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ISOCRATES
VOLUME II



Translated by
GEORGE NORLIN

ISOCRATES

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PREFACE

IN order to include in this volume the discourses of Isocrates which deal more particularly with the domestic and the foreign policy of Athens and with his own life and work in relation thereto, I have departed from the conventional order and grouped together the *Peace*, the *Areopagiticus*, *Against the Sophists*, the *Antidosis* and the *Panathenaicus*. For convenience, the conventional numbering is given in brackets.

Miss Maud E. Craig, Assistant Professor of Classics in the University of Colorado, who assisted greatly in the preparation of the first volume, has helped even more in the preparation of the second. Her painstaking care in going over the manuscript, in verifying references, and in reading proof deserves more than this acknowledgement.

GEORGE NORLIN

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I. ON THE PEACE

INTRODUCTION

It is questionable whether the title *On the Peace*, which is used in most modern editions, following the two manuscripts Γ and Ε^a and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, is more appropriate to the matter of the discourse than the title *On the Confederacy*,^b which is given in the other manuscripts and in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* iii. 17.

In any case, the discourse is only in a very limited sense an argument for a particular treaty of peace to end the wretched Social War which Athens was waging against her former allies, the Chians, the Coans, the Rhodians, and the Byzantines, who had withdrawn from the Second Athenian Confederacy and were now fighting for their independence. The Athenians were themselves weary of the war, and Isocrates seems to assume that some sort of peace is to be patched up.^c Eubulus, leader of the peace party, had apparently already drawn up the articles

^a See General Introd. p. xlvi, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L.

^b Ὁ ΣΤΗΜΜΑΧΙΚΟΣ. The word *συνμαχία* means any alliance, no matter how limited or temporary, but denoted also a voluntary federation of allied states under a recognized leadership, such as the Confederacy of Delos, formed in 478 B.C., and the Second Confederacy or League, formed in 378 B.C., both under the leadership of Athens.

^c In fact, he speaks as if the peace were already an accomplished fact. See 15.

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of a treaty^a conceding independence to the recalcitrant allies, and it only remained for the General Assembly to act upon them. But Isocrates is not interested in this proposed pact; it does not go to the root of the matter, being merely a palliative—an expedient to end one war only to make room for another.^b He is seeking a permanent cure for the troubles into which Athens has fallen, and he finds it only in a radical reversal of her policy of aggression.^c He proposes, therefore, that she make a lasting peace “not only with Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium, but with all the world.”^d This is a high-sounding phrase, but he means nothing less. Athens must come to her senses, throw away her dream of empire, and recognize once for all the right of each Hellenic state to be free and independent. Not only that, she must be alert and active in the championship of that right and, by the exercise of moral supremacy, win back the good will of the Hellenes and so regain the leadership which she lost by the exercise of military power.

In urging this, he has in mind the position which Athens once held among the Hellenic states; he is thinking of the Confederacy of Delos as it was in the beginning—a voluntary federation of free states with a common purpose and a chosen leadership—before Athens turned it into an empire maintained by force. It is the ideal of the *Panegyricus* over again^e—an ideal more precious now in contrast with the evils of imperialism more clearly seen and more vividly set forth in the light of recent history. When

^a See 16, note.

^b See 25.

^c See 132 ff.

^d See 16.

^e See *Paneg.* 80, 81, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L.

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he wrote the *Panegyricus*, he had before him the disasters which overtook, first, the Athenian Empire and, after it, the Empire of Sparta. Since that time, the Theban supremacy, gained at the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., had taken the same "mad" course and suffered a similar fate.^a Moreover, Athens had in the meantime repeated the mistakes which brought about the dissolution of the Confederacy of Delos. The Second Confederacy, formed in 378 B.C., had started out with bright hopes. It seemed that the lessons of former experience had been laid to heart, but these were soon forgotten. The same coercive measures were taken to extend and hold together the League.^b Chares, in particular, the leading general of Athens, who had no mind for moral scruples, bullied the allies and treated them as subject states;^c and orators—above all Aristophon—were not lacking at home to dangle before the people the alluring baits of empire. The results were the revolt of the allies, the Social War, and the state of demoralization in Athens which is described in this discourse and in the *Areopagiticus*.

The hopeful exuberance of the *Panegyricus* is absent from the discourse *On the Peace*. There is no suggestion here of a union of all Hellas in a crusade against Persia, although that dream is still in the background of the author's mind.^d Twenty-five years of disconcerting experience have had their effect. It is enough for Isocrates now to urge Athens to set her own house in order and to take the lead in a consistent policy

^a See *Philip* 53, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L.

^b See General Introd. p. xxxvii, Vol. I., L.C.L.

^c See Diodorus xv. 95.

^d See *Epist.* ix., Vol. III., L.C.L.

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of peace, resorting to war only to defend the principle that the states of Hellas have the right to be free. For this purpose it is, he thinks, a waste of time to talk of a new treaty of peace. Athens is already pledged to a treaty^a which guarantees the independence of the Greek cities and forbids aggression. This part of the Treaty has been and is a dead letter : ^b all that is necessary is to put it into effect. Nothing more clearly than this shows the change in the mind of Isocrates. The covenants of the "Peace of Antalcidas," which are denounced with bitter eloquence in the *Panegyricus*,^c are here termed the "most just and the most expedient"^d which can be expected under the present circumstances.

This discourse was probably written in 355 B.C. Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from the Athenian Confederacy in 357. The peace which conceded their independence was signed in 355. The internal evidence of the oration indicates that it was composed while the negotiations were pending.^e

The author of the Greek "hypothesis" states that when the question of peace or war was brought before the General Assembly, Isocrates arose and gave this address. This he infers from the speech itself, which has the form and the atmosphere appropriate to such an occasion. It is certain, however, that Isocrates did not deliver it, and it is likely that he composed it as a political pamphlet to be circulated among a reading public.^f

^a The "Peace of Antalcidas." See *Paneg.* 115, note *a*, Vol. I. p. 192 ; and this discourse 16.

^b See *Paneg.* 115.

^c See *Paneg.* 115 ff.

^d See *On the Peace* 16.

^e See Jebb, *Attic Orators* ii. p. 183.

^f See General Introduct. p. xxx, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L.

ΙΣΟΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ

- Steph.
p. [159] Ἄπαντες μὲν εἰώθασιν οἱ παριόντες ἐνθάδε ταῦτα μέγιστα φάσκειν εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα σπουδῆς ἄξια τῇ πόλει, περὶ ὧν ἂν αὐτοὶ μέλλωσι συμβουλεύσειν· οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν πραγμάτων ἤρμοσε τοιαῦτα προειπεῖν, δοκεῖ μοι πρέπειν καὶ περὶ τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἐντεῦθεν ποιήσασθαι τὴν 2 ἀρχήν. ἤκομεν γὰρ ἐκκλησιάσοντες περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἃ μεγίστην ἔχει δύναμιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλευομένους ἄμεινον τῶν ἄλλων πράττειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγεθος, ὑπὲρ ὧν συνεληλύθαμεν, τηλικουτόν ἐστιν.
- 3 Ὅρῳ δ' ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου τῶν λεγόντων τὴν ἀκρόασιν ποιουμένους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, τῶν δ' οὐδὲ τὴν φωνὴν ἀνεχομένους. καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ποιεῖτε· καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον εἰώθατε πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους ἐκβάλλειν, πλὴν τοὺς συναγορεύοντας ταῖς ὑμετέραις ἐπιθυ-

^a Cf. a similar statement in Demosth. *Against Timocr.* 4.

^b This expression is used in a similar connexion in *Antid.* 22.

THE ORATIONS OF ISOCRATES

I. ON THE PEACE

ALL those who come before you on this platform are accustomed to assert that the subjects upon which they are themselves about to advise you are most important and most worthy of serious consideration by the state.^a Nevertheless, if it was ever appropriate to preface the discussion of any other subject with such words, it seems to me fitting also to begin with them in speaking upon the subject now before us. For we are assembled here to deliberate about War and Peace, which exercise the greatest power over the life of man, and regarding which those who are correctly advised must of necessity fare better than the rest of the world. Such, then, is the magnitude of the question which we have come together to decide.

I observe, however, that you do not hear with equal favour the speakers who address you, but that, while you give your attention to some, in the case of others you do not even suffer their voice to be heard.^b And it is not surprising that you do this ; for in the past you have formed the habit of driving all the orators from the platform ^c except those who

^a Plutarch (*Phocion* 9) states that this happened in the case of Phocion.

- 4 *μίαῖς*. ὁ καὶ δικαίως ἂν τις ὑμῖν ἐπιτιμήσειεν, ὅτι συνειδότες πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους οἴκους ὑπὸ τῶν κολακευόντων ἀναστάτους γεγεννημένους, καὶ μισοῦντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων τοὺς ταύτην ἔχοντας τὴν τέχνην, ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως διάκεισθε πρὸς αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ κατηγοροῦντες τῶν προσιεμένων καὶ χαιρόντων τοῖς τοιούτοις αὐτοὶ φαίνεσθε μᾶλλον τούτοις πιστεύοντες ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις.
- 5 Καὶ γάρ τοι πεποιθήκατε τοὺς ῥήτορας μελετᾶν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐ τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ πόλει συνοίσειν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀρέσκοντας ὑμῖν λόγους ἐροῦσιν. ἐφ' οὓς καὶ νῦν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἐρρύηκεν. πᾶσι γὰρ ἦν φανερόν ὅτι μᾶλλον ἡσθήσεσθε τοῖς παρακαλοῦσιν ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἢ τοῖς περὶ τῆς
- 6 εἰρήνης συμβουλευούσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ προσδοκίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν ὥς καὶ τὰς κτήσεις τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κομιούμεθα, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀναληψόμεθα πάλιν, ἣν πρότερον ἐτυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες· οἱ δ' οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ὑποτείνουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν δεῖ καὶ μὴ μεγάλων ἐπιθυμεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ
- [160] *στέργειν* τοῖς παροῦσιν, ὃ χαλεπώτατον πάντων

* This term is used of estates in 117. Here it is used of both families and their estates. Cf. 88.

† By the casualties and expenses of war.

‡ Demagogic leaders of the war party, later termed sycophants. See 121 ff.

§ As head of the Confederacy of Delos, which developed into the Athenian Empire. During the period of supremacy, which lasted from the close of the Persian Wars to the end of the Peloponnesian War, Athens frequently disciplined recalcitrant confederate states by expelling their citizens and settling Athenians on their lands. Such settlements were called cleruchies. When Athens formed the

ON THE PEACE, 4-6

support your desires. Wherefore one may justly take you to task because, while you know well that many great houses ^a have been ruined ^b by flatterers ^c and while in your private affairs you abhor those who practise this art, in your public affairs you are not so minded towards them ; on the contrary, while you denounce those who welcome and enjoy the society of such men, you yourselves make it manifest that you place greater confidence in them than in the rest of your fellow-citizens.

Indeed, you have caused the orators to practise and study, not what will be advantageous to the state, but how they may discourse in a manner pleasing to you. And it is to this kind of discourse that the majority of them have resorted also at the present time, since it has become plain to all that you will be better pleased with those who summon you to war than with those who counsel peace ; for the former put into our minds the expectation both of regaining our possessions in the several states and of recovering the power which we formerly enjoyed,^d while the latter hold forth no such hope, insisting rather that we must have peace and not crave great possessions contrary to justice,^e but be content with those we have ^f—and that for the great majority of

new naval confederacy in 378 B.C. it was expressly stipulated by her allies and agreed to by Athens that such abuse of power should not be repeated. But the jingoistic orators advocated nothing less than the restoration of the former empire with all its powers and practices.

^d The state which seizes and holds foreign possessions is a robber. Isocrates throughout this discourse proposes to make the moral code within the state the basis of her foreign policy.

^f A proverbial tag. Cf. *To Demonicus* 29, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L.

- 7 τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν. οὕτω γὰρ ἐξη-
 ρητήμεθα τῶν ἐλπίδων καὶ πρὸς τὰς δοκούσας εἶναι
 πλεονεξίας ἀπλήστως ἔχομεν, ὥστ' οὐδ' οἱ κεκτη-
 μένοι τοὺς μεγίστους πλούτους μένειν ἐπὶ τούτοις
 ἐθέλουσιν, ἀλλ' αἰὲ τοῦ πλέονος ὀρεγόμενοι περὶ
 τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κινδυνεύουσιν. ὅπερ ἄξιόν ἐστι
 δεδιέναι, μὴ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔνοχοι γενώμεθα
- 8 ταύταις ταῖς ἀνοίαις· λίαν γάρ τινές μοι δοκοῦσιν
 ὠρμῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ὥσπερ οὐ τῶν
 τυχόντων συμβεβουλευκότων, ἀλλὰ τῶν θεῶν
 ἀκηκοότες ὅτι κατορθώσομεν ἅπαντα καὶ ῥαδίως
 ἐπικρατήσομεν τῶν ἐχθρῶν.

Χρὴ δὲ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας περὶ μὲν ὧν ἴσασι μὴ
 βουλευέσθαι (περιέργον γάρ) ἀλλὰ πράττειν ὡς
 ἐγνώκασι, περὶ ὧν δ' ἂν βουλευῶνται, μὴ νομίζειν
 εἰδέναι τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἀλλ' ὡς δόξῃ μὲν
 χρωμένους, ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ δὲ γενησόμενον ἀγνοοῦντας,¹
 οὕτω διανοεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.

- 9 Ὡν ὑμεῖς οὐδέτερον τυγχάνετε ποιοῦντες, ἀλλ'
 ὡς οἰόντε ταραχωδέστατα διάκεισθε. συνεληλύ-
 θατε μὲν γάρ, ὡς δέον ὑμᾶς ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν
 ῥηθέντων ἐκλέξασθαι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ δ' ἤδη
 σαφῶς εἰδότες ὁ πρακτέον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐθέлет'
 ἀκούειν πλὴν τῶν πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορούντων.
- 10 καίτοι προσῆκεν ὑμᾶς, εἴπερ ἡβούλεσθε ζητεῖν τὸ
 τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐναντιουμένοις

¹ ἀγνοοῦντας add. by Ritschl.

* This somewhat wordy passage in which the orator becomes the philosopher reflects a fundamental idea of his pedagogy: There can be no exact science or knowledge of what to do in all contingencies and relations of life; the best that we can do is to develop sound, not infallible, judge-

ON THE PEACE, 7-10

mankind is of all things the most difficult. For we are so dependent on our hopes and so insatiate in seizing what seems to be our advantage that not even those who possess the greatest fortunes are willing to rest satisfied with them but are always grasping after more and so risking the loss of what they have. Wherefore we may well be anxious lest on the present occasion also we may be subject to this madness. For some of us appear to me to be over-zealously bent on war, as though having heard, not from haphazard counsellors, but from the gods, that we are destined to succeed in all our campaigns and to prevail easily over our foes.

But people of intelligence, when dealing with matters about which they have knowledge, ought not to take counsel—for this is superfluous—but to act as men who are already resolved what to do, whereas, in dealing with matters about which they take counsel, they ought not to think that they have exact knowledge of what the result will be, but to be minded towards these contingencies as men who indeed exercise their best judgement, but are not sure what the future may hold in store.^a

You, however, do neither the one thing nor the other, but are in the utmost confusion of mind. For you have come together as if it were your business to select the best course from all that are proposed ; nevertheless, as though you had clear knowledge of what must be done, you are not willing to listen to any except those who speak for your pleasure. And yet, if you really desired to find out what is advantageous to the state, you ought to give your attention

ment in dealing with them. See General Introd. p. xxvii, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L., and *Antid.* 184, note.

- ταῖς ὑμετέραις γνώμαις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἢ τοῖς καταχαριζομένοις, εἰδότας ὅτι τῶν ἐνθάδε παριόντων οἱ μὲν ἅ βούλεσθε λέγοντες ῥαδίως ἐξαπατᾶν δύνανται (τὸ γὰρ πρὸς χάριν ῥηθὲν ἐπισκοτεῖ τῷ καθορᾶν ὑμᾶς τὸ βέλτιστον), ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συμβουλευόντων οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοιτε τοιοῦτον.
- 11 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν μεταπείσαι δυνηθεῖεν ὑμᾶς, μὴ φανερόν τὸ συμφέρον ποιήσαντες. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων πῶς ἂν ἄνθρωποι καλῶς δυνηθεῖεν ἢ κρῖναι περὶ τῶν γεγεννημένων ἢ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων, εἰ μὴ τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς τῶν [161] ἐναντιουμένων παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐξετάζοιεν, αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτοὺς κοινούς ἀμφοτέροις ἀκροατὰς παράσχοιεν;
- 12 Θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων, εἰ μηκέτι μνημονεύουσι, καὶ τῶν νεωτέρων, εἰ μηδενὸς ἀκηκόασιν, ὅτι διὰ μὲν τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲν πώποτε κακὸν ἐπάθομεν, διὰ δὲ τοὺς ῥαδίως τὸν πόλεμον αἰρουμένους πολλαῖς ἤδη καὶ μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιεπέσομεν. ὦν ἡμεῖς οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα μνείαν, ἀλλ' ἐτοίμως ἔχομεν, μηδὲν εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πράττοντες, τριήρεις πληροῦν καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοράς ποιεῖσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν καὶ πολεμεῖν οἷς ἂν τύχωμεν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντες.
- 13 τούτων δ' αἰτιὸν ἔστιν, ὅτι προσῆκον ὑμᾶς ὁμοίως ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων σπουδάζειν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχετε περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων βουλεύησθε, ζητεῖτε συμβούλους τοὺς ἁμεινον φρονούντας ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, ὅταν δ' ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐκκλησιάζητε, τοῖς μὲν

* Cf. *Antid.* 21 ; *Demosth. On the Crown* 6.