A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY

Updated and Revised Edition

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A Dictionary of Philosophy

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Preface

'My philosophy is . . . ' When a leading figure in the eye of the media is invited to adorn some ceremonial occasion by discoursing upon the philosophy of whatever it may be or when we speak of someone taking something philosophically, the word is being used in a perfectly reputable and useful sense. In this sense philosophy is a matter of standing back a little from the ephemeral urgencies to take an aphoristic overview that usually embraces both value-commitments and beliefs about the general nature of things.

But, although the two senses are not altogether unrelated, it is with philosophy in a second sense that this *Dictionary* deals. For better or for worse, we are concerned here with the very different activity pursued as an academic discipline by departments of philosophy within institutions of tertiary education. To the immediate question, 'What (in this sense) is philosophy?' a good preliminary answer might be that given by a distinguished and well-loved Cambridge professor. The story is told that the preferred response of G. E. Moore was to gesture towards his bookshelves: 'It is what all these are about.' So let us too start by saying that philosophy is the main subject of most of the writings of Plato; of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics;* of large parts of the works of St Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham; of the *Meditations* of Descartes; of the *Ethics* of Spinoza and the *Monadology* of Leibniz; of Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason;* and, finally, in the present century, of Moore's own *Principia Ethica*, of Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World* and *Mysticism and Logic*, and of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

It is only after we have become acquainted with several specimen problems, and with some distinctively philosophical approaches to these problems, that it can begin to be illuminating to press the question, 'What is it that distinguishes all this as philosophical?' If this tactic strikes you as cowardly, even evasive, then ask yourself how you would set about answering the question 'What is mathematics?', put by someone who had

not enjoyed so much as a primary school training in counting and calculation. 'Philosophy' is not a shorthand term; it refers to a kind of activity with which the questioner is most likely to be completely unfamiliar. So the best response to the uninitiate's question, 'What is philosophy?', is not to labour to formulate a neat dictionary definition but instead to offer a few typical philosophical problems as specimens and illustrations, adding whatever remarks may then be necessary to enable enquirers to identify further examples for themselves.

A. N. Whitehead once remarked, with no more exaggeration and distortion than is inevitable in any such epigram, that later philosophy has consisted in a series of footnotes to Plato. So let us use as a prime example, what many contemporaries prefer to call a paradigm case, the topic discussed in *Theaetetus:* 'What is knowledge?' Plato makes it very clear in this dialogue that he is concerned with logical and semantic issues. What does it mean to say—and what is logically presupposed and implied by saying—that something is known? To settle these issues would indeed, in one sense, be to show how knowledge is possible and when and under what conditions it can exist. But Plato is asking the philosopher's logical, conceptual, and semantic questions and these are altogether different from the factual questions asked by the psychologist or the physiologist; their concern would be to investigate the actual mechanisms either of perception or of the expression of assertions in speech or writing. Plato's questions are likewise altogether different from the equally factual questions asked by those whose subject is misleadingly and too narrowly described as the sociology of knowledge. For, in so far as this kind of sociologist really is concerned with knowledge in particular and not beliefs in general (regardless of whether these are or are not known to be true), he is not asking what knowledge essentially is. He is, rather, asking what social conditions promote or inhibit the acquisition of what sorts of knowledge.

As a second paradigm case, one might consider the much disputed issues of 'freewill or predestination' and 'freewill or determinism'. Both phrases are prejudicial and misleading. For the strictly philosophical questions ask what is logically presupposed and logically implied by various kinds of discourse and whether these presuppositions are or are not logically compatible with one another. In the one case it is not a matter of whether the essentials of theism are true or whether we are often (or ever) responsible agents in making our own choices. The relevant question is whether the idea of a creator God, not only all foreseeing but also the sustaining cause of our every action and our very existence, is compatible with the ideas of human responsibility and human choice. Again in the case of the second phrase it is not a matter of whether the Universe is in some sense deterministic nor whether there is

in human conduct some reserved area of indeterminism. Here the question is whether the sciences, and in particular the human sciences, presuppose or reveal some form of determinism and whether this is or is not logically compatible with whatever may be presupposed or implied by our everyday discourse about choice and human action. To describe these issues as those of freewill *or* determinism, or their theological predecessors as those of freewill *or* predestination, is to beg the central philosophical questions in an incompatibilist sense.

Because the present book sets out to be a dictionary of philosophy in the second of the two senses distinguished earlier, very little attention is given to anything that is philosophical only in the first and more popular interpretation. This, and not European parochialism, is why the classics of Chinese philosophy get such short shrift. The *Analects* of Confucius and the *Book of Mencius* are both splendid, of their kind. But neither sage shows much sign of interest in the sort of question thrashed out in *Theaetetus*. The truth is that these classics contain little argument of any sort. When, later in the same tradition, Mo Tzu speaks of the Will of Heaven and when he repudiates fatalism, he does not attempt to analyse these concepts. What he offers as support for his preferred doctrines is an appeal to either his own authority or that of the Sage Kings, or else he points to the unfortunate practical consequences of people holding views alternative to his own. 'If the gentlemen . . . really want the world to be rich and dislike it to be poor . . . they must condemn the doctrine of fatalism. It is a great harm to the world.'

This is a wholly different ball game from that being played by Aristotle in Chapter IX of his *De Interpretatione* in his discussion of the problem of the seafight. Here he first presents a philosophical argument for fatalism and then dismisses it on the basis of his own counter-argument to show (not that it is antisocial or damaging to the interests of the working class but) that it is invalid.

Because philosophy, as we understand it, is characteristically argumentative and essentially directed towards the determination of what logical relations do and do not obtain, a course in this discipline can be, can indeed scarcely fail to be, a fine mental training. However, once we are fully aware of how totally different the two senses of the word 'philosophy' are, we do need to notice that many of the issues of philosophy as an intellectual discipline are in some way relevant to philosophy as world-outlook. To glimpse this truth we need look no further than our two paradigm cases. If, for instance, either an analysis of the concept of knowledge or an examination of the presuppositions and implications of scientific practice should reveal that authentic objective knowledge is either generally or in some particular spheres impossible, then it must become preposterous to strive to subordinate private practice

or public policy to what is thereby proved to be unobtainable. Again, if the findings of the psychological and social sciences really do show that there is no room for choice and for responsibility, then the rational man has somehow to jettison either these ideas or those of the human sciences.

So much for explaining what this *Dictionary* is a dictionary of. And, essentially, it is a dictionary, not an encyclopedia. The majority of items are accounts of the meanings of key words and phrases. We have nevertheless so far departed from true purity of Johnsonian purpose as to admit biographical entries; for the greatest philosophers these entries run to as much as three or four thousand words. We hope that the dictionary's users will find it of value to have both kinds of information in a single volume. A table of symbols and abbreviations has been added on pp. xii–xiii.

Except for this present Preface the whole is heavily cross-referenced. Asterisks preceding a text word or name indicate that the word or name itself constitutes a separate entry, where additional relevant information will be found. In addition there are also explicit verbal injunctions to refer to relevant material under other headings. Although the aim has been to make each individual entry comprehensible and self-sufficient we both hope and expect the normal unit of consultation will be two or three entries rather than one. We, as an editorial team, have encouraged contributors to make a special point of anticipating and correcting common mistakes and popular misconceptions; we hope that many users will detect, and welcome, a certain sense of pedagogic mission. We have not credited particular entries to particular contributors. This is partly because many entries are too short to bear the weight of initials and partly because—in some cases—drastic editing has been necessary in order to preserve uniformity and balance in the book as a whole.

We believe that we have produced a reference book both more comprehensive and in some other ways better than any of its predecessors and competitors. Yet it is obvious that we must have omitted some items that ought to have been included and admitted some interlopers that ought not to have been. So I conclude by inviting detailed criticism, which I shall keep on file until such time as it can be put to constructive use, either by me in the production of a revised edition of the present *Dictionary* or by someone else hoping to do better by learning from and correcting the mistakes that I have missed or made. For, although the other members of the editorial team and the many contributors have collectively and in some cases individually put in far more work than I,

there is no escaping the fact that, in the words of Harry Truman: 'The buck stops here.'

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Preface to the second edition

I rounded off my Preface to the first edition by inviting 'detailed criticism'. The response to this appeal has been excellent. Many reviewers, friends, and ordinary users have pointed out apparent errors or omissions. In the several reprints of the first edition it has been possible to correct proofreading slips and some other small errors, but alterations and additions demanding major changes have had to wait for this second edition. Every suggestion received has in the course of a thorough revision been carefully considered and most, although of course not all, have been adopted. For reasons of tact I will not specify any significant deletions, but there have been many substantial additions and changes.

The editorial team were all convinced that the first edition was a more comprehensive and in other ways better work than any predecessor or current competitor; it is gratifying to add that both the reviewers and the buying public appear to have agreed. The second edition, thanks largely to the help of some of these reviewers and of the buying public, is, we hope, much improved. However we are not infallible and everything in this world both can and should be made better. I therefore ask once more for suggestions and corrections.

Antony Flew

Propositional (or sentential) logic

symbol *read as*	*connective*	*example*	*read as*
& (ampersand) $\wedge$ ·	conjunction	$P \,\&\, Q$ $P \wedge Q$ $P \cdot Q$	P and Q
$\vee$ (vel)	disjunction	$P \vee Q$	P or Q
$\supset$ (hook) $\rightarrow$	conditional	$P \supset Q$ $P \rightarrow Q$	P materially implies Q *or* (informally) if P then Q
iff $\leftrightarrow$ $\equiv$	biconditional	P iff Q $P \leftrightarrow Q$ $P \equiv Q$	P if and and only if Q
$\neg$ $-$ $\sim$ (tilde)	negation	$\neg P$ $-P$ $\sim P$	not P *or* it is not the case that P

P, Q *or* p, q stand for sentences.

Predicate (or quantificational) logic

symbol	*description*	*stand for*
F, G	predicate constants	predicates (e.g. " . . . is tall", " . . . runs".)
a, b, c,	individual constants	individual names (and function like proper names of objects)
x, y, z,	variables	place holders (and function like pronouns)
$\forall$	universal quantifier	"for all . . . " or "for every . . . " $(\forall x)Fx$ = for all x, F is true of x
$\exists$	existential quantifier	"for some . . . ", or "there is one . . . " $(\exists x)Gx$ = for some x, G is true of x
ι (iota)	definite description operator	"the unique . . . " $(\iota x)Fx$ = the one and only x that is F
E!	E shriek	"there is exactly one . . . " $(E!x)Fx$ = there is exactly one x that is F

Set theory

symbol		*explanation*
ϵ (epsilon)	membership	$x \epsilon A$ = x is a member of A
$\subset$	proper inclusion	$A \subset B$ = A is a proper subset of B *or* A is properly included in B (N.B. it is not the case that $A \subset A$)
$\subseteq$	inclusion (subset)	$A \subseteq B$ = A is a subset of B *or* A is included in B (N.B. $A \subseteq A$. A is a subset of A)
$\cap$ (cap)	intersection	$A \cap B$ = the set of all things belonging to both A and B
$\cup$ (cup)	union	$A \cup B$ = the set of all things belonging to A or belonging to B
$< >$	ordered n-tuple	$<x, y>$ = the pair x, y in that order
{ } (brace)	sets	sets are indicated either (1) extentionally: {1, 3, 5, 7} = the set consisting of the numbers 1, 3, 5, and 7. or (2) by definition: $\{x: \phi x\}$ = the set consisting of all things that satisfy the condition ϕ. N.B. (2) is also written $\hat{x}\ (\phi\ x)$
$\emptyset$ or 0 or { }	the null set	the empty set
$\times$	Cartesian product (read as 'cross')	$A \times B = \{<x, y>: x \epsilon A, \& y \epsilon B\}$

Formal languages and systems

symbol	*stand for*
L	language
S	system
wff	well-formed formula
ϕ, ψ	wffs
$\Gamma.\Delta$	sets of wffs
$\vdash$ (turnstile)	" . . . is provable from . . . "
$\models$	" . . . is valid consequence of . . . "
$\top$	the true
$\bot$	the false

Modal logic

symbol	*stand for*
$\Box$	necessarily
$\Diamond$	possibly

A

Abailard, Peter, See Abelard.

abandonment. One of the central ideas of atheistic existentialists, such as *Sartre. Since God does not exist there can be no objective values or meaning to life; thus man is thrust out into the world, "abandoned". He must make decisions, distinguish right from wrong, but as there is no guiding hand he is thrown back entirely on himself.

Abbagnano, Nicola (1901–). Italian existentialist philosopher. He studied at Naples and lectured in Turin from 1936, becoming co-editor of the journal *Rivista di filosofia.*

Influenced by *Husserl's *phenomenology and by the works of *Kierkegaard, *Heidegger, and *Jaspers, Abbagnano presented his "philosophy of the possible" in the three-volume *Storia della filosofia* (1946–50). Human existence must be interpreted as the series of possibilities that follow the realization of being and every act of choice. Not enough attention is given in modern modal logic to the meaning either of 'possible' as distinct from 'potential' (here taken as implying predetermination and perhaps actualization) or of 'contingent' (here taken as implying the necessity of something else). Every possibility has its positive and negative aspects (*see* double aspect theory) and there is a logical relationship between possibility and freedom, for which Abbagnano argues in *Possibilità e libertà* (1956); the *normative 'ought-to-be' is the moral equivalent of the empirical 'may-be'.

abduction. 1.A *syllogism of which the *major premise is true but *minor premise is only probable. **2.** The name given by C. S. *Peirce to the creative formulation of new statistical hypotheses that explain a given set of facts.

Abelard (or **Abailard**), Peter (1079–1142). French philosopher, logician, and theologian. Details of his life and misadventures are contained in his *Historia Calamitatum Mearum* (The Story of my Misfortunes). When still quite young he studied under the famous nominalist Roscelin. In Paris Abelard became first a pupil and later the opponent of the realist William of Champeaux (*see* nominalism; realism; universals and particulars). One of Abelard's many quarrels was with Fulbert, a canon of Paris, whose niece Heloïse was successively pupil, lover, and covert wife of Abelard. In 1118, Abelard, having been castrated by ruffians in Fulbert's employ, retired to a monastery. It is from this period onwards that his writings are usually dated.

On the logical side Abelard commented on the Neoplatonic Porphyry's *Isagoge* (*see* scholasticism), on Aristotle's *Categories*, as well as on the *De Divisionibus* (On Classification) attributed to Boethius. His *Dialectica*, a logical work in its own right, was repeatedly revised until a few years prior to his death. The *Scito te Ipsum* (Know Thyself) contains a well worked out ethics of intention. *Sic et Non* (For and Against) stimulates discussion by listing, for a total of 158 controverted questions, points on which authoritative theological texts appear to be discordant (for example, on whether faith should be supported by reason). Other works are his *Introduction to Theology*, and a treatise on the Trinity. St. *Bernard of Clairvaux was among his theological opponents.

Abelard played a major part in the universals controversy, a part that was shaped by the form in which that controversy presented itself to *scholasticism. His stance in general was antirealist. The extreme form of one type of realism held, in effect, that in the end there are only ten objects, these being the ten Aristotelian *categories. Thus any diversities within the category of substance—even between, for

example a horse and a rock—are really cases of variations within a single object. One of Abelard's arguments against this theory relies on the fact that it absurdly makes the same thing have simultaneously contrary qualities. Another, and saner, form of realism which he also attacks is the collection theory, according to which the universal is the collection of all the objects in question. Thus the universal *man* is simply all men; the latter, that is comprise a collective class. Some of Abelard's criticisms of this theory rely on his neglect of the distinction between a mere collection and a complete collection, or on the ordinary fact that the ways in which parts of a class relate to their whole are not identical in the two cases of collective classes and classes in the more usual (distributive) sense. Nevertheless, certain sections of his theory of collective classes deal interestingly with identity and continuity, and in particular with the nature of allegedly "principal parts" necessary for continued identity. (This discussion allowed Roscelin, with whom he quarrelled, to cast doubt on Abelard's post-1118 identity.)

Although thus opposed to these and other realist theories, Abelard is nevertheless critical of psychologistic or nominalistic theories of the universal. For him, talk involving universals is in a sense about things, since, for example, being a man is not being a horse. But this does not mean that universals as such are things. A similar attitude is evinced in his discussion of the way in which propositions have meaning.

Abrabanel, Judah. *See* Ebreo.

absolute idealism. *See* idealism.

absolute space. Space regarded as an entity within which bodies are placed, and which itself has real properties, such as shape or extension. This view was held by Newton, but opposed by Leibniz and most subsequent philosophers. *See also* relativity; space and time, philosophy of.

absolute, the. A term used by post-Kantian idealist metaphysicians to cover the totality of what really exists, a totality thought of as a unitary system somehow both generating and explaining all apparent diversity. For *Schelling and *Hegel reality is spiritual, and their absolute is a very unanthropomorphic philosophical God, rather than Nature. The more atheistical F. H.* Bradley begins by arguing that all the fundamental categories of ordinary thought are corrupted by irremovable contradictions, and hence must be dismissed as mere appearance: quality and relation, substance and cause, subject and object, time and space, are all equally irredeemable. The absolute, which is reality, must have a nature which is above all these merely apparent categories. It must transcend all relational thinking, though all thinking is somehow or other relational. It must have a unity overcoming and passing beyond all relations and differences. No wonder, perhaps, that mischievous critics represented it as being, like our brave captain's map, "a perfect and absolute blank"; or as being like the night, in which all cows are black. The idea is anticipated by *Spinoza, in his notion that reality is one single substance, *Deus sive Natura*, God or Nature.

absolutism. 1. (in politics) The exercise of power unrestricted by any checks or balances. **2.** (in philosophy) The opposite of 'relativism', and hence infected with all the same ambiguity and indeterminacy. *Compare* relativism.

abstract ideas. A concept the peculiar nature of which has been a longstanding concern with philosophers. If words are employed meaningfully then, surely, the user must have an idea of what they mean; indeed perhaps that idea *is* the meaning? Granted this seductively obvious assumption, then a question arises about such gen-

eral words as 'man', or 'animal', or 'triangle'. Since they cannot refer to anything individual and particular, maybe what is involved is abstract ideas conceived as special kinds of mental images. *Locke once suggested that such abstract general ideas must have all the diverse characteristics of all the individuals belonging to the class "yet all and none of these at once" (*Essay* IV (vii) 9). *Berkeley leapt upon this unhappy suggestion, excoriating it as contradictory and absurd. His own first proposal was later hailed by *Hume as "one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters" (*Treatise* I (i) 7). Offered in the *Principles*, it was that we employ a particular idea from the class, as representative of it. Later, and often unnoticed, in *Alciphron* (VII 14) Berkeley sketched but never developed an altogether different account, suggestive of the later *Wittgenstein: significant expressions may have meaning simply because they have a use; as, "for instance, the algebraic mark, which denotes the root of a negative square, hath its use in logistic operations, although it be impossible to form an idea of any such quantity." *See also* conceptualism; nominalism; realism; universals and particulars.

abstraction. In thought, leaving out, by not attending to, the apparently irrelevant distinguishing features (or even common features) of the several individuals falling within a class. All classification must involve some abstraction. In classifying a group of individuals as yellow, one is ignoring any other respects in which they either resemble or differ from one another. What is called abstract or non-objective art ought rather to be described as non-representational. Abstraction is found rather in the simplifications of represented objects, for instance in Picasso's cubist period. In opposing actuality to 'mere abstraction' philosophers contrast the world of existence with that of *subsistence.

absurdity. In the vulgar sense, obvious falsity or opposition to common sense or reason. The argument form called **reductio ad absurdum* consists in deriving a definite contradiction, that is, both a proposition and its negation, from a set of premises; whence it follows that at least one of the set must be false if the others are true. Philosophers and linguists have attempted to provide criteria for the kind or kinds of apparently non-self-contradictory absurdity exemplified in sentences such as 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously'. *See* category mistake.

Abunaser. *See* al-Fārābī.

Academy of Athens. In effect, the first university, established by *Plato about 385 BC. The 'Old Academy' of Plato and his immediate successors was sometimes distinguished from both the 'Middle Academy' of *Arcesilaus and the 'New Academy' of *Carneades with their sceptical tendencies (*see* Scepticism). An Athenian school of *Neoplatonism, calling itself the Academy, was closed down, as a bastion of paganism, in 529 AD.

Academy of Florence. The informal college established in 1462 at Careggi, near Florence, in imitation of Plato's *Academy of Athens. Under the guidance of *Ficino, it played a leading role in the Platonic revival in Renaissance Europe.

acceptance. One possible reaction to a theory or to evidence. A philosopher of science who believes that evidence never decisively proves or refutes a scientific theory may conclude that acceptance of a theory ought always to be provisional or partial. This seems, however, to conflict with the high confidence we all place in the technologies and predictions that are justified by a well tested theory. The conflict is particularly marked in statistics, where the provisional nature of the evidence is

often very clear. *See also* Popper; science, philosophy of.

access. *See* privileged access.

accident 1. (in scholastic philosophy) That which in itself has no independent or self-sufficient existence, but only inheres in a *substance. This latter may remain in a more or less fixed form, while "its" accidents disappear or alter. **2.** (in Aristotelian logic) An inessential property, that which may be attributed to a substance without being essential to that substance. For instance, a girl may be blonde, but she must be female; blondeness in this example is an accident, femaleness is not.

accident, fallacy of the. *See* converse fallacy of the accident.

Achilles and the tortoise (or **Achilles paradox**). *See* Zeno's paradoxes.

acquaintance *and* **description, knowledge by.** Where the word 'know' takes a direct object, as in 'Father knew Lloyd George' or 'Pan Am knows America', philosophers speak of *knowledge by acquaintance;* where it is followed by a that-clause, as in 'I know that p', they talk of *knowledge by description.* In the *Republic*—in developing the great images of the sun, the line, and the cave—*Plato starts from the idea that every cognitive faculty must and can only involve knowledge by acquaintance. Hence all such faculties must have, like varieties of perception, their own peculiar objects for us to be acquainted with. *See also* knowledge.

acrasia (or **akrasia**). (Greek for: weakness.) An alternative name for *weakness of the will. The term derives from the Aristotelian distinction between the *akrates*, the morally weak man, and the *enkrates*, the man who can resist temptation. *See also* Plato.

action. A word sometimes applied to things (for example, the action of acid on metal), but primarily relating to the doings of purposive agents. Aristotle distinguished an action—what a man does (*poiesis*)—from what merely happens to him (*pathos:* usually translated 'affection' or 'passion').

There are three main philosophical problems about action. (1) The first concerns how it is to be defined. The standard account, 'a bodily movement preceded by an act of will', runs into problems (*see* volition). (2) The second issue concerns the evaluation or appraisal of action (*see* responsibility).

(3) A source of much recent debate has been the *explanation* of action. The 'actions' of a drugged or hypnotized man are explicable in terms of special causal antecedents; but what of a normal rational action, such as putting on an overcoat to go out? Should we say that my **reason* for donning the coat (wanting to avoid the cold) is the *cause* of my action? A standard objection to this view depends on the Humean thesis that a cause is logically independent of its effects: it is alleged that the connection that such explanations would invoke ('whenever someone desires to avoid the cold, and a coat is the best way to do it, and nothing prevents him, then he puts on a coat') is a trivial logical connection—a mere explication of what desiring something *means.* However, it seems a mistake to suppose that desire can only be specified by reference to the acts in which they issue; so this type of objection appears unfounded.

Some philosophers are opposed in principle to the attempt to explain action causally, because they fear such an approach threatens human freedom. But such a threat would only arise if the mental antecedents of action turned out to be occurrences that were somehow beyond the agent's control.

action at a distance. The idea, in physics, that one body can affect another without any intervening mechanical link between them. The use of the term implies a remote and instantaneous influence by the body, without any

apparent mechanism for transmitting the force produced.

This would seem to be the case in gravitational interactions, for example, where two masses mutually attract although they are separated by empty space. From Newton's time until the early 19th century such phenomena (including magnetic and electrostatic interactions) were explained by postulating hypothetical fluids, such as the luminiferous ether, to transmit a force.

In modern physics the idea of hypothetical fluids has been abandoned and action at a distance is described in terms of what Einstein himself characterized as "the rather artificial notion" of fields. This model allows the phenomena to be quantified and "explained" in terms of local interactions. Thus an electric charge is said to set up an electric field in the space around it; a second charge in this region experiences a force by interaction with this field. An alternative, but mathematically equivalent, description uses the idea of *virtual particles*, exchanged between the interacting bodies. Such interactions are not instantaneous but are transmitted at the speed of light. According to the general theory of *relativity a gravitational field is the result of a "bending" of space-time caused by the presence of a mass. So far attempts to extend this idea to electrical and other interactions, thus producing a unified field theory, have been unsuccessful.

actuality *and* **potentiality**. **1**. Contrasting terms for that which has form, in Aristotle's sense, and that which has merely the possibility of having form. Actuality (Greek: *energeia*) is that mode of being in which a thing can bring other things about or be brought about by them—the realm of events and facts. By contrast, potentiality (Greek: *dynamis*) is not a mode in which a thing exists, but rather the power to effect change, the capacity of a thing to make transitions into different states. **2.** In the philosophy of *Husserl actuality (German: *Wirklichkeit*) means existence in space and time, as opposed to possibility.

Adelard of Bath (fl. 12th century). English writer on philosophy, important for transmitting Arabic scientific learning to the West. His main philosophical work, *De Eodem et Diverso* (On Identity and Difference), contains one of the medieval solutions to the difficulty of allowing an equally full degree of reality both to the existence of the individual and to that of the species and genus to which he or it belongs. Adelard argued that species and genus are unaffected by individuating characteristics (*see* genus; individuation, principle of).

ad hominem argument. (Latin for: argument directed at a man.) The name stands for two kinds of argument. The first kind is a fallacious argument (*see* fallacy) whereby the premises merely attack a particular man (for example, for his unwholesome moral character) while the conclusion purports to establish the falsity of a thesis he holds. The argument may establish some interesting inconsistency between the man and his views, or lead one to find the grounds on which he holds them to be suspect. But it shows nothing about the truth or falsity of his thesis.

The second kind is an argument taking as its premise something that is accepted by the other party but not perhaps by the arguer and deducing a consequence unacceptable to that other party. This form of argument is sometimes dismissed as fallacious or otherwise improper. Such rejection is quite wrong. There is no fallacy in drawing from a premise a conclusion that does indeed follow. Nor is there anything improper about showing someone that they cannot consistently hold that and reject this.

For instance, it was discovered that close private associates of a political leader had been profiting generously from real estate deals of a kind that

that politician had denounced as wicked. Opponents who pointed out that these practices were inconsistent with his stated principles were attacked as slanderers and hypocrites for no better reason than that they had never themselves lived by, nor even pretended to accept, those politically popular but contentious principles.

This second kind of argument *ad hominem* is not improper but quite specially appropriate where two disputants are in moral disagreement. For how could one be moved nearer to the other better or more rationally than by being shown that his own first stated principles would require conclusions that he himself would find repugnant?

a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. (Latin for: from the phrase qualified to the same phrase without qualification.)In traditional logic, a fallacy also known as the *converse fallacy of the accident.

a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. (Latin for: from the phrase without qualification to the same phrase qualified.) In traditional logic, a fallacy also known as the fallacy of the accident. *See* converse fallacy of the accident.

Aenesidemus (1st century BC). Sceptical philosopher, active in Alexandria. His works, now lost, included *Pyrrhonian Discourses* and an *Outline of Pyrrhonism*. Originally an Academic, Aenesidemus broke away to revive an authentic Pyrrhonian philosophy. He systematically reduced the argument for "suspension of judgment" to ten "tropes" or modes. *See* Pyrrho; Scepticism.

aesthetics. The philosophical study of art. In its original Greek derivation, the term denoted the study of sense experience generally, and it was not until the mid-18th century, following a usage introduced by the German philosopher A. G. *Baumgarten, that a particular reference to the idea of *beauty in nature and art was established. The current meaning developed even later in the 18th and early 19th centuries, coinciding with the first clear articulation of the concept of fine art.

Although discussions of beauty have always figured in the history of philosophy, these discussions were, until the modern period, invariably linked to primary concerns with epistemology and ontology, or with moral and social value, or with logic. *Plato and *Aristotle, for example, were both concerned with the question whether art could embody and communicate knowledge and truth. And Plato's view that it could not—that art stood at several removes from reality—led him to proscribe most forms of art from his ideal Republic, lest its citizens be diverted from nobler pursuits. In the early 18th century, empiricist philosophers such as Francis *Hutcheson and David *Hume were primarily concerned with the standards and logic of our judgments of taste and beauty.

The real impetus to the idea of aesthetics as a distinctive branch of philosophy occurred in the work of Baumgarten and, especially, *Kant. For each came to regard aesthetic consciousness as a significant and unitary element of human experience generally. In Kant's view, aesthetic judgment is unlike either theoretical (that is, cognitive) judgment or practical (that is, moral) judgment, in that it is effected entirely subjectively, solely in reference to the subject himself (though the judgment nevertheless commands universal assent in virtue of the common ground of our subjectivity). At the same time, Kant argued in his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), aesthetic judgment provides the essential focus for connecting the theoretical and practical aspects of our nature. It can thus reconcile the worlds of nature and freedom which he had earlier, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), shown to be distinct.

Kant's aesthetic theories were to find extensive elaboration in the work