LOCAL, ETHNIC, AND NATIONAL LOYALTIES IN VILLAGE INDONESIA: A SYMPOSIUM

Edited by G. William Skinner

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Yale University
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PREFACE

Anthropological field research in Indonesia, until the early 1930's, was more or less the domain of European, especially Dutch, anthropologists. During the immediate pre-war period, Raymond Kennedy, Edwin M. Loeb, Cora DuBois and Margaret Mead, among others, went as pioneer American anthropologists to various parts of the far-flung East Indies.

In this Symposium, a new generation of American anthropologists presents fruits of its field research in the young Republic of Indonesia. All six contributors have combined training in their academic disciplines with area and language training, as offered in post-war American universities.

They represent three institutions especially interested in Southeast Asia Studies. The organizer of the Symposium, G. William Skinner, although now on the staff of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, and Andrea Wilcox Palmer did their fieldwork under the auspices of Cornell University. Clifford and Hildred Geertz were members of a team of Harvard students whose research was sponsored by the Center of International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward M. Bruner and Peter R. Goethals represent Yale University.

In memory of the vital role which he played in the development of Yale's Southeast Asia Studies and the keen interest which he took in the Indonesian people and their culture, I am dedicating this Symposium to my late colleague, Professor Raymond Kennedy.

Karl J. Pelzer
Director, Southeast Asia Studies

August 1, 1959

CONTENTS

THE NATURE OF LOYALTIES IN RURAL INDONESIA

By G. William Skinner

The great majority of Indonesia's people live in the hamlets and villages which dot almost every island of the archipelago. While it would be misleading to discount the significance of an urbanization rate which is relatively high for Southeast Asia or to minimize the great importance of cities and towns in the nation's social structure, the fact remains that most Indonesians reside in rural corporate settlements within which many of their most enduring social relationships and loyalties are contained.

It would be meaningless, however, to speak of the Indonesian village. The world of village Indonesia is divided, first of all, into the various cultural areas each of which is the homeland of one of the country's many ethnically distinct agricultural peoples. Several of the most significant differences within village Indonesia are closely associated with ethnicity, and in order to point up the relevance of these differences to the problem of loyalties, the papers in this symposium deal with the villages of five contrasting peoples. While there is greater justification for speaking of the Javanese villager or the Sumbawan village, it goes without saying that considerable variation is often found from one village to another even within an area whose population is ethnically homogeneous. A Sundanese village typical of the Sumedang area differs in many respects from one typical of the Sukabumi area, and the caveat implicit in this observation should be understood to apply to each of the following papers.

This symposium treats the interplay of the villager's local, ethnic and national loyalties. It would be gratifying to report that the participants found the concept of "loyalty" an incisive analytic tool or that we have made any considerable progress in sharpening the concept to that end. Unfortunately neither is the case. The contributors are concerned in a general way with the villager's identification with various more or less inclusive sociocultural and sociopolitical groups and with the ties of allegiance and affect which bind him more or less strongly to individuals, institutions, causes and symbols at various levels in the political-administrative structure. It will be useful to draw a distinction among loyalties to an individual person, to a corporate group, and to a cause, which may be

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This symposium is the outgrowth of a panel discussion organized by the editor and presented at the 1959 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Washington, D.C.

termed, respectively, personal, group and programmatic loyalty.[1] Beyond this, however, there is little point in attempting an analytical definition here.

Nevertheless, in order to provide context for the contributions to follow, there is reason, perhaps, for pointing up some of the more important factors relevant to local loyalties, to ethnic loyalties, and finally to national loyalties in village Indonesia. In this introductory paper I shall try to indicate briefly what these factors are, with special reference to the ethnic groups treated elsewhere in the symposium.

It is no simple matter to determine what a village is in many parts of rural Indonesia. There is not uncommonly a distinction between a larger administrative unit with little social significance, on the one hand, and a small though multifamily settlement within which face-to-face social relations and primary loyalties are largely contained, on the other. The situation, however, is seldom so neat, for there may be more than one level of supra-hamlet village-type administration, and some of these "political villages" may have considerable social significance. Many of these complications arose through tampering on the part of higher political authority. Originally the "social village" in simple form was probably characteristic of that part of the archipelago where sedentary agriculture was practiced. New settlements were sometimes established as offshoots of the old. In the relatively densely populated core of the Javanese Mataram kingdom, sub-settlements proliferated to the point where, at least by the 18th century, a village complex consisting of a mother village together with related hamlets was the rule rather than the exception. This natural village -- "natural" since its growth was undirected from above and since it had become the focus of village loyalties for the residents of all component settlements -- served as the major prototype of the administrative village now found in widely scattered parts of the country.

For purposes of administrative convenience and efficiency, the Indies government initiated a consolidation process which by the end of the 19th century had created kalurahan (Javanese) or desa (Indonesia) -- as the village complex is called -- throughout Java. In most Sundanese areas, the imposition of the desa administrative unit, coupled as it was with the development of wet-rice cultivation, provided the population with its first stable and sizable territorial social unit, but as Mrs. Palmer reports below, even today the sense of identification with the territorial village group is not strong. In the part of Java studied by Mr. Geertz, east of the Mataram core area, the original village unit (dukuhan) has retained its own social functions and esprit de corps, and village loyalties have by no means been entirely extended to the kalurahan unit.[2] In Madura, however, even though the desa complex is made up of discrete kampong, themselves often consisting of scattered farm settlements, the larger unit has come to be regarded as the local

1. See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 24-25.
2. Robert R. Jay, "Local Government in Rural Central Java." Far Eastern Quarterly, 15, 2 (February 1956), pp. 219-20.

community by its members.[3]

In this century, the Netherlands Indies government initiated a new program further to consolidate and standardize rural administration. In Java small kalurahan were merged, and in parts of Sumatra and Borneo the process of consolidating hamlets into village units was begun. In the last decades of Dutch rule, villages in the directly ruled areas of Sumatra and Borneo were grouped into negeri or other units more or less comparable in size to the Javanese kalurahan.

Throughout most of East Indonesia, however, there was less manipulation of village units. In the greater part of Sulawesi (Celebes), Maluku (Moluccas) and Nusatenggara (Lesser Sundas), the Indies government concluded agreements with local rulers whose territories were recognized as self-governing states (swapradja). In these indirectly ruled areas, the lower administrative structure was not standardized from the center. Whereas in most of western Indonesia the village complex (desa, kalurahan, negeri, etc.) was the meeting place between the central administrative system and the governed, in most of eastern Indonesia, the meeting place was at a considerably higher level, that of the swapradja.[4]

For much the same reasons which motivated the preceding regime -- though there is now much talk of desa-level autonomy -- the government of independent Indonesia has endeavored to continue and extend the process of village consolidation. This policy was made clear as early as 1948 in the official clarification of the decentralization law of the original Republic, and new legislation in 1957 (Law No. 1) predicated the extension of autonomy to the lowest level on the consolidation of traditional village or hamlet units into desa of adequate size. In spite of the present artificiality of the "government village" in Bali or the gabungan unit in Sumbawa, as described in the papers below, the government is determined to strengthen them and infuse them with social significance for the villagers.

For present purposes it may be useful to define as "local" those loyalties focussed at or below the highest unit whose administrative officer is selected or elected by the villagers from among themselves. Joint participation in the selection or election process in itself gives the unit in question some social significance and generally implies a good deal more. By this criterion, the highest local unit in Bali is the hamlet (together with the non-territorial local units described by Mrs. Geertz), in Sumbawa the single-settlement village, in Java proper the kalurahan, in Sundanese Priangan the desa, and among the Toba Batak the negeri. So specified, it is probably a safe generalization to say that the villager's strongest loyalties at the present time are local, that the objects of his most enduring loyalties are local individuals, groups and causes.

3. For a comparative discussion of territorially-based communities throughout Indonesia see B. Ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948, pp. 62-74.
4. John D. Legge, Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series). Ithaca, 1957, p. 4.

These loyalties are variously structured, as the following papers abundantly attest, but it is perhaps useful to note that most of the traditional loyalties are related to the kinship structure, religious organizations, or the civil-adat[5] administrative hierarchy. The kinship structure is an important focus of local loyalties where unilinear kin groups are present -- among, for instance, the Balinese, Batak and Minangkabau. Where the kinship structure has territorial or religious significance, kin loyalties will be accordingly diffuse. Likewise, the religious and civil-adat structures are not always so discrete as appears to be the case in the Sumbawan or Toba Batak village; they may be intermeshed in various ways, as in Bali and Madura, or a separate religious structure may be entirely obviated. The relative importance of personal, group, and programmatic loyalty at the local level and the degree to which village social structure has room and even need for new organizational forms, as distinguished from new content for old forms, are major variables in village Indonesia directly relevant, as most of the following papers show, to the development of national loyalties. If there is any moral here, it is that the problem of loyalties in Indonesia cannot be understood apart from social structure of the local community.

Regional levels, if we may so designate those between the administrative village or its equivalent and the nation, are no great focus of village loyalties. There are several reasons why regional loyalties as such are relatively unimportant to the villager. In the first place, all administrative officials serving at levels from the province down to the sub-district, just above the desa or its equivalent, are appointed by the center from among the civil-service employees of the Ministry of Interior.[6] Consequently, insofar as regional administrative levels are of significance to the villager, they are often a focus of national rather than specificially regional loyalties. This generalization needs qualification in the case of several regional administrative units which were formerly indirectly ruled swapradja and whose traditional rulers have continued as civil heads under the unitary state. The Special District of Djokjakarta, headed by Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, provides the outstanding example of a regional focus of loyalties which are clearly neither local nor ethnic nor national. This situation, however, results from a combination of several factors unique to the person of the sultan and to the special history of the region. On the other hand, it is notable that villagers in western Sumbawa see the capital of the regional swapradja, also headed by the former sultan, as the locus of new national institutions and influences.

5. Adat refers to indigenous custom, which may have the force of law. See in particular the papers by Mr. Bruner and Mr. Goethals below.
6. The five levels of regional administration are, in the most nearly standard terminology, the propinsi (province), keresidenan (residency), kebupaten (regency), kewedanan (district), and ketjamatan (sub-district). The system is by no means completely standardized throughout Indonesia, however. It will be noted, for instance, that in the residency of Tapanuli, under which the Toba Batak negeri described by Mr. Bruner falls, the level of kewedanan is dispensed with. In Nusatenggara province, in which Sumbawa falls, the residency level is omitted, the daerah being equivalent to the kebupaten and the swapradja to the kewedanan.

Second, in areas where regionalism or "provincialism" is marked, it has flowed from basic policy differences between politicians and other leaders from the outer islands, on the one hand, and the central government in Djakarta on the other.[7] Although such policy matters directly affect his welfare, they are not ordinarily within the cognizance of the average villager. Even if, say, provincial leaders in Medan presented a united front to Djakarta, even if they fought the "good fight" in the interests of the local people, the Toba Batak villager would not thereby feel any closer to his fellow provincials, the Karo and Simelungun, Bataks, the Malays, or the immigrant Javanese. At least for the average villager outside Java, ethnic loyalties, being closer to his normal sphere of action, take priority over allegiance to any region not coterminous with his ethnic area.

Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance for this symposium, in moving from local up into regional levels of the sociopolitical structure, the villager almost immediately and universally encounters leaders and officials, groups and causes, which are predominantly town- and elite-oriented. The administrative officials are town-bred, often not from the local area, and of markedly superior educational attainment and social status. Organizations based at regional levels are largely urban in character, and their leaders are seldom farmers. The councils (DPRD or Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah) at the kebupaten level, even in areas where they were popularly elected in 1957, consist largely of townspeople identified with the civil service or following other urban-type occupations. As a recent student of regional autonomy puts it, the autonomous kebupaten "serves the interests of the elite, which has never belonged to, or has escaped from, the desa."[8] Above the local level, the villager is hard put to find leaders who genuinely identify themselves with the values of the rural population. Barriers of class, occupation and urbanism, then, tend to inhibit the extension of the villagers' loyalties to intermediate "regional" levels except when these are perceived as the focus of national or ethnic loyalties. These factors help explain why the contributors to this symposium seldom find it necessary to refer to regional as against either ethnic or national loyalties.

If we now turn to the ethnic loyalties of the Indonesian villager, it becomes necessary to specify what is meant by "ethnic" in the Indonesian context. The relevant Indonesian term is sukubangsa, which generally denotes an indigenous group characterized by a distinctive culture, with particular reference to language and adat. In the absence of definitive and comprehensive field surveys, it is difficult to estimate the total number of sukubangsa found in Indonesia, but even if we limit ourselves to discrete ethnic groups larger than 100,000 persons and speaking mutually unintelligible languages, the number exceeds 35. The three largest of these groups are the major indigenous peoples of Java and Madura: the Javanese

7. For an informed and provocative discussion of the relative importance of political, economic and ethnic factors in outer-island "provincialism," see Chapter 5 of Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series). Ithaca, 1958.
8. Legge, op. cit., p. 61.

(est. pop. in 1956: 36 million), the Sundanese (12.5 million) and the Madurese (5 million). The next largest ethnic groups are the Minangkabau (2.7 million), whose home area is the province of West Sumatra, and the Buginese (2.4 million), whose homeland is in southwestern Sulawesi. Eight more ethnic groups fall in the size range from two million down to 750,000, including the Balinese (1.6 million) and the Toba Batak (950,000). The Sumbawans, the subject of Mr. Goethal's paper, rank about thirtieth in size among Indonesian sukubangsa, numbering approximately 135,000 in 1956.[9]

Given the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of the typical Indonesian ethnic group and its concentration in a geographic region, the sukubangsa would appear to be a logical focus for the individual's loyalties. But when compared, say, with the new nations of Africa, ethnic loyalties in Indonesia are somewhat less prominent. In many parts of Indonesia, the villager seldom sees his sukubangsa as a major focus of either group or programmatic loyalties. There is considerable variation in this regard, however, and it may be useful to point to several factors which affect the intensity of ethnic loyalties among the various Indonesian peoples.

The historical, administrative and political integrity of the group is obviously relevant. Not since the Dutch began nibbling away at the Mataram kingdom have the Javanese had any political or administrative unity. During the last century of colonial rule, the Javanese were divided among four native states and, in the directly ruled part of the island, three provinces. So too, under the Republic, the major provincial boundaries on Java cut through Javanese areas rather than separate them from neighboring ethnic groups. The Sundanese must reach far back into history for a symbol of ethnic unity, the Padjadjaran kingdom, and at the present time whereas almost 94 percent of the country's Sundanese live in the province of West Java, only some 77 percent of that province's population is Sundanese. The Madurese ethnic area is far larger than the island itself, and more Madurese live in Java proper than in the residency of Madura. Similarly the Toba Bataks, who have never enjoyed political unity, form a bare quarter of the population in the recently truncated province of North Sumatra in which they are concentrated. In precolonial times, the Balinese and the Sumbawans were both divided among competing overlords, and only in recent decades have they achieved administrative unity at levels which may eventually become autonomous.[10]

9. Population estimates for 1956 are based on projections of the 1930 census data by administrative unit and sukubangsa (Nederlandsch-Indië, Department van Economische Zaken, Volkstelling 1930, 8 vols. Batavia, 1933-36.) in accordance with the 1956 registered population by administrative unit (Indonesia, Biro Pusat Statistik, Penduduk Indonesia. Djakarta, 1958). All demographic statistics or estimates subsequently cited in this paper or in the editor's footnotes are drawn from or based on these sources.

10. The ethnic area of the Sumbawan sukubangsa is now roughly coterminous with the swapradja of Sumbawa: 94 percent of all Sumbawans live in this unit, and 86 percent of the indigenous population is Sumbawan. In the case of Bali, the island is now an administratively unified daerah, over 97 percent of whose population is Hindu Balinese.

On the other hand, there is probably some significance in the fact that the home areas of several of the sukubangsa with greatest ethnic awareness and group loyalty were largely coterminous with a single administrative unit under Dutch rule, thus providing a political-administrative focus for the group. This was the case, for instance, with the Atjehnese (the Government of Atjeh) and the Minangkabau (the West Coast Residency). In each case the Indonesian government attempted to obliterate these ethnically significant boundaries by submerging the old unit in a larger province, but ethnic loyalties and regional pressure of one kind or another have recently caused Djakarta to recreate the former units as the provinces of Atjeh and West Sumatra.

More important than the matter of administrative boundaries is the nature of intergroup contact. Ethnic awareness is intensified by interethnic contact, and ethnic loyalties come to the fore only when the members of the group recognize common interests vis-à-vis others. It is notably those ethnic groups whose members during the last half century of Dutch rule were most mobile and most avidly in pursuit of scarce ends in the larger society which are outstanding today for ethnic loyalties bordering on chauvinism. The Buginese and Minangkabau were traditionally mobile before Dutch contact, the former as sailors and seagoing traders, the latter as itinerant merchants. Minahassans, Ambonese, and Toba Bataks became mobile through the vagaries of colonial history -- Christianization, population pressure on the land, and peculiarities of governmental policy. In somewhat different ways, social organization among each of these peoples is centrifugal, to borrow the term used by Mrs. Geertz; it expells the most ambitious and venturesome of the young men and, to a lesser extent, women into the larger society. For example, at the time of the 1930 census, over ten percent of all Minahassans, Ambonese and Buginese lived outside their respective home areas.[11]

Such ethnic groups are not only exposed to other peoples, they are thrown into competition with them. Under the colonial regime, and in the independent republic as well, the Ambonese, Minangkabau, Minnahassans and, to a lesser extent, Toba Bataks have, along with the strategically situated Javanese, been disproportionately successful aspirants to positions of higher status in the modern, national and urban sector of society. But competition has been intense, frustration not uncommon, and the process has sharpened not only ethnic loyalties but also ethnic animosities.

These remarks have considerable relevance for the loyalties of Indonesian villagers. To begin with, insofar as the villager is immobile and in situ, he tends to take his sukubangsa for granted. His ethnic awareness develops in response to the degree and nature of contact, vicarious or actual, with other groups. The amount of actual contact is, of course, not unrelated to the size of the group and to the location of the village near the center or at the periphery of the ethnic area. The villager in Central Java may never have laid eyes on a non-Javanese Indo-

11. In these computations, the home area of the Minahassans was defined as the Division of Manado, of the Ambonese as the Division of Amboina, and of the Buginese as the Government of Celebes and its Dependencies.

nesian, and he is correspondingly less conscious of his Javaneseness than is the villager who migrated from Java to South Sumatra. The amount of vicarious contact is related to the centrifugal force of the local social structure. Those who leave to seek their fortune in the larger society usually return to their native villages at least for visits, and in telling of their experiences with other peoples, they heighten the ethnicity of the stay-at-homes. This kind of influence is largely absent in a centripetal social structure such as that of the Balinese.

The degree of urban influence is another factor directly relevant to the villager's ethnic loyalties. Ethnic consciousness is accentuated in an urban setting. Given the heterogeneity and competitiveness of townspeople, it could hardly be otherwise. As Mrs. Palmer points out, it is the cities that support Sundanese ethnic organizations and breed interethnic animosities. The urban job hunter is quick to resent the disproportionate employment of other groups, and almost as quick to rely on ethnic favoritism within his own. Toba Bataks and Minahassans, who fifty years ago were barely aware of one another, today play out bloody feuds in the streets of Djakarta. The competition among sukubangsa has led to more than one attempt by town-bred leaders to solicit support in the countryside. As it is, villages near ethnically heterogeneous cities tend to be more strongly oriented toward their ethnic group than are those more remote, and as urban influences continue to penetrate villages, the intensity of ethnic loyalty -- and antagonism -- may be expected to increase.

At the present time, however, the villager's ethnic loyalties do not in most cases contravene his national loyalties. As the following papers suggest, national identification takes the form of personal loyalty (most ubiquitously to President Sukarno), group loyalty (to the Indonesian state or people), and programmatic loyalty (most prominently to the nationalist cause). In regard to the latter two forms, participation in the struggle against non-Indonesian outgroups for nationalistic political and economic causes has been a major factor shaping national loyalties. If the Javanese villager identifies himself more readily with the Indonesian state than does the Balinese, and the latter more readily than the Sumbawan, the contrast may flow in part from the different roles played by each in the Revolution. The government inevitably falls back on anti-foreignism (with Indonesian citizens of foreign descent seldom clearly defined as members of the ingroup) in its efforts to minimize ethnicity among indigenous Indonesians and maximize national loyalties. Although mass media seldom directly touch the average villager, the great nationalistic campaigns have indirectly penetrated even the most remote village. A villager who may never have met a Dutchman or a foreign Chinese is by now likely to feel himself in some way a participant in the struggle for West Irian and, perhaps, even in the fight for a "national economy."

A more deep-seated and durable basis for national loyalties in the Indonesian village is provided by education. Village schools -- and Mr. Goethals reminds us that by no means even all administrative villages have them -- are part of an educational system centralized in the Ministry of Education in Djakarta, and the Ministry aims at making responsible Indonesian citizens of all public-school pupils.

The medium of instruction, at least beyond the first few grades, is Indonesian, a standard language developed from Malay and identified with no one sukubangsa. The Indonesian nation has been well served by the fortunate circumstances which made it unnecessary to adopt Javanese as the national language. (One need only think in this regard of India, Burma and Ceylon.) Textbook writers are not always able to find historical symbols identified with the Indonesian people as a whole, as opposed to one or another of the major sukubangsa, but in terms of contemporary symbols, the nation has an easy edge over most ethnic groups.

The introduction of the electoral process into village Indonesia in 1955 has had profound effects on the structure of loyalties. The election campaigns brought the Indonesian state into the immediate awareness of the villagers and in general fostered national loyalties of all kinds. The first elections were for national bodies -- Parliament and the Constitutent Assembly; they were accompanied by citizenship education undertaken by officials in the national civil service; and the related campaigns were waged for the most part by national parties. The 1955 elections gave millions of villagers for the first time a sense of participation in the main stream of national life.

It seems a little odd to Americans that in Indonesia religious affiliation is considered a completely respectable basis for political parties whereas sukubangsa affiliation is not. There are few overtly ethnic parties, and only one of these -- the Partai Persatuan Daya, a party of the Dyak peoples in West Borneo -- has achieved any considerable success. The dysfunctional aspects of political ethnicity for national integration are obvious.[12] Ethnic groups are particularistic in orientation and diffuse in their obligations, and if ethnic roles are merged with political roles, the result can only be the compounding of favoritism and corruption in government. Even more alarming to national political leaders is the problem of separatism, which has recently become a serious threat to national unity. Whatever the origins of dissident regionalist movements, given the geographical concentration of the various sukubangsa, appeals to ethnic loyalty can serve as a powerful weapon of their leaders.

But political ethnicity has its functional aspects as well. The identification of minority ethnic groups each with a single party could help circumscribe Javanese dominance in a governmental structure with no second chamber. More important for our purposes here, a system of parties based on ethnicity could serve to develop the villagers' national loyalties (at least as well as religious parties) without exacerbating schisms in the village or the rural countryside. In all of the villages treated in the following papers, competing national parties have, in the course of the election campaigns, divided either one village or hamlet from another or one group from another within the village. The cross-cutting of ethnic group and even village with party politics may heighten national loyalties as opposed to

12. In writing this paragraph I have profited from reading "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," an unpublished paper by Immanuel Wallerstein of Columbia University.

ethnic and local loyalties, but at what price to local social stability?

In point of fact, several ostensibly national parties function as ethnic parties. For instance, at least 75 percent of the IPKI vote (544,803 in December 1955) was cast by Sundanese, and approximately 70 percent of the PERTI vote (465,359) was cast by Minangkabau.[13] PERTI illustrates the relevant possibilities in this regard, for in several remote areas of rural West Sumatra, it is the only party which has organized the Minangkabau villagers. A truly national party occasionally functions in the same way in ethnic areas where particular combinations of social, religious and historical factors give the party a near monopoly of rural support. The Nahdatul Ulama, for instance, comes near to being the party of the Madurese villager. It is questionable whether the latter's national loyalties are any weaker in consequence, whereas a very obvious consequence is that his local world is far less rent by factionalism than is its Javanese counterpart. In many parts of Indonesia village unity has been sacrificed at the altar of national integration.

As it stands, most of village Indonesia has been penetrated by a number of national political parties, and the result has been not only the development of new loyalties to national institutions and causes, but also the restructuring of local loyalties. Herbert Feith, whose analysis of the 1955 elections followed intensive fieldwork, warns against one-way interpretations of the relation between social structure and political process: "However strongly one emphasizes the importance to parties of associations with previously existing social groups and centers of social power [in Indonesia's village areas], it should in no way be thought that campaigning was merely the political rubber-stamping of a previously existing pattern of authority."[14] In many cases, the elections created new social roles, elevated new local leaders, or left in their wake new organizations. In the process the social structure was permanently altered and local loyalties realigned in the significantly different ways described in the following papers.

And what about the future? Much depends on the way in which the basic autonomy law of 1957 is implemented and on the final results of the debate as to the role of political parties and popular elections in the national political system. If local autonomy is ever introduced on any scale at the so-called "third-level" -- that of the desa, consolidated desa or, as envisaged by many Ministry of Interior officials, that of the subdistrict -- and if interparty competition is curbed and new national elections indefinitely postponed, then local loyalties may well be extended and reinforced. Should the rural population gain any real representation in the elected councils (DPRD) at the kebupaten level, the villager might acquire a focus for regional loyalties supplementing and growing out of more traditional, strictly local loyalties. But whatever happens on the national scene, the process whereby the villager's

13. IPKI stands for Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League for the Upholding of Indonesian Independence), and PERTI for Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah (Islamic Education Association). For an analysis of the regional support of political parties, see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series). Ithaca, 1957, pp. 57-62.

14. Ibid., p. 37

local loyalties are infused with national significance or redefined in national terms will probably be accelerated.

National loyalties are not so well developed in the Indonesian village as in the villages of some other Asian countries where revolutionary programs of national reconstruction have captured the imagination of the rural population. National identity in Indonesia is still in large part defined in terms of what Indonesians are not and who they oppose. Only the government can provide the focus for national loyalties of the constructive, programmatic kind, which are at present weak in the villages. In the meantime, village schools, the lower reaches of the administrative system, and nationally oriented political organizations are rapidly increasing the villager's awareness of his nation and forging new ties between the farmer and the state.

The implication of the following papers is that ethnic loyalties have not assumed alarming proportions in the villages. It is possible that inclusion in this symposium of villages in still other ethnic areas of the outer islands might have modified this impression. In any case, there is no guarantee that ethnicity will not become more important as a consequence of the same modernization process which must underlie the consolidation of national allegiance. As the villager is brought closer to the national stream, his contact with representatives of other ethnic groups will increase. As he learns more about his country, he will become more conscious of his sukubangsa's distinctiveness within the total ethnic composition of the nation and of the existing distribution of privileges among the different groups. Since to a considerable extent "national" influences are urban influences, the invidious ethnicity of the cities may be exported in some degree to the villages. In particular, if the villager's rising expectations are continually frustrated, he may direct his aggression toward other groups -- not only the Dutch and the Chinese, but other sukubangsa as well. There are dangers here, and it may well be that ethnic loyalties in a politicized and invidious form will grow in intensity before national loyalties triumph. Recognition of the dangers, however, will help rather than hinder Indonesia's audacious experiment to create unity out of diversity.

THE SUMBAWAN VILLAGE*

By Peter R. Goethals

South of Celebes a chain of smaller islands extends Indonesia's volcanic arc eastward from Java a thousand miles into the Molucca sea. The islands of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa and Flores, the main links in this chain, are today grouped with Timor, Sumba and a number of lesser islands into a single administrative unit within the modern Republic of Indonesia. This unit, known literally as the "Province of the Southeast Islands," is administered from its capital at Singaradja, northern Bali. Its component islands differ widely from one another in terms of population density, agricultural productivity, ethnic affiliation and historical tradition. Our concern here is with Sumbawa, in particular western Sumbawa. To assess the present balance of local and national loyalties in this part of Indonesia we might start with a survey of the factors shaping the island's history and then turn to the profile of a single village in western Sumbawa.

Two major linguistically distinct groups of Indonesian people have inhabited the island since prehistoric times. Traditional accounts still tell of ancient marriage ties between the royalty of the Sumbawa-speaking states to the west and members of the Bima-speaking courts of eastern Sumbawa. These and other contacts between adjacent peoples speaking mutually unintelligible languages may well have prompted even at that time something akin to ethnic identity, at least among the respective elites. Yet such reflected and doubtless ephermeral feelings of ethnic solidarity cannot have had the cogency of local loyalties. Then, far more than today, highly localized differences of custom (adat) remained within both the Bima and Sumba linguistic groups - differences of which the villagers were intensely aware. Sharply emphasizing this awareness was the scattered distribution of the many small nucleii of population throughout the island. Sumbawa's early political entities were but narrowly extended within separate coastal or riverine basins, with the result that none was as large as, much less coterminous with, either of the major language

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