



CHINA AND THE WORLD

SPEECHES OF AMBASSADORS TO
CHINA AT PEKING UNIVERSITY

中国与世界

驻华大使北京大学演讲集

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Preface

On May 4, 1998, when Peking University celebrated its centenary, President Jiang Zemin personally attended and gave an important speech. On June 29, 1998, US President Clinton addressed and held a dialogue with Peking University students. These two events attracted worldwide attention to Peking University.

During this same period, Peking University invited fifteen nations' ambassadors to China to address the students and faculty of Peking University, speaking on diplomatic affairs to the School of International Relations and to the university community at large. These speeches, presented over the course of one year, have been collected to form this book.

Each of these ambassadors' speeches provides us with a new perspective for understanding China's historical involvement in the international arena, historical issues in China's diplomacy, current regional situations, and the patterns of international diplomacy. There is no doubt that the diplomatic language employed by the ambassadors reflect the specific national interests of their respective ambassadorial offices, and I hope that the readers of this book will understand the speeches in light of both their content and their perspectives.

I am truly grateful to everyone who contributed time and effort to make this book possible.

Chi Huisheng
Executive Vice-President
Peking University
March 19, 2002

序

1998年5月4日,北京大学庆祝一百周年华诞,国家主席江泽民亲临大会并发表重要讲话。6月29日美国总统克林顿在北大发表演讲并与学生对话,两次活动使北京大学备受世人瞩目。与此同时,北京大学先后邀请了15个国家的驻华使节来校,为国际关系学院等院系师生发表专题演讲,历时一年。本书即是这一活动的结集。这一篇篇职业外交官的演讲,为我们认识中国与其他国家关系的历史与现状,并透过双边关系透视地区局势和世界格局,提供了新的视野。当然,其中也可能不乏外交辞令和固执的偏见,留待广大读者识鉴。

我向为本书付梓做出贡献的各位表示衷心的感谢。

北京大学常务副校长 迟惠生

2002年3月19日

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Canada's Role at the United Nations Security Council

Howard Balloch

Ambassador of Canada to the People's Republic of China

May 7, 1999

Introduction

In Canada, whenever we ask Canadian people what should be the important elements of Canada's foreign policy, we get a consistent answer. We were told that Canada should support the UN and other multilateral institutions; should be pursuing a foreign policy based on peace.

Canada has, of course, been a member of the UN since its very inception, a tireless champion of this most important international organization, and has been active in the whole range of the UN-related organizations, from UNICEF to the World Health Organization, to the specialized agencies of all sorts. The UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights Charter which was passed in 1947 was drafted by a Canadian, John Peters Humphrey, who, I actually personally had the opportunity to study with when I was in McGill University a long time ago. The Declaration was one of the most important early achievements of the UN, and today still exerts great influence on people's lives around the world, and remains the basic document which everybody agrees, it founds the very first level requirements for all countries in the world to respect in terms of human rights.

Canadians have participated in every peacekeeping operation the UN has organized, including the supervision of elections in Korea in 1948 and observing the cease-fire in Kashmir in 1949. Indeed, the concept of placing UN peacekeepers between opposing forces – first applied in 1956 to monitor cease-fires in Cyprus and the Sinai Desert – was conceived by Canadian Foreign Minister (the later Prime Minister) Lester Pearson, for which he was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. Since then, Canadians have participated in various UN missions, from weapons control and landmine removal to humanitarian rescue operations. For example, although it does not have diplomatic relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Canada is one of the major food aid donors to that country, through the United Nations' World Food Program.

In terms of turning the UN into a universal organization that it has always intended to be, Canada also played an important role. It played a key role in the People's Republic of China's assumption of its seat at the UN in 1971, following Canada's establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1970. Indeed, the first ambassador of the PRC to Canada, Huang Hua, then became the PRC's first permanent representative to the UN, and became Foreign Minister when he returned to China later.

Why does Canada put so much emphasis on multilateralism? As a middle power, not a superpower, Canada believes to rely on multilateral institutions to establish and maintain peace and the rule of law in international affairs, through a fair and equitable international system on which we can rely when disputes arise. Canada's principled position as a determined supporter of multilateralism, is based on our belief in the international order, and quite frankly a recognition that Canada does not have the capacity to project our power or to impose our will on others by sheer force or obduracy. Canada has worked hard to strengthen multilateral institutions, from the UN to the World Trade Organization, from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to the ASEAN Regional Form. And I would have to say, during the course of the decade, we have

found that it is easier to pursue our national interest in the context of strong multilateral institutions than had those institutions not existed. We have been able, put it simply, to increase our influence internationally by using multilateral institutions effectively. Now, I'd like to take a few minutes to look at the question of the Security Council.

On January 1 this year, we took our seat as an elected non-permanent member for our sixth two-year term. In February, we served as President of the Council preceding China's presidency by month, one of the two terms of presidency we'll have during our time on the council.

While the five permanent members of the Security Council may take their privileges for granted, the ten other rotating members of the Security Council have to be elected for a two-year term. Canada has earned this privilege six times since the UN was established in 1945, I believe only Germany has been elected many times. Our current term – the sixth term in fact comes fifty years after our first term at the beginning of the UN in 1948-1949. This time, Canada received quite a respectable vote of confidence when 133 out of 177 potential votes were cast in our favor. That China has been an outspoken supporter of Canada's role in the Security Council has been particularly gratifying.

We don't take our ten-year on the Security Council lightly. Canada invested heavily in preparing for our tenure on the Security Council. A key element was extensive consultations with our constituents – the UN membership and the Canadian people – about the directions that we believe we should be pursuing once we join the council. As a result, I believe we have the mandate, some credibilities and responsibilities to win people's trust and push our particular agenda forward. This agenda involves making the UN Security Council more transparent and inclusive, so that it will act more effectively and react more rapidly to emerging crises, demonstrate leadership when intervention is required for humanitarian reasons, and meet the challenges of preventing the spread of regional and internal armed conflicts.

In January 1999, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade established a Foreign Affairs web site dealing with Canada at the UN. It provides the latest information about Canada's activities at the UN while enabling readers to make comments and suggestions. You may find it at www.Dfait-maeci.gc.ca/onw2000UN/.

The latest edition of Canada World View, our department's news periodical, focuses on Canada's involvement at the UN, including our Council tenure. You may find it at www.Dfait-maeci.gc.ca/Canada-magazine.

Today I would like to describe briefly some of the ways I believe the world has changed since Canada last served in the Security Council ten years ago, and review how Canada has responded to these changes.

A Changed International Context

During Canada's tenure on the Security Council ten years ago, the Cold War was just beginning to give way to a new, uncharted path to the future. The global context in which the Council operates, the membership it represents and the challenges it faces are considerably different from what they were a decade ago. It is interesting to note that we were gripped with the collective management of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in our last few months on the Council in 1990. During those months, Canada played a seminal role in arguing for and obtaining Security Council sanction for military action to oust Iraq's forces from Kuwait. And the effort was successful in the form of the UN Security Council Resolution 678. It remains the central concern of the international community and the main responsibility of the Council to obtain and maintain the global peace and security.

As recent events in such different places as Kosovo and Sierra Leone have demonstrated, armed conflict, sadly, affects not only armies, but also an increasing number of *non-combatants*, especially the most vulnerable, who are often the principal targets and, overwhelmingly, the victims of conflict. Casualties from armed conflicts have doubled in the past 10 years to about one

million annually.

This is partly the result of a change in the complexion of war. Most armed conflicts now occur inside rather than between states. In the case of failed states, modern warlords and vigilantes have emerged – aided and abetted by outside arms dealers and others who benefit from the marketplace of conflict. These individuals and groups take advantage of, brutalize and terrorize civilians. The result, as we have seen on our television screens: human tragedies of devastating proportions, exploitation of civilians, massive refugee flows and genocide.

The nature of threats to our global security is also evolving. They are no longer strictly military in nature. Many are multi-faceted and have a transnational dimension: illicit drugs, terrorism, environmental degradation, human rights abuses and weapons proliferation all pose challenges that respect no borders and cut across many disciplines. Often they cannot be solved unilaterally. Some do, however, have a direct impact on our everyday lives, even if we are far from the particular problems.

The traditional state-based security concern is no longer the only one that worries the global community. The security of the individual, and of groups of individuals within one or more states, must also merit the attention of the multilateral community and due attention of the United Nations Security Council.

Canada's Focus on Human Security

The changed global context has led to a refocusing of Canada's own foreign policy priorities, involving three elements promoting human security, that is, the security of human beings as distinct from the security of state:

First, undertaking new initiatives to focus global attention and action on challenges directly threatening the security of individuals. Examples of such initiatives are the campaign to ban anti-personnel mines and Canada's efforts to curtail the abuse and proliferation of military small arms and light weapons. These initiatives involve building coalitions with other countries and with groups within countries, with civil society, non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, like the Red Cross.

Second, pursuing specific human security projects. These include peace-building initiatives to prevent and resolve conflicts; the advancement of humanitarian standards – the driving force behind Canada's efforts at the UN to create the International Criminal Court; and adapting international and regional institutions to integrate human security concerns in their work, such as in the UN Security Council, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Organization of American States (OAS).

The International Criminal Court (ICC), whose framework was established last year, will be the first permanent international tribunal empowered to prosecute individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and eventually, crimes of aggression. The ICC will break new ground in dealing with international crimes on an international basis rather than a state basis, and its jurisdiction will extend to crimes committed in internal conflicts. The ICC will come into existence as soon as 60 states ratify the Statute, Canada has pledged to ratify as soon as possible, and urges other countries to do the same, as a means of bringing to justice those who have committed crimes against humanity. What this means in the future is that unspeakable crime of war such as the Nanjing Massacre here in China will in future be prosecutable by the ICC. There will be record and because of that record we hope and trust there will be a much greater deterrent to such actions in the future as they has been in the past.

The final element is using robust action when necessary. There should be no mistaken, Canada believes that the United Nations should be prepared to use strong measures, including economic sanctions and military forces, to preserve human security when other measures have failed.

In these three ways, Canada's experience can be usefully applied to promoting human security internationally by providing leadership, training and directing peacekeeping and civilian police.

drug interdiction, and developing innovative approaches to overseas aid. Canada has made significant contributions to the personnel and fund of these activities; the Canadian government has chosen to spend these resources on human security because we believe they will be put to good use. And when conditions warrant, Canada is prepared to sponsor and participate in vigorous actions at the UN, including military actions in defense of human security objectives.

The Security Council and Human Security

The UN Security Council remains the paramount global instrument to safeguard peace and security. A strong, effective and purposeful Security Council is therefore essential. However, the Council faces challenges to its credibility. It is falling short of the responsibilities entrusted to it by the international community.

Increasingly, the Council has limited its involvement in emerging conflicts based on factors other than human suffering. It has been inconsistent in choosing the conflicts in which it will become involved. For example, many people believe that UN resources tend to be focused on Europe while similar conflicts in Africa are ignored. And it is entirely inactive in responding to some of the new challenges affecting human security. Setbacks in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda have diminished the resolve of Council members to undertake new peacekeeping initiatives. Other factors affect the Council's capacity to act. Some are based on resurgent isolationist and unilateralist impulses, others in a renewed pursuit of narrow national self-interest and-most disturbingly-the shortage of funds caused by the arrears in payments of several irresponsible members of the UN.

The resulting inertia has far-reaching implications for the Council. While obliged by the UN Charter to carry out Council decisions, some countries may well begin to choose not to do so. In the absence of strong, coherent international action, some aggressors may be tempted to act - whether their targets are other states or civilian populations within their own borders. In the absence of a strong Security Council which can be counted on to act decisively and consistently, undue burdens are placed on individual countries, adhoc coalitions and regional organizations that do not always possess the capacity to respond effectively. Without resolute Council leadership and action, civilians caught in situations of armed conflict are often left in a security void. This vacuum will be and, in some cases, already is being filled by others - combatants, including mercenaries, who act with little restraint and scant regard for even the most basic humanitarian standards.

Canada would like to see the Security Council mandate renewed, and we would like to see the Security Council use that mandate to renew with vigor, with which it approached its tasks at the beginning of the 1990s. Canada is working to shape a more active Council, one that focuses more on the human dimension of security and the unprecedented civilian toll of modern conflicts. We will endeavor to do so by working to broaden the Council's agenda and decisions to include human security themes, to reassert its leadership, and to make the Council's operations more transparent and responsive to the UN membership. For example, earlier this year, we took an initiative to try to help find solution to Iraq Problems. We did so by insisting that the Council consider not only the question of arms control and weapons inspection, but also consider the humanitarian impact of the current situation. And we proposed to set up a series panel, a third party included, to consider the questions of war damage, and prisoners of war left over from the Gulf War. The panel could address all of these issues simultaneously, so that the preoccupation of the international community and the perception in Iraq would not be solely the question of weapon inspection, but would also have a significant humanitarian dimension.

We believe the Council has made progress toward broadening its mandate. Its interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security - the test for Council action - now includes intrastate and inside-state issues. The need to act in support of purely humanitarian goals, to restore stability and in defense of the security of the individuals was behind the Council's operations in Cambodia, Somalia, Mozambique and Haiti.

To address today's security agenda, the Council must take an even more comprehensive view of its mandate. Canada is working to enhance the Council's capacity to address new, non-traditional threats to security, such as ethnic conflict, mass refugee flows, illicit small arms trafficking, gross human rights abuses, failures of governance and the rule of law, and human deprivation.

Canada will encourage the incorporation of these human security concerns into the Council's actions and decisions. In establishing new peace operations, the Council has begun to include, under due conditions, human rights, peace building, and rule of law, democratization and humanitarian components. The UN's current missions in Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic and Bosnia are examples of these.

The Security Council also needs to examine carefully the use of sanctions. Sanctions can be a powerful tool and need to be used properly to be effective and credible. All aspects of sanctions—the objectives, the type, the targets, implementation, conditions and timing for their suspension—need to be considered closely and continually monitored by the Council in terms of their effectiveness and their cost.

Efforts to broaden the Council's horizons need to be complemented by a re-assertion of the Council's leadership. This means that the Council's authority, especially concerning the possible use of military force, must be respected. But the Security Council must assume its responsibilities and take hard decisions when the need arises. Otherwise, it risks being marginalized when regional or other organizations choose to act in the face of the Council's unwillingness to make a decision or to act.

The Council must also correct its tendency to focus selectively on certain conflicts while neglecting others. The Council must represent and be seen to represent the entire international community. Its credibility depends on a willingness to address threats to peace and security wherever they occur. To that end, Canada has joined China's effort to ensure greater focus on the security challenges that threaten Africa.

When it decides to act, the Council needs to have the resources to do so effectively. The progressive starvation of peacekeeping resources is a matter of very deep concern.

Leadership also requires reaching beyond the members of the Security Council to other UN members and other organizations. To this end, Canada has promoted and will continue to promote co-operation between the Council and other regional security organizations, for instance in Haiti, between the UN and Organization of American States, or in Bosnia, where the UN, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe and NATO all have their roles. Such arrangements must spring from willing and effective partnerships—not from a void created by Security Council inaction. Pressures to contract out the Council's responsibility for peace and security to other bodies must be resisted.

To be a leader, the Council must also be ready to act rapidly. For this reason, Canada continues to support the creation of the UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters. It will allow the Council to establish quickly a beachhead for a UN peace mission, increasing the chances for effective and timely Council action. Finally, to be more effective, the Council needs to be more inclusive. Canada will continue to promote participation by non-Council countries whose nationals are involved in the conflicts, or other countries who are involved in peacekeeping operations where the Council is deliberating. It means providing a greater information flow from the Council and the Secretary-General to the UN membership. Because we are not always on the Security Council, we have a special perspective that we bring to bear here. We have been probably the single largest contributor to the Security Council debates when we are not on the Security Council. Because we view the Security Council as an agent of the UN membership as a whole, not simply an exclusive club for the five permanent members.

The Kosovo Crisis and the Security Council's Failure to Act

The Security Council needs to learn to address in a consistent fashion all of the issues I have mentioned here in order to remake itself into an effective body which can be counted on to address emerging security issues in a timely fashion. If it fails to do so, it will continue to fall short of the responsibilities entrusted to it by the international community. However, it would be impossible to address the general issues facing the Security Council today without making mention of the crisis in Kosovo.

Canada would have strongly preferred that the United Nations Security Council explicitly authorize the use of force in Kosovo. Canada worked hard to engage in the Council affairs to ensure that it fully assumed its responsibility of advancing peace and security. Unfortunately, certain members of the Council could not reconcile yesterday's assumptions about sovereignty with today's imperatives of human emergency.

This is lamentable because in failing to take decisive action in response to new security threats, the Council risks diminishing its rightful leadership role in pursuing global peace. And where there is now simply resistance by some to intervention on the basis of humanitarian considerations, the Council could instead work toward a universally agreed set of conditions and limits for action in favor of human security. And I should say that in the case of Kosovo, there is no question about the threat to human security that the actions of the government of Belgrade was taking. The head of the UN, who was in the camps in Macedonian and in Albania earlier this week, has completed a report, which he gave to the UNSC, I believe, the day before yesterday, in which he corroborated the view before the military action began, there was an intended ethnic cleansing going on that was resulting in massive dislocation, significant deaths and a very drastic situation that cried out for collective intervention.

Why is the UN failing to fulfil the hopes of its members?

Apart from the issues of resources, comprehensiveness and selectivity I have already mentioned, a major problem afflicting the UN is the preoccupation of some members with sovereignty, which when viewed in absolute terms will undermine the international order. Sovereignty is not an absolute concept, it is not always total, it is partially ceded each time a nation joins a multilateral institution. Joining an international organization implies giving up to a higher collective order a degree of national control, whether in areas of economics (for instance, ceasing to protect domestic industries) or politically, to prevent internal or external behavior considered unacceptable by the collective.

There is an inherent contradiction between pledging allegiance to an international order whose values must be upheld, while at the same time granting one or more members the right to impose its will on the collective through a veto. The veto system at the UNSC is a flaw of the international order. It is possible if I were the Ambassador of the US, I would not say that. If it is possible, if I were in my friend and colleague's position, the Chinese Ambassador to Canada giving a speech in McGill University, I would not say that. Because both China and the U. S. had the veto. But I wonder whether the UN will forever be flawed unless it finds a means for the collective to over-ride a veto. In the US, a veto passed on a law by the President can be overridden by Congress if sufficient majority is generated. In most countries, where the action of an executive to block the legislation to veto something, there are means in which the legislature can over-ride that veto. And we believe in the UN, as in the WTO or the Universal Postal Union, each member should have a say, but no member should have a determining say which can over-ride the collective will of all the other members.

Under the current UN system, the Security Council tends to function as an executive committee with first and second-class citizens, those permanent members with veto and those non-permanent members without, where the absence of limits on exercising the veto can and does prevent the UN from taking action. There are clear limits to acceptable national behaviour, even

within national boundaries: the Holocaust in Europe would be no more acceptable whether perpetrated within a state's own national boundaries, than in an invaded state. Such crimes against humanity are a clear violation of the UN Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If there is no means for the UN to address those because of the action of the single veto, then the UN will never be an effective organization it would like.

Yet today, some large powers have denied the UN the ability to act, through unwillingness to give up power to the collective or by denying the UN the financial support it is owed. They remain committed to the primacy of established principles of national sovereignty over what they consider undefined and indeterminate concepts of international humanitarian law. To address this, the Security Council needs to establish a standard of humanitarian law, which must be met and enforced. And we are not talking about establishing a concept of international humanitarian law, a standard in which countries don't agree. We must come to those collectively. But, once we have come to those collectively, we must decide the UN is the body that will apply them. Today, however, the UNSC is incapable of determining the criteria for when and how to stop genocide or the expulsion of a group of people to another area. As long as there is no mechanism to override the use of the veto by permanent members of the Security Council, I fear the Council will continue to fail to meet the expectations of the international community that it respond effectively to armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.

China and other permanent members of the Security Council, along with non-permanent members, have the potential to demonstrate maturity in their foreign policies at the end of the century, commensurate with their size and stature as major world players. In order to achieve this maturity and strengthen the international order, they must learn to subordinate their national sovereignty to the collective good, as expressed by the UN, whether it be authorizing the UN action in Kosovo, or extending the mandates of peacekeeping in Macedonian or civilian police to maintain law and order in Haiti. Until then, the Security Council's actions will fall short of the lofty UN ideals, and real universal peace and human security will remain elusive.

Questions and Answers

Chair: Thank you very much, Ambassador! Ambassador gave us a very interesting and instructive speech. And he essentially answered several important questions. One is why Canada is interested in the UN activities or in multilateral activities. The other thing is that how the UN Security Council can take up responsibilities. And also the world has changed, how the world should meet such new problem resulting from globalization and international integrity. And finally, how countries should deal with the sovereignty issue. These are very witty and very important questions that probably every country is facing at the moment.

China as a permanent member of the Security Council, is clearly facing this set of problems as well. China, as Canada, is a very active participant and strong supporter of the UN. Of course, some of the questions are also being debated here, for example, question of Kosovo. Many of the issues are very complicated, and sometimes are frustrating. For example, on the Kosovo issue, of course, we have lots of common grounds, but on this issue, China and Canada have some differences. On the question of morality, of course, intervention in Kosovo issue is justified on the ground of morality, on the ground of protecting human security, and also fighting against ethnic cleansing. But, the problem is the military intervention, is it the best method? That is being debated here a lot. So many of the issues are very interesting. I think many of us have been thinking about these issues over time. So I think it is a wonderful opportunity for us to listen to the Canadian perspective, one Canadian perspective. And at the same time, reflect within ourselves. It is also a good opportunity for us to ask questions to clarify the issues. Maybe we will spend some time to raise some questions and let His Excellency Ambassador to explain further his views.

Question 1: I know Canada is also a member of the NATO. Maybe before the Kosovo war, there are violations of human rights in the Former Yugoslavia. But during the war, hundreds of people have already died during air raid, and not mentioning those who died because of lack of medical care or other reasons caused by the war. And also during the war, we have noticed the NATO has bombed the civilian tractor and buses. Do you think Canada is also playing a very important role during NATO's action? Thank you.

Answer: This is really a hard question. Quite frankly, it is very easy, whether you are in Beijing or home in Ottawa in Canada or some place, to say there should be a better way. We wish there had been a better way. The decision to take military action to try to force the end of the human suffering in Kosovo was a very difficult decision to take. And it was taken after month and month and month of trying to find other solutions, and even as it has been taken, other solutions are being pursued, the diplomatic solutions.

One civilian's death, one human life in a conflict is too many to lose. And nobody takes the damage of civilians lightly. Nobody in Canada, or I would argue in those NATO countries that have much larger participation in the military action, believes it is a good thing. Nobody revels even seeing a young Serbian soldier dying. But sometimes, the world is faced with very very difficult moral choices, in which there is no completely good answer. There is no, maybe, completely bad answer. There is no completely good and easy solution. What do you do when it is clear that a state within its own border is conducting a program of genocide and ethnic cleansing? That is rounding up young men in village stadiums, and shooting them. That is conducting basically mass murder. How do you bring it to a halt? You can say it is within their borders, not our responsibilities, I would argue the whole world has gone beyond that. To say that we all have the responsibility for human security as I describe it, then is the question, OK, what do you do about it? When it is clear that Milosevic will receive any foreign envoy that we sent, be the Canadian Foreign Minister, or other personnel. We think it looks like the diplomatic solution will work. However, it doesn't. As soon as they leave Rome, it is perfectly clear that there is absolutely no change, the ethnic cleansing continues.

Now, I think that you will note that although there has clearly been civilian casualties in the conflict, very unfortunately, considering the total amount of pressure militarily being brought to bear on Yugoslavia, that enormous effort has been made to try to keep civilian toll or damage to an absolute minimum. Yes, the tractors were bombed, what do the forces responsible for that, saying we know what happened. They say we made mistake. Our pilot mistook it and it was a bad mistake, and we apologize. But this is outside the orders of engagement for those engaged in military actions. Yes it is a bad thing of civilian death. Our Foreign Minister was in Russia late last week, trying to bring Russia in, because we believe only Russia can bring pressure to bear on Milosevic in the way perhaps some the NATO members cannot, and help get this back on a diplomatic track. But it cannot get back on diplomatic track. That simply means the ethnic cleansing, the genocide will continue. A diplomatic track means we've got to start to see the end of this terrible treatment of the ethnic-Albanian in Kosovo. No one is not responsible for this. But building an international order, in which human security is a real objective, unfortunately results in action from time to time. If it has been, it should have been, in my view, and I speak personally, we should have had the UNSC authorization for this use of force. And we couldn't get it, and in the end, that made it a little difficult to take decision to intervene than otherwise. In the case of the Gulf War, it was an easier decision for a number of reasons. Because a national boundary has been breached, and if a national boundary has been breached in this case, probably it would be easier this time. But nonetheless, it is always a bad thing, war is always a bad thing, and what we say is that academically we can argue back and forth whether action in Kosovo is right or wrong. But I can tell you, because I know the players' concerns, that nobody took the decision, believing it is going to be fun. Nobody took this decision, believing it is good to kill people. It was an alternative to continuing which, the evil that we were seeing. And what we are saying, if you build a

strong Security Council with the clear mandate, authority, and resources to take the decisive action when it needs to act resolutely, then we'll need to take that action less often. Because countries will know, and regimes will know that there are limits to behavior that can't be crossed.

Question 2: What do you think about the Asian Pacific Region maintaining the sustained security and peace after the Cold War? I know that when he delivered a speech in the General Assembly of the UN in 1991, the Canadian Secretary of Foreign Affairs raised a concept of cooperative security. I'd like to know, do you think the cooperative security is effective in the region after the Cold War? Especially the philosophy of the US is to construct balance of power in the region. Thank you.

Answer: I wrote the speech he gave in 1991. It involved a proposition of Canada, which is part of that effect which made shortly before in the creation of what we called the North Pacific cooperative security dialogue. That was not a successful proposal. It was very strongly opposed by the US. It was opposed, I can only presume, because they didn't like the notion of a multilateral process emerging to address common security concern. I would be very frank with you why it received not very positive reaction in Washington. I think the US Navy was very concerned that such a dialogue, such an approach could involve navy arm control discussions. In the Western Pacific where the US Navy's forces were really, unchallenged, and substantially greater than those that really drove of the Soviet Union into collapse. They did not wish to see their freedom of action and their dominance put in question. Some others are also not completely convinced it is a good way to go. Canada was convinced that that is the way we do things in Canada. We believe the multilateral approach works better, because it allows a collective to sit down, a number of countries or all the countries to sit down to talk about the differences, not just bilateral face to face, but in the context of a lot of people's concerns, a lot of countries' concerns. A recognition can then emerge that everybody has legitimate security interest, and it is in the collective interest to find ways of satisfying all those security concerns. We believe and I should say this is not simply Canadians being good guys internationally. I mean we have found we work at it pretty good. And making multinational institutions work for us and for our national interest. We have found it is easier to find multilateral approaches or international process serve for the adjudication of disputes. Resolve disputes in ways that are satisfactory to Canada, then it would be simply as we were sitting down nose to nose with countries, some of which are bigger than us. We enter into the free trade agreement with the US in the mid-1980s. Even though at that time, about 80 percent of the trade between Canada and the US was already moving without taxes or duties, already duty-free. So why the big free trade agreement was the most important dispute-settlement mechanism for us? So that we could take to international arbiter disputes with the US and we can settle on the basis of right or wrong, rather than settle on the basis of who's carrying the bigger stick, because we rarely end up carrying the big stick in our dispute with US. We believe that finding international approaches to the resolution of disputes helps those disputes from never reaching the level of war.

Do I think there's much future for cooperative security approaches, multilateral security institutions emerging in Asia? I don't know. The ASEAN Regional Forum, which is little bit more than a talking shop has emerged, that is a good thing. Talking is always better than shooting. But we have seen a relative reluctance within that context, within that forum, as seeing significant confidence-building measure introduced. Confidence-building measures, which come out of multilateral security dialogues and forum, helps conflicts be avoided. Everything is simple as notification as movement is seen. So if the Chinese Navy is heading out to do a major exercise, somewhere in the western Pacific, it tells other countries that it is about to do the practice that navy should do. So nobody will get upset when they see it. It's just a standard practice, an observation of the military exercises, or the exchange of military personnel. All kinds of confidence-building measures that can be constructed in the context of cooperative security dialogues. And we think

this can help international peace and security. There has been a degree of reluctance in this part of the world. And I would be frank in saying that we understand the reluctance of those countries that rely heavily on bilateral security arrangements like Japan and US, because that is the way they play the game. But we are also sometimes a little surprised at not having more support from countries like China, which, we believe, it is in their interest to have these things multilateralized, to help give a collective method of addressing some of the security concerns, which China legitimately has. So we haven't stop pushing.

Question 3: How could Canada employ and advocate to the global society, to the UN its policy of multilateralism completely with its particularly close and crucial relationship with USA?

Answer: If the implication of your question is that our close relationship with the US derogates the credibility of our position on multilateralism, I would take issue. Yes, we have a close relationship with the US, we share a very long, undefended border. Many of the things that are imported, the values that are imported to the US are imported to Canada. At the same time, we have a lot of problems in our relationships with the US. We have more disputes with US than we have with any other country. We have different views in the way we approach all sorts of foreign policy issues. We sustain and maintain very good relationship with Cuba against American's opposition. During China's Great Leap Forward and the Famine of 1959-61, Canada took a decision to supply significant amounts of grain to China. The US, the Eisenhower Administration tried to stop us, and prevented Canadian wheat moving over US ports. Because they opposed Canada violating it's own internal Trading with the Enemy Act. We ignored those. When we decided we should enter into diplomatic relations with China, the US objected and asked us not to. The President, then of the US, called our Prime Minister, a word that I would not even repeat in this forum, because you are too young to hear those words. There are a lot of difficulties in some of those things.

At the time of Gulf War, during the autumn of 1990, we were arguing strenuously that UNSC's authorization was necessary for the use of the force. The U.S. and Britain were both arguing that Chapter 5 of the UN's charter gave them sufficient authority to take action without specific authority being sought and approved. They were not happy with the fact that we argued otherwise. Eventually for reasons of coalition building and recognized that the position we had was right, they finally, somewhat reluctantly, accept that we approach the Security Council for the authority that was embedded in the Resolution of 678.

We got difficulties with our relationship with the US in terms of pursuing our own international objectives, and one of the objectives is strengthening multilateral world order.

Question 4: What do you think about the role of a permanent military unit in the UN? You talk much about the international cooperation for peace and security; can you shed light on Canada's role in this?

Answer: On the permanent military? Now I'll give you both personal view and where we are. I think that originally there were some of us who believed that would be useful for the UNSC to be able at the momentary decision to dispatch a force to areas where peace was threatened or peace was being broken. Because right now the form of an international peacekeeping or peace-operation, it takes some time to put those together. It is clear that the UN was not in a short term having those kinds of resources available to it. And where we are now we have more or less agreement, but it is not yet being established as a part of UN arsenal we are reaching an agreement, on the notion of a rapid deployment group, very small, that would basically establish the first beach-head of a UN presence in a war-torn region, and then would become the central co-op planning union for the peace-keeping operation that would be composed as now of the military forces of the UN members on the basis of voluntary contributions as in the past.

I personally still believe if you wish to design the most effective UN, you would perhaps put

yourselves on a rotating basis. The assignment of national forces to the UN, to the UN rapid deployment force that would be under the authority of the UN, and deployable at any given time. It would not necessarily mean a standing force forever and ever. We must be sending several hundreds of Canadian troops to serve for a period on this force. And if they were used, they used. And if they were not, they were not. They are rotating back and forth from time to time, and we are not daring yet.

Question 5: Mr. Ambassador, my question is about the reform of the UNSC. You just mentioned the SC like a mechanism to override the use of veto of the permanent members of the SC. I think in some issues Russia and China would not yield to the Western world, I think sometimes it's nearly impossible to reach agreement to create a mechanism to override the use of veto of the permanent member. So in this case, what does the Canadian government do if Russia or China would not yield in some issues or they can not reach an agreement in some issues like the Kosovo crisis? Do you think it is possible for the NATO to take the place of the UN, if sometimes they can conduct the reform of the UN? Thank you.

Answer: It is certainly not easy to find a mechanism that would eventually give the collective capacity to override the veto. I am not talking about finding a way of getting western powers to have their way over the objection of Russia or China, or Russia and China. Anyway, I am talking about our ability to override a specific American veto on any particular cases, because they have the American veto too. What I am saying is that we have a situation that it would be very difficult to get countries to agree there is a mechanism in which their veto can be overridden. What is that mechanism, I have no idea. Maybe it is a 90 percent of vote of the General Assembly. Maybe it is something else that would prevent a single veto from keeping collective action when otherwise virtually universally-agreed from taking place. Even if it were collective override capacity, it might not be sufficient to override reluctance to military actions in Kosovo. I don't know. But I do say that in theory if we have a situation where one country, maybe Britain, maybe the US, maybe Russia, maybe China, who knows, can block a collective views of the whole rest of the international community, we have a flawed organization.

The NATO is being used, because the UN was not usable. Is it possible for the NATO to take over the role of the UN? No! Because the NATO doesn't represent the collective will of the whole world. And therefore the NATO can never play the role of the UN. Can it be effective in military intervention? Perhaps! And we may end up, we will, I am sure, that we are going to end up with the solution to the Kosovo business, that we will see a return to diplomatic front, and we will see, in retrospective, probably by most countries, a recognition that some NATO's military intervention was necessary to get back to the diplomatic approach. But that doesn't mean the NATO has replaced the UN in this event. Naturally it is a less good exercise, a less acceptable exercise even if I believe it is necessary to take, in that it is not the UN authorized use of force.

Now I mean we've seen all kinds of proposals of last year to reform the SC, including establishing other permanent members without veto, and rotating regional members with vetoes. These and other things we have seen very little willingness of those veto-wielding countries any significant changes that could see any dilution in their exclusive authority. We are also convinced that the membership, permanent seat and vetoes should not be based on some archaic concepts of the world that were born at the end of the Second World War, the veto was given to France, as a part of nation-building for France which had been destroyed, devastated by the second World War, not in recognition that France itself had earned or enjoyed a significant role in the world, but a recognition and fear that if France didn't have a veto, maybe somehow Germany would rise again. You know there are views that are no long pertaining. Among the last-year proposals of expanding the Security Council, one suggested Germany should become a permanent member of the UNSC, which we thought, quite frankly, is not a diplomatic revulsion. We thought that in a while there should be three Middle-European powers with permanent seats in the UN, which was

just because Germany was big, just because it was economically strong. That didn't make a lot of sense, when there were other countries, Canada included, that had long since demonstrated far greater support for the multilateral order and the UN than Germany had. Nothing is against Germany. We want to be arguing for a permanent seat for ourselves, but it is not politically likely. It is going to be a very difficult task to reform the Security Council to make it into an effective organization as we wish. But I would argue that unless we do so, we are going to see other instances in the future, where the UN would be pushed aside and other solutions would be found to deal with the conflicts. Perhaps other solutions are far less palatable and less attractive as the current NATO action in Kosovo, where straight, direct, unilateral single nation actions will be taken.

Question 6: I'd like to ask another question on Kosovo issue since this is a hot topic. As we all know the situation in Kosovo is worse. There are more and more refugees, and lots of people are complaining that few things have been done by the NATO to help and protect the refugees. Now they are in a good need of medical care, food and other supplies. I've known that the US has done few things. My question is what has Canada done or is going to do to help the security of the refugees since the basic element of Canadian foreign policy is to protect the human security?

Answer: I don't know who is saying that the NATO countries have not done enough to help the refugees. I think they've done enormous amount. I think Germany, particularly, (lots of countries try) put a huge effort in helping to set up the refugees' camps in Macedonia and alleviating the sufferings of those foreigners across the Macedonian border. There is a very substantial pressure in Albania where people are trying to help. The day before yesterday, the first 5000 refugees arrived in Canada. We have said we would take, hopefully temporarily, because they don't want to forever leave their homes. We would take 5000, and 5000 is not enough, we'll take more. Greece, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Britain have all, and I am sure I left lots, offered to take refugees temporarily on their territory, while this crisis plays itself out. It is hard to do as much as we would like in a war-torn and very confusing situation. People are pouring across the border in uncontrolled ways. Sometimes there have been as many as ten thousands of people pouring to the places of Macedonia or Albania in a single day. We provide the camp, the food and all the necessary things, and it is not an easy task.

Question 7: Just now, in your speech you mentioned two concepts. One is the human security; the second is the national interest. The question I want to ask is what comes first when Canadian government deals with a crisis. First I want to give an example that in Kosovo crisis, the NATO bombed Yugoslavia, but in the last-year crisis of Indonesia, no government or organization took such action. So I think the national interest comes first, then comes the human security. Do you agree with me?

Answer: I certainly agree that's your point of view! I think I did make a comment. The situation in Indonesia was quite different. I think you have to recognize that a lot of countries, including Canada, were doing their best to make it clear that the failure of the Indonesian government to protect the citizens of Chinese origin in Indonesia was unacceptable. And had that situation gone on much longer, I think you would see in much hardening of international attitudes, but whether it would result in bombing, I am not sure. Because I am not sure if this was a case of state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing that could be addressed that way. Mystery is still going on.

Let me tell you, my wife is an ethnic-Chinese from Indonesia. OK! Just a fact. Her cousins had their store looted, had their children beaten up. Though there was no loss of life, it is a real issue for me. I'm not pretending that you can forget about it. But I'm not sure the situation suggests that military intervention is a right solution. I did say that, I think I did imply there are legitimate perceptions about selectivity in terms of the issues in which the international community and the UNSC get involved. The Rwanda crisis, Ethiopia issue, Sierra Leone and other events happened in Africa should be matters of deep concerns to international community. But because

they are in Africa, people refuse to consider them, and don't care very much about them.

But the event of Balkans, which of course is exactly where the spark went off that began the First World War in 1914 is quite different. The Europeans care most about it, and so does everybody. And there is a degree of selectivity there, which is not right. But we also know that even if the action in Kosovo were the UN sponsored actions at the moment, the UN right now is insufficiently funded to deal with five different crises at the same time. I think we demonstrate in Cambodia a very significant and collective contribution to solving an issue a long way from the UNSC members' interest.

But the record of the collective suggests that you are right. Have many commentators surpassed the world affairs? I wouldn't answer the question. I just remind you there have been commentators surpassed. Would there have been a collective coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait, if Kuwait had had no oil? I don't know. There is no question the record suggests the degree of selectivity that I believe we should be working toward changing.

Question 8: I have a question about the WTO. Why could not China enter the WTO after years of negotiations with Western countries? I mean what's the main obstacle for China on the way to the WTO?

Answer: I was with your Premier when he was in Canada couple of weeks ago. Part of the discussions we had at that time were very intensive on the bilateral agreement between Canada and China that would be necessary for the WTO accession. China must come to terms with its principal trading partners, very importantly the US, but also the European Union, Canada, Australia, and many other countries, and then must come to agreement with the WTO as an institution which has two sets of negotiations. We are close in the words of your premier in Canada when he was there. He said if we are coming close to the US, I would say we are 95 percent of the way there, if we are coming close to Canada, I would say we are 99 percent. I think we are very close. There are, at the same time, two principal impediments, there have been or are today, two principal impediments to Chinese entry into the WTO.

One is the biggest problem over the last 10 years. And the other is a relatively newer problem. The biggest problem, a legitimate problem, is that bringing this huge economy into line with international rules is really tough. It is really tough on China in terms of its social and economic impact. And it is really hard to do, because you are taking a command economy, and insisting that it operate effectively as a market economy. And a market economy doesn't mean the prices are established by the state, people can buy and sell what they want. It means there is a decent set of regulations to govern all kinds of economic activities. There is good commercial law. There is dispute settlement mechanism available on arbitration and so on. There are clear rules for opening up markets, including consulting engineering, insurance, banking and the management of quotas of agricultural goods. It is a huge task. And China has been working extremely hard at that task. But it is not easy, and there are big consequences, there are always some losers when you are more economically open. China has been legitimately worried about how it would manage the problems that the reform would create. Therefore has been arguing for long transitional periods. The countries like Canada and others already in the WTO are naturally for shorter transition period. Because we'd like to see our business establish themselves earlier in China. Those are resolvable issues, but they have been difficult to resolve. I'll give you a simple little example, but it is quite important. A lot of Canadian agricultural goods have been come to China, and the new tariff-free quota system is going to be in place in which hundreds of thousands of tons of certain products can come into China at 3 percent or 2 percent tariff. That is what we agree to, that is great. And then above that, it will be a higher tariff, you know if the volume is greater. Lots of countries have that kind of regimes. And we say to China how those tariff-free quotas can be managed, who gets the quotas, and how are they going to be transparent to the exporters and importers? And China has to figure out a system that will design those quotas. And there are inter-