Manstead
and
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The Blackwell Encyclopedia of

Social Psychology

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Encyclopedia
of
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Preface

Neither of us ever aspired to edit an encyclopedia, but when we were approached independently by two separate publishers, we began to think there was real merit in the idea. Our commitment to social psychology, and our belief in the important contributions made by our discipline, quickly led us to take up the challenge. After all, social psychology is now taught, studied, and researched throughout the world, and is an accepted core subject in every serious degree course in psychology, as well as being a discipline with spheres of interest in sociology, anthropology, and other behavioral sciences. We hope that this book will be a standard resource for all social psychologists: a volume to which students, instructors, researchers, and practitioners can turn when they want to discover more about a particular phenomenon, concept, or theory.

Every step has been taken to ensure that all key topics in social psychology are addressed, and the entries themselves have been written by a large but carefully selected team of authors. The principal criterion used to select authors was that they should be internationally recognized authorities on the topic(s) in question. The book is therefore comprehensive in coverage and authoritative in content. In short, this *Encyclopedia* can be used by introductory students as a comprehensive introduction to the field of social psychology, by more advanced students and instructors as a way of checking or extending their knowledge of a particular topic, and by researchers as an informed and informative guide to the research literature.

Talking to colleagues we realized that there is a broad consensus about what the key sources of literature are in our field: we agree on a selection of top journals, for example. But there is no existing encyclopedia or dictionary which is accepted as a standard work of reference. We have aspired to provide such a volume. To this end, we have been ably supported by four superb Advisory Editors, who helped us generate the initial list of entry titles and then each contributed several key entries. They also emphasize something we wanted to highlight, namely, the international profile of social psychology – Susan Fiske (University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA), Michael Hogg (University of Queensland, Australia), Harry Reis (Rochester University, USA), and Gün Semin (Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). Our task was then made immeasurably easier by the overwhelmingly positive reactions to our first wave of invitations, which ensured that the entries in this book are written by leading scholars, and indeed its list of contributors reads like a "Who's Who" of social psychology. We take this opportunity of thanking them all for their scholarly and impartial contributions, which it has been our pleasure to read and edit.

We envisage that the target audiences of this volume will use the *Encyclopedia* differently. For example, instructors will be able to use entries to update lectures, react quickly to the challenging questions of students which fall outside their areas of expertise, and to keep themselves abreast of recent developments in the field as a whole. Students should find the

book particularly useful when searching for definitions of a key term, and for directing their own writing assignments to the core of an area. Various aspects of the structure of the book should help both audiences. There are four levels of entry, appropriate to the importance of an area within the field – 3,000 word feature items (of which there are 93), 1,000 word *major items* (101), 200 word *glossary items with brief explanation* (64), and 50 word *glossary items* (90). The three main levels of entry have a bibliography of commensurate length (10, 5, and 2 references, respectively), which guide the reader to more detailed literature, focusing on classic as well as contemporary sources. Page numbers of all book chapters are given, to facilitate library searches. Finally, all entries (with a few reasonable exceptions) provide a definition in the first paragraph, and make clear cross-references to other relevant entries (these are printed in uppercase on first mention in the text, and feature and major items are relisted alphabetically at the end of each entry).

The structure of the entries allows readers to use the book in a "top-down" or "bottom-up" fashion. Top-down, a complete newcomer to the field might start with the feature entry on SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, which includes cross-references to areas recognized as part of the core of the discipline. These include ATTITUDE THEORY AND RESEARCH, ATTRIBUTION THEORIES, RESEARCH METHODS, SOCIAL COGNITION, STATISTICS, SOCIAL INFLUENCE, and INTERGROUP RELATIONS. If intrigued by the topic of social influence, say, the reader can proceed from the entry on this topic (3,000 words), to more specific entries on MAJORITY SOCIAL INFLUENCE (200 words) and glossary items (50 words), including NORMATIVE INFLUENCE and INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCE. Alternatively, one might work from the bottom up, beginning with a key term such as ADJUSTMENT AND ANCHORING (50 words), working up to HEURISTICS (3,000 words), and cross-checking the entry on REASONING (1,000 words). Entries are arranged in alphabetical order, but if you cannot immediately locate material on a desired topic, consult the extensive index. Even where we have decided that a topic did not merit a separate entry of its own, it is often covered extensively in more than one other entry.

When we began work on this book, we came across two quotations which neatly illustrate the roles of contributors to, and editors of, this volume. Goethe wrote that "In der Beschränkung zeigt sich der Meister" (which might be rendered as "Mastery lies in brevity,"!). We believe our set of entries shows that to be the case, and thank our contributors once again for prostrating themselves on our Procrustean bed of editorial guidelines. Regarding our own role as editors, Dr Johnson defined a lexicographer as "a harmless drudge"! We certainly do not recognize this as a description of our work on this volume, perhaps because the objective of this book is to go well beyond the task of merely defining key terms and concepts. Instead, the goal is to provide accurate, up-to-date, and lively explications of key topics in social psychology. Our decision that we should both read, and where necessary re-read, all the entries has been vindicated. We have been students of social psychology again, we have benefited enormously from our journey through the field, and we have both gained from our discussions *en route*. We have also enjoyed each other's "company" tremendously (often at the end of a telephone or email node, but sometimes over a bottle or two of Barolo). Last, but not least, as a challenge to the hegemony of alphabetical order, the order of our names was determined by height in centimetres.

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Contents

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accessibility This refers to how easily a construct is retrieved. Knowledge is accessible when it is recently, frequently, or chronically available. PRIMING makes categories temporarily accessible before a stimulus is perceived. In addition, individuals have categories that are chronically accessible; they are regularly and readily usable. For example, some people may chronically perceive everyone in terms of how intelligent they are. When a person's chronic and temporary primes conflict, contextual priming initially dominates individual differences in accessibility, but a person's chronic constructs dominate contextual priming after a delay (Bargh et al., 1986).

Accessible constructs significantly influence the ENCODING of relevant stimuli, affecting how they are perceived and judged; this is especially true of stimuli that are moderate or ambiguous (Bruner, 1957). For example, if a person's construct for friendliness is accessible, the person would interpret an ambiguously described other person to be more friendly than otherwise.

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<div align="right">SUSAN T. FISKE
BETH A. MORLING</div>

accountability This refers to social pressures to justify one's views or decisions to others. As such, accountability plays a key part in most proposed solutions of the classic Hobbesian riddle: How is society possible? (*see* Semin & Manstead, 1983). Organized social life cannot exist without some regularity. This regularity is provided by shared rules, norms, and social practices. Accountability is a critical rule and norm-enforcement mechanism – the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other. Expectations of accountability are an implicit or explicit constraint on virtually everything people do ("If I do this, how will others react?"). Failure to act in ways for which one can construct acceptable accounts leads to varying degrees of censure, depending on the gravity of the offence and the norms of the society (Tetlock, 1992).

Although one can make a powerful case for the universality of accountability (Semin & Manstead, 1983), the specific NORMS and values to which people are held accountable vary dramatically from one culture or time to another. When people leave groups and join new ones, they must often learn new vocabularies of motives – new rules for generating acceptable explanations of behavior. Vocabularies of motives vary as a function of both the micro and macro contexts. The micro context includes IDEOLOGIES and VALUES that characterize distinctive organizations within society and rules within organizations. The macro context refers to cultural ideologies and values. An important research task is systematic ethnographic work to characterize the normative beliefs and values that define standards of accountability in particular decision-making settings.

Accountability researchers generally assume that people seek the approval and respect of those to whom they are accountable. Researchers do, however, characterize the

approval motive in quite distinctive ways. Some trace it to the desire to protect and enhance one's social image or identity, some trace it to the desire to protect and enhance one's self-image, and still others (most notably, SOCIAL EXCHANGE theorists) trace it to the desire to acquire power and wealth. Researchers also diverge over the degree to which people are motivated more by fear of loss of approval or by the quest to enhance their standing in the eyes of others (defensive versus expansive SELF-PRESENTATION).

Research on accountability has proceeded at the micro and macro levels. At the micro level, numerous experimental studies have manipulated whether people feel accountable for their judgments and decisions, to whom people feel accountable, whether people learn that they are accountable prior to or only after exposure to the evidence on which they base their decisions, and the importance of the audience to whom people feel accountable. This research reveals that accountability can have a wide range of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral effects. When people learn that they must justify their opinions to an audience whose own views are known, and people have not yet taken a position themselves, accountability motivates people to shift their views to the anticipated audience (ingratiation, CONFORMITY, and strategic attitude shifts). When people are asked to justify their opinions to an audience whose own views are unknown, and people have not yet taken a stand themselves, accountability motivates preemptive self-criticism in which people attempt to anticipate objections the audience might raise to their positions (increased INTEGRATIVE COMPLEXITY). When people are asked to justify their opinions on an issue where they have already taken a difficult-to-reverse stand, accountability motivates defensive bolstering in which people try to generate as many justifications as they can for their initial position. When people are accountable to multiple audiences with conflicting policy preferences, they often cope by buckpassing (trying to transfer responsibility for the decision to others) and by procrastination (delaying the decision until further evidence is in hand).

Experimental research has also shown that the effects of accountability are not limited to shifts in public response thresholds (e.g., making people reluctant to take any kind of controversial stand). This point can be most conclusively made by manipulating whether people learn of being accountable prior to or only after exposure to the evidence on which they base judgments. If accountability reduces judgmental biases such as primacy effects or overconfidence simply by transforming people into fence-sitters who never stray from the midpoints of attitude scales, then it should not matter when they learn of being accountable. If accountability reduces judgmental biases by motivating people to think in more nuanced, self-critical, and differentiated ways about the stimulus evidence, it should matter a great deal whether they learn of being accountable prior to exposure to the stimulus evidence. Research indicates that the latter position is correct (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989).

Research on the macro level focuses on the role that accountability plays in facilitating or impeding the functioning of social systems. Economists, for example, stress the role of market accountability in motivating providers of goods and services to do so in the most efficient way possible. Political scientists have devoted much attention to the incentives that different accountability arrangements create for both leaders and followers (e.g., constitutional democracy, oligarchy, tyranny). Sociologists and anthropologists have documented enormous variation in accountability ground rules across both institutions and cultures.

One important theme running through the voluminous macro literature on accountability is the frequency with which "perverse effects" arise in the functioning of real-life accountability systems. Corporate Boards of Directors are supposed to hold top management accountable to shareholders, but instead often become allies and accomplices of the Chief Executive Officer. Government regulatory agencies are supposed to hold the regulated industry accountable to the public interest but instead are often "captured" by the regulated interests. Politicians in democracies are accountable to the mass public but

often give greater weight to highly cohesive special interests. This macro literature has numerous implications for micro researchers who are interested both in diffusion of responsibility and the logic of collective action.

In sum, accountability is a construct that links levels of analysis. Researchers have appropriately approached accountability from a variety of perspectives. Some have focused on both individual and situational variation in the social motives underlying responses to accountability demands; some focus on the cognitive and political strategies people use to cope with accountability demands; and still others focus on how accountability systems function or malfunction in complex real-world settings. *See also*: IDEOLOGY; INTEGRATIVE COMPLEXITY; NORMS; VALUES.

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PHILIP E. TETLOCK

accounts Storylike constructions containing description, interpretation, emotion, expectation, and related material (*see* ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY). This concept has two heritages:

(1) research in sociology that emphasizes people's need to save face and present to others acceptable excuses and justifications for their behavior that is potentially blameworthy (e.g., Scott & Lyman, 1968). These scholars gave the term account a relatively narrow definition, focusing on "valuative inquiry" – meaning, principally, ascription of responsibility for some type of problematic event or predicament.
(2) research in social psychology on attribution that emphasizes the processes by which people interpret and understand aspects of their world such as interpersonal event (e.g., ATTRIBUTION THEORIES). This work led to the broader definition of account stated above, in which attribution or interpretation is a central part of the overall storylike presentation (*see* Harvey, Weber, & Orbuch, 1990, for a summary of theory and research embracing this broader conception); this latter line of theory subsumes situations involving valuative inquiries and those which are relatively nonevaluative. The extension of attribution ideas to the accounts paradigm was developed in order to provide a sensitive way to examine explanation within naturally occurring contexts, such as written stories and oral presentations (*see* DISCOURSE ANALYSIS). In developing this extension, it was assumed that the meaning conveyed by these storylike constructions is different from that supplied by the individual attributions that form part of the story. A concept highly related to the concept of account is that of narrative (Shotter, 1984). Similar to work on accounts, this area of investigation focuses on people's stories and story-telling orally and in writing, and the effects of these stories on aspects of their lives.

Why do people offer accounts? In general, they do so in order to achieve a greater sense of control (Schönbach, 1992). More specifically, accounts are offered for the following reasons: to maintain or enhance self-esteem; to engage in catharsis or emotional purging

regarding some highly grievous matter; simply to achieve completion in understanding of some complex state of affairs; and to stimulate enlightenment, hope, and will (e.g., the instance of stories written by persons who have suffered through great loss or anguish and who wish to enlighten and give strength to those who read their stories).

Thus far, research on accounts has attempted to reveal different conditions leading to and consequences of account-making, and to how people's accounts affect the way they are perceived by others (see PERSON PERCEPTION). One prominent line of research involves asking individuals to provide an autobiographical micronarrative – or a very short story – pertaining to some highly memorable event in their life. Baumeister and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990) have used this approach to investigate the different perceptions and attributions made by people remembering such events as when they were victims or perpetrators of wrong-doing, or when they had unrequited love for another, or were the object of such unrequited love. While the possibility of memory distortion and comparability of accounts across people are daunting issues for this program of research, work to date shows the merit of the technique in eliciting stories about various human dilemmas. A general type of evidence emerging is that people either remember events, or color their accounts of these events, in ways that present themselves to others in relatively positive lights (see IMPRESSION FORMATION, SELF-PRESENTATION).

The most active research domain for work on accounts pertains to their role in helping people cope with stressful events. One such event that has received considerable attention to date is that of divorce and separation, or dissolution of CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS. When a major stressor such as divorce or unexpected death of a spouse occurs (see BEREAVEMENT, STRESS AND COPING), account-making and the related activity of confiding in close others (which presumably involves part, but not all, of an individual's account of an event) are conceived to contribute to positive coping. On the other hand, suppression of the account-making and/or confiding activities

are posited to contribute to negative coping, or psychological and physical health problems. Evidence tends to support this model of the role of accounts as related to health outcomes. Account-making and confiding research also has been extended to situations involving sexual abuse and incest, again with the findings showing more positive coping for persons who are able to engage in account-making activities and confiding versus those who are not about to engage in such activities.

Overall, research on accounts and confiding in dealing with major stressors and relationship loss is quite promising because of its focus on:

(1) the context, as perceived by the individual, surrounding the stressful event; and
(2) a relatively broad and full analysis of the individual's own words, thoughts, and feelings associated with the stressor.

In order to make substantial further gains, however, this line of research must address such imposing issues as: how to code accounts reliably; how to delineate more precisely health and behavioral outcomes associated with accounts and confiding activities; and how to establish causal links among accounts, confiding, and health and behavioral outcomes.

See also: ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY; ATTRIBUTION THEORIES; DISCOURSE ANALYSIS; IMPRESSION FORMATION; STRESS AND COPING.

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JOHN H. HARVEY

accuracy in impression formation With no single criterion for assessing accuracy, it may be inferred from consensus among those judging a target's attributes, from agreement between judges' impressions and the target's self-reports, or from concordance between judges' impressions and objective measures, such as target behaviors or test scores.

LESLIE A. ZEBROWITZ

achievement motivation The need for achievement, or achievement motivation, has been defined as "the desire or tendency to do things as rapidly and/or as well as possible . . . to accomplish something difficult . . . and attain a high standard . . . to excel" (Murray, 1938, p. 164). The study of achievement motivation, which was a minor issue in the experimental analysis of motivation during the Murray era, subsequently ascended to become the central topic in human motivation (see Atkinson, 1964; Weiner, 1992).

THE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE
APPROACH
Following Murray, the next person of importance in the study of achievement motivation was David McClelland, for he refined the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a projective technique developed by Murray and used primarily in clinical settings, so that it would be applicable for the measurement of human needs in research settings. Individuals were classified as high or low in achievement needs based on their scores on the TAT, and their achievement strivings (e.g., intensity of performance, persistence at achievement tasks) were anticipated based on these need scores.

In addition, McClelland (1961) related achievement needs to the economic development of countries, using various sources of written material to classify cultures as high or low in achievement needs.

The first attempt to place the study of achievement strivings within a broader conceptual framework was then undertaken by Atkinson (1964). Rather than predicting behavior knowing only one's intrapsychic need state, Atkinson contended that achievement strivings could be understood within a decision theory framework in which behavior was conceptualized as determined by what one values and the expectancy of attaining that valued goal. The incentive VALUE of an achievement goal was assumed to be pride in accomplishment. Furthermore, pride was postulated to be inversely related to the expectancy of success (the more difficult the goal, the greater the pride in accomplishment). Guided by Murray and McClelland, Atkinson also specified that the motivation to undertake achievement behavior is influenced by the need for achievement. According to his theory, achievement strivings are a product of: Need for Achievement × Expectancy of Success × Incentive Value. Thus, Atkinson was able to predict that positive achievement strivings are most aroused at tasks of intermediate difficulty, where incentive and expectancy both are given numerical values of 0.50. In addition, individuals high in achievement needs are predicted to be more motivated by intermediate difficulty tasks, and thus are more likely to select those tasks, than are persons low in achievement needs.

Difficulties with TAT assessment, and with the implicit assumption that an individual's need for achievement is constant across different content domains, in part resulted in the relative demise of this approach. Consistent with the emerging emphasis on cognitions in psychology, the study of achievement strivings turned to the thoughts that mediate between an achievement-related stimulus and achievement behaviors.

THE ATTRIBUTIONAL APPROACH
The thought process that attracted most attention related to attributions of causality, or

the perceived reasons why one succeeded or failed (Weiner, 1986). Attribution theorists documented that causal thinking influences performance, affective reactions, and the responses of others to those who are succeeding or failing. For example, an ascription of failure to low ability impedes subsequent performance as compared with an attribution to low effort or bad luck (*see* HELPLESSNESS). Further, an individual failing because of low ability experiences humiliation and shame, whereas poor performance due to lack of effort evokes guilt. In addition, failure due to low effort is more severely punished by others than is failure ascribed to lack of ability, which tends to give rise to sympathy from others (*see* ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY). Thus, ATTRIBUTION THEORIES incorporated a variety of AFFECTS that were neglected by need theorists, as well as broadening the cognitive determinants of performance.

Other variables have also been identified that exert an influence on achievement strivings. These are linked with the structure of the environment which, in turn, shapes particular achievement-related thoughts.

THE ACHIEVEMENT CONTEXT
The structural characteristics of the school system have been argued to have negative motivational consequences for school children. The general contention is that in competitive environments, success is defined as doing better than others. Thus, SOCIAL COMPARISON is involved, there are few winners but many losers, and failure indicates that one is not as good as others (*see* COOPERATION AND COMPETITION). In this setting, the goal of the students therefore is to demonstrate superior capacity (high ability). Hence, ability is equated with value and students may protect their self-worth by not trying (*see* SELF HANDICAPPING) or by telling their peers that they are not trying. Student goals are therefore egoistic (self-focused) or directed toward peer acceptance, rather than directed toward environmental mastery (task-focused). Ego-versus task-orientation and self-versus mastery-focus relate to a variety of achievement behaviors.

Another important environmental influence on achievement strivings is whether the situation is perceived as self-regulated or as controlled by others, and whether the reward is intrinsic to the learner or is imposed from the environment. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION and self-responsibility for achievement strivings tend to enhance learning, persistence, and achievement-related actions (*see* CONTROL MOTIVATION, LOCUS OF CONTROL).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In the past 50 years, there has been much empirical and theoretical process in the study of achievement motivation. What began as a search for the qualities of a person that produce achievement-related behavior has now extended to include the thoughts, emotions, and contextual factors that can enhance or inhibit achievement strivings.
See also: ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY; ATTRIBUTION THEORIES; COOPERATION AND COMPETITION; CONTROL MOTIVATION; SOCIAL COMPARISON; VALUES.

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activation The generalized innervation of the cerebral cortex associated with either external stimulation or emotional states and mediated by various structures in the midbrain and limbic system. The term is sometimes used outside the context of physiology to describe undifferentiated excitation (*see* AROUSAL, DRIVE).
See also: AROUSAL; DRIVE.

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