-scale implications and extrapolations.

The construct validity of domains

A research project dealing with Puerto Rican bilingualism in the Greater New York City Area has yielded data which may help clarify both the construct validity of domains as well as the procedure for their recognition. Since domains are a higher order generalization from *congruent situations* (i.e. from situations in which individuals interacting in appropriate role-relationships with each other, in the appropriate locales for these role-relationships, and discussing topics appropriate to their role-relationships) it was first necessary to test intuitive and rather clinical estimates of the widespread congruences that were felt to obtain. After more than a year of participant observation and other data-gathering experiences it seemed to Greenfield (1968) that five domains could be generalized from the innumerable situations that he had encountered. He tentatively labeled these 'family', 'friendship', 'religion', 'education' and 'employment' and proceeded to determine whether a typical *situation* could be presented for each domain as a means of collecting self-report data on language choice. As indicated below each domain was represented by a congruent person (interlocutor); place and topic in the self-report instrument that Greenfield constructed for high school students.

Domain	*Interlocutor*	*Place*	*Topic*
Family	Parent	Home	How to be a good son or daughter
Friendship	Friend	Beach	How to play a certain game
Religion	Priest	Church	How to be a good Christian
Education	Teacher	School	How to solve an algebra problem
Employment	Employer	Workplace	How to do your job more efficiently

Greenfield's hypothesis was that within the Puerto Rican speech community, among individuals who knew Spanish and English equally well,