

Foreign Policy Making in Russia

An Analysis of Domestic Entanglements

Edited by

Eunsook Chung



THE SEJONG INSTITUTE

Foreign Policy Making in Russia

An Analysis of Domestic Entanglements

Foreign Policy Making in Russia

An Analysis of Domestic Entanglements

Edited by
Eunsook Chung

The Sejong Institute

Foreign Policy Making in Russia

An Analysis of Domestic Entanglements

Edited by Eunsook Chung

Published by the Sejong Institute

Pundang P. O. Box 45, Sungnam, Korea 463-050

The Sejong Institute is an independent, non-profit organization devoted to research on international affairs, national security, and Korean unification.

Copyright © 1998 by the Sejong Institute

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the Sejong Institute.

Printed in the Republic of Korea by the Kwangil Publishing Co., Seoul, Korea

ISBN 89-7429-342-0 93340

Contents

Foreword / 7

Introduction / 9

- 1 Power Struggle and Russian Foreign Policy Making**
Hannes J. Adomeit / 17
- 2 Russian Foreign Policy Making**
Institutionalization in Offing?
Andrei V. Kortunov / 55
- 3 Interest Groups and Russian Foreign Policy Making**
Economic, Epistemic, and Civic Domains
Eunsook Chung / 101

Selected Bibliography / 133

Notes on the Contributors / 143

Index / 145

Foreword

This volume, *Foreign Policy Making in Russia: An Analysis of Domestic Entanglements*, is the outcome of a project that was launched in 1996 under the auspices of the Sejong Institute. It constitutes the fifth research project for the Sejong Institute in its pursuit of Russian studies. *Korea and Russia: Toward the 21st Century* (1992), *Russia in the Far East and Asia Pacific Region* (1994), *Russia's Far Eastern Region* (in Korean, 1995), and *Russia's Military Strategy in the New Security Environment* (1996) comprise the volumes previously published by the Institute as project results.

As a research and policy analysis organization, the Sejong Institute has been devoted to research on national security, foreign policy, and Korean reunification since 1983, aiming to strengthen the bond between the study and policy formulation. In the process, the Sejong Institute has made no effort to impose a single set of policy preferences or political judgments on individual contributors. I hope that the findings in this volume will encourage additional research in the field of Russian foreign policy, particularly with regard to specialists and academics both within Korea and abroad.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the renown contributors for their cooperation in producing this book. Special thanks are due to Dr. Eunsook Chung, who dealt with the many substantive and technical questions that arose along the complexities of international coordination.

Bae-Ho Hahn
President
The Sejong Institute
December 1997

Introduction

Researchers on Russia have thus far agreed that the opportunities to participate in the foreign policy process have expanded since the breakup of the Soviet Union, but that institutions were unstable and infirm, especially during the early years of Andrei Kozyrev's lead of Russia's foreign ministry.¹

One of the major reasons for the replacement of Kozyrev as foreign minister by Yevgeni Primakov in January 1996 was to end Russia's fragmented foreign policy. Indeed, Duma criticism of the Foreign Ministry has dropped off considerably since the appointment of Primakov. It was also a major diplomatic success on the home front that foreign policy was kept out of the presidential election battle in mid-1996. Primakov neutralized the opposition's national-patriotic cards by using them himself, together with Boris Yeltsin, to uphold Russian interests and independence more actively. A day after Yeltsin began his second term as President, Primakov, being asked about his relations with the new but powerful officials – Chubais, Lebed, Rodionov – stated:

I am interested first and foremost in their understanding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the interdepartmental coordinator of Russia's foreign policy. All three of them understand this. Moreover, Chubais, Lebed, and Rodionov want to strengthen the position of the Ministry of Foreign

¹ To illustrate a few: Nicolai N. Pedro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State* (New York: Long man, 1997); Leszek Buszynski, *Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996); Peter Shearman, ed., *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov, eds., *Damage Limitation or Crisis?: Russia and the Outside World* (Washington, D.C.: Brasseys, Inc., 1994).

Affairs as the country's principal foreign-policy agency. We cannot have several departmental foreign policies. There is a one foreign policy - that of the state.²

Nevertheless, it is not clear yet, whether Primakov has managed to assert control over Russian foreign policy. Robert O. Freedman sees at least six actors participating in Russia's foreign policy making within the executive only, let alone the State Duma: (i) Yeltsin himself and the extensive presidential apparatus; (ii) the Foreign Ministry led by Primakov; (iii) Lukoil, Transneft, Gazprom and other energy conglomerates linked to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin; (iv) the Defense Ministry led by Igor Rodionov; (v) the Atomic Energy Ministry led by Victor Mikhailov; and (vi) the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations led by Oleg Davydov, and the *Rosvooruzheniye*, state-owned arms export company, which is subordinate to the ministry.³ Recently, it is even said that the leading example of an independent foreign policy making actor in Russia is Lukoil, owned in part by the American oil company ARCO.⁴ Lukoil's sign with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company to extract Azerbaijani oil from the Caspian Sea at the rebuff of the Russian Foreign Ministry points to a widespread lack of coordination among the foreign policy elite.

Naturally, competing visions on Russia's national interest and appropriate strategies for it among the political elites in Moscow have very often taken the shape of a power struggle. Most recently, some military experts are inclined to see the creation in the summer of 1996 of a new body, Defense Council, under the Russian Federation President as a political attempt to bring about a gradual waning of Aleksander Lebed's (then Security Council Secretary's) influence on power organizations.⁵

² *Izvestia*, 9 August 1996.

³ Robert O. Freeman, "Russian Policy Making and Caspian Sea Oil," *Analysis of Current Events*, 9, no. 2 (February 1997), 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ In the new body, the Russian President is Chairman, Prime Minister Victor

In the meantime, the general population in Russia has changed from what it was during the Cold War days. That is, in the process of articulating and aggregating their own interests, each newly emerging group of the Russian society influences the leaders' policy options not only internal but also external in one way or another.

In this book three specialists, whose research bases are differently located from each other in Moscow, Ebenhausen (until very recently in Medford), and Seoul, have surveyed the role of political elites, governmental organizations, and semi to nongovernmental groups in the process of Russia's foreign policy making in three articles and suggest some tentative conclusions concerning the direction of change. In preparing their analyses, the authors address the following issues in one way or another: How each participant or groups have arrived to set their own interests?, How well do they rationalize their narrow interests through common-good terms?, and Would Russia follow a path of gradual institutionalization and partnership with the Western powers or of the opposite direction?

If there is a theoretically shared assumption for the three authors of this book, it would be the linkage theory of foreign policy. That is, this book is designed to project domestic configuration of Russia's foreign policy in an era of transition. As elaborated in Robert D. Putnam's two-level games approach, in order to conclude a negotiation successfully, foreign policy actor(s) in each country must bargain on two levels, not only reaching an international agreement but also securing its domestic ratification. At the domestic level, the actors who are supposed to ratify an agreement at the international level are

Chernomyrdin is Vice Chairman and Presidential Assistant for National Security Yuri Baturin is Secretary. Nine of seventeen members of the Defense Council are concurrently members of the Security Council and the new body claims for itself a very important component of the work of the Security Council per se. (*Sevodnya*, 27 July 1996; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 July 1996).

not confined to the parliament. According to Putnam, they may represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even public opinion.⁶

In Chapter 1 Hannes Adomeit explores Russia's foreign policy making from an angle of power struggle among Russia's decisionmaking actors. He argues that the task facing an analyst attempting to reconstruct the distribution of domestic power and its impact on foreign policy is more complex and difficult today than at any time in the Soviet era. Having briefly noted the evolution of the relationship between personalities, power, and policy at the early stage of Russian Federation, which were favorable to the West, Adomeit pays attention to the political comeback of nationalists and communists and its impact on Russian foreign policy in the period from 1992 to 1996. Yet the author asks readers for the recognition of cooperative policies Russia has thus far pursued in her relations with the West. Eventually, based on his conviction that the future direction of Russian foreign policy and the interrelationship between foreign policy and domestic politics can best be discussed in the context of the rise and fall of some of Yeltsin's closest advisers, Adomeit depicts power rivalries among the advisers especially around the presidential election of summer 1996: The Korzakov-Soskovets-Barsukov troika ("War Party"), Alexander Lebed, Chubais-Nemtsov-the Big Seven, etc. The author emphasizes that after the war party was defeated and Lebed was ousted in 1996, the representatives of the new

⁶ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, 42 (Summer 1988), 427-61. For other recently publicized researches in this vein, see also Peter B. Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1994); Ronen Palan and Barry Gills, eds., *Beyond the Global-State Divide: A Neo-Structuralist Approach* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Richard Rosecrance and Art Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Thomas Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy* (Boulder: Westview 1993); and Daniel Verdier, *Democracy and International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

financial and commercial structures who had financed the president's reelection campaign came to dominate. The author's tentative conclusion is that at least for the foreseeable future, pragmatist and cooperative tendencies should continue to characterize Russia's conduct in world affairs.

The second chapter prepared by Andrei Kortunov sheds light on the institutional competition and rivalry in Russia's foreign policy making process. Kortunov, drawing mostly from his own personal experiences as a prominent specialist on his country's policy toward the U.S., explores the operation of the main foreign policy institutions of post-communist Russia and their interactions with each other. Kortunov stresses that the formulation and conduct of Russian foreign policy are severely affected by the domestic factors. His chapter is structured in a way to trace the stages of the development of Russian Statehood itself: (i) early post-independence period, associated with an upsurge of liberal reformism (1992 – fall of 1993); (ii) intensified internal power struggle and cardinal shift from democratic pluralism to the revival of rigid centralized controls (later part of 1993); (iii) establishment of the presidential system leading to sweeping readjustments in the system of state authority (1993 – late 1994); and (iv) exacerbation of internal contradictions and crisis of authoritarian rule, as manifested by the civil war in Chechnya (1995 – early 1997). In the context of these stages, the author details the rise and fall of each state organization in its influence in the foreign policy making: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Security Council, Presidential Security Force, Defense Council, State Duma, etc. In forecasting Russia's future foreign policy making, Kortunov underlines that such international controversies as NATO expansion are bound to grow in importance in internal Russian debates and lead to an even more complex and contradictory situation in the way Russian foreign policy is formulated and conducted.

Our third chapter written by Eunsook Chung deals more widely with the influence of interest groups, that is, semi to nonstate actors in the process of Russia's foreign policy making in a new era. Shedding light on the pluralist image of

international relations theory, the three – economic, epistemic, and civic – domains of the Russian society are chosen to comprise the interest groups lobbying in the Russian foreign policy process. While admitting some limitations in using the concept of interest groups, which mostly stem from the communist legacy, Chung deals firstly with economic groups such as the oil and gas complex, military-industrial complex, and regional groups, which possess policy implications for Russia's external economic relations. Secondly, the author looks into epistemic community composed of foreign policy experts and academicians on international relations. Chung argues that given the complex patterns of interdependence among states and the increasingly technical nature of international issues, decision-makers in Russia are mostly experiencing uncertainty about their interests and how to realize them. In this situation, says Chung, those who can supply information and expert advice can exert considerable influence on policy. Lastly, the notion of the interest group in this chapter also embraces a broader concept of civil society including various civic and religious organizations, which, as movements, could play roles either in setting public parameters for foreign policy direction or directly influencing it. As concluding remarks, Chung distinguishes democracy and democratization and emphasizes that Russia has not yet reached a point of stable democracy, but is in the process of democratization where multiple actors attempt to affect foreign policy making in a disorderly way. Accordingly, her proposal is that both policy analysts and policy makers of other countries should be patient with the unstable process in Russia's foreign policy today.

Due to the quickness of changes in Russia's development on the one hand, and the limited space for each author to utilize on the other hand, the authors do not intend to provide a comprehensive review of each and every actor in the process of Russia's foreign policy making. Nevertheless, the fact that the nature and function of the different actors involved in the process of Russia's foreign policy were attempted to be

disclosed is the real substantial achievement of this book. The selected bibliography at the end of the book lists the major works in the field and is intended to assist those who seek in-depth knowledge of the various aspects of Russia's foreign policy making.

I would like to acknowledge Drs. Kortunov and Adomeit for their suggestions and encouragement at the outset as well as their own contributions of articles. Especially, I feel obliged to express special thanks to Dr. Adomeit, who had to move across continents from North America to Europe during our project period, for his generosity in pleasantly accepting the pressure imposed by the editor.

The chapters of this volume do not represent views of the Sejong Institute. As for any errors of fact, interpretation, or conceptualization, the authors of this volume accept full responsibility.

Eunsook Chung

Seoul

