# Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism

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# Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism

**Criticism of the Works of Novelists, Poets, Playwrights, Short Story Writers, and Other Creative Writers Who Lived between 1900 and 1999, from the First Published Critical Appraisals to Current Evaluations**



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# Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism

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George Orwell, "Reflections on Gandhi," *Partisan Review* 6 (Winter 1949): 85-92; reprinted in *Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism,* vol. 59, ed. Jennifer Gariepy (Detroit: The Gale Group, 1995), 40-3.

William H. Slavick, "Going to School to DuBose Heyward," *The Harlem Renaissance Re-examined,* ed. Victor A. Kramer (AMS, 1987), 65- 91; reprinted in *Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism,* vol. 59, ed. Jennifer Gariepy (Detroit: The Gale Group, 1995), 94-105.

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Readers who wish to suggest new features, topics, or authors to appear in future volumes, or who have other suggestions or comments are cordially invited to call, write, or fax the Managing Editor:

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# Contents

# Edmund Husserl
## 1859-1938

(Full name Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl) German philosopher.



## INTRODUCTION

Husserl was the founder of phenomenology, a philosophical method that seeks certainty about the existence of being and about the authenticity and reliability of knowing. He was a formative influence on twentieth-century thought and methodology, not only in philosophy as one of the progenitors of existentialism, structuralism, and postmodernism, but in literature, music, painting, psychology, and the physical sciences, where his concern for the reduction of investigation to the essential minimum, his identification of the act of perception and the thing perceived, and his postulation of the authority of subjective perception have become standard. Husserl refined phenomenology and its focus throughout his life, moving from a world-based contemplation of actual things and phenomena without presuppositions to a transcendental contemplation of *a priori* essentials to a philosophy of inter-subjective social relationship in the actual world.

## BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Husserl was born in Prossnitz, Moravia. His early school career was not distinguished, but he did show aptitude in the sciences and went on to study astronomy, mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the universities of Leipzig, Berlin, and Vienna, where he received his doctorate in philosophy in 1882. A year later he began studying with the psychologist and philosopher Franz Brentano. Brentano's influence was of particular importance because he championed a psychology that described phenomena, rather than the organs deemed responsible for psychological conditions. With Brentano, too, Husserl studied logic and the British empiricists Locke, Hume, and Mill, and developed the belief that philosophy had to be a "strict and rigorous science." In 1886, with Brentano's recommendation, Husserl became a lecturer at the University of Halle. During his years there, until 1901, his shaping as a philosopher took place, and the fundamental content of his philosophy was formulated. His publication of a theory of arithmetic in 1891 was of particular significance to his thought because it elicited a critical response from the mathematician-philosopher Gotlob Frege, which turned Husserl away from psychologism and toward logic. His 1901 publication of the *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical Investigations*) was the first full, systematic presentation of phenomenology, and it brought him recognition and esteem. That same year Husserl joined the faculty of the University of Goettingen, where he lectured on the works of other philosophers as well as phenomenology. He also wrote copiously but published only an article titled "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" (1910; "Philosophy as Rigorous Science") and the first volume of his monumental *Jarbuch fuer Philosophie und Phaenomenologische Forschung* (11 vols., 1913-31; *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*). From 1916 until 1928 Husserl was a full professor of philosophy at the University of Freiburg, where he remained until his retirement in 1928. During his Freiburg years, his reputation grew to international proportions: he lectured in London, was published in Japan, became a corresponding member of the Aristotelian Society, and was asked to contribute an entry on phenomenology to the *Encyclopedia Britannica.* During those years a number of important students gathered around him, including Martin Heidegger, whose work was strongly influenced by Husserl's even when it diverged from it. Husserl retired in 1928 but continued to work vigorously, lecturing in Am-

sterdam, Paris, Vienna, Prague, and within Germany. In 1933 he was invited to join the philosophy faculty of the University of Southern California, which he declined. After 1935 the Nazi government forbade Husserl, who had been born Jewish, though a convert to Lutheranism, to travel or to lecture. In 1938 one of his students, Herman Van Breda, learned that the Nazis were intending to burn Husserl's work. After Husserl's death in 1938, Van Breda managed, with the help of Husserl's widow, to smuggle all of his manuscripts (more than forty-thousand pages, many written in shorthand) out of Germany to safety in Belgium, where they were archived for transcription, publication, and research.

## MAJOR WORKS

All of Husserl's writings considered together constitute a single work formulating and refining phenomenology. From *Logical Investigations,* "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," and the volumes of *Ideas,* through the *Meditations cartesiennes* (1931; *Cartesian Meditations*) and the later "Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die tranzendentale Phänomenologie" (1936; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*), his work shows phenomenology as a philosophy whose ongoing project is to reconcile the Cartesian division between an objective, concrete reality and the subjective constructions of thought; to reestablish the observational methodology of Aristotle; to provide a reliable basis for attaining authentic knowledge; and by means of clarity of thinking and rigor of perception to provide for the ethical interaction between people necessary for the development of civilization and humane association. The last challenge Husserl felt keenly because of his belief that World War I had marked the end of validity and humanity for European thought. After the triumph of Nazism and what he saw as the mystification of thought, this project became even more urgent. Husserl maintained that the actualization of humanity depended upon the freedom of the mind. Establishing and exercising that freedom, as well as providing the description of fundamental human reality, he believed, were the tasks of phenomenology.

## PRINCIPAL WORKS

*Philosophie der Arithmetik: Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen* [*The Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations*] (philosophy) 1891

*Logische Untersuchungen* [*Logical Investigations*] 2 vols. (philosophy) 1901

"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ["Philosophy as Rigorous Science"] (essay) 1910

*Jarbuch fuer Philosophie und Phaenomenologische Forschung* [*Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*] 11 vols. (philosophy) 1913-31

*Transzendentale Phänomenologie* [*Transcendental Phenomenology*] (philosophy) 1913

"Phänomenologie" ["Phenomenology"] (essay) 1929

*Meditations cartesiennes: Introduction a la phenomenologie* [*Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*] (philosophy) 1931

"Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie" [*The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*] (philosophy) 1936

*Erfahrung und Urteil* [*Experience and Judgement*] (philosophy) 1936

## CRITICISM

### Gottlob Frege (review date 1894)

SOURCE: A review of Dr. E. Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic,* in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals,* University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 314-24.

[*The following excerpt is a translation (by E. W. Kluge) of Frege's 1894 critical review of Husserl's* Philosophy of Arithmetic, *which played a significant role in causing Husserl to refocus the direction of his thought.*]

The author decides in the Introduction [of ***Philosophy of Arithmetic***] that for the time being he will consider (only) cardinal numbers (cardinalia), and thereupon launches into a discussion of multiplicity, plurality, totality, aggregate, collection, set. He uses these words as if they were essentially synonymous; the concept of a cardinal number[1] is supposed to be different from this. However, the logical relationship between multiplicity and number (p. 9) remains somewhat obscure. If one were to go by the words "The concept of number includes the same concrete phenomena as the concept of multiplicity, albeit only by way of the extensions of the concepts of its species, the numbers two, three, four, etc.," one might infer that they had the same extension. On the other hand, multiplicity is supposed to be more indeterminate and more general than number. The matter would probably be clearer if a sharper distinction were drawn between falling under a concept and subordination. Now the first thing he attempts to do is to give an analysis of the concept of multiplicity. Determinate numbers, as well as the generic concept of number which presupposes them, are then supposed to emerge from it by means of determinations. Thus we are first led down from the general to the particular, and then up again.

Totalities are wholes whose parts are collectively connected. We must be conscious of these parts as noticed in and by themselves. The collective connection consists neither in the contents' being simultaneously in the awareness, nor in their arising in the awareness one after another. Not even space, as all-inclusive form, is the ground

of the unification. The connection consists (p. 43) in the unifying act itself. "But neither is it the case that over and above the act there exists a relational content which is distinct from it and is its creative result." Collective connection is a relation *sui generis*. Following J. St. Mill, the author then explains what is to be understood by "relation": namely that state of consciousness or that phenomenon (these expressions are supposed to coincide in the extension of their reference) in which the related contents—the bases of the relation—are contained (p. 70). He then distinguishes between primary and mental relations. Here only the latter concern us more closely. "If a unitary mental act is directed towards several contents, then with respect to it the contents are connected or related to one another. If we perform such an act, it would of course be futile for us to look for a relation or connection in the presentational content which it contains (unless over and above this, there is also a primary relation). The contents here are united only by the act, and consequently this unification can be noticed only by a special reflection on it" (p. 73). The difference-relation, whereby two contents are related to one another by means of an evident negative judgment, is also of this kind (p. 74). Sameness, on the other hand, is (p. 77) a primary relation. (According to this, complete coincidence, too, would be a primary relation, while its negation—difference itself—would be a mental one. I here miss a statement of the difference between the difference-relation and collective connection, where in the opinion of the author the latter, too, is a mental relation because perceptually no unification is noticeable in its presentational content.) When one is speaking of "unrelated" contents, the contents are merely thought "together", *i.e.* as a totality. "But by no means are they really unconnected, unrelated. On the contrary, they are connected by the mental act holding them together. It is only in the content of the latter that all noticeable unification is lacking" (p. 78). The conjunction 'and' fixes in a wholly appropriate manner the circumstance that given contents are connected in a collective manner (p. 81). "A presentation . . . falls under the concept of multiplicity insofar as it connects in a collective manner any contents which are noticed in and by themselves" (p. 82). (It appears that what is understood by "presentation" is an act.) "Multiplicity in general . . . is no more than something and something and something, etc.; or any one thing and any one thing and any one thing, etc.; or more briefly, one and one and one, etc." (p. 85). When we remove the indeterminateness which lies in the "etc.," we arrive at the numbers one and one; one, one and one; one, one, one and one; and so on. We can also arrive at these concepts directly, beginning with any concrete multiplicity whatever; for each one of them falls under one of these concepts, and under a determinate one at that (p. 87). To this end, we abstract from the particular constitution of the individual contents collected together in the multiplicity, retaining each one only insofar as it is a something or a one; and thus, with respect to the collective connection of the latter, we obtain the general form of multiplicity appropriate to the multiplicity under consideration, *i.e.* the appropriate number (p. 88). Along with this number-abstraction goes a complete removal of restrictions placed on the content (p. 100). We cannot explain the general concept of number otherwise than by pointing to the similarity which all number-concepts have to one another (p. 88).

Having thus given a brief presentation of the basic thoughts of the first part, I now want to give a general characterization of this mode of consideration. We here have an attempt to provide a naive conception of number with a scientific justification. I call any opinion naive if according to it a number-statement is not an assertion about a concept or the extension of a concept; for upon the slightest reflection about number, one is led with a certain necessity to such conceptions. Now strictly speaking, an opinion is naive only as long as the difficulties facing it are unknown—which does not quite apply in the case of our author. The most naive opinion is that according to which a number is something like a heap, a swarm in which the things are contained lock, stock and barrel. Next comes the conception of a number as a property of a heap, aggregate, or whatever else one might call it. Thereby one feels the need for cleansing the objects of their particularities. The present attempt belongs to those which undertake this cleansing in the psychological wash-tub. This offers the advantage that in it, things acquire a most peculiar suppleness, no longer have as hard a spatial impact on each other and lose many bothersome particularities and differences. The mixture of psychology and logic that is now so popular provides good suds for this purpose. First of all, everything becomes presentation. The references of words are presentations. In the case of the word "number," for example, the aim is to exhibit the appropriate presentation and to describe its genesis and composition. Objects are presentations. Thus J. St. Mill, with the approval of the author, lets objects (whether physical or mental) enter into a state of consciousness and become constituents of this state (p. 70). But might not the moon, for example, be somewhat hard to digest for a state of consciousness? Since everything is now presentation, we can easily change the objects by now paying attention, now not. The latter is especially effective. We pay less attention to a property and it disappears. By thus letting one characteristic after another disappear, we obtain concepts that are increasingly more abstract. Therefore concepts, too, are presentations; only, they are less complete than objects; they still have those properties of objects which we have not abstracted. Inattention is an exceedingly effective logical power; whence, presumably, the absentmindedness of scholars. For example, let us suppose that in front of us there are sitting side by side a black and a white cat. We disregard their color: they become colorless but are still sitting side by side. We disregard their posture: they are no longer sitting, without, however, having assumed a different posture; but each one is still at its place. We disregard their location: they are without location, but still remain quite distinct. Thus from each one we have perhaps derived a general concept of a cat. Continued application of this process turns each object into a less and less substantial wraith. From each object we finally derive something which is completely without restrictions on its content; but

the something derived from the one object nevertheless does differ from that derived from the other object, although it is not easy to say how. But wait! This last transition to a something does seem to be more difficult after all; at least the author talks (p. 86) about reflection on the mental act of presentation. But be that as it may, the result, at any rate, is the one just indicated. While in my opinion the bringing of an object under a concept is merely the recognition of a relation which previously already obtained, in the present case objects are essentially changed by this process, so that objects brought under the same concept become similar to one another. Perhaps the matter is to be understood thus, that for every object there arises a new presentation in which all determinations which do not occur in the concept are lacking. Hereby the difference between presentation and concept, between presenting and thinking, is blurred. Everything is shunted off into the subjective. But it is precisely because the boundary between the subjective and the objective is blurred, that conversely the subjective also acquires the appearance of the objective. For example, one talks of this or that presentation as if, separated from the presentor, it would let itself be observed in public. And yet, no-one has someone else's presentation but only his own, and no-one knows how far his presentation—*e.g.* that of red—agrees with that of someone else; for the peculiarity of the presentation which I associate with the word "red," I cannot state (so as to be able to compare it). One would have to have the presentations of the one as well as that of the other combined in one and the same consciousness; and one would have to be sure that they had not changed in the transfer. With thoughts, it is quite different: one and the same thought can be grasped by many people. The components of a thought, and even more so the things themselves, must be distinguished from the presentations which in the soul accompany the grasping of a thought and which someone has about these things. In combining under the word "presentation" both what is subjective and what is objective, one blurs the boundary between the two in such a way that now a presentation in the proper sense of the word is treated like something objective, and now something objective is treated like a presentation. Thus in the case of our author, totality (set, multiplicity) appears now as a presentation (pp. 15, 17, 24, 82), now as something objective (pp. 10, 11, 235). But isn't it really a very harmless pleasantry to call, for example, the moon a presentation? It is—as long as one does not imagine that one can change it as one likes, or produce it by psychological means. But this is all too easily the result.

Given the psychologico-logical mode of thought just characterized, it is easy to understand how the author judges about definitions. An example from elementary geometry may illustrate this. There, one usually gives this definition: "A right angle is an angle which is equal to its adjacent angle." The author would probably say to this, "The presentation of right-angledness is a simple one; hence it is a completely misguided undertaking to want to give a definition of it. In our presentation of right-angledness, there is nothing of the relation to another adjacent angle. True enough; the concepts 'right angle' and 'angle which is equal to its adjacent angle' have the same extension; but it is not true that they have the same content. Instead of the content, it is the extension of the concept that has been defined. If the definition were correct, then every assertion of right-angledness, instead of applying to the concretely present pair of lines as such, would always apply only to its relation to another pair of lines. All I can admit is (p. 114) that in this equality with the adjacent angle we have a necessary and sufficient condition for right-angledness." The author judges in a similar way about the definition of equinumerosity by means of the concept of a univocal one-one correlation. "The simplest criterion for sameness of number is just that *the same* number results when counting the sets to be compared" (p. 115). Of course! The simplest way of testing whether or not something is a right angle is to use a protractor. The author forgets that this counting itself rests on a univocal one-one correlation, namely that between the numerals 1 to $n$ and the objects of the set. Each of the two sets is to be counted. In this way, the situation is made more difficult than when we consider a relation which correlates the objects of the two sets with one another without numerals as intermediaries.

If words and combinations of words refer to presentations, then for any two of these only two cases are possible: either they designate the same presentation, or they designate different ones. In the first case, equating them by means of a definition is useless, "an obvious circle"; in the other, it is false. These are also the objections one of which the author raises regularly. Neither can a definition dissect the sense, for the dissected sense simply is not the original one. In the case of the word to be explained, either I already think clearly everything which I think in the case of the definiens—in which case we have the "obvious circle"—or the definiens has a more completely articulated sense—in which case I do not think the same thing in its case as I do in the case of the one to be explained: the definition is false. One would think that the definition would be unobjectionable at least in the case where the word to be explained does not yet have a sense, or where it is expressly asked that the sense be considered nonexistent, so that the word acquires a sense only through this definition. But even in the latter case (p. 107), the author confutes the definition by reminding us of the distinctness of the presentations. Accordingly, in order to avoid all objections, one would probably have to create a new root-word and form a word out of it. A split here manifests itself between psychological logicians and mathematicians. The former are concerned with the sense of the words and with the presentations, which they do not distinguish from the sense; the latter, however, are concerned with the matter itself, with the reference of the words.[2] The reproach that it is not the concept but its extension which is being defined, really applies to all the definitions of mathematics. So far as the mathematician is concerned, the definition of a conic section as the line of intersection of a plane with a cone is no more and no less correct than that as a plane whose equation is given in Cartesian coordinates of the second degree. Which of these

two—or even of other—definitions is selected depends entirely on the pragmatics of the situation, although these expressions neither have the same sense nor evoke the same presentations. By this I do not mean that a concept and the extension of a concept are one and the same; rather, coincidence of extension is a necessary and sufficient condition for the fact that between the concepts there obtains that relation which corresponds to that of sameness in the case of objects.[3] I here note that when I use the word "same" without further addition, I am using it in the sense of "not different," "coinciding," "identical." Psychological logicians lack all understanding of sameness, just as they lack all understanding of definitions. This relation cannot help but remain completely puzzling to them; for if words always designated presentations, one could never say "A is the same as B." For to be able to do that, one would already have to distinguish A from B, and then these would simply be different presentations. All the same, I do agree with the author in this, that Leibniz' explanation "Eadem sunt quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva veritate" does not deserve to be called a definition, although I hold this for different reasons. Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself. One could call Leibniz' explanation a principle which expresses the nature of the sameness-relation; and as such it is of fundamental importance. I am unable to acquire a taste for the author's explanation that (p. 108) "We simply say of any contents whatever that they are the same as one another, if there obtains sameness in the . . . characteristics which at that moment constitute the center of interest."

Let us now go into details! According to the author, a number-statement refers to the totality (the set, multiplicity) of objects counted (p. 185). Such a totality finds its wholly appropriate expression in the conjunction "and." Accordingly, one should expect that all number-statements have the form "A and B and C and . . . Q is *n*," or at least that they could be brought into such a form. But what is it that we get exactly to know through the proposition "Berlin and Dresden and Munich are three" or—and this is supposed to be the same thing—through "Berlin and Dresden and Munich are something and something and something"? Who would want to go to the trouble of asking, merely to receive such an answer? It is not even supposed to be said by this that Berlin is distinct from Dresden, the latter from Munich, and Munich from Berlin. In fact, in the second form at least there is contained neither the difference of Berlin from Dresden nor even their sameness. Surely it is peculiar that this form of number-predication almost never occurs in every-day life and that when it does occur, it is not intended as a statement of number. I find that there are really only two cases in which it is used: in the first case, together with the number-word "two", to express difference—"Rapeseed and rape are two (different things)"—in the other, together with the number-word "one" to express sameness—"I and the Father are one"—. This last example is particularly disastrous, for according to the author it should read, "are something and something" or "are two". In reality we do not ask "How many are Caesar and Pompei and London and Edinburgh?" or "How many are Great Britain and Ireland?" although I am curious as to what the author would answer to this. Instead, one asks, for example, "How many moons does Mars have?" or "What is the number of moons of Mars?" And from the answer "The number of moons of Mars is two" one gets to know something which is worth asking about. Thus we see that in the question as well as in the answer, there occurs a concept-word or a compound designation of a concept, rather than the "and" demanded by the author. How does the latter extricate himself from this difficulty? He says that the number belongs to the extension of the concept, *i.e.* to the totality. "It is only indirectly that one can perhaps say that the concept has the property that the number . . . belongs to its extension" (p. 189). Herewith everything I maintain has really been admitted: In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept. I am not going to argue over whether the assertion applies directly to a concept and indirectly to its extension, or indirectly to the concept and directly to its extension; for given the one, the other also obtains. This much is certain, that neither the extension of a concept nor a totality are designated directly, but only a concept. Now if the author used the phrase "extension of a concept" in the same sense as I, then our opinions about the sense of a statement of number would scarely differ. This, of course, is not the case; for the extension of a concept is not a totality in the author's sense. A concept under which there falls only one object has just as determinate an extension as a concept under which there falls no object or a concept under which there fall infinitely many objects—where according to Mr. Husserl, there is no totality in any of these cases. The sense of the words "extension of the concept moon of Mars" is other than the sense of the words "Deimos and Phobos"; and if the proposition "The number of Deimos and Phobos is two" contains a thought at all, at any rate it contains one which differs from that of the proposition "The number of moons of Mars is two". Now, since one never uses a proposition of the latter form to make a statement of number, the author has missed the sense of such a statement.

Let us now consider the ostensible genesis of a totality somewhat more closely (pp. 77 ff.). I must confess that I have been unsuccessful in my attempt to form a totality in accordance with the instructions of the author. In the case of collective connections, the contents are merely supposed to be thought or presented together, without any relation or connection whatever being presented between them (p. 79). I am unable to do this. I cannot simultaneously represent to myself redness, the Moon and Napoleon, without presenting these to myself as connected; *e.g.* the redness of a burning village against which stands out the figure of Napoleon, illuminated by the Moon on the right. Whatever is simultaneously present to me, I present to myself as a whole; and I cannot disregard the connection without losing the whole. I suspect that in my soul there just isn't anything which the author calls "totality", "set", "multiplicity"; no presentation of parts whose union is not presented with them, although it does exist. Therefore it is not at all astonishing that Mr. Husserl himself

later (p. 242) says of a set that it contains a configurative moment which characterizes it as a whole, as an organization. He talks of series (p. 235), swarms, chains, heaps as of peculiar kinds of sets. And no union is supposed to be noticeable in the presentation of a swarm? Or is this union present over and above the collective connection? In which case it would be irrelevant so far as the totality is concerned, and the "configurative moment" could not serve to distinguish kinds of sets. How does the author come to hold his opinion? Probably because he is looking for certain presentations as the references of words and word-complexes. Thus there ought to correspond a presentational whole even to the word-complex "redness and the Moon and Napoleon"; and since the mere "and" allegedly does not express a presentable relation or union at all, neither ought one to be presented. Add to this the following. If the union of the parts were also presented, almost all of our presentations would be totalities; e.g., that of a house as well as that of a swarm or heap. And hereby, surely, one notices only too easily that a number as a property of a house or of the presentation of a house would be absurd.

The author himself finds a difficulty in the abstraction which yields the general concept of totality (p. 84). "One must abstract completely . . . from the particularities of the individual contents collected together, at the same time, however, retaining their connection. This seems to involve a difficulty, if not a psychological impossibility. If we take this abstraction seriously, then of course the collective connection, rather than remaining behind as a conceptual extract, also disappears along with the particular contents. The solution lies at hand. To abstract from something merely means: not paying any particular attention to it."

The core of this exposition clearly lies in the word "particular." Inattention is a very strong lye which must not be applied in too concentrated a form, so as not to dissolve everything; but neither ought it to be used in too diluted a form, so that it may produce a sufficient change. Everything, then, depends on the proper degree of dilution, which is difficult to hit. I, at least, did not succeed in doing so.

Since in the end, the author himself really does admit that I am right after all—that in a number-statement there is contained an assertion about a concept—I need not consider his counterarguments in more detail. I only want to remark that he evidently has not grasped my distinction between a characteristic and a property. Given his logicopsychological mode of understanding, this is of course not surprising. Thus he comes to foist on me the opinion that what is at issue in the case of numberstatements is a determination, the definition of a concept (p. 185). Nothing was farther from my mind.

Three reefs spell danger for naive, and particularly for psychological, views of the nature of numbers. The first lies in the question, how the sameness of the units is to be reconciled with their distinguishability. The second consists in the numbers zero and one; and the third, in the large numbers. Let us ask how the author seeks to circumnavigate these reefs! In the case of the first, he adduces (p. 156) my words, "If we want to let a number arise by collecting different objects, then we obtain a heap in which the objects are contained with just those properties in which they differ; and this is not the number. On the other hand, if we want to form a number by collecting what is the same, the latter will always coalesce into one and we shall never arrive at a multiplicity." It is clear that I have used the word "same" in the sense of "not different." Therefore the author's charge that I confuse sameness with identity does not apply. Mr. Husserl tries to blunt this antithesis by means of his hazy sameness: "In a certain respect, sameness does obtain; in another, difference. . . . A difficulty, or better, an impossibility would obtain only if the expression 'collection of what is the same' (which is intended to describe the genesis of a number) demanded absolute sameness, as Frege mistakenly assumes" (pp. 164, 165). Well, if the sameness is not absolute, then the objects will differ in one or the other of the properties with which they enter into combination. Now with this, compare the following: "The sameness of the units, as it results from our psychological theory, is obviously an absolute one. Indeed, already the mere thought of an approximation is absurd, for what is at stake is the sameness of the contents insofar as they are contents" (p. 168). According to the author, a number consists of units (p. 149). He here understands by "unit" a "member of a concrete multiplicity insofar as number-abstraction is applied to the latter" or "a counted object as such." If we consider all of this together, we shall be hard pressed to get clear about the author's opinion. In the beginning, the objects are evidently distinct; then, by means of abstraction, they become absolutely the same with respect to one another, but for all that, this absolute sameness is supposed to obtain only insofar as they are contents. I should think that this sameness is very far indeed removed from being absolute. But be that as it may, the number consists of these units which are absolutely the same; and now there enters that impossibility which the author himself emphasizes. After all, one must assume that this abstraction, this bringing under the concept of something, effects a change; that the objects which are thought through the medium of this concept—these very units which are absolutely the same—are distinct from the original objects, for otherwise they would resemble one another no more than they did at the beginning and this abstraction would be useless. We must assume that it is only through being brought under the concept of a something that these units which are absolutely the same arise, whether they appear through a metamorphosis out of distinct objects or whether they appear in addition to these as new entities. Therefore one would think that in addition to the remaining objects there are also units, sets of units over the above sets of apples. This, however, the author most emphatically denies (p. 139). Number-abstraction simply has the wonderful and very fruitful property of making things absolutely the same as one another without altering them. Something like this is possible only in the psychological wash-tub. If the author