



梁为祥 总主编



**[读写]**

# 研究生英语教程

English Course for Graduate Students  
(Reading and Writing)

(2)

**下册**

上海交通大学出版社

English Course for Graduate Students

# 研究生英语教程

(读 写)

下册

总主编 梁为祥

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上海交通大学出版社

## 内 容 提 要

本书严格遵照了《非英语专业研究生英语教学大纲》规定的教学内容、目的和要求编写,内容主要突出“读”和“写”。除了课文后面附有的生词和双解注释之后,还着重编写了重点练习,并附上 Text B 和 5 篇科技读物。最后编排了写作内容,下册的写作内容重点突出几种常用文章体裁的写作,涵盖 10 个方面内容。每一项包括写作理论指导、实例演绎和写作练习。

### 图书在版编目(CIP)数据

研究生英语教程. 读写. 下册/梁为祥总主编. —2 版.  
—上海:上海交通大学出版社,2001

ISBN 7-313-01581-X

I. 研… II. 梁… III. ①英语-阅读教学-研究生-教材  
②英语-写作-研究生-教材 IV. H31

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2001)第 12664 号

### 研究生英语教程

(读写)

下册

(第二版)

梁为祥 总主编

上海交通大学出版社出版发行

(上海市番禺路 877 号 邮政编码 200030)

电话: 64071208 出版人: 张天蔚

立信会计常熟市印刷联营厂印刷 全国新华书店经销

开本: 850mm×1168mm 1/32 印张: 8.375 字数: 246 千字

1996 年 8 月第 1 版 2001 年 3 月第 2 版 2001 年 3 月第 4 次印刷

印数: 4051~8100

ISBN 7-313-01581-X/H·175 定价: 11.50 元

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# 前 言

为了贯彻落实国家教育部颁布的最新《非英语专业研究生英语教学大纲》(简称《大纲》,下同)精神和要求,适应 21 世纪研究生英语教学发展的需要而编写了这套系列教材:《研究生英语教程(读写)》(上下册)、《研究生英语教程(听说)》、《研究生英语教程(练习)》(上下册)和《研究生英语教程(自学辅导)》。由东南大学外语系梁为祥教授担任总主编。

《研究生英语教程(读写)》编写工作严格遵照了《大纲》规定的教学内容、目的和要求。全套教程主要突出“读”和“写”的内容。除了课文后面附有的生词和双解注释之外,还着重编写了重点练习。所以在练习部分,打破传统的编写体系,只安排 answer questions, paraphrase 和 translation(含英译汉两段和汉译英两段,且贴近课文内容)。此后,附上 Text B 和 5 篇科技读物。为了帮助学生有效地阅读,还列出了生词和短语。同时,编写了 understanding the text,以利学生理解课文。

在《研究生英语教程(读写)》的每个单元后编排了写作内容。上册的写作内容重点突出 basic writing (sentence skills),涵盖 10 个方面内容。下册的写作内容重点突出 writing essays and practical writing,也涵盖 10 个方面内容。每一项也同样包括写作理论指导、实例演绎和写作练习。旨在锤炼学生的写作基本功,达到提高写作水平的目的。

《研究生英语教程(练习)》(上下册)的内容主要涵盖 Text A, Text B 的词汇结构,与课文内容有关的翻译练习(含英译汉和汉译英),同时结合硕士研究生学位统考的题型、内容和难度等编排

了一定内容的练习,不仅帮助学生更有效地消化、理解课文,提高英语水平,还有助于学生增强应试能力。

《研究生英语教程(听说)》,以功能意念为纲,涉及 36 个常用语言功能,突出为表达这些功能常用的语言形式。根据中国学生学习外语的特点,强调了在听的基础上练习说,使说的练习有模仿的基础。设计了多种练习说的活动和场景,便于学生由浅入深、由易到难地提高口头表达能力。每单元除适合课堂教学的内容以外,还有适合课后复习、自学的材料,以便学生课后复习巩固课堂所学内容。

为了便于教师在教学中的参考和读者自学的需要,我们编写了《研究生英语教程(自学辅导)》。其中包括《研究生英语教程(读写)》中的练习答案和课文译文,以及《研究生英语教程(听说)》中的练习答案和听力书面材料。

《研究生英语教程(读写)》(上下册)各有 Text A 课文 10 篇,主要安排在 160 个教学课时里,每一篇 Text A 安排 6 个课时,每一项写作安排 2 个课时。而 Text B 以及后面的补充读物均由学生课外自学。本册书与教学安排同步进行,但以学生自学为主。

《研究生英语教程(听说)》适用于 72 课时(每周 2 课时,每学期 18 周,两个学期)教学使用。

在系列教材的选材中,我们十分注意到了内容的趣味性、信息性、实用性、可思性和前瞻性。同时还十分重视语言的规范性、致用性,文体的多样性,内容的广泛性和时代性等,使之内容、形式具有超前性,富有一定的特色。

在编写过程中,东南大学外语系梁文艳老师亦做了不少工作,在此予以感谢。

编 者

2001 年 1 月

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# Unit One

## Text A

### Ideas Come First

Theodore Rosezak

In raising these questions about the place of the computer in our schools, it is not my purpose to question the value of information in and of itself. For better or worse, our technological civilization needs its data the way the Romans needed their roads and the Egyptians of the Old Kingdom needed the Nile flood. To a significant degree, I share that need. As a writer and teacher, I must be part of the 5 to 10 percent of our society which has a steady professional appetite for reliable, up-to-date information. I have long since learned to value the services of a good reference library equipped with a well-connected computer.

Nor do I want to deny that the computer is a superior means of storing and retrieving data. There is nothing sacred about the typed or printed page when it comes to keeping records; if there is a faster way to find facts and manipulate them, we are lucky to have it. Just as the computer displaced the slide rule as a calculating device, it has every right to oust the archive, the filing cabinet, the reference book, if it can prove itself cheaper and more efficient.

But I do want to insist that information, even when it moves at the speed of light, is no more than it has ever been: discrete little bundles of fact, sometimes useful, sometimes trivial, and never the substance of thought. I offer this modest, common-sense notion of

information in deliberate contradiction to the computer enthusiasts and information theorists who have suggested far more extravagant definitions. In the course of this chapter and the next, as this critique unfolds, it will be my purpose to challenge these ambitious efforts to extend the meaning of information to nearly global proportions. That project, I believe, can only end by distorting the natural order of intellectual priorities. And insofar as educators acquiesce in that distortion and agree to invest more of their limited resources in information technology, they may be undermining their students' ability to think significantly.

That is the great mischief done by the data merchants, the futurologists, and those in the schools who believe that computer literacy is the educational wave of the future; they lost sight of the paramount truth that *the mind thinks with ideas, not with information*. Information may helpfully illustrate or decorate an idea; it may, where it works under the guidance of a contrasting idea, help to call other ideas into question. But information does not create ideas; by itself, it does not validate or invalidate them. An idea can only be generated, revised, or unseated by another idea. A culture survives by the power, plasticity, and fertility of its ideas. Ideas come first, because ideas define, contain, and eventually produce information. The principal task of education, therefore, is to teach young minds how to deal with ideas; how to evaluate them, extend them, adapt them to new uses. This can be done with the use of very little information, perhaps none at all. It certainly does not require data processing machinery of any kind. An excess of information may actually crowd out ideas, leaving the mind (young minds especially) distracted by sterile, disconnected facts, lost among shapeless heaps of data.

It may help at this point to take some time for fundamentals.

The relationship of ideas to information is what we call a

generalization. Generalizing might be seen as the basic action of intelligence; it takes two forms. First, when confronted with a vast shapeless welter of facts (whether in the form of personal perceptions or secondhand reports), the mind seeks for a sensible, connecting pattern. Second, when confronted with very few facts, the mind seeks to create a pattern by enlarging upon the little it has and pointing it in the direction of a conclusion. The result in either case is some general statement which is not in the particulars, but has been imposed upon them by the imagination. Perhaps, after more facts are gathered, the pattern falls apart or yields to another, more convincing possibility. Learning to let go of an inadequate idea in favor of a better one is part of a good education in ideas.

Generalizations may take place at many levels. At the lowest level, they are formulated among many densely packed and obvious facts. These are cautious generalizations, perhaps even approaching the dull certainty of a truism. At another level, where the information grows thinner and more scattered, the facts less sharp and certain, we have riskier generalizations which take on the nature of a guess or hunch. In science, where hunches must be given formal rigor, this is where we find theories and hypotheses about the physical world, ideas that are on trial, awaiting more evidence to strengthen, modify, or subvert them. This is also the level at which we find the sort of hazardous generalizations we may regard as either brilliant insights or reckless prejudices, depending upon our critical response: sweeping statements perhaps asserted as unassailable truths, but based upon very few instances.

Generalizations exist, then, along a spectrum of information that stretches from abundance to near absence. As we pass along that spectrum, moving away from a secure surplus of facts, ideas tend to grow more unstable, therefore more daring, therefore more controversial. When I observe that women have been the

homemakers and childminders in human society, I make a safe but uninteresting generalization that embraces a great many data about social systems past and present. But suppose I go on to say, "And whenever women leave the home and forsake their primary function as housewives, morals decline and society crumbles." Now I may be hard pressed to give more than a few questionable examples of the conclusion I offer. It is a risky generalization, a weak idea.

In Rorschach psychological testing, the subject is presented with a meaningless arrangement of blots or marks on a page. There may be many marks or there may be few, but in either case they suggest no sensible image. Then, after one has gazed at them for a while, the marks may suddenly take on a form which becomes absolutely clear. But where is this image? Not in the marks, obviously. The eye, searching for a sensible pattern, has projected it into the material; it has imposed a meaning upon the meaningless. Similarly in Gestalt psychology, one may be confronted with a specially contrived perceptual image: an ambiguous arrangement of marks which seems at first to be one thing but then shifts to become another. Which is the "true" image? The eye is free to choose between them, for they are both truly there. In both cases — the Rorschach blots and the Gestalt figure — the pattern is in the eye of the beholder; the sensory material simply elicits it. The relationship of ideas to facts is much like this. The facts are the scattered, possibly ambiguous marks; the mind orders them one way or another by conforming them to a pattern of its own invention. Ideas are integrating patterns which satisfy the mind when it asks the question, What does this mean? What is this all about?

But, of course, an answer that satisfies me may not satisfy you. We may see different patterns in the same collection of facts. And then we disagree and seek to persuade one another that one or the other of these patterns is superior, meaning that it does more

justice to the facts at hand. The argument may focus on this fact or that, so that we will seem to be disagreeing about particular facts — as to whether they really are facts, or as to their relative importance. But even then, we are probably disagreeing about ideas. For as I shall suggest further on, facts are themselves the creations of ideas.

Those who would grant information a high intellectual priority often like to assume that facts, all by themselves, can jar and unseat ideas. But that is rarely the case, except perhaps in certain turbulent periods when the general idea of “being skeptical” and “questioning authority” is in the air and attaches itself to any dissenting, new item that comes along. Otherwise, in the absence of a well-formulated, intellectually attractive, new idea, it is remarkable how much in the way of dissonance and contradiction a dominant idea can absorb. There are classic cases of this even in the sciences. The Ptolemaic cosmology that prevailed in ancient times and during the Middle Ages had been compromised by countless contradictory observations over many generations. Still, it was an internally coherent, intellectually pleasing idea; therefore, keen minds stood by the familiar old system. Where there seemed to be any conflict, they simply adjusted and elaborated the idea, or restructured the observations in order to make them fit. If observations could not be made to fit, they might be allowed to stand along the cultural sidelines as curiosities, exceptions, freaks of nature. It was not until a highly imaginative constellation of ideas about celestial and terrestrial dynamics, replete with new concepts of gravitation, inertia, momentum, and matter, was created that the old system was retired. Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, similar strategies of adjustment were used to save other inherited scientific ideas in the fields of chemistry, geology, and biology. None of these gave way until whole new paradigms were

invented to replace them, sometimes with relatively few facts initially to support them. The minds that clung to the old concepts were not necessarily being stubborn or benighted; they simply needed a better idea to take hold of.

## New Words and Expressions

**oust** /aust/ *vt.* to take the place of 取代

**archive** /'ɑ:kaiv/ *n.* a place in which are kept records of interest to a government, or to an institution, a firm, a family etc. 档案馆

**discrete** /di'skri:t/ *a.* separate; discontinuous 分离的; 不连续的

**extravagant** /ik'strævəgənt/ *a.* absurd 荒唐的

**critique** /kri'ti:k/ *n.* an article, book, etc. criticizing esp. an idea or a person's system of thought 评论

**unfold** /ʌn'fəuld/ *vi.* develop 展开

**acquiesce** /,ækwi'es/ *vi.* accept quietly 默认

**futurologist** /'fju:tʃə'rələdʒist/ *n.* someone who makes studies in futurology 未来学家

**paramount** /'pærə,maunt/ *a.* most important 最重要的

**validate** /'vælideit/ *vt.* to make valid; to confirm the validity of 使生效; 证实

**unseat** /ʌn'si:t/ *vt.* to remove from a seat 剥夺...的席位, 使退位

**plasticity** /plæs'tisiti/ *n.* the state or quality of being plastic 可塑性

**fertility** /fə'tiliti/ *n.* the condition or state of being fertile (思想等的) 丰富

**welter** /'weltə/ *n.* a disordered mixture 杂乱无章

**hunch** /hʌntʃ/ *n.* intuitive feeling or idea 预感

**unassailable** /ʌnə'seiləbl/ *a.* unable to be attacked 无懈可击的

**childminder** /'tʃaildmaində/ *n.* person looking after children for payment 临时看护小孩者

**forsake** /fɔ:'seik/ *vt.* to give up 放弃, 抛弃

**contrive** /kən'traiv/ *vt.* devise; plan or make resourcefully 发明;设计; 策划

**beholder** /bi'həuldə/ *n.* seer 观看者

**elicit** /i'lisit/ *vt.* to draw out, cause to come out 引出,诱出

**dissenting** /di'sentiŋ/ *a.* different, disagreeing 不同的,有异议的

**dissonance** /'disənəns/ *n.* a lack of agreement among beliefs, or between beliefs and actions 信仰或信仰与行为之间的不一致,不协调

**replete** /ri'pli:t/ *a.* quite full, esp. of food (尤指食物)充满

**paradigm** /'pærədaɪm/ *n.* a very clear or typical example of something 范例,示例

**benighted** /bi'naitid/ *a.* lost in moral darkness; untaught 愚昧的,无知的

## Notes

1. Theodore Roszak (1933-): American social philosopher and critic, attended U. C. L. A. (B. A. 1955) and Princeton University (Ph. D. 1958), and is now Professor of History at California State University at Hayward. Among his major works are: *The Making of a Counter Culture*; *Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition* (1969), and *The Cult of Information; The Folklore of Computers and the True Art of Thinking* (1986), from which the text is taken.
2. For better or worse: Whatever happens
3. Rorschach psychological test; a psychological test in which the subject is presented with a series of blots of ink of standard designs. The responses of the subject yield useful, if not always specific, information about his intelligence and emotional state [after Hermann Rorschach (1884-1922), Swiss psychiatrist].
4. Gestalt psychology: the theory of unitary mental organization based on the observation that perception is structural and cannot be



resolved as the mere agglomeration of minute definable responses to local stimuli. Our apprehension of visual shapes, for instance, or of melodies in music, is a total and integrated response which merely analytical procedures are inadequate to describe.

5. The Ptolemaic cosmology: the theory of the universe propounded by Ptolemy, Greek astronomer and geographer of Alexandria, which holds that the earth is the centre of the universe, and the sun, planets and stars revolve around it (古希腊天文学家)托勒密的宇宙论(天动说)



1. Discuss the following questions according to your comprehension of the text.
    - 1) How does the mind work when a generalization is to be made?
    - 2) What is the proper relationship between ideas and information according to the author?
    - 3) How does the author differ from the computer enthusiasts and information theorists on the role of the computer in education?
    - 4) Why does the author cite the example of the Ptolemaic cosmology towards the end of this essay?
    - 5) What is the author's purpose in writing this critique?
  2. Paraphrase the following statements in your own words.
    - 1) Generalizations exist, then, along a spectrum of information that stretches from abundance to near absence.
    - 2) An excess of information may actually crowd out ideas, leaving the mind (young minds especially) distracted by sterile, disconnected facts, lost among shapeless heaps of data.
    - 3) Information may helpfully illustrate or decorate an idea; it may, where it works under the guidance of a contrasting idea, help to call other ideas into question.
    - 4) At another level, where the information grows thinner and more
- 8 •