

東亞文明研究叢書 19

東亞文化圈 的形成與發展 儒家思想篇



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序言

十九世紀中葉以前的東亞地區，以中國為中心，包括朝鮮半島、日本列島，以及中南半島的越南等地方，除若干時期有過短暫的不愉快事件而外，大致說來，可說是處在有秩序又有人情味的時代。

茲先介紹這個世界值得注意的幾件事。首先是這個世界的溝通方式。有名的日本高僧圓仁，於八三八年隨著日本遣唐使節團到唐朝來請益高僧。在唐朝十年期間，求訪天台宗名師，於八四七年返國，其名著《入唐求法巡禮行記》，被稱為東方的《馬可波羅遊記》，詳細記載入唐求法的經過，尤其當時正逢唐武宗消滅佛教，圓仁記載了所見所聞，這些資料不見於今傳諸史書，相當珍貴，可說是武宗迫害佛教的第一手材料。除此而外，我們從圓仁的遊記可發現他來到中國的第一年，語言不通，他和中國人交談，都是藉「筆言通情」。所謂「筆言」，就是用筆書寫漢字，藉漢字來傳達彼此的感情，也就是所謂的筆談。這種情形，反映了「漢字文化圈」的一面。

再看統一新羅時代名儒學者崔致遠的例子。他在十二歲的時候，奉其父之命到唐朝留學，而且希望考上唐朝的科舉。臨行的時候，他父親告誡說：「十年不第，即非吾子也，行矣勉之。」（《三國史記》卷46〈崔致遠傳〉）結果來到唐朝的六年後，不負其父的期望，考上了進士科（當時應該說是「賓貢」科，所以《新唐書·藝文志》著錄崔致遠著《桂苑筆耕》二十卷時，注曰：「高麗人，賓貢及第」；韓國《增

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補文獻備考》卷一八五特列〈選舉考·賓貢科〉一項，其「登中朝科第者」即含崔致遠。）這個時候是八七四年。崔氏後來在唐朝做官，奉派到淮南節度使高駢那裏當幕僚。八八五年返國，受到重用，八九三年也曾任遣唐使，但因此時的新羅已陷入戰亂，使其志不能充分發揮。這是東亞文化圈地區藉著留學制度，乃至科舉制度、任官制度，使東亞士子與中原士子得以交流，其學歷在唐朝中國與新羅王朝都予以承認，並能夠受到唐、羅兩國政府重視的一個典型例子。

唐朝貞觀年間，也就是七世紀前半葉，京師長安已經成為全世界的文化中心地，國子監則成為國際的最高學府。當時朝鮮三國（高句麗、百濟、新羅）、日本，乃至高昌、吐蕃等國，都曾派遣學生來唐留學。尤其是統一朝鮮半島以後的新羅，派遣留學生與留學僧最多，同一時期可達一、二百人。日本因有海峽之隔，危險性高，所以留學生與留學僧通常是先在國內作基礎教育，然後隨同使節團一齊到中國作短期請益，但也有少數在中國作長期居留，乃至於做官。有名的吉備真備，在唐玄宗開元年間，留唐學習十九年(716～735)，總共學習了三史、五經、名、刑、算術、陰陽、曆道、天文、漏刻、漢音、書道、秘術、雜占等十三道。返國時，攜回了唐禮、曆、樂書以及武器等，對日本此後文教事業的推展，貢獻極大。在吉備入唐的翌年(717)，另一有名的阿倍仲麻呂也來唐朝留學，入學於太學，一時頗負盛名。學成之後在唐做官。七五三年要歸國的時候，船從蘇州出發，結果漂流到今之北越而沒有回成，仍在唐朝為官，與李白、王維友善。阿倍仲麻呂在唐朝最初使用的姓名是朝臣仲滿，

其後改為朝衡，一稱晁衡。肅宗、代宗年間，在唐朝做到安南（今之越南）節度使。一般說來，留學生學成後，除在唐朝做官而外，通常是回國貢獻其所學。因此，使節團員、留學生們在回國之際，都儘量蒐集唐朝的典章文物，以作為建國的藍本。吉備真備所攜回的資料，相當可觀。留學僧方面，新羅的高僧，首推圓光，他本來是研習玄學、儒學、文學、史學等，二十五歲的時候，到陳朝金陵（南京），學習佛法，尤其是成實、涅槃等。學成後，在隋朝及唐初頗受禮遇。

關於一般所說的典章文物，除了文化意義的攝取而外，實際上還代表東亞諸國可以據此而建立共同運行的政治體制。一七八四年，日本福岡市志賀島地方發現了一顆刻有「漢委奴國王」五個字的蛇鈕金印，引起相當大的震撼，而有真偽的爭辯。但在一九五七年，雲南晉寧石寨山古墓出土了屬於西漢時代的「滇王之印」，也是蛇鈕金印。因而強化「漢委奴國王」金印的真實性。其實在《後漢書·東夷倭人傳》已經記載光武帝建武中元二年(57)，「倭奴國奉貢朝賀，光武賜以印綬。」這裏說的是倭境內有許多小國，其中的「奴國」到中國來朝貢賀年，並獲得東漢光武帝賞賜印與綬，這個印就是上面所說在志賀島發現的那顆金印，非常珍貴，它為中、日歷史交流作了有力的印證。尤其在朝貢時，應該呈上國書，此一金印當即用來蓋在國書上的官銜，以證明該王（國）在中國天下秩序中所具有的地位。這是天下政治秩序在運作時，非常重要的一個證明文件。

再如高句麗長壽王去世後，消息傳到北魏，當時是孝文帝在位，也就是太和十九年(491)十二月，孝文帝乃於城東的

行宮為長壽王舉哀。北魏是胡族的鮮卑政權，入主於中國華北，這個時候朝廷的舉哀，顯然是以中國的統治者，為鄰國國君的去世而舉行哀悼儀式，表現著政治的溫情。又如五四九年的十月，百濟聖王派遣使臣到南方的梁朝朝貢，抵達南京城時，才知道發生了侯景叛變，京城已經被攻破，梁武帝憂憤而死，百濟使臣不禁痛哭於端門外，路人看了都為之灑淚。這也是東亞政治活動有人情味的一個好例子。唐朝爆發安、史叛亂後，玄宗於七五六年逃亡到四川。新羅景德王聽到這個消息，專程派遣使臣由長江赴成都朝貢，使玄宗非常感動，親自作了五言詩賞賜其王，其中說到：「益重青青志，風霜恒不渝。」高麗朝史官金富軾著錄此詩時，接著說：「豈古詩『疾風知勁草，板蕩識貞臣』之意乎？」（《三國史記》卷9〈新羅景德王本紀〉）兩國之政治情感，躍然於此。

在宗教方面又如何呢？除了前面所舉新羅高僧圓光、日本高僧圓仁之例而外，新羅高僧慈藏在唐太宗貞觀年間來華學習佛法，有海東孔子之譽。返國後，大倡佛法，並建言服中朝衣冠、奉中朝正朔，促進中、韓文化交流，其功甚偉。有名的日本高僧空海（弘法大師），八〇四年入唐，向惠果學習真言宗，八〇六年返國創立真言宗，在佛教界貢獻極大。空海在詩文、書道方面的成就，也是膾炙人口。

透過以上的這些實例，我們可發現在古代的東亞地區，其實是一個可以溝通的區域，文化背景相差不大，所以在政治、文化等方面，彼此可以從事各種交流，國界似乎不是很重要。這種地理上、文化上的共同體，我們可以稱做「東亞文化圈」。由於東亞文化圈是以中國文化為核心，所以學界

通稱為「中國文化圈」，或者稱為「漢字文化圈」。

現在要追問的是東亞文化圈如何形成與發展？從上面所舉的那些例子看來，下列五要素在東亞地區是共通的：那就是漢字、儒學、律令（法制）、科技（特指醫學、算學、天文、曆法、陰陽學等）、佛教（尤其是佛教）。二〇〇二年六月二十六日到二十八日，由臺灣大學歷史學系所召開的學術研討會，就是以「東亞文化圈的形成與發展」作為主題，邀集海內外學者進行研討。會中共發表四十五篇論文以及兩個專題演講。由於經費等問題，今特選其中有關儒家思想與政治法制部分，分裝兩冊公刊於世，以就教於海內外同好。

《儒家思想篇》共收十三篇論文，其中直接觸及「東亞」概念的思考有四篇，相對於韓國問題者有二篇，關係到日本問題者有六篇，另一篇為儒學問題。四篇東亞概念問題中，杜維明〈多元現代性：「儒家」東亞興起的涵義〉一文，是大會的專題演講題目。杜氏指出多元現代性的概念，是基於三個相互關聯的論斷，此即：以傳統作為界定現代化過程方面起積極作用的因素是持續存在的；非西方文明涉及現代西方的自我認識；地區的知識具有全球性意義。「儒家」東亞的興起，表明儘管全球趨勢主要在於經濟和地緣政治方面，但文化傳統繼續在現代化過程中起著強而有力的影響，這是引人深思的課題。《政治法制篇》共收十六篇論文，其中涉及政治文化者有十一篇，法律文化者有五篇。從這些論文的討論中，可以發現學者們或重視文化的普遍現象，或重視文化的特殊現象；在研究方法上，不論文化的普遍現象或特殊現象，都需要有人關懷，這樣才能得到接近全貌的理解。再

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者，文化的攝取，由於各地區需求不盡相同，基於主體性考量而呈現選擇性。凡此問題，這兩冊所收諸論文，提供了對話的平台，相信有助於瞭解東亞地區歷史文化的過去與未來。

此套書初版於二〇〇三年八月由臺灣大學歷史學系發行後，迄今即將告罄，茲商得臺灣大學東亞文明研究中心資助，列入該中心研究叢書之一，以利有關東亞文明研究之推展。是為序。

高 明 士 謹識 2004年12月30日
於臺灣大學東亞文明研究中心

東亞文化圈的形成與發展

—儒家思想篇—

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Multiple Modernities: Implications of the Rise of “Confucian” East Asia

Tu, Weiming*

For more than two decades, I have been engaged in a transtemporal, cross-cultural, and interdisciplinary discussion on the modern significance of Confucian humanism. As an evolving axial-age civilization, the Confucian tradition has undergone significant transformations. The difference between Classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism is arguably more pronounced than the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism and, mainly because of the impact of the West, the rupture between Neo-Confucianism and the New Confucianism of the twentieth-century is perhaps more radical than that between traditional Christology and the contemporary “God is dead” theology. As scholars in cultural China conventionally do nowadays, we can roughly periodize more than two thousand years of Confucian history into three epochs. Classical Confucianism began with Confucius (551-472. BCE) and, since Confucius described himself as the transmitter of an ancient scholarly tradition, its origins could be several centuries earlier, and end with the disintegration of the Han empire in the third century.

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Neo-Confucianism, symbolized by the Confucian Revival in the Song dynasty (960-1279), was marked by the spread of its ideas and practices to Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. Prior to the sudden appearance of the Western powers in mid-nineteenth century, East Asian polity, society and culture had been so much seasoned in the Confucian persuasion that political governance, social ethics and even the habits of the heart in China, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan were characteristically Confucian in word and deed. The flexibility and adaptability of the Confucian teaching to different styles of leadership, education, and organization, including the family, enabled it to maintain a coherent world view under divergent circumstances. Yet, Confucianism has been so much an integral part of East Asia and so salient a feature of the Sinic world that, unlike Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, it is often perceived as a regional phenomenon rather than a world religion.

However, when we examine the Confucian phenomenon from a variety of academic disciplines, we are impressed by the universal implications of the *Problematik* it evokes. In other words, this historically and culturally specific form of life offers insights into perennial intellectual and spiritual concerns that address the human condition of the emergent global community.¹

In our joint venture to explore modernity both as a historical reality and as a conceptual framework, Confucian East Asia helps to identify three sets of issues: (1) traditions in

¹ See Tu : Weiming's chapter on Confucianism in Alvin D. Sharma, ed., *Our Religions* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1993).

the modernizing process, (2) the relevance of non-Western civilizations to the self-understanding of the modern West and (3) the global significance of local knowledge. While each one of these issues is immensely complex and the interactions among them layer the picture with ambiguities, a discussion of them together will hopefully show new possibilities emerging in this creative confusion, and show that we are at a critical juncture to move beyond three prevalent but outmoded exclusive dichotomies: the traditional/modern, the West/the rest and the local/global. Our effort to transcend these dichotomies has far-reaching implications for facilitating dialogues of civilizations in the global community. I would like to focus my attention on the rise of East Asia as an exemplification of this mode of thinking.

Whether or not Hegel’s philosophy of history signaled a critical turn in which Confucianism, together with other spiritual traditions in the non-Western world, was relegated to the dawn of the Spirit, the common practice in cultural China of defining the Confucian ethic as “feudal” is predicated on the strong thesis of historical inevitability implicit in the Hegelian vision. We need to unpack this highly condensed version of “Confucian China and its Modern Fate.”² It is too easy to relegate it to the background as a blatant assertion of Eurocentrism. After all, the overwhelming majority of the East Asian intellectuals accepted the judgment that Confucianism, like other axial-age civilizations, was outmoded. The enduring

2 Joseph Levenson : *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, 3 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

power of the Hegelian persuasion that, in the last analysis, the burden of history must be borne by the reflective minds of the modern West, if not the Prussian thinker who, for the first time in human history, philosophized as a world philosopher, is manifested in the current debate on the “end of history.”³

The irony is that the entire Enlightenment Project as captured by the epoch-making Kantian question, “What is Enlightenment?” was, in its initial stage of formulation, an affirmation that cultural traditions outside the West, notably Confucian China, was well ordered without the benefit of revelatory religion. What happened in the 19th century when the dynamics of the modern West engulfed the world in a restless march toward material progress was definitely not the result of a straightforward working out of the Enlightenment Project. On the contrary, it was thoroughly undermined by the unbound Prometheus, symbolizing an unmitigated quest for complete liberation. While, in the eyes of the East Asian admirers, the demands for liberation from all boundaries of authority and dogma characterized the dynamic transformation of the modern West, we need not be either post-imperialist social critics or a post-colonial cultural critics to acknowledge that the modern West also symbolizes conquest, hegemony and enslavement. This background is indispensable in understanding Habermas’ concerted effort to continue the unfinished business of the Enlightenment Project.

Hegel, Marx and Weber shared the ethos that, despite all

3 Francis Fukuyama : *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

its shortcomings, the modern West was the only arena where meaningful progress in the world could be made. The unfolding of the Spirit, the process of historical inevitability or the “iron cage” of modernity was essentially a European predicament. Confucian East Asia, the Islamic Middle East, Hindu India, or Buddhist Southeast Asia was on the receiving end of this process. Eventually, modernization as homogenization would make cultural diversity inoperative, if not totally meaningless. It was inconceivable that Confucianism or, for that matter, any other non-Western spiritual traditions could help shape the modernizing process. The development from tradition to modern was inevitable and irreversible.

In the global context, what some of the most brilliant minds in the modern West assumed to be self-evidently true has turned out to be parochial, a form of local knowledge that has significantly lost much of its universal appeal. In both the Western and non-Western world, the projected transition from tradition to modernity never occurred. As a norm, traditions continue in modernity. Indeed, the modernizing process itself is constantly shaped by a variety of cultural forms rooted in distinct traditions. The recognition of the relevance of radical otherness to one’s own self-understanding of the 18th century seems more applicable to the current situation in the global community than the inattention to any challenges to the Western mindset of the modern age. As we near the 21st century, the openness of the 18th century may provide a better guide for the dialogue of civilizations than the exclusivity of the 19th century and most of the 20th century.

In the fields of Asian and comparative religion, it has long

been established that, since religious pluralism is inevitable, inter-religious dialogue is both necessary and desirable. Indeed, all major studies of human spirituality, inspired by cultural diversity as a pervasive phenomenon in urban centers, take an ecumenical approach to world religions. Long before Samuel Huntington's controversial hypothesis of the "coming clash of civilizations,"⁴ numerous attempts had been made to explore the possibilities of communication, negotiation, accommodation, and fusion between and among different faith communities. Huntington's warning against major fault lines in international politics further enhances the urgency for civilizational dialogues and for exploring a global ethic. Implicit in this sense of urgency is the increasing awareness that the anticipated emergence of the "global village," far from being an integrated fiduciary community, signals difference, differentiation and outright discrimination.

Fraternity, the functional equivalent of community, has attracted scanty attention in modern political thought among the Enlightenment values advocated at the French Revolution. The preoccupation with defining the relationship between the individual and the state since Locke's treatises on government is of course not the full picture of modern political thought, but it is undeniable that communities, notably the family, have been ignored as irrelevant in the main stream of Western academic discourse. Hegel's fascination with the "civil society" which exists beyond the family and below the state was mainly

4 Samuel Huntington : *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).