


大学专业英语系列教程

Selected Readings in Ethics

伦理学 专业英语教程

何怀宏 选文
张华 蔡蓁 编注



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图书在版编目(CIP)数据

伦理学专业英语教程/何怀宏选文;张华,蔡蓁编注. —北京:北京大学出版社,2003.6
(大学专业英语系列教程)
ISBN 7-301-05618-4

I. 伦… II. ①何… ②张… ③蔡… III. 伦理学-英语-高等学校-教材 IV. H31

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2002)第 033027 号

书 名: 伦理学专业英语教程

著作责任者: 何怀宏 选文 张 华 蔡 蓁 编注

责任编辑: 范一亭

标准书号: ISBN 7-301-05618-4/H·0749

出版者: 北京大学出版社

地 址: 北京市海淀区中关村北京大学校内 100871

网 址: <http://cbs.pku.edu.cn>

电 话: 发行部 62750672 邮购部 62752015 编辑部 62765014

电子信箱: zpup@pup.pku.edu.cn

排 版 者: 鑫曦照排室

印 刷 者: 北京市银祥福利印刷厂

发 行 者: 北京大学出版社

经 销 者: 新华书店

787×1092 16 开本 14.25 印张 354 千字

2003 年 6 月第 1 版 2003 年 6 月第 1 次印刷

定 价: 21.00 元

大学专业英语系列教程

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总 序

辜正坤

西学东渐给东方的外语出版界造成一种奇特的景观：在相当短的时间内，外语出版物的数量扶摇直上，使它种民族语出版物相对汗颜，这是可以理解的。日本明治维新之后，就出现过类似的情形，外语（尤其是英语）原著注释读物动辄一套就是数百本，洋洋大观。毫无疑问，这对推进日本的外语教学起到了非常重要的作用。时至今日，其效应已经明显昭示出来：当今的中国各大学发表的论文为 SCI 所收录者，最多者一年达 500 篇，而东京大学一年就达 40,000 篇，两者相距 80 倍！如果以为日本的论文数量必与其科学水平成正比，因而中国大学的科学研究水平就落后了东大 80 倍的话，恐怕是一种很大的误解。其中的奥妙之一，就在于日本学者的英语水平普遍较高，许多论文是直接用英文写成，因此容易被世界各地的媒体注意到，其入选 SCI 的机会也就相对增多。反观中国学者的论文，绝大多数用汉语写成，少量靠懂英语的学者翻译，只有极少量的学者能够自己用英文直接写作。因此，大多数的中国论文是难以进入西方学者的视野的。当然入选 SCI 的机会也就相对少得多了。当然，这并非是说，中国的科研水平就反过来比日本高，而是说，由于中国学者英语写作水平普遍偏低的原因，其实际的科研水平未能在英语世界的文献中充分显示出来。由此可以明白，提高中国学者的英语能力（尤其是阅读文献与用英语写作的能力）是一件非常迫切的事。

然而，改革开放 20 多年来的英语学习大潮虽然使许多中国人在英语学习方面获得了较高的造诣，上了一个较为理想的台阶，但是有更多的人却老在一个水平上徘徊不前：要学的教材已经学了，该考的科目已经通过了，但是，面对英语的殿堂，人们并没有登堂入室的感觉。听说能力未能应付裕如或许情有可原，因为学习者可以抱怨没有相应的可以一试身手的客观条件，但是在阅读方面，例如阅读文史哲、数理化的专业文献方面，却仍是磕磕绊绊、跋前踖后，字典不离手，冷汗不离身。这种处于瓶颈地带，欲罢不可、欲进不能的促迫感，源于一个关键的原因：缺乏专业外语文献阅读训练。学校里使用的基础英语教材编得再好，也只能解决基础问题，不能解决超过基础的专业阅读问题。正如要做游泳健儿的人只在游泳池里按照游泳要领奋力拨拉了一阵池水，自觉亦有劈波斩浪之感，但与真正的河涛海潮相比，终究属于两重洞天。

于是，就产生了这一整套专业英语阅读教程。

它的目标非常明确，无非是要把英语知识与技能的培训和高层次系统知识的灌输二者有机结合起来，达到既学语言又学知识的目的；即温故，又知新。照我看来，这是最有效率的学习与巩固方略。

如前所述可以明白，这套教程不只是对一般想要提高英语实际水平的人有用，对于专家学者或研究人员，也有很大的好处。一个人无论多么博学多才，也不太可能对各个专业的英语经典文献和地道表达都了然于胸，因此，当需要在尽可能短的时间内对某专业的英语经典

文献或概念有所把握时,这一整套书无疑不会使人们失望。

这套书的编选思路最初萌发于 1991 年,当时称作《注释本英文世界文化简明百科文库》。编者当时曾会同北京大学英语系大学英语教研室教师和北京大学出版社若干编辑共商过具体编选事宜,并由北京大学出版社出版。尔后还进行过多次类似的讨论。文库分上、中、下三编,每编含精选名著一百种左右。在编选思路,力求达到雅俗共赏,深入浅出,系统全面。在系统性方面,注意参照《大英百科全书》和《中国大百科全书》的知识框架,用英文把更为完备的知识系统介绍给读者。在实用性方面,亦注意选材的内容与词汇量同现行的英语教材、实际英语教学水平相呼应。

本编为上编,除可供大学英语分科专业阅读选用教材之用外,亦可供社会上一般读者提高英语水平、直接经由阅读原著而掌握某一专业知识之用。基本的编辑方针是 1) 选目必须系统、广泛,尽可能把大学的重要专业都包容进去(包括人文社会科学和理工科专业); 2) 选目可大致分三类: A. 简史类; B. 名篇、名著类; C. 比较规范的或经典的西方专业教材类; 3) 每册书的字数最好在 20 万字上下(个别可以例外)。至于其他具体事项,则随书说明。

教育部在 1999 年亦强调大学英语教学不能停留在基础英语教学上,而要逐步过渡到教授专业分科英语,使学生尽可能进入阅读专业英语文献的水平。因此这套教材的产生是适得其时的。

当然,它的具体效果如何,还有待检验。好在这套教材的编注与出版都是一个较长的过程,这期间可望获得有关方面的建议与批评,以期使它精益求精,日臻完善。

是为序。

2001 年于北京大学英语系

西方伦理学的线索

(代序)

何怀宏

西方哲学伦理学从概念、理论资源乃至问题对近代以来中国思想的巨大影响毋庸多言,一个比较极端的说法是:“我们都是在用西语进行哲学思维,只不过有思考得好与不好之别。”所以,不管我们是想努力走出还是继续承受这种影响,都有必要认真对待它,有必要深入原文、原模原样地认识西方哲学伦理学。编选《伦理学专业英语教程》就是这方面的一个尝试。

这本教程基本是按照历史顺序和重要性编选的,除了每篇选文之前的篇目和作者介绍,我们还想在这里试叙西方伦理学演变的一些主要线索,以帮助读者理解西方伦理学来龙去脉的大要。虽然自苏格拉底开启比较明确系统的伦理学探讨以降,西方伦理学两千多年来的演变纷纭复杂,任何类似的概括都要冒简化、遗漏乃至扭曲的危险,但如果随时警醒到这一点,这样做的危险也许就不会太大,而且可以使我们在进入西方伦理学时不致漫无头绪、毫无门径可寻。

为鲜明对照起见,在西方规范伦理学的历史演变中,我们说大致可以辨认出这样两条主要线索:第一条是从快乐主义(hedonism)发展到功利主义(utilitarianism);第二条是从完善论(perfectionism)一变而为义务论(deontology)。它们并构成一种两相对照的关系:在传统社会主要是完善论和快乐主义的对照;而在近现代,尤其是在当代,则主要是义务论与功利主义的分野。说“对照”而不说“对立”、“两军对战”,是因为两者虽常常对峙,但也并不总是处在激烈冲突之中,有时又只是并行,内容如行为规范上有重合乃至客观上有互补。在传统社会,伦理学试图回答的基本问题是:什么是善(good)?尤其什么是至善(the highest good)?人生的根本目的是什么?而在现代社会,伦理学试图回答的基本问题是:什么是正当(right)?什么是应当(ought)?或者说,道德评价的最终根据或标准是什么?

在这两条主线之外,又有两条重要的支线,一条是道德上的怀疑主义、道德相对主义(ethical relativism);另一条是道德上的认识论、元伦理学(meta-ethics)。下面我们就来分别叙述。

从快乐主义到功利主义的一条线索最为单纯明朗,因为这理论也是相当单纯明朗的。快乐主义理论最早的明确代表是古希腊昔勒尼派的阿里斯提卜,他认为快乐是人生的根本目的,不仅人事实上是如此,而且人应当如此,寻求快乐乃是人的天职,是人最高的、本质的东西。而且,这种快乐是积极的、当下的享受,所以要“及时行乐”。这快乐也不分肉体还是精神的快乐都值得追求,甚至肉体的快乐更优越于精神的快乐。当然,人还是要谨慎行事,不要追求那种后面会伴随巨大痛苦的快乐,人应当占有快乐而不是做它的奴隶。伊壁鸠鲁也认为快乐是最高的善,痛苦是最大的恶,但他理解的快乐主要是一种比较消极、平静的快

乐,是“肉体的无痛苦和灵魂的无纷扰”,而尤其是一种精神的宁静的快乐。这种快乐与诚实、正直的德性不可分离。快乐主义的代表人物还有卢克莱修等。

快乐主义在近代发展为功利主义。功利主义常被视作是一种普遍的快乐主义,亦即它追求的不再主要是个人的快乐,而是整个社会或大多数人的快乐;这种快乐也不再主要被理解为主观的感受和满足,而是被理解为客观的、常常是可以从外面衡量的功效和利益。功利主义最鲜明、最典型的代表是边沁,他接过哈奇森“最好的行为是实现最大多数人的最大幸福的行为”的观点,将功利主义发展为一个严密、清晰的体系,并使之成为进行激进的法律和政治改革的利器。而密尔则多少修正甚至离开了功利主义的观点,强调快乐和幸福还有性质的差别,说“做不满足的苏格拉底要比做满足的傻瓜要好”。快乐主义和功利主义一般都是诉诸经验的,而西季维克则在功利主义的前提之下又诉诸直觉的原则。当代功利主义则有明确的行为功利主义和规则功利主义之分。

快乐主义和功利主义是一元的,它对“何为至善”或者“何为道德判断的根据”的问题的回答是相当单纯和明确的:快乐或功利。而作为我们的区分范畴的完善论的回答则可以说是多元甚至驳杂的:是人的保存、全面发展、和谐、完善等等。当然,它在具体的某个伦理学家那里还是力图统一的,但无论如何,它的内容不那么单一。

完善论注意的是人的整体素质和潜能的全面实现,而又尤其是作为人的特性的德性和理性的趋于至善。苏格拉底开启了一种反省的伦理学,他认为德性是至善,并且德性就是知识,德性就是有关善恶的知识以及在任何情况下都坚持行善避恶。如若义务、德性和快乐起了冲突,绝不可为了快乐而牺牲义务、德性。柏拉图认为至善是对理念或本质的观照、知觉和凝思,而绝非快乐。亚里士多德也许是古代完善论最全面、最中道和最通俗的阐述者,他认为快乐只是一种善而非至善,人所追求的目标可以用一个更全面的词“幸福”(eudaimonia)来表达,而且,对这种幸福的理解是尽量完美地实现人之所以为人的东西,亦即训练自己的理性和德性,而理智或沉思的德性又高于实践或伦理的德性。斯多亚派认为主要的善就是按照自然而生活,这也就是按照人的本性、按照德性而生活。德性是最高和惟一的善,有德性者对快乐是冷淡和无动于衷的,人要努力摆脱痛苦、畏惧、欲望和快乐这些激情。还有像新柏拉图主义者也都可以理解为是完善论者。基督教伦理学则可以被理解为是一种神圣的完善论:人仍然渴望一种尽善尽美,甚至是一种更广大和更永久,即指向无限和永恒的尽善尽美,只是人最终的完善被推到了彼岸,而且不可能完全靠自力来实现。从斯多亚派开始,古代完善论的发展越来越趋于内在。

近代完善论又渐渐恢复了对社会政治的关注:完善不仅是个人的完善,也是社会的完善、政治共同体的完善。从斯宾诺莎到黑格尔,可以明显地看出这一关注的加强,但是,19世纪以后,作为整体的完善论伦理学的活力和影响实际上已趋弱化。20世纪像麦金泰尔等主张的德性伦理学虽然力图恢复例如亚里士多德的古代完善论的传统,却难成主流,而以康德为主要代表的义务论变成了与功利主义抗衡的主要伦理学理论。

我们不宜说义务论就是完善论的直接引申,而宁可说义务论是从完善论中的一支转变出来的,因为完善论实际是相当驳杂的,它自身构成一个相当广大、内在歧异的派别。相对而言,苏格拉底对不计功利的个人义务的强调、柏拉图对社会正义原则的探讨、斯多亚派对超越于苦乐的德性的遵循等等,都是完善论中义务论的先声。虽然在它们那里,善的理念还是优先于正当。

快乐主义、功利主义、完善论可以说都是效果论或目的论的,即它们都主张人的道德行为应当服务于人生的某种根本目的或至善,或者说主张判断人的一种行为或品质是否正当应当主要根据这种行为所达到的目的或效果。而康德提出的义务论则主张判断行为正当与否应当独立于或脱离行为的目的或效果,而根据这一行为本身或行为规则的性质来考虑。例如,“说谎是不正当的”主要是因为说谎的行为准则违反了道德规范应是“可普遍化”的原则。当代一些著名的哲学家、伦理学家如罗尔斯、诺齐克、哈贝马斯,法学领域中的自然法学派如德沃金等都可以说是属于义务论的派别。整个西方伦理学进入近代的演变趋势大致是完善论淡出、义务论凸现,快乐主义转变为功利主义而与义务论成对峙之势。

还有两条支线也是源远流长,但其影响却是在现代,尤其是 20 世纪凸现:一条是道德怀疑主义和相对主义,其源可溯至古希腊的智者、怀疑论者,到 19 世纪尼采提出“上帝死了”、“价值重估”,20 世纪如存在主义、后现代主义、福柯、德里达、利奥达等都对伦理学理论、尤其是规范伦理学提出了明确挑战;另一条是道德认识论或对道德命题真理性的探讨,一般来说,过去这种探讨尚与规范伦理学结合在一起,如快乐主义和功利主义一般是和经验论结合;义务论则多与直觉主义结合;而世俗的完善论则和理性主义联系较紧密。但 20 世纪兴盛的元伦理学,则试图脱离规范伦理学或与其保持距离而比较独立地探讨道德命题的可靠性。它经历了直觉主义(从摩尔的价值论直觉主义到罗斯、普里查德的义务论直觉主义)、情感主义(艾耶尔、史蒂文森)到重新谨慎地诉诸理情(图尔敏、拜尔、黑尔等)三个阶段,直到罗尔斯等重新转向以实质性问题为重心的正义理论和规范伦理学。

还有一些与形而上学、本体论有关的伦理学问题:一是与世界的本性相关的人的本性问题,人性是自私的还是同时还赋有同情或仁爱的感情;二是人的意志是自由的还是受着自然、社会或某种神秘的必然性的支配,这涉及道德责任的根本问题;三是对人的整个看法以及人和世界的前途问题,究竟是持一种乐观主义还是悲观主义的态度。但以上问题在 20 世纪探讨趋少,从心理学角度探讨伦理问题的倾向也趋减弱,而从其他一些学科例如生物学的角度的道德探讨却有所加强。另外,涉及生态环境、医学等各个领域具体问题的应用伦理学在近数十年更有长足的发展。

对以上所有问题的回答构成了多种多样的组合,使西方伦理学思想在各个伦理学家那里呈现出多种多样的面貌,涉及具体的人可能都得进行具体的分析,而不宜做过于简单化的处理,所以,以上我们所论只是提供一个大致线索而已。

前 言

《伦理学专业英语教程》的篇目就时间跨度而言,涵盖了从古希腊到 20 世纪的西方伦理学重要著作,既有柏拉图对话、《沉思录》等传统经典,亦有《正义论》、《德性之后》等当代名作;就版本的选用而言,多为牛津、剑桥等著名出版社的权威性版本;就理论类别而言,涉及规范伦理学、元伦理学和美德伦理学的代表作,包罗了伦理学发展的主要思想理论和重要概念,既有对伦理问题本身的研究,也有对伦理学发展流变的概要性介绍;既涉及传统的研究领域,也关注到现当代道德论争的焦点问题。本书尽量做到经典性与时代性的结合,理论性与可读性的结合。我们希望它能成为哲学专业、伦理学、德育等相关专业的研究生,本科生以及需要扩大知识范围、培养交叉学科研究能力和构建跨学科知识框架的学生学习英语文献和了解西方伦理学思想和理论的教材。

《伦理学专业英语教程》共选文 16 篇,每篇文章后附有详细的语言注释和术语注解,目的是帮助读者对原著思想有一个较为准确的理解。每篇文章后,还配有理解练习和语言练习题目。练习的编排意在使读者通过阅读提高语言水平和语言运用能力,为过渡到顺畅地阅读英文伦理学原著做准备。同时还配有开放式论题,旨在引发进一步的思考和阅读,并提供一些具体的事例,以便结合理论对现实的道德问题做出分析。此外,在书后附有收集了一些较生僻单词的词汇表和伦理学常用术语表,意在为读者阅读本书以及其他伦理学英文著作扫除一些语言和理解上的障碍,培养对术语的敏感和高效率的阅读方式。

此书编写过程中,我们得到北京大学出版社郭荔女士和范一亭先生的大力支持,在此表示衷心的感谢。

编者
2002 年 10 月

目 Contents 录

1. Crito/克里同篇	Plato/柏拉图(1)
2. Nicomachean Ethics/尼各马可伦理学	Aristotle/亚里士多德(11)
3. On Duties/论义务	Cicero/西塞罗(21)
4. Meditations/沉思录	Marcus Aurelius/马可·奥勒留(33)
5. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals/道德原则研究	David Hume/大卫·休谟(44)
6. The Theory of Moral Sentiments/道德情操论	Adam Smith/亚当·斯密(54)
7. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals/道德形而上学基础	Immanuel Kant/伊曼纽尔·康德(63)
8. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation/道德与立法原理导论	Jeremy Bentham/杰罗米·边沁(74)
9. On Liberty/论自由	John Stuart Mill/约翰·斯图尔特·密尔(84)
10. On the Genealogy of Morals/论道德的谱系	Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche/弗里德里希·威廉·尼采(94)
11. Principia Ethica/伦理学原理	George Edward Moore/乔治·爱德华·摩尔(104)
12. The Right and the Good/正当与善	William David Ross/威廉·大卫·罗斯(112)
13. A Theory of Justice/正义论	John Rawls/约翰·罗尔斯(120)
14. After Virtue/德性之后	Alasdair MacIntyre/阿拉斯代尔·麦金泰尔(132)
15. Ethics/伦理学	William Frankena/威廉·弗兰克纳(144)
16. Encyclopaedia Britannica/不列颠百科全书的伦理学词条	Peter Singer/彼得·辛格(155)
练习参考答案	(165)
伦理学常用术语表	(193)
词汇表	(206)
参考书目	(211)

1

Crito

克里同篇

●Plato(柏拉图)

Crito

《克里同篇》是柏拉图的早期对话之一。描述了苏格拉底在被执行死刑之前，一位叫克里同的朋友来力劝他利用已安排好的方便条件越狱，但他出于正义的考虑而自愿留在狱中。虽然苏格拉底以腐蚀青年之罪而遭受极不公正的指控，并被判处死刑，但他却拒绝越狱，认为越狱就推翻了他与国家之间的契约——服从其法律和审判。他认为至关重要之事并非只是活着，而是活得正当，以报复行为来对抗所受伤害并不正当。本文所选的是一段苏格拉底与他心目中的“法律的声音”的对话。

Plato

柏拉图(前 427 ~ 前 347)，古希腊雅典哲学家。苏格拉底的学生，亚里士多德的老师，贵族家庭出身。早期主要受苏格拉底的影响，试图运用归纳的方法，从具体的伦理道德行为探求一般的勇敢、虔敬、正义、美的定义。中期阐发了理念论，认为理念是第一性的存在，是万物的本体、共相以及追求的目标。柏拉图的思想体系深刻影响了 2300 多年来人类思想文化的发展，其中包括古代的斯多亚主义，近代的莱布尼茨、康德、黑格尔，现代的新康德主义、新实在论等。其主要著作还有《斐多篇》、《会饮篇》、《理想国》、《巴门尼德篇》、《法律篇》等。

Soc. Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name^① which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: 'Tell us, Socrates,' they say; 'what are you about? Are you going by an act of^② yours to overturn us—the laws and the whole State, as far as in you lies^③? Do you imagine that a State can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?' What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Anyone, and especially a clever rhetorician^④, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we might reply, 'Yes; but the State has

injured us and given an unjust sentence.' Suppose I say that?

Cr. Very good, Socrates.

Soc. 'And was that our agreement with you?' the law would say; 'or were you to abide by^⑤ the sentence of the State?' And if I were to express astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably add: 'Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the habit of^⑥ asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies^⑦ you in attempting to destroy us and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid^⑧ and begat^⑨ you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against^⑩ those of us who regulate marriage?'

None, I should reply.

'Or against those of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic^⑪?'

Right, I should reply.

'Well, then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you^⑫? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us^⑬; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands? — you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods^⑭ and of men of understanding? Also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed^⑮? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank^⑯, but whether in battle or in a court

of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country.'

What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

Cr. I think that they do.

Soc. Then the laws will say: 'Consider, Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good^{①⑦} that we had to give, we further proclaim^{①⑧} and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age^{①⑨} and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him^{②①}; and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract^{②②} that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong^{②③}: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education^{②④}; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose^{②⑤} them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer, and he does neither. These are the sort of accusations^{②⑥} to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians.'

Suppose I ask, why is this? They will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agreement.^{②⑦} 'There is clear proof,' they will say, 'Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus^{②⑧}, or to any other place unless when you were on military service^{②⑨}; nor did you travel as other men do^{③①}. Nor had you any curiosity to know other States or their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our State; we were your es-

pecial favorites, and you acquiesced^③ in our government of you; and this is the State in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial—the State which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death^④. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us, the laws, of whom you are the destroyer^⑤; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or not?’

How shall we answer that, Crito? Must we not agree?

Cr. There is no help, Socrates.

Soc. Then will they not say: ‘You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants^③ and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind^④, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedæmon^⑤ or Crete^⑥, which you often praise for their good government, or to some other Hellenic^⑦ or foreign State. Whereas you, above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the State, or, in other words, of us her laws (for who would like a State that has no laws?), that you never stirred out of her^⑧: the halt, the blind, the maimed, were not more stationary in her than you were^⑨. And now you run away and forsake^⑩ your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

‘For just consider, if you transgress^⑪ and err in this sort of way, what good will you do, either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the neighboring cities, as, for example, Thebes^⑫ or Megara^⑬, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws^⑭, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their

own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws⁴⁵ is more than likely to be corrupter of the young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be decent of you⁴⁶? Surely not.

But if you go away from well-governed States to Crito's friends in Thessaly⁴⁷, where there is great disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison⁴⁸, set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways⁴⁹ is—that is very likely; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you violated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things⁵⁰; you will live, but how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what?—eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue then? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would confer upon them⁵¹? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; for that your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy⁵² that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world they will not take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will.

‘Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below⁵³. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids⁵⁴. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought

least to wrong^⑤, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren^⑥, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.'

This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you will say will be in vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God^⑦.

(节选自 *The Apology, Phaedo, and Crito of Plato; The Golden Sayings of Epictetus; The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*, translated by Benjamin Jowett; Hastings Crossley; George Long, New York: P. F. Collier, 1909)

【注 释】

① **by any name**: 用任何名目。

② **by an act of**: 凭借某个人的行为。

③ **as far as in you lies**: 尽你的力量。

④ **rhetician**: 修辞家。修辞作为公众演说的技艺在希腊民主制中占有重要地位,立法、审判等城邦重大事务的裁决往往依赖于修辞家们在公民大会等公众场合中的争论。这些善于辞令的人物在城邦政治生活中起关键作用。

⑤ **abide by**: 遵守, 比如: I abide by what I said. (我是言而有信的。)

⑥ **in the habit of**: 有某种习惯, 比如: I am in the habit of brushing my teeth twice daily. (我习惯每天刷两次牙。)

⑦ **justify**: 证明……是对的, 比如: The course of events fully justifies our views. (事情的发展完全证明我们的意见是正确的。)

⑧ **by our aid**: 凭借我们的帮助。我们常说“借助科学知识”就是用了这个短语: by the aid of scientific knowledge.

⑨ **beget**: 及物动词, 指给予生命, 比如: Abraham begat Isaac. (亚伯拉罕生下了以撒。)

⑩ **urge against**: 极力反对, 比如: Our boss urged against the adoption of the measure. (我们的老板极力反对采纳这项措施。)

⑪ **gymnastic**: 体育。古希腊人极为看重身体的锻炼和塑造。体育在其教育体系特别是在柏