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中青年经济学家文库

配置效率、X-效率 与国有企业改革

霍燕滨 著



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序

在较长的时间内，我国经济理论界对效率的关注比较多地集中于资源的配置效率，而对依赖于人的努力程度的X-效率却关注不够。实际上，由于人的积极性不能充分发挥而形成的低效率（X-低效率）甚至比市场扭曲所形成的配置低效率更为严重。这种倾向的出现，在很大程度上源于现代经济学关于“人”的假定：个人，不管他被置于何种环境，都被假定是追求最大化的理性“经济人”，个人所在的环境可以彼此不同，但这只意味着个人追求最大化面临不同的约束条件，这样，一切效率上的差别，都是不同的约束条件造成的，它与个人的本性无关。在作了这样的假定以后，经济理论回避了对“人”的分析和认识，而只专注于外部约束条件的研究，整个经济活动变成了非人格化的游戏。

针对这样一种理论倾向，霍燕滨博士的这本专著在吸收关于配置效率研究成果的基础上，重点对X-效率、X-效率与配置效率的关系和提高X-效率途径等问题进行理论探讨，并以研究的成果对我国国有企业改革中的效率状况做出自己的解释。这一研究成果，不仅具有深刻的理论意义，而且具有重要的现实意义。

本书在以下若干方面具有启发：

首先，对两种效率范畴即配置效率和 X-效率进行比较研究。作者的研究没有停留在对概念的一般界定上，而是以经验实证为支撑，并将对 X-效率和配置效率的比较深入到 X-效率理论与新古典理论各自的假定上面。从而让读者看到，在理论的包容性方面，新古典理论只是 X-效率理论的特例。

其次，对人的本性和人格理论的研究。作者从理性特征和行为特征两个方面对人的本性进行分析。在理性特征上，人有两种相互冲突的倾向：一是努力追求利益最大化，并将这种努力建立在计算和注意细节的基础上。二是倾向不受约束，不愿计算和不注意细节。受约束和不受约束是人格特征的两个极端，每个人表现出来的是“选择性理性”。在行为特征上，个人受“惰性区域”的约束。在“惰性区域”里，个人的努力水平之间难以分辨。惰性意味着趋向灵活性是一种有限的意愿。在惰性区域里，个人改变努力水平不需要细致的监督。这种分析为企业管理者提高企业管理水平指出了方向。

X-效率的企业理论是建立在其人格理论基础上的。作者在梳理了 X-效率的人格理论以后，对 X-效率的企业理论进行了探索性的评述。由此使读者看到了与新古典理论完全不同的企业定义、企业家职能和企业科层制度的表述。这为我们研究企业问题打开了一个比新古典理论更广阔视野。

再次，对我国企业改革的研究。在我国以市场化为

取向的改革中，有两种基本主张，一种主张是强调产权制度改革，主张确立个人对财产的排他性权利，并且认为这是市场经济正常运行的基础性条件。另一种主张是强调竞争的市场环境，认为这是提高企业效率的主要途径。作者认为，无论是所有制还是竞争环境，虽然对提高企业效率都会产生重要影响，但它们毕竟都是外部约束因素，只有在它们与“人”的联系中，才能清楚地认识它们对企业效率的影响和作用，X-效率的提高归根结底依赖于个人的努力。作者比较了国有企业和非国有企业的效率，结果显示，国有企业和非国有企业的效率差异主要是在X-效率上。在个人并不总是自愿付出最大努力的情况下，激励就是重要的，以此为根据，作者提出深化国有企业改革要解决激励问题。而产权改革是建立激励机制的重要方面。这样一种结论的提出，无疑为我们正在进行的企业改革提出了一种富有启发的思路。

最后，在此基础上，作者揭示两种效率之间存在的内在关联性。作者认为，在一定条件下，配置效率可以成为X-效率的表现形式，同时，X-低效率可以是在配置低效率的基础上产生的，在市场化进程中，二者是交织在一起的。作者的这些理论探讨为企业内部机制改革同产权与市场环境的配套改革提供了重要的理论支持。

X-效率理论是一个复杂的理论体系。在我国对X-效率理论的探讨方兴未艾。该书的探索无疑是可贵的，

但这只是一个开端，许多与 X - 效率理论有关的重要问题尚未展开，已有探索得出的结论也是一家之言。我衷心地希望，该书的出版能够引起读者对 X - 效率理论的关注和讨论。

逢锦聚

2002 年 9 月于南开园

内 容 提 要

自 20 世纪 30 年代以后，经济学家对效率的关注几乎一边倒地集中于配置效率，在大多数经济学家看来，效率就是满足帕累托均衡条件的配置效率，低效率就是偏离帕累托均衡而形成的配置低效率。尽管在现实中低效率普遍存在，但多数经济学家坚持认为，个人在追求效用的最大化，企业在追求利润的最大化，而政府则追求社会福利的最大化。在各个市场主体都追求最大化的假定下，还存在低效率，那么低效率理所当然地就被规定为配置低效率了。

但是，理论的发展经常是在突破前期理论的假定方面实现的。原先作为理论前提的假定，在后来，受到经济学家的质疑，一旦这些假定被破解，理论就完成了一次进步。科斯就是破解了新古典的企业“黑箱”以后，而开创了现代企业理论的。企业的“黑箱”被科斯打开了，但是，作为经济活动基本单位的个人，仍然被罩在“黑箱”里，个人，不管他被置于何种环境，都被假定是追求最大化的理性“经济人”，个人所在的环境可以彼此不同，但这只意味着个人追求最大化面临不同的约束条件。这样，一切效率上的差别，都是不同的约束条件造成的，它与个人的本性无关。在作了这样的假定以后，经济学家回避了对“人”的分析和认识，而只专注于外部约束条件的研究，整个经济活动变成了非人格化的游戏，个人在这场游戏中被视为同质的原子。经济学家承认个人偏好表现形式的差

别，却不承认个人有“不追求最大化”的偏好。

针对理论的这样一种倾向，本书拟在对已有理论评析的基础上，继承其对配置效率研究方面的积极成果，重点对 X - 效率、X - 效率与配置效率的关系和提高 X - 效率途径等问题进行研究，并尝试性地以研究的成果对我国国有企业改革中的效率状况做出解释。

本书首先对两种效率范畴，即配置效率和 X - 效率进行界定，重点对 X - 效率范畴及其理论进行阐发，对莱宾斯坦 (Leibenstein) 的主要观点，即在个人被假定为追求最大化以后，配置低效率是微不足道的给出理论上的解释，说明几乎被经济学家遗忘的 X - 效率在经济中的重要地位，唤起理论界对这一领域的关注。

在此基础上，本书试图揭示两种效率之间存在的内在关联性，在一定条件下，配置效率可以成为 X - 效率的表现形式，同时，X - 低效率可以是在配置低效率的基础上产生的，在市场化进程中，二者是交织在一起的。揭示两种效率的相互依存性具有重要的理论意义。

在我国的市场化改革中，有两种基本主张：一种主张是强调产权制度改革，主张确立个人对财产的排他性权利，并且认为这是市场经济正常运行的基础性条件。另一种主张是强调竞争的市场环境，认为这是提高企业效率的主要途径。本书认为，无论是所有制还是竞争环境，都是外部约束因素，只有在他们与内部约束因素的联系中，才能清楚地认识他们的地位和作用。所以，本书的研究可以为产权制度改革主张和完善竞争环境的主张奠定一个共同的基础。本书指出，个人既需要产权提供激励，也需要竞争给予压力，但 X - 效率的提高归根结底还要依赖于个人的努力。所以，虽然产权制度改革和竞争环境的改善都是提高 X - 效率所需要的，同时也是提高配置效率所

需要的。但经济学一定还要关注个人的努力和效率。以市场化为导向的改革在我国启动以后，人们更多的是倾向在效率和资源有效配置之间画等号。然而，国有企业与非国有企业之间效率差别不断地提醒人们，X-效率是存在的。本书的目的主要有两个：一是阐述X-效率理论的基本内容，梳理该理论的发展逻辑。二是在此基础上借助经验数据，对我国国有企业中的X-效率进行估计。以此为根据，提出深化国有企业改革所要解决的突出问题。

本书试图做出的理论创新及主要贡献有：

1. 对配置效率和X-效率进行系统的比较研究，从理论上论证X-效率比配置效率更重要。剖析由配置低效率所引起的X-低效率的途径，揭示新古典经济学为什么会疏漏X-效率的原因。

2. 吸收决策理论的合理成分，对X-效率学派的人格理论作探索性的梳理。对人的理性特征、惰性特征和努力决定进行阐述和发挥，构造一个更接近现实的个人人格。

3. 在人格理论的基础上对X-效率学派的企业理论进行评析。X-效率学派的企业理论使用超微观的研究方法，即以个人作为基本的研究对象。在企业中，个人之间的努力是分散的，但惰性区域在个人相互影响下会相应的调整。在科层结构中，信息传递会因为个人惰性而延误或丢失。这些因素一同作用，决定了企业无法实现成本最小化。但X-低效率的存在正好说明企业家的不可替代性。

4. 通过比较国有企业和非国有企业的效率，论证所有制只是影响企业效率的关键性外在因素。比较的结果显示，国有企业和非国有企业的效率差异主要是在X-效率上。在个人并不总是自愿付出最大努力的情况下，激励就是重要的，而来自产权的激励虽然是多重激励机制中最重要的机制，但它必须内化

于劳动者个人的积极性，才会最终提高效率。

5. 在我国的市场化进程中，市场分割和要素价格扭曲现象一直没有得到消除。要素价格扭曲直接形成配置低效率。但在价格双轨制的背景下，国有企业可以享受到国家的政策优惠，并经常要求国家扩大政策保护的范同。本书将论证这种配置低效率其实主要是一种X-低效率。在高度市场化的国家，市场分割现象并不严重，所以，配置低效率并不成为X-效率的表现形式。在我国的转轨期间，配置低效率和X-低效率之间的关系具有特殊性，即X-低效率可以通过配置低效率表现出来。

6. 在讨论政府管制与效率部分中，将两种效率结合起来。产权是个人努力的主要激励因素，因此，产权制度改革应当是国有企业改革的主要内容之一。本书将说明，受国家管制的国有企业，由于缺乏竞争，存在严重的X-低效率。因此，解除某些行业的管制，让国有企业参与竞争，是提高国有企业效率的重要途径。要素市场化进程滞后于产品市场化进程，这使我国经济中的X-低效率异常严重，而国有企业又是制约要素市场化的关键“隘口”，因此，国有企业改革与要素的市场化互为前提、互为因果。这说明，在我国的经济改革中，不可能走单项改革的道路。

关键词：配置效率 X-效率 国有企业改革

Abstract

The concern of economists with efficiency has been concentrated on allocative efficiency almost completely since 30s of 20th century. In the opinion of most economists, efficiency is the allocative efficiency that satisfy the balance condition of Pareto. Low efficiency is the low allocative efficiency formed by the deviation from Pareto balance. Despite universal existence of low efficiency in reality, most economists insist that individuals pursue the maximization of effectiveness and enterprises pursue the maximization of profit while governments pursue the maximization of social welfare. Low efficiency exists under the supposition that all market subjects pursue maximization. So low efficiency is naturally specified as allocative low efficiency.

However, the development of theory is often realized by overthrowing the suppositions of past theories. The suppositions taken as the premise of theory are questioned by economists later. Once these suppositions are overthrown, the theory will make some progress. Coase created the theory of modern enterprise after opening the new classical "black box" of enterprise. Coase opened the "black box" of enterprises. However, individuals, as the basic unit of economic activities, are still kept in the "black box". An individuals is supposed to be rational economic person who pursues maximization un-

der any circumstance. Different environments only mean different restrictive conditions on the individual's pursuit of maximization. So all efficiency difference is caused by different restrictive conditions, which has nothing to do with the nature of the individual. After making such supposition, economists have avoided the care and cognition of human and only focused on the research of external restrictive conditions. The whole economic activities have become non-personal games. Individuals are deemed as atoms of the same quality in these games. Economists recognize the difference of the manifestation of personal preference but do not recognize an individual may have the preference of not pursuing maximization.

This book puts forward two categories of efficiency, i. e., allocative efficiency and X-efficiency. It mainly expounds the category and theory of X-efficiency and gives theoretical explanation of the main opinion of Leibenstein that the allocative low efficiency is insignificant after the individuals are supposed to pursue maximization. It illustrates the important position of X-efficiency in economy which has almost been forgotten by economists to arouses the concern of the theoretical circle with this field.

The value of this thesis lies also in the indication of the internal relationship between two kinds of efficiency. Under certain conditions, allocative efficiency may become the manifestation of X-efficiency. Meanwhile, X- in efficiency may be generated based on allocative low efficiency. During the course of general adoption of market principles, both are interwoven. The indication of the mutual dependence of two kinds of efficiencies has important theoretical significance.

There are two kinds of basic opinions in the market-oriented re-

form of China. (1) Property right reform should be stressed and individuals' exclusive right to properties should be established. The establishment of such rights is the basic condition for the normal operation of market economy. (2) Competitive market environment is the main channel for enterprises to enhance their efficiency and should be stressed. In the theory of X efficiency, ownership system and competition environment are both external restriction factors. Their positions and functions can be clearly understood only through understanding the relation between them and internal restrictive factors. So the research in this thesis can lay a solid foundation for the opinions on both property right reform and competition environment improvement. This thesis indicates that individuals needs both property right as stimulation and competition as pressure. The enhancement of X-efficiency depends on the efforts of individuals. So property right reform and the improvement of competition environment are both demanded by the enhancement of X-efficiency and allocative efficiency. Economics has neglected X-efficiency in its progress. It is a kind of efficiency concept of operators and engineering personnel, a kind of efficiency reflecting the elastic relationship between input and output and a kind of concept with new classical tendency that economists always hesitate to recognize and accept. After the market-oriented reform was carried out in China, people tend to equal efficiency to the effective allocation of resources all the more. However, the difference of the efficiency of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises has kept reminding people of the existence of X-efficiency. This book has two purposes. One is to expound the basic content of X-efficiency theory and straighten out the development logic of this theory. The other is to estimate the X-efficiency of Chinese state-

owned enterprises by aid of empirical data. On basis of this estimation, the problems to be solved by the reform of state-owned enterprises in the next stage are raised.

The theoretical innovation and main contribution of this book:

1. It conducts system comparative research of allocative efficiency and X-efficiency, demonstrates X-efficiency is more important than allocative efficiency from theoretical angle, finds the channels through which low X-efficiency results from allocative low efficiency and reveals why new classical economics neglected X-efficiency.

2. It absorbs the reasonable element of decision making theory, explores the personality theory of X-efficiency school, expounds the rational characteristics, inert characteristics and hard decisions and builds an individual personality more close to reality.

3. It expounds the enterprise theory of X-efficiency school on basis of personality theory. The enterprise theory of X-efficiency school uses super-microcosmic research method, i. e., taking individuals as the basic object of research. The efforts of individuals are decentralized in enterprises. However, the inert area will be correspondingly adjusted under the mutual influence of individuals. Information transmission can be delayed or lost due to personal inertia. The simultaneous functioning of these factors decides that enterprises can not realize the minimization of cost. The existence of X- in efficiency just demonstrates the irreplaceability of enterprisers.

4. It demonstrates that ownership system is the key external factor that influences enterprise efficiency by comparing the efficiency of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned ones. The difference of efficiency of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned ones mainly lies in X-efficiency. Where individuals are not always willing to pay

the greatest efforts, stimulation is the most important while property right stimulation is the most important mechanism among many stimulation mechanisms. State-owned enterprises and non-state-owned ones have different property right structures, which have different effect of stimulation. This is the important cause of efficiency difference.

5. During the course of general adoption of market principles in China, the phenomenon of market division and element price distortion has not been eliminated. Element price distortion directly causes allocative low efficiency. However, under the background of dual price system, state-owned enterprises can enjoy the preferential national policies and often require the state to enlarge the scope of policy protection. This book demonstrates that this kind of allocative low efficiency is actually a kind of X-efficiency. In highly market-oriented countries, the phenomenon of market division is not serious. So allocative low efficiency does not become the manifestation of X-efficiency. During the period of transformation, the relationship between allocative low efficiency and X-efficiency is special, i. e. , low X-efficiency can be displayed through allocative low efficiency.

6. It combines two kinds of efficiency in the part of discussing governmental control and efficiency. Property right is the main factor that stimulates individual efforts. Therefore, property right reform should be the main content of the reform of state-owned enterprises. The book indicates that serious low X-efficiency exists in state-owned enterprises controlled by the state due to the lack of competition. So decontrolling of certain industries and letting state-owned enterprises participate in competition is an important channel of enhancing their efficiency. The formation of element market has lagged behind that of

product market, which indicates that low X-efficiency is extremely serious in Chinese economy. State-owned enterprise is the key pass that restricts the formation of element market. Therefore, the reform of state-owned enterprises and the formation of element market is the premise, cause and effect of each other. This indicates that China should not carry out single reform in its economic reform.

Key Words: Allocative efficiency X-efficiency State-owned-enterprise Reform