

VOLUME TEN

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS

SECOND EDITION

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
KEITH BROWN

CO-ORDINATING EDITORS
ANNE H. ANDERSON
LAURIE BAUER
MARGIE BERNS
GRAEME HIRST
JIM MILLER





ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS

SECOND EDITION

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
KEITH BROWN

CO-ORDINATING EDITORS

ANNE H. ANDERSON
LAURIE BAUER
MARGIE BERNS
GRAEME HIRST
JIM MILLER



Amsterdam Boston Heidelberg London New York Oxford
Paris San Diego San Francisco Singapore Sydney Tokyo

Elsevier Ltd., The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford, OX5 1GB, UK

© 2006 Elsevier Ltd.

VOEGELIN, CHARLES FREDERICK (1906–1986) AND VOEGELIN,
FLORENCE MARIE (1927–1986)
Copyright © 2006 National Research Council of Canada, Canadian Crown Copyright.

ECUADOR: LANGUAGE SITUATION
EL SALVADOR: LANGUAGE SITUATION
HONDURAS: LANGUAGE SITUATION
PANAMA: LANGUAGE SITUATION
TAIWAN: LANGUAGE SITUATION
Copyright © 2006 J DeChicchis

SPEECH INTERFACE DESIGN
Copyright © 2006 N Yankelovich

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

*Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier's Rights Department in Oxford, UK:
phone (+44) 1865 843830, fax (+44) 1865 853333, e-mail permissions@elsevier.com.*

*Requests may also be completed on-line via the homepage
(<http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissions>).*

First edition 2006

Library of Congress Control Number: 2005935119

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0-08-044299-4 (set)

This book is printed on acid-free paper
Printed and bound in the United Kingdom

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
**LANGUAGE &
LINGUISTICS**

SECOND EDITION

EXECUTIVE EDITORIAL BOARD/HONORARY EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Keith Brown
University of Cambridge, UK

CO-ORDINATING EDITORS

Anne Anderson
University of Glasgow, Scotland

Laurie Bauer
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

Margie Berns
Purdue University, USA

Keith Brown
University of Cambridge, UK

Graeme Hirst
University of Toronto, Canada

Jim Miller
University of Auckland, New Zealand

SECTION EDITORS

Keith Allan
Monash University, Australia
Semantics (logical & lexical)

Anne Anderson
University of Glasgow, Scotland
Psycholinguistics

Alex Barber
The Open University, UK
Philosophy & Language

Laurie Bauer
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Morphology

Margie Berns
Purdue University, USA
Applied Linguistics

James P. Blevins
University of Cambridge, UK
Syntax

Billy Clark
Middlesex University, UK
Foundations of Linguistics

Östen Dahl
Stockholm University, Sweden
Semantics (grammatical)

Marcel Danesi
University of Toronto, Canada
Semiotics

Peter T. Daniels
Independent Scholar, USA
Writing Systems

Philip Durkin and Kathryn Allen
Oxford English Dictionary, UK
Glossary

Catherine Emmott
University of Glasgow, Scotland
Text Analysis & Stylistics

John Esling

University of Victoria, Canada
Phonetics

Erik Fudge

University of Reading, UK
Religion & Language

John Gibbons

Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong
Law & Language

Mark Hale

Concordia University, Canada
Historical & Comparative Linguistics

Patrick Hanks

Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
Germany
Lexicography

Bernd Heine

University of Cologne, Germany
Typology & Universals

Graeme Hirst

University of Toronto, Canada
Natural Language Processing & Machine Translation

Kurt R Jankowsky

Georgetown University, USA
Biographies

Dennis Kurzon

University of Haifa, Israel
Law & Language

Jennifer Lai

IBM Research, USA
Speech Technology

Elena Lieven

Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,
Germany
Language Acquisition

Andrew Linn

University of Sheffield, UK
History of Linguistics

Kirsten Malmkjær

Middlesex University, UK
Translation

Lutz Marten

School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London, UK
Countries & Language

Susan McKay

University of Queensland, Australia
Media & Language

Raj Mesthrie

University of Cape Town, South Africa
Society & Language

Miriam Meyerhoff

University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Variation & Language

Jacob L. Mey

University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
Pragmatics

Marc Naguib

University of Bielefeld, Germany
Animal Communication

Jon Oberlander

University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Cognitive Science

Sarah Ogilvie

Oxford University Press, UK
Languages of the World

Allan Ramsay

University of Manchester, UK
Computational Linguistics

Françoise Salager-Meyer

Universidad de los Andes, Merida, Venezuela
Medicine & Language

Michael Silverstein

University of Chicago, USA
Linguistic Anthropology

Rosanna Sornicola

Università di Napoli Federico II, Italy
Spoken Discourse

Bernard Spolsky

Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Education & Language

Robert J. Stainton

University of Western Ontario, Canada
Philosophy & Language

Harry Whitaker

Northern Michigan University, USA
Brain & Language

Richard Wiese

University of Marburg, Germany
Phonology

Ruth Wodak

University of Lancaster, UK
Politics & Language

Bencie Woll

University College London, UK
Sign Language

HONORARY EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS

Barry Blake

La Trobe University, Australia

Yueguo Gu

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China

Yukio Otsu

Keio University, Japan

Sally Thomason

University of Michigan, USA

Nigel Vincent

University of Manchester, UK

GUIDE TO USE OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

Structure of the Encyclopedia

The material in the Encyclopedia is arranged as a series of articles in alphabetical order. To help you realize the full potential of the material in the Encyclopedia we have provided several features to help you find the topic of your choice: an Alphabetical list of Articles, a Subject Classification, Cross-References and a Subject Index.

1. Alphabetical List of Articles

Your first point of reference will probably be the alphabetical list of articles. It provides a full alphabetical listing of all articles in the order they appear within the work. This list appears at the front of each volume, and will provide you with both the volume number and the page number of the article.

Alternatively, you may choose to browse through the work using the alphabetical order of the articles as your guide. To assist you in identifying your location within the Encyclopedia, a running head line indicates the current article.

You will also find 'dummy entries' for certain languages for which alternative language names exist within the alphabetical list of articles and body text.

For example, if you were attempting to locate material on the *Apalachee* language via the contents list, you would find the following:

Apalachee *See* Muskogean Languages.

The dummy entry directs you to the *Muskogean Languages* article.

If you were trying to locate the material by browsing through the text and you looked up *Apalachee*, you would find the following information provided in the dummy entry:

Apalachee <i>See:</i> Muskogean Languages.

2. Subject Classification

The subject classification is intended for use as a thematic guide to the contents of the Encyclopedia. It is divided by subject areas into 36 sections; most sections are further subdivided where appropriate. The sections and subdivisions appear alphabetically, as do the articles within each section. For quick reference, a list of the section headings and subheadings is provided at the start of the subject classification.

Every article in the encyclopedia is listed under at least one section, and a large number are also listed under one or more additional relevant sections. Biographical entries are an exception to this policy; they are listed only under biographies. Except for a very few cases, repeat entries have been avoided within sections, and a given

- Punic *See* Phoenician
Punjabi
Punning
Puşcariu, Sextil (1877–1948)
Putnam, Hilary (b. 1926)
Putonghua *See* Chinese
Qatar: Language Situation
Qimhi, David (1160–?1235)
Quakerism
Quantifiers: Semantics
Quantity
Quechua
Queer Talk
Question Answering from Text, Automatic
Quilis, Antonio (1933–2003)
Quine, Willard van Orman (1908–2000)
Quintilian (ca. 30–98 A.D.)
Quirk, Professor The Lord Charles Randolph (b. 1920)
Qur'an
(R) as a Variable
Radical Interpretation, Translation and Interpretationalism
Radio: Language
Radulphus Brito (ca. 1275–1320)
Rajarajavarmā, A. R. (1863–1918)
Ralph of Beauvais (fl. 1175)
Ramat, Paolo (b. 1936)
Ramstedt, Gustaf John (1873–1950)
Ramus, Petrus (1515–1572)
Ranquel *See* Mapudungan
Rask, Rasmus Kristian (1787–1832)
Rassadin, Valentin Ivanovich (b. 1939)
Rastafari Language
Rational Analysis and Language Processing
Ratke, Wolfgang (1571–1635)
Raumer, Rudolf von (1815–1876)
Raymundus Lullus (ca. 1235–1315)
Reading and Multiliteracy
Reading Processes in Adults
Reading Processes in Children
Realism and Antirealism
Reconstruction, Cultural
Reconstruction, Morphological
Reconstruction, Syntactic
Recovery of Language after Stroke or Trauma in Adults
Recursion
Reductionism
Reduplication
Reference: Philosophical Theories
Reference: Psycholinguistic Approach
Reference: Semiotic Theory
Reference: Stylistic Aspects
Referential Relations in Spoken Discourse
Referential versus Attributive
Reflexivity
Reflexivity in Sociolinguistics
Reformation, Northern European
Register Variation: Core Grammar and Periphery
Register: Dictionaries
Register: Overview
Reichard, Gladys A. (1893–1955)
Reichenbach, Hans (1891–1953)
Reinecke, John E. (1904–1982)
Reiner, Erica (b. 1926)
Reinhart, Tanya
Reinisch, Simon Leo (1832–1919)
Reisig, Karl (1792–1829)
Reiske, Johann Jakob (1716–1774)
Relational Network Grammar
Relations and Functions
Relative Clauses
Relative Clauses in Spoken Discourse
Relativism
Relevance Theory
Relevance Theory: Stylistic Applications
Religion and Literacy
Religion: Overview
Religious Language
Remediation of Language Disorders in Adults
Remediation of Language Disorders in Children
Renaissance Linguistics: French Tradition
Renaissance Linguistics: Spanish Tradition
Renou, Louis (1896–1966)
Reported Speech: Pragmatic Aspects
Representation in Language and Mind
Researching Naturally Occurring Speech
Respect Vocabulary in Austronesian
Reuchlin, Johann (1455–1522)
Réunion: Language Situation
Reversing Language Shift
Rhaeto Romance
Rhetoric, Classical
Rhetoric: History
Rhetoric: Semiotic Approaches
Rhetorical Structure Theory
Rhetorical Tropes in Political Discourse
Rhyme
Rhythm
Rhythmic Alternations
Riau Indonesian
Richards, Ivor Armstrong (1893–1979)
Richter, Elise (1865–1942)
Rickford, John R. (b. 1949)
Right Node Raising
Rigid Designation
Ritual and Religious Language
Ritwan *See* Algonquian and Ritwan Languages

- Robins, Robert Henry (1921–2000)
 Role and Reference Grammar
 Romaine, Suzanne (b. 1951)
 Roman *Ars Grammatica*
 Romance Languages
 Romani
 Romania: Language Situation
 Romanian
 Romanian Lexicography
 Ronjat, Jules (1864–1925)
 Rorty, Richard (b. 1931)
 Rosetti, Alexandru (1895–1990)
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)
 Rousselot, Pierre Jean, Abbé (1846–1924)
 Rozwadowski, Jan Michał (1867–1935)
 Rule Borrowing
 Rule Ordering and Derivation in Phonology
 Rules and Principles
 Rules and Rule-Following
 Runes
 Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970)
 Russenorsk
 Russian
 Russian Federation: Language Situation
 Russian Formalism
 Russian River Pomo *See* Pomoan Languages
 Russian Lexicography
 Rwanda: Language Situation
 Ryukyuan
 Saadya Gaon (882–942)
 Saami
 Sacks, Harvey (1935–1975)
 Sacred Texts: Hermeneutics
 Said Ali, Manuel Ida (1861–1953)
 Sainliens, Claude de (d. 1597)
 Sajnovics, János (1735–1785)
 Salar *See* Turkic Languages
 Salina *See* Hokan Languages
 Salishan Languages
 Samar-Leyte
 Samoa, American: Language Situation
 Samoa: Language Situation
 Samtoy *See* Ilocano
 San Marino: Language Situation
 Sanchis Guarner, Manuel (1911–1981)
 Sanctius, Franciscus (1523–1600)
 Sandhi
 Sango
 Sanskrit
 Sanskrit: Discovery by Europeans
 Santali
 São Tomé and Príncipe: Language Situation
 Sapir, Edward (1884–1939)
 Saudi Arabia: Language Situation
 Saussure, Ferdinand (-Mongin) de (1857–1913)
 Saussure: Theory of the Sign
 Saussurean Tradition in 20th-Century Linguistics
 Sayce, Archibald Henry, Reverend (1845–1933)
 Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse
 Scaliger, Joseph Justus (1540–1609)

Poutsma, Hendrik (1856–1937)

R Supheert, Utrecht University, Utrecht,
The Netherlands

© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Hendrik Poutsma, one of the leading Dutch Anglicists of the early 20th century, was born in Gorredijk, the Netherlands, on December 7, 1856, the son of a headmaster of a municipal primary school. He began his career as a primary school teacher but qualified for a secondary school teaching certificate in English after a stay in England. This marked the beginning of a lifelong career as English master at a number of Dutch secondary schools. Poutsma's education and career mirror those of many early Anglicists in the Netherlands, which knew no tradition of English studies at the university level until 1886, when the first chair of English was established at the University of Groningen.

Poutsma's *magnum opus* is a multivolume, 3200-page grammar of English, published over a period of 22 years, intended for continental, and notably Dutch, students of English: the *Grammar of late modern English*. It offers a highly detailed and systematic description of English grammar. In his preface to the first edition, Poutsma professes to focus on the language of the last 200 years, but in fact he bases his description on a huge corpus of examples, also included in the book, ranging from Chaucer to contemporary newspapers, with 19th-century poets and novelists taking pride of place. Because of its sheer size, the *Grammar* is a reference work rather than a textbook. A more practical enterprise is *Do you speak English?*, which saw six editions between 1893 and

1930, and offers English vocabulary with Dutch translations. It provided some of the material for Ten Bruggencate's authoritative Dutch–English dictionary.

Although Poutsma did not train or teach at university and emphatically based his analysis on specimens of actual written language, his grammar is theoretical and complex. His framework of references shows that he placed his work within the context of theoreticians such as O. Jespersen and H. Sweet. E. Kruisinga, fellow Dutch Anglicist and Poutsma's junior by 19 years, is warmly acknowledged in the preface to part I of the second edition of the *Grammar* (1928). The *Grammar* was criticized for paying little attention to phonetics and word formation, and for overstepping the boundary between synchronic and diachronic syntax, but was nevertheless used at universities in Europe and America. Dutch appreciation for Poutsma's massive contribution to English language studies in 1932 was expressed with a honorary doctorate from the University of Amsterdam.

See also: Jespersen, Otto (1860–1943); Kruisinga, Etsko (1875–1944); Sweet, Henry (1845–1912); English in the Present Day (since ca. 1900).

Bibliography

- Poutsma H (1893). *Do you speak English?* Amsterdam: Stemler.
- Poutsma H (1904–1926). *A grammar of late modern English*. Groningen: Noordhoff.
- Stuurman F (1993). *English masters and their era*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Power and Pragmatics

J Wilson, University of Ulster at Jordanstown,
Newtownabbey, Northern Ireland

© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

Pragmatics is concerned with meaning in the context of language use. Basically, when we communicate through language we often mean more than we say; there is often a gap between speaker meaning and sentence meaning. For example, why is it that we interpret *Can you pass the salt?* as a request and not simply a question? Why do we tend to interpret *John*

has three children as meaning no more than three children? Why, when we say *some of the boys came to the party*, do we know that not all of the boys came to the party? And why do we find that certain utterances are paired, such as greeting/greeting, question/answer, or request/response? Pragmatic theories attempt to explain this knowledge by seeing communication as a process of rational and reasoned interpretation, which draws not only on linguistic structure but also shared and world knowledge, cultural norms, and individual components of specific interactional contexts (see Levinson, 1983, 2000; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Yule, 1998; Mey, 2001;

Blakemore, 1992). The question we want to consider here is how this view of human communication is related to the operation of power in society.

Pragmatics, Power, and Language

Pragmatics is recognized as a branch of language study and in recent times the operationalization of power within, or through, the use of language in society has become a central concern of discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, and pragmatics. Textbooks are now giving specific emphasis to the area (see Mesthrie *et al.*, 2000) and there are emergent branches of study, such as critical linguistics, critical discourse analysis, or critical sociolinguistics (see Fairclough, 2001; Wodak, 1996; Talbot *et al.*, 2003), where it is the analysis of power within linguistic practices that is the core focus. The term 'critical' links these approaches closely with social theory and their central aim is to demystify the way in which language operates in society. The term 'power' is not always easily defined, however (see Thornborrow, 2001). Power can be ideological, economic, or cultural, for example, and within these confines, power can operate at a range of different levels: the social, individual, military, state-based, legal, and so on. Though all this is true, there is a general understanding that the operation of power is the ability to get an individual to behave or not to behave in a particular manner. Although this process may be realized in different ways and in different social environments, the pragmatic resources utilized may be of the same type. The problem is, of course, that not everyone has the same access to such resources, and, even when they do, not everyone has the same ability to use those resources in the same way. Hence, some individuals or groups may access or use pragmatic resources to maintain a position of power over others (Harris, 1984; Lakoff, 2000; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998).

Consider, for example, the act of ordering someone to do X. Parents may order a child to be quiet, an army officer may order soldiers to *march*, or a police officer may order a motorist to *stop*. Orders or commands such as *Stop!*, *Be quiet*, or *Quick march*, are imperative forms that function to signal a specific action or, as it is known, a 'speech act' (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) (*see Speech Acts*). Speech acts frequently have linguistic markers that indicate which act is being performed, such as *I apologize*, or *I order you to X*, but frequently the act is underlying or indirect, as in (*I order you*) *March!* But equally important in producing speech acts is the recognition that certain conditions hold, such as X has the authority, right, or power to order Y. In the examples

above, this power condition is institutionalized within the system of parental control, within the legal system for traffic law, and within the formal authority of army hierarchy. Thus, although we can all produce orders, we do not all have access to formal roles that ensure the order is carried out. Hence, in contexts such as schools, medical encounters, or certain forms of business organizations, the power to utilize selected pragmatic resources is differentially distributed (Drew and Heritage, 1992; Bourdieu, 1991; Lippi-Green, 1997) (*see Institutional Talk*).

This type of control may be seen in the organization of talk in interaction. Here, there are issues of not only who can say what, but who can speak when and about what topic. Studies of the distribution and organization of taking turns at talk clearly show that in schools it is the teacher who organizes and distributes the turns at talk (Coulthard, 1977). Similarly, in the doctor's surgery, it is the doctor who is in control; it is his job to ask the questions and the patient's job is simply to respond (Wodak, 1996). In these contexts, there is an interactional asymmetry in relation to responsibility for talk organization. Indeed, in the case of either the school or the surgery, for the student or the patient to begin to ask questions or to take the lead in talking would be seen as a challenge to the power and control of the doctor or teacher.

But it need not be a specifically formal situation where such forms of control operate. Studies of gender differences have continually indicated that in mixed-gender interactions, men attempt to dominate the control of turns, access to the floor, and topic content and distribution (Talbot, 1998; Tannen, 1994). As Shaw (2000) has shown, things become even more complicated when gender and formal context are mixed. In a study of what may be termed 'illegal' interruptions in British House of Commons Proceedings, Shaw noted how male MPs made such interruptions more frequently than female MPs. Furthermore, when women MPs did carry out such actions, they were more frequently censured for this by the Speaker of the House.

Instrumental and Influential Power

The pragmatic control of turns or of specific speech actions could be seen as the use of instrumental power. Instrumental power is often formally embedded as a system of control either explicitly formulated as within the law or more subtly ingrained within what Foucault called "regimes of truth" (Foucault, 1980), that is, the control over access to certain forms of knowledge. But there is also what is seen as influential power in the operation of pragmatics,

and here this may be seen in almost all walks of life, although influential power is more often highlighted in the workings of the media, particularly in advertising, and in politics (Talbot *et al.*, 2003; Bell, 1991).

Consider a burger chain advertising statement: *where good people go for good food*. How are we meant to understand this? There is a clever juxtaposition between *good* as a moral/reflective issue and *good* as a comparative adjective of assessment. In the advertising strap line, there is an effort to get us to process the phrase *good people* and *good food* together. But why? According to Grice (Grice, 1975; see also Sperber and Wilson, 1995) what happens is that the juxtaposition of *good people* and *good food* creates an incongruity in terms of the relevance of the claim. It is incongruent, argues Grice, because communication is based on an assumption of cooperation, where we try to speak the truth in a clear and concise manner as simply as is necessary to convey a message relevant to the talk. This gives one answer to our question above as to why we assume that John has no more than three children when someone says *John has three children*. If John had more or less than three children, then according to the pragmatic principles espoused by Grice, the speaker would have said so (see Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988)).

Grice does not say that his principles are rules that must always be in operation, or which must be obeyed, merely that they provide a heuristics for interpretation. Interestingly, he also suggested that when a speaker says more or less than required, is obscure, or seemingly irrelevant, this may be an indicator that they intend their hearer to look beyond the meanings of the words themselves in order to retrieve the message. In this case, the speaker may be generating a specific kind of inference referred to as a ‘conversational implicature’ (see Levinson, 1983). For example, if I say *John was in the room* in response to your question *Where have all the apples gone?*, this does not seem to be an answer at all. However, if you assume I am being relevant and saying as much as possible, then you will try to see my response as an answer. Perhaps in this case we both have shared knowledge that John likes to eat apples; if that was the case, you could then infer both that although I do not know who took the apples (if I did I would have said so) I believe/infer that John has taken the apples. The reason I believe this is because, as we jointly know, John really likes his apples, he was in the room, and now the apples are missing. Formally, there would be more to explain here, but the general point is that from a particular utterance we can gain more information

than is readily available from sentence interpretation alone (see **Implicature**).

What then has the process of eating *good food* to do with the moral or other inclinations involved in being *good people*? One answer is that eating food involves choice. We often hear it said after an enjoyable meal at a restaurant that either the food or the restaurant itself, or both, was a *good choice*. Hence, eating out also involves some discernment on behalf of the customers. And those who are *good* at this get *good food*. Hence, in this case, not only can you enjoy the *good food* but you can give yourself a pat on the back as one of the *good people* capable of making a good choice.

Good people (those who know or care) go for good food to X.

There is also a more general interpretation here, simply that this restaurant is where *good* people go for their food. Since most of us wish to think of ourselves as *good*, then this restaurant is the place to be. Both assumptions would be worked out using a similar approach. In both cases, the message is clear: if you consider yourself *good* in either (or even more) of the interpretations provided, then you should be in restaurant X.

This kind of influential power attempts to control our actions by pushing our choices in a particular direction. Since *good* may be taken in a number of ways, it expands the range of audiences that it might influence. Thus, any ambiguity is utilized for a positive purpose, as is the case with the politician before an election who says *We have no intention and see no reason at this time to raise taxes*. In this case there are two elements worthy of attention. The first is the negation of the term *intention*. If intention means one is going to do X (raise taxes), then this is denied. However, in the second part of the sentence the adverbial *at this time* marks any intention as time- and context-based. Consequently, if at a later time one does raise taxes (after being elected for example), one could not be accused of having previously misled the public.

Such time-controlled modifications are frequent in the political domain. The British Prime Minister stated, in relation to Britain’s involvement in the Iraq conflict in 2004, that “At the present time, we believe, we have sufficient troops” (in Iraq). We see the use of the adverbial again, but also in this case the use of an epistemic marker of knowledge, i.e., *believe* as opposed to *know* (see Chafe and Nichols, 1986). *Believe* is weaker than *know* and may be used to ‘hedge’ any claims. Should future events prove against one’s statement, one can always say that is what I believed at the time.

Pragmatics, as may be seen, is central to the operation of power in society. In formalized contexts, it explains acts in terms of their conditions of operation; similarly, it explains in such contexts, and others, who is expected talk when and about what. It also allows us to see how embedded inferential information may be calculated to explain specific messages and similar embedded information may be used to sidetrack us or to protect the speaker. Knowledge of pragmatics is therefore central to understanding power and its role in human communication.

See also: Critical Applied Linguistics; Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988); Implicature; Institutional Talk; Maxims and Flouting; Speech Acts; Speech Act Verbs.

Bibliography

- Austin J L (1962). *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bach K & Harnish R M (1979). *Linguistic communication and speech acts*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bell A (1991). *Language of the news media*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Blakemore D (1992). *Understanding utterances*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bourdieu P (1991). *Language and symbolic power*. Thompson J B (ed.) (Raymond G & Adamson M trans). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Chafe W & Nichols J (eds.) (1986). *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Coulthard M (1977). *Discourse analysis*. London: Longman.
- Davis S (1991). *Pragmatics: A reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Drew P & Heritage J (1992). *Talk at work: Interaction in institutional settings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fairclough N (2001). *Language and power*. London: Longman.
- Foucault M (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings*. Gordon C (ed.). Brighton: Harvester.
- Gazdar G (1979). *Pragmatics: Implicature, presupposition, and logical form*. New York: Academic Press.
- Grice H P (1975). 'Logic and conversation.' In Cole P & Morgan J (eds.) *Syntax and semantics*, vol.3: Speech acts. New York: Academic Press. 41–58.
- Harris S (1984). 'Questions as a mode of control in a magistrate's court.' *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 49, 5–27.
- Hutchby I & Wooffitt R (1998). *Conversation analysis: An introduction*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lakoff G (1987). *Women, fire and dangerous things*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff R T (2000). *The language war*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Levinson S C (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson S C (2000). *Presumptive meanings*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lippi-Green R (1997). *English with an accent: Language, ideology and discrimination in the United States*. London: Routledge.
- Mey J L (2001). *Pragmatics: An introduction* (2nd edn). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mesthrie R, Swann J, Deumert A & Leap W L (2000). *Introducing sociolinguistics*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Searle J R (1969). *Speech acts*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Sperber D & Wilson D (1995). *Relevance* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Shaw S (2000). Language gender, and floor apportionment in political debates. *Discourse and Society* 11(3), 401–418.
- Talbot M (1998). *Language and gender: An introduction*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Talbot M, Atkinson K & Atkinson D (2003). *Language and power in the modern world*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Tannen D (1994). *Gender and discourse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thornborrow J (2001). *Power talk: Language and interaction in institutional discourse*. London: Longman.
- Wodak R (1996). *Disorders of discourse*. Harlow, Essex: Longman.
- Yule G (1998). *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pragmatic Acts

J L Mey, University of Southern Denmark,
Odense, Denmark

© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A Philosophers' Mistake

An often heard critique of the Searlean approach to speech act theory (and, by implication, also of Austin's and Grice's; see Mey, 2001: 93–94) is that it concentrates on 'speech' to the exclusion of other phenomena (e.g., writing) that also fall into the category of 'language.' As a result of this critique, some linguists have suggested that we replace the term 'speech act' by a more 'general' one, such as 'act of language' (compare also the French distinction between *acte langagier* and *acte de parole*; German has *Sprachhandlung* as opposed to *Sprechakt*; Bühler, 1934) (see *Speech Acts*; Grice, Herbert Paul (1913–1988); Austin, John Langshaw (1911–1960)).

What is at stake here is more than a terminological quibble. Those who want to consider speech as different, less comprehensive than 'language' overlook the fact that all language originates in speech; writing is a later development, arising from the need to preserve the spoken word for later and remote use. However, there is a wider implication, one that is equally often overlooked by linguists and many philosophers alike. As Searle (1969: 16) remarked,

When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with certain kinds of *intentions*.

In the standard philosophical approach to language, as we encounter it in works by thinkers such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Reichenbach, Lewis, and a host of other earlier philosophers, the fundamental unit establishing and legitimating our acts of thinking and speaking is the abstract proposition, as it manifests itself in the well-formed linguistic sentence. In this approach, the user of language is conspicuously absent, and consequently so, too, are his or her intentions. For linguists such as Chomsky and his followers, the persistent problem is how to connect a certain representation of the world with a given, well-formed linguistic expression. However, people do not always necessarily think in propositions representing well-formed abstract formulae; nor do they speak in correct sentences, derived according to the rules of an abstract grammar. Regarding people's world representations, the 'intentionality' that Searle

points to comprises more than just cognizing: Affect, will, ethical considerations, and so on have to be taken into consideration when we talk about 'mental states.'

Combining these different facets of human mental activity is often thought of as a process of 'addition': To a given propositional content (e.g., 'to shut the door') I can add a volitional component (as in 'I want you to shut the door'), a component of ordering (as in the imperative 'shut the door!'), a component of questioning (as in 'is the door shut?'), and so on. These additional components are then manifested by their appropriate speech acts: wanting, ordering, questioning, etc. It is this kind of thinking that is at the basis of Gazdar's (1979: 4) often quoted formula: 'Pragmatics is meaning without semantics.'

The main difference between speech act theorists such as Searle (one could also mention others, such as Austin, Ryle, and Grice) and linguists such as Chomsky is that the former include the speaker's mental state in their considerations of 'how to do things with words' (Austin, 1962). However, another problem arises here, having to do with the nature of the speech act as primarily defined (in the Searlean approach) in relation to an 'ideal speaker' (the hearer, if present, is similarly idealized). Thus, Searle's approach not only is basically speaker oriented (the hearer being thought of as a speaker who is temporarily 'out of function' – one who is listening to a speaking person in order to become a speaker him- or herself) but also, both speaker and hearer are located in some abstract, idealized universe, devoid of any relation to their actual status as language users. Even where dialogue or conversation is concerned, the question of what the speakers are saying to each other is discussed from a strictly idealized, speaker-oriented viewpoint; thus, questions as well as answers are uttered by dummies figuring as speaker/hearers (e.g., the ubiquitous 'Peter' and 'Mary'). It is in this sense that we must understand Levinson's (1983: 293) often quoted remark that there is no such thing as abstract 'questionhood' or 'answerhood': all questions and their corresponding answers originate in real-world language users. A question is always a concrete somebody's question, and an answer is always given by somebody with real expectations, needs, and obligations.

However, if this is true for questions and answers, then it must hold for other speech acting as well. There are no orders except those given by a superordinate to a subordinate. The speech act of ordering is widely different, for example, in the military than

in the family; although it is true that everywhere certain people give orders while others have to take them, the difference is in the people and their placement in society. Similarly, there are no promises except those given by a concrete 'promiser' to a concrete 'promisee,' as they are characterized by their actual living conditions, especially when it comes to understanding what a promise is about, being able to accept a promise, and so on. Also, regarding ordinary conversation, the accepted ordering sequence of the individual replies not only represents some external schema (as used in conversation analysis) but also reflects and reproduces the power structure of our society: The powerful grab the floor, whereas the weak withdraw under pressure (*see Conversation Analysis*).

A final aspect (partially adumbrated in the preceding) is essential to our understanding of speech acting. A speech act never comes alone but carries always with it a bevy of other acts on which it essentially depends for its success (*see Speech Acts and Grammar*). Some of these are strictly speech oriented, whereas others are of a more general nature and include, besides speech, those aspects of communication that often are referred to as 'extralinguistic': gestures, intonation, facial mimics, body posture, head movements, laughter, and so on. It is these inclusive acts that I call 'pragmatic acts (*see Pragmatics: Overview*).'

An Illustrative Case: The Irony of Irony

I now illustrate the previous discussion by adducing a classical instance of purported speech acting: the use of irony in speech. Much has been written about irony by linguists, philosophers, sociologists, computer scientists, psychologists, and others. I limit myself here to contrasting two characteristic approaches from different camps: one linguistically and philosophically oriented, and the other more geared toward a computational view (*see Irony*).

Sperber and Wilson, two of the best known authors writing on the subject of irony from a philosophical-linguistic standpoint, have expressed their views on the subject in a number of important contributions. Here is a typical quote:

"Irony plays on the relationship between speaker's thought and the thought of someone other than the speaker" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 243).

According to these authors, the speech act of irony is, in the final instance, expressive of a purely mental process, contrasting two thoughts: the speaker's and someone else's.

In contrast to this mentalistic view of irony, others have taken the stance that irony is first of all a situational phenomenon: "Ironic language presupposes an ironic situation, either in the *hic et nunc* or . . . in the human condition at large" (Littman and Mey, 1991: 134). Specifically, a situation is ironic whenever the acting persons' explicit or implicit goals clash with the reality of their acts. For example, consider the firefighter whose smoking in bed causes the fire station to burn down: His implicit goal, to prevent fires, clashes with his explicit acting, causing a fire to break out. This 'clashing' of act and intention is not only typical for irony but also typical for all sorts of humor; cf. especially Freud's definition of humor as "a shock between two heterogeneous or incompatible worlds" (as quoted in Haverkate, 1990: 107; Freud, 1916/1948). Similarly, in Littman and Mey's (1991: 135) terminology, irony is based on a 'twist' that "appears to depend upon some relationship between (1) the actor's goals, (2) the actor's plans, and (3) the actor's state of knowledge about the likelihood of the plan succeeding."

Irony thus presupposes an ironic situation, one in which an actor's plans somehow come to naught through his or her own fault or lack of knowledge, as attested by Robert Burns's "best laid schemes of mice and men" that sooner or later all "gang a-gley" – most often through the actors' own doings. If we accept this view of irony, then it should be evident that the acting is a central ingredient of any kind of ironic utterance; in fact, ironic utterances are only possible within some kind of action frame, viz., an ironic situation that makes the irony possible. Irony is thus, strictly speaking, not a speech act by its own volition and authority; its quality of 'act' depends on the acting persons and their views and knowledge of the situation in which they act.

It follows that ironic utterances are not, as Sperber and Wilson (1981: 302) maintain, basically to do with speaker attitude but with the world; not principally with speaking but with acting. The distinction between 'using' an utterance and 'mentioning' it (in irony) that these authors advocate (Sperber and Wilson, 1981) thus turns out to be just as vacuous as the time-worn distinction between 'saying' and 'meaning' when applied to irony (cf. Booth, 1974). As to 'mentioning,' this is itself a case of language use and thus not essentially different from other 'use'; as such, it is situation dependent. Speech, by itself, does not act: strictly speaking, there are no speech acts since, ultimately, all speech acting crucially depends on the situation in which the action takes place. Hence, speech acts, in order to be viable, have to be 'situated,' as discussed next.

Acting in a Social Situation

Previously, I stressed the need to think of speakers and hearers as acting in a social context. In traditional linguistics, the user, when and if he or she appears on the scene (as we have seen it happen in Searle's or in Sperber and Wilson's works), is always defined as an individual speaker whose words are spoken in the abstract space of 'exemplary thinking': The utterances that are produced lack any anchoring in the societal reality and invoke a context only as needed to make (minimal) sense. Such a context is never extended beyond the immediate needs of the description; it is not one that is solidly placed in the speakers' and hearers' actual social environment, a *situated* context. Similarly, the voices that we are hearing in the constructed dialogues of linguists' examples belong to lifeless characters (e.g., the famous 'Mary' and 'Peter') and not to real, interacting persons on a common, social scene (Mey, 1994: 155) (*see Context, Communicative*).

Typical for the social situation is that it is a common scene – that is, a situation whose participants are on some kind of shared footing. Elsewhere (Mey, 2001: 135), I have advocated the necessity of situating our speech acts in context, especially with regard to analyzing people's conversation. The reason is that no speech act, or any conversational contribution, can be understood properly unless it is situated within the environment in which it was meant to be understood. 'Quoting out of context' is a well-known means of manipulating a conversational partner; the proper use of conversational techniques excludes such manipulation precisely in the name of good conversational behavior.

In particular, the French sociologist Jacques Rancière (1995) applied the notion of 'common scene' to the political domain. Here, politics is defined as the "battle for the common scene of understanding" (Rancière, 1995: 13) – a battle that is not merely about defining a common ground, in the sense of establishing some common definitions or some common conceptual framework, but primarily about what is understood as being common, by ruling out various kinds of 'misunderstanding' (the title of Rancière's work). The point is that such a 'ruling out' should not be conceived of as a one-sided 'ruling' (in the sense of a judge ruling some question out of order) but as an appeal to the commonly accepted rules for making and breaking a social relationship. It is here that the notion of 'social' situation becomes crucial.

Rancière's 'social scene' is more than a simple context, understood as a common platform of conversation; rather, the question that he raises concerns the

underlying presuppositions making the scene possible. This possibility involves what the actors can afford, not just what they can think and cognize. Thus, the common scene is 'transcendental' in an even deeper sense than Kant's: Not only the possibility of thinking and cognizing but also the very possibility of acting is questioned. This is why Rancière's notion of common scene is so important for the theory of pragmatic acts (*see Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804); Pragmatic Presupposition*).

Understanding a scene depends entirely on the acting. An active understanding implies having an idea of what to do on the scene, not just of what to say or think (these latter, although important, are still subordinated to the acting). Conversely, one's understanding of others depends on understanding their acting and the role they assume on the scene. What may appear as crazy behavior outside of the theater (cf. the expressions, a 'theatrical' laugh, to assume a 'tragic' posture, or even to put on 'an act') is perfectly understandable and rational on the scene, where role and rationality depend on each other. Rational acting is to act in accordance with one's role; any acting outside of that role is irrational (besides being strictly speaking impossible if one wants to keep one's place, both as an actor on the scene and as a member of the theatrical company).

Pragmatics tries to place the common scene within society by making it clear that also on the societal scene at large (and not just in politics) a 'battle' for domination is going on. If we do not understand this battle as a struggle between the forces of society, our understanding of the common scene and its actors will be incomplete. Conversely, our acting is determined by the scene: The scene's 'affordances' (a term from psychology; Gibson, 1979) are the limits of our actions. Common affordances create a common platform for action; a lack of such affordances restricts our possibilities of acting socially. Inasmuch as our acting depends on our understanding of the scene and its affordances, the scene is only 'actable' for all actors if it has been established as common – that is, affordable for everybody and by everybody.

From the previous discussion, it is clear that not only the scene determines our acting but also, conversely, our actions determine and reaffirm the existing scene. We profess adherence to our common platform by acting within its confines, by obeying its limitations, and by realizing our possibilities. Our acting on the scene (this includes our so-called 'speech acts') is thus always a 'situated action' – that is, an action made possible and afforded by and in a particular situation. The next section explores in more detail what this has to say for the question of pragmatic acts.