CULTURE AND EXPERIENCE

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by

A. Irving Hallowell

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THIS volume of selected papers celebrates the sixtieth birthday of Dr. A. Irving Hallowell, Professor of Anthropology in the University of Pennsylvania. It is a tribute to him from his friends and fellow anthropologists in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia Anthropological Society welcomes the opportunity to pay honor to one of its most distinguished members. The book appears as Volume IV of the Publications of the Philadelphia Anthropological Society. To a donor who prefers to remain anonymous and to the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the Society wishes to express its grateful appreciation for generous gifts toward publication.

J. Alden Mason
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Preface



FIRST OF ALL I WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO THE PHILADELPHIA Anthropological Society for promoting the publication of this volume and, in particular, to the officers of the society and members of the Publication Committee who have devoted so much time and thought to it. It was their idea that since many of my papers which dealt with problems on the borderline between anthropology and psychology were scattered about in various periodicals, it might be useful to have them brought together and republished in a single volume.

It was neither desirable nor practical, however, to include all these papers; the major question then was what to select and what to omit and how to organize the articles selected. I did not wish to republish a series of papers arranged in chronological order, unedited and with no central focus. My choice of papers has been highly selective, and the material as it now stands has been organized around a series of problems I have dealt with from time to time, along with relevant data collected in the field. All of the previously published papers chosen for inclusion have been edited and some cutting, to eliminate repetitions, has been done. Besides this, some unpublished material has been added: Chapters 5 and 18, sketching the ethnohistorical background of the Northern Ojibwa (Berens River Saulteaux) and the Lac du Flambeau Ojibwa, specially prepared for this volume; Chapter 9, "Cultural Factors in Spatial Orientation"; and Chapter 17, the introduction to Part IV on problems in studying the psychological dimension of culture change. In content, the chapters range from those of the most general and theoretical nature to those which embody concrete observations on Ojibwa culture and behavior relevant to the general problems discussed. Except in two instances (Chapters 2 and 19), the titles of previously published articles have been retained.

The title of the volume, *Culture and Experience,* is intended to suggest an underlying theme which, I believe, will be apparent throughout. For a long time it has seemed to me that, sooner or later, anthropology will have to come to closer grips with a central problem towards which many of its data converge: it should be possible to formulate more explicitly the necessary and sufficient conditions that make a human exis-

tence possible and which account for the distinctive quality of human experience. A human level of existence implies much more than existence conceived in purely organic terms. Even if a naturalistic frame of reference is fully accepted, physical anthropology cannot give a complete answer to this question. The unique qualitative aspects of a human existence that arise out of conditions of human experience which are not simple functions of man's organic status alone, and that have variable as well as constant features, must be thoroughly explored in all their ramifications and given more explicit formulation.

Perhaps Franz Boas had some such problem in mind when he commented that one of the central questions of anthropology "was the relation between the objective world and man's subjective world as it had taken form in different cultures." At any rate, it seems to me that although we now know a great deal about man's organic status, seen in evolutionary perspective, about his capacity for the symbolic transformation and articulation of experience, and the wide variations in his sociocultural mode of life, the full significance of this knowledge cannot be brought to a logical focus without reference to an implicit psychological dimension. For a human level of existence not only necessitates a unique biological structure and a sociocultural mode of life, it necessitates a peculiar and distinctive kind of psychological structuralization, characterized by a level of personal adjustment and experience in which a unique and complex integration occurs between responses to an "outer" world of objects and events and responses to an "inner" world of impulse, fantasy, and creative imagination. Besides this, a human existence is one in which potentialities for readjustment, reorientation, change, are constantly present. (Cf. Hallowell, 1953a.*)

Part I, *Culture and Personality Structure,* contains papers which are the most general and theoretical in nature. The first of these discusses questions pertaining to the ultimate roots of human culture and personality structure viewed in the broad horizons of behavioral evolution. The second paper, "The Recapitulation Theory and Culture," is critical in nature. It is included because of the enormous influence the theory of recapitulation exerted in the heyday of evolutionary theory and later in psychoanalytic theory. By means of it phylogenetic processes and events could be brought into the same frame of reference as ontogenetic development not only in the prenatal but the postnatal period, and stages in cultural evolution could be related to stages in the development of the human individual. When combined with the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the determining conditions and consequences of the acquisition and transmission of culture were given a biological weighting quite different from that now generally assumed in theories of learning and personality formation. The role that the recapitulation theory played in Freud's thinking cannot be minimized; but he was not

*All references indicated by year and serial letter are to items in the Hallowell Bibliography at the end of the volume.

alone. Sir James G. Frazer adhered to it, as did J. M. Baldwin and G. Stanley Hall among psychologists. (See Hallowell, 1954a.)

The Rorschach paper deals with more than technical problems. In it I have tried to bring to a common focus certain aspects of personality and culture theory, contemporary theories of perception, and some assumptions inherent in the Rorschach test as a psychological instrument. An extended version of this paper will appear in Bruno Klopfer, and others, *Developments in the Rorschach Technique,* II. *Fields of Application* (Yonkers-on- Hudson: World Book Co., 1955). It was written in 1952 and supersedes an earlier survey of the use of the Rorschach test in anthropology (Hallowell, 1945b).

The last paper in this section, "The Self and its Behavioral Environment," was completed in September 1951 and submitted to the late Geza Roheim for inclusion in Volume IV of *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences.* Since this volume had not gone to press at the time of his death (1953), it was withdrawn and subsequently published, with minor revisions, in *Explorations* (March 1954). (I mention these details because explicit reference to the expected source of original publication unfortunately has appeared in print.) As published in *Explorations,* the paper included the section on "The Ojibwa Self" which in this volume is Chapter 8 (Part II). The paper elaborates a generic aspect of the psychological structure of man on which I laid some stress in "Personality Structure and the Evolution of Man." But in addition it sets forth certain basic orientations, found in all cultures, which seem to be functionally related to the dominant ego-centered processes in human beings and are likewise inherent in the functioning of any human society.

Part II, *World View, Personality Structure, and the Self: The Ojibwa Indians,* groups together previously published material which epitomizes some of the most salient characteristics of the Ojibwa world as conceptualized and experienced by the individual. This part is prefaced, however, by a brief and broad-gauged ethnohistorical account of the Ojibwa as an ethnic group with special reference to the position of the Berens River people who so constantly reappear in the chapters of this volume. For the Ojibwa, in general, full ethnographic details must be sought in the sources listed in George P. Murdock's *Ethnographic Bibliography of North America* (Behavioral Science Bibliographies [2nd ed., New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1953]). For the Berens River Ojibwa other articles of mine contain considerable ethnographic information. In most of my articles I have used the term Saulteaux for these people since this is their most usual designation in Canada, including references in official documents. In Chapter 5 I have discussed the synonymy of Ojibwa designation which occasionally has caused some confusion.

One of the questions that has arisen in the course of personality and culture studies is how far specific personality constellations may transcend

local ethnic units and be characteristic of the people in considerably wider regions (Hallowell, 1953a, pp.606-7). In "Some Psychological Characteristics of the Northeastern Indians," reprinted here as Chapter 6, I raised this question in concrete form and assembled data that strongly indicate that the Ojibwa in most respects exhibit psychological characteristics shared by other Indians of the Eastern Woodland Culture Area in former times. Recently, John J. Honigmann in his book, *Culture and Personality* (New York, 1954, p. 334), has suggested "that a relatively homogeneous personality can be discerned in the vast coniferous forest zone extending from northeastern Canada to western Alaska." Several articles of mine written in the thirties (Hallowell, 1936a, 1939a) contain some additional case material on the Ojibwa.

Part III, *The Cultural Patterning of Personal Experience and Behavior,* includes articles which, although documented for the most part by observations on the Ojibwa, are keyed to categories of general human experiences and behavior. In a chapter, "Culture and Behavior," contributed to the *Handbook of Social Psychology,* edited by Gardner Lindzey (Addison-Wesley Press, 1954), Clyde Kluckhohn has organized his survey of the pertinent anthropological literature under such broad headings as Sexual Behavior, Perception, Cognition, Affect, "Abnormal" Behavior, Evaluative Behavior, etc. A number of chapters in this part have reference to the same categories. Although I have omitted a paper on "Cultural Factors in the Structuralization of Perception" (Hallowell, 1951a), Chapters 9, 10, 11, on spatiotemporal orientation and measurement, while concerned more essentially with the cognitive aspects of human behavior, naturally involve perceptual experience as well. The interrelations of affective experience, culture, and behavior are the major focus of Chapters 13, 14, and 15. In Chapter 16 sexual behavior is considered in relation to culturally defined norms of conduct on the one hand, and actual behavior on the other, particularly the kind of psychological affects that occur in cases of deviation and their relation to the operation of social sanctions. Chapter 14 deals with the latter theme from a more inclusive point of view.

Chapter 12, "The Nature and Function of Property as a Social Institution," originally appeared in a periodical that had a very short run and has been defunct for many years. In it I deal with property rights as distinctive human phenomena, characteristic of all human societies, no matter how varied in patterning they may be. To my mind, one of the universal functions of all systems of property rights is to orient the individuals of a given society towards a complex set of basic values which are necessary to its functioning. This kind of value orientation is just as crucial in relation to the motivations and interpersonal adjustments of the individual as are the values associated, for example, with sexual behavior or religious behavior. "Property rights are not only an integral part of the

economic organization of any society; they are likewise a coordinating factor in the functioning of the social order as a whole."

Part IV, *The Psychological Dimension in Culture Change,* includes a preliminary orientation to a very broad and complex problem, as well as the results of a field study undertaken at Lac du Flambeau in 1946. The special feature of the latter was the use made of projective tests and the analysis of the results obtained to probe the psychological depth of the effects of acculturation upon the life adjustment of the Indian population. Since such tests had not been used previously (except by myself) in trying to investigate the psychological dimension of culture change, the study must be considered as highly experimental. While its results have yet to be finally appraised the subsequent use of the Rorschach by George R. Spindler, in an investigation of acculturation in relation to personal adjustment on the Menomini Reservation, indicates the kind of potentialities inherent in projective techniques when used systematically in a well-designed project.

Melford E. Spiro participated in the earliest planning stage of this volume, and he was good enough to look over my papers with a critical eye and make suggestions regarding those he thought should be included and excluded. I am greatly indebted to him for this, and to my colleague Loren C. Eiseley for his keen interest in the project and the opportunity I have had of discussing many practical details with him at every stage in the preparation of the manuscript. But it is impossible to express the debt I owe to my wife, Maude F. Hallowell. It was she who assumed the responsibility of carefully reading all the papers I set aside for possible republication and who assisted me in arriving at the final selection and the plan of organization. And upon her, too, fell the entire responsibility of editing the manuscript.

A. Irving Hallowell

Philadelphia
March 1954

Acknowledgments

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American Anthropologist

American Journal of Orthopsychiatry

American Sociological Review

Columbia University Press

Explorations

Houghton Mifflin Company

Journal of Projective Techniques

Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland

Journal of Social Psychology

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

Psychiatry

Dr. Howard Spoerl

Robert S. Peabody Foundation for Archaeology

The Woods Schools

World Book Company

Yale University Press

Phonetic Key

In the rendering of native Ojibwa words which appear in this book, I have approximated the *Phonetic Transcription of Indian Languages* (Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections LXI, No. 6, 1916), recommended by a committee of the American Anthropological Association. I have not, however, followed all the refinements indicated. For the general reader it is hoped that the symbols used for the following sounds will make the Indian words sufficiently pronounceable:

Vowels

a, as in *father*
ä, as in *hat*
e, as *a* in *fate*
ī, as in *pique*
o, as in not (o̧, *nasalized*)
u, as in *rule*
ɑ, as *u* in *but*

Consonants

c, approximates *sh* in *ship*
j, approximates *z* in *azure*
tc, approximates *ch* in *church*
dj, approximates *j* in *judge*

‘ breathing, concluding syllable after a vowel

´ (acute) and ` (grave) indicate major and secondary stress accents, respectively

Contents

Chapters marked with an asterisk (*) have not previously been published.

ABOUT THE NOTES

The notes will be found on pages 367 *to* 429. *In the note section, at the upper right-hand corner of each recto page and the upper left-hand corner of each verso page, will be found boldface numbers indicating the pages of the text to which the notes on these two pages refer.*

PART I

Culture, Personality, and Experience

Chapter 1 - Personality Structure and the Evolution of Man*



THE REJECTION OF ANY THEORY OF UNILINEAR CULTURAL EVOLUTION seems to have led to a declining interest in all problems of cultural evolution as well as in any *inclusive* approach to what was once considered a central problem of anthropology—the evolution of man. It almost appears as if, in recent years, we had tagged the problem of human evolution as an exclusively biological problem. Or, perhaps more accurately, a problem that centers around the morphology of the primates in relation to the emergence of creatures that can be identified as true hominids. Other orders of continuity and differentiation that human evolution implies have dropped out of the picture, although in the nineteenth century they were the focus of considerable interest. We have even tended to leave the definition of man in the hands of the physical anthropologist. Does this mean that we are all agreed that the only criteria of human status are morphological criteria? Are there no others of any importance? Is even the question of human evolution in its inclusive aspects of no interest to those of us who are not physical anthropolgists?

It is paradoxical, I think, that whereas opponents of human evolution in the nineteenth century were those who naturally stressed evidence that implied discontinuity between man and his primate precursors, anthropologists of the twentieth century, while giving lip service to organic evolution have, by the special emphasis laid upon culture as the prime human differential, once again implied an unbridged gap between ourselves and our animal forebears. Yet continuity as well as differentiation is of the essence of any evolutionary process. So where, may we ask, do the roots of culture lie at the prehuman level? Even the concept of human nature in the minds of some has become relativistic—relativistic, that is, to the particular cultural form through which it is empirically manifest. But if this is so, what is the emergence of a cultural mode of adaptation a function of? Surely not of a subhuman nature, since other primates, whatever their distinctive natures, did not evolve a cultural mode of existence.

*Presidential address, the American Anthropological Association, 1949; reprinted from *American Anthropologist*, LII (April-June 1950).

What has happened, of course, is that the human paleontologist, expert in biology, has concentrated on the morphology, locus, and succession of early hominids and related forms. And in recent years new discoveries have kept him extremely busy. The prehistoric archeologist, on the other hand, has concentrated on the forms, distribution, and succession of the objects from which the early cultures of man can be inferred. Neither has been directly concerned with *behavioral evolution,* an area which lies somewhere between the morphological facts and the material cultural evidence of man's existence. In other words, human evolution has been mainly approached through two lines of evidence: (1) skeletal remains, fragments of an organic structure which is only one of the material *conditions* of behavior; (2) the material products of human activity. Consequently, it is easy to understand how it has come about that man's human status has so often been characterized in terms of one or more criteria derived from these sources alone: the structure of the brain case, teeth, pelvis, foot, for instance, or the use of tools.

But there is an obvious difference between these two indicative categories of a human status when viewed evolutionally. The material evidence of organic structure can be related to the morphological traits of other primates, including those of an earlier temporal period, and facts about both continuity and differentiation can be stated. The contrary is true of the material cultural remains. *Their* only connections can be traced *forward,* not backward. So while they may be an index to the presence of man, tools tell us little about the steps in his evolution. If we wish to get behind the tool, as it were, we have to ask questions which neither the archeologist nor the physical anthropologist can answer by a direct appeal to his data. Tool-making is a specific product of behavior and what we have to know in order to explain the making and using of tools by one creature and not another is the kind of psychobiological structure that is a necessary condition of tool-making.[1] In this particular case we know that while, under certain conditions, individual chimpanzees have been observed to construct tools, tool-making and using is not an attribute of chimpanzee society. Neither is it traditional in any other infrahuman primate society. The problem becomes perplexing from the standpoint of human evolution since what we would like to know is whether there is any inner continuity between the processes which make it possible for an infrahuman primate to make and use tools and tools as a characteristic feature of human cultural adaptation. In order to gain any understanding of this problem a deeper question must be faced. It was propounded in the nineteenth century as the evolution of mind, the emergence of the human mind being conceived as the flowering of a long process.

No wonder some of those who reflected on this question, but who had chiefly the facts of comparative anatomy as their data, sincerely felt like St. George Mivart that such facts "re-echo the truth of long ago pro-

claimed by Buffon, that material structure and physical forces can never alone account for the presence of mind."[2] In this, of course, they were essentially right. In fact Mivart, a prolific and widely read writer, stated the problem very well in 1874. He says,

> Man being, as the mind of each man may tell him, an existence not only conscious, but conscious of his own consciousness; one not only acting on inference, but capable of analyzing the process of inference, a creature not only capable of acting well or ill, but of understanding the ideas "virtue" and "moral obligation," with their correlatives freedom of choice and responsibility—man being all this, it is at once obvious that the principal part of his being is his mental power.
>
> In nature there is nothing great but man,
> In man there is nothing great but mind.
>
> We must entirely dismiss, then, the conception that mere anatomy by itself can have any decisive bearing on the question as to *man's nature and being as a whole*. To solve this question, recourse must be had to other studies; that is to say, to philosophy, and especially to that branch of it which occupies itself with mental phenomena—psychology.
>
> *But if man's being as a whole is excluded from our present investigation* [he goes on to say] man's body considered by itself, his mere "massa corporea," may fairly be compared with the bodies of other species of his zoological order, and his corporeal affinities thus established.[3]

It is clear from this quotation that to Mivart an inclusive approach to the evolution of man required that some consideration be given man's psychological evolution. Nevertheless he himself felt impelled to adopt a more exclusive approach: he kept to the material evidence. In the background of Mivart's thinking as well as that of others reflecting on problems of human evolution in the post-Darwinian period and long thereafter, there persisted the old metaphysical dualism of Descartes, the mind-body dichotomy. Psychologists and philosophers were almost forced to wrestle with the mind-body problem in some form, while anthropologists of the same period were content to deal with the material evidence of evolution and leave them to labor undisturbed.[4] But, however phrased, the problem of "mental" evolution still remains:[5] for neither the facts of organic structure in themselves, nor any reconstruction of behavioral evolution exposes the differential factors that ultimately led to the transformation of a subhuman society into a human society with an expanding cultural mode of adaptation. Consequently, some reconceptualization of the whole problem seems in order and I think we already have moved in that direction. It is no longer adequate, for example, to identify mind with mental traits such as consciousness, reason, intelligence, or, even more vaguely, with some sort of quantitative variable such as "mental power," which one then attempts to trace up or down the phylogenetic scale. Yet in the recent discussions of the Australopithecines one well-known authority on primate morphology employs both "mental power" and "intelligence" as conceptual indices for inferring the superior capacities of the Australopithecine over the chimpanzee and gorilla. It is even suggested that the superior "mental power" of the former accounts