# 切はめる移位国共全面

抗战胜利之初美苏与国共和战关系研究

对 给 冲突、对抗、 中国的不是和平与民主,而是异常错综复杂的"三国 于难以调和的根本利益冲突,美苏介入中国内政带 基于某种特定情况下的妥协是策略的、暂时 而最终走入战争, 战 国共由和谈陷入战争, 充分证明了这一点 胜 治局面。在"三国四方"关系发展演变的 利 到 国共全面内战, 战争是难以避免的。美苏由合作走向 是现实政治逻辑发展的结 中国政 局始于寻求和

# 国共全面向战的缘起

The Origins of the Overall Breaking Out of Civil War between KMT and CCP

——抗战胜利之初美苏与国共和战关系研究

----A Study on Roles of the U.S., the Soviet Union, KMT and CCP in the Peace or War Relations in the Early Postwar Period of China

犯亚光 著

黑龙江人民出版社

Heilongjiang People's Publishing House

#### 图书在版编目(CIP)数据

国共全面内战的缘起一抗战胜利之初美苏与国共和战关系研究/纪亚光著。 一哈尔滨: 黑龙江人民出版社,2008. 1 ISBN 978-7-207-07722-6

I. 国... II. 纪... II. ①美苏关系—国际关系史—研究 ②第三次 国内革命战争—研究 IV. D819 K226.07

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2008)第 004702 号

南开大学亚洲研究中心资助出版

责任编辑: 冯海燕 装帧设计: 赵 澳 责任排版: 莎墨 SOHO

# 图共全面自战的缘起

——抗战胜利之初美苏与国共和战关系研究

# 犯亚光 著

出版发行 黑龙江人民出版社

通讯地址 哈尔滨市南岗区宣庆小区1号楼

邮 编 150008

文 the www.longpress.com

电子邮箱 hljrmcbs@ yeah. net

印 刷 黑龙江省地质测绘印制中心印刷厂

开 本 787×1092 毫米 1/16 开・印张 19.25

字 数 350 千字

版 次 2008年4月第1版 2008年4月第1次印刷

书 号 ISBN 978-7-207-07722-6/D·988

定 价: 38.00元

(如发现本书有印刷质量问题,印刷厂负责调换)

本社常年法律顾问:北京市大成律师事务所哈尔滨分所律师赵学利、赵景波

證水此名献给 我亲爱的父亲纪建新 (1934~2007)





抗日战争胜利后,中国政局如何发展?为何会随之爆发全面内战?这似乎是早有定论的问题。在大陆地区,包括中国现代史、中国革命史和中共党史,都将其归结为蒋介石的内战阴谋;而在台湾地区,则一致将其归结为中国共产党的责任。两种定论鲜明对立,使得这段历史成为有待澄清的悬案。有鉴于此,亚光为寻求历史真相,将抗战胜利之初中国政局的发展置于时代大背景下进行考察,从美苏国共四方的复杂关系演变中寻求其内在规律性,其研究成果具有澄清史实,开拓视野的双重功效,意义深远。

澄清史实,首要的工作是占有丰富翔实的资料,尤其要靠第一手的资料说话。在收集和运用资料方面,亚光下了很大的工夫。在他的著作中,不仅运用了台海两岸的相关中文档案和文献资料,还大量运用了美国外交档案和刚解密不久的苏俄档案。尽管对苏联的文献资料只能借助中文翻译件,但总体上资料是丰富翔实的,在运用方面也比较恰当,从而保证了其结论的客观公正性。

采用动态分析的方法,而不止是静态的论述,是亚光这部著作的一个突出特点。这段历史之所以复杂,不仅因其涉及到美苏国共这三国四方,更体现在三国四方牵一发动全局的微妙变化所产生的深远互动。亚光于卷轶浩繁的中外文资料中耐心推陈比较,细致入微地分析了三国四方关系的变迁,从美苏合作推演到国共和谈,从东北问题论及四方关系的初步变奏,一方面是马歇尔使华,一方面是蒋经国与斯大林密谈,从国际到国内,从国民党到共产党,可谓丝丝入扣。通过比较论述从两国到

三国再到四方的关系演变,生动地勾画出战后中国政局发展活生生的背景与变幻。对亚光这种宽阔的研究视野和严谨的治学态度,我深感欣慰。

对于这样一段错综复杂、众说纷纭的历史,能否清晰地把握其发展 演变的内在规律性,是有相当难度的。通读书稿,我认为亚光很好地做 到了这一点。他从抗战胜利后中国政局的核心问题——和平抑或内战 为中心,就美苏干预中国内政的背景、过程、结果进行系统探讨,力图从 姜苏国共间的相互关系发展演变过程中寻找战后中国政局发展的内在 逻辑,并以此框架整部书稿。围绕这样的目标,亚光颇有新意地提出"三 重政治空间"的阐释体系来分析各政治力量的强弱和政局走向。他认 为:由"雅尔塔协定"展示出战后影响中国政局发展的"三重政治空间", 即美苏大国政治空间居于主导地位,中国政府居于次要地位,中国共产 党处于边缘状态的最低层面政治空间。因此,以美苏根本利益为目标的 "雅尔塔协定"政治框架必然受到来自中国内部的强有力挑战,并促使 中国的政治格局由"三重政治空间"向美国与国民党、苏联与中国共产 党"两大阵营"转变。以这一阐释体系统揽全书,亚光得出了他的明确 结论:正是因为美苏以其利益及在远东的战略目标为出发点,故其干预 中国内政带给中国的不是和平与民主,而是错综复杂的政治格局.从而 使中国构建政治新秩序的社会成本与政治成本大为增加。美苏由合作 走向对抗,国共由和谈陷于战争,是现实政治合乎逻辑演变的必然结果。 这些主要观点在全书中上下一致,一以贯之,逻辑严密,论证有力,使人 信服,达到了较高的学术水平。

亚光是一位严肃认真的青年学者,他从着手写作博士论文到今天, 已有七年之久。这七年间,他执著钻研,笔耕不辍,学术水平不断提高。 欣闻他以博士论文为基础的书稿即将付梓,作为他的博士生导师,我乐 于向学界推荐这部具有学术创新意义的著作。

是为序。

谨识于南开园 2007 年10 月12 日

——A Study on Roles of the U.S., the Soviet Union, KMT and CCP in the Peace or War Relations in the Early Postwar Period of China

Focusing on the core issue of peace or civil war in the early post WWII China, the book tries to find out the inner logics of the development of Chinese political situation by investigating the evolving course in the complicated relationships among the U. S., the Soviet Union, Kuomingtang (KMT), and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which the author defines as the relationship among "three – country and four – party" through exploring in great details of the background, process and result of the U. S. and Soviet Union's intervenes into Chinese politics, based on which, the book also seeks to assess the roles of the U. S. and Soviet Union in the changing peace or civil war selections affecting by the relationship between KMT and CCP.

In the early period after the success of the anti – Japanese War, there existed a treble political space in the three – country and four – party relations. The first space was the great power political space constituted by the U. S. and Soviet Union. In such political space, the U. S. and Soviet Union conducted a series of formal talks and informal contacts concentrating on operations against Japan and the setting up of a new regional Eastasian political order that would serve the benefits of all parties. The final attainment of efforts in such political space was the Yelta Agreement which settled down the basic principles for the postwar Chinese political situation that all parties should avoid the breaking out of civil war and acknowledge the leadership under Chiang Kaishek with the precondition that KMT gave up its one party dictatorship.

The second political space was composed of three national governments of the U.S, the Soviet Union and Chinese government led by KMT. Under such political space, KMT government got commitments from the U.S. and Soviet Union governments of supporting its rulings with the prerequisite that it accepted the political system established in "Yelta Agreement", all of which were delineated in the Sino – Soviet Union Treaty of Friendly Alliance.

The third political space included not only Chinese government, the U.S. and Soviet Union governments, but Chinese Communist Party and its local governments that had been playing a significant role in Chinese politics. Of course, CCP was still playing a dominated part at this stage, it could have no more roles but to passively accept political arrangements set by the U.S. and Soviet Union. It was the above mentioned treble political spaces that determined the basic situation of Chinese politics in the early days after the anti – Japanese war.

With the development of national and international circumstances, the treble political spaces gradually disintegrated and switched to form two big political camps: the camp composed of the U.S. and KMT government, and the camp made up of the Soviet Union and CCP. Various factors gave rise to the decomposition of the treble political spaces, the main ones could be listed as following: Firstly, the contradictions between the U.S. and Soviet Union were constantly intensified and progressively the contradictions evolved into confrontation which directly endangered the Yelta system based on the basic principle of reciprocal compromise. Secondly, to some extent, the Yelta Agreement and Sino - Soviet Union Treaty have been the engagement clauses exchanging for the Soviet Union's ratification of KMT government and promises of not providing any sort of support to CCP under the condition that the Soviet Union in turns had the possession of extraordinary power in the Northeastern China. Facing the unfair political arrangements plotted by the big powers, Chinese Communist Party, who had made tremendous contribution in the anti - Japanese War, vigorously sought opportunities and space for surviving and development by marching into the North East. It turns out that such move not only created favorable conditions for CCP's surviving and development, but shook the postwar political situation in China settled down in Yelta Agreement and the Sino - Soviet Union Treaty to its foundations. Thirdly, out of the intention of staying away from civil war, the U.S. and the Soviet Union demanded the KMT government to carry out the political reform which in fact affected the political interests of KMT and

therefore encountered great resistance from the inside of KMT. As a result, on the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the KMT, a huge wave of anti – Yelta Agreement and anti – Sino – Soviet Union Treaty tide came into being. Finally, as two unequal agreements, both Yelta Agreement and Sino – Soviet Union Treaty stumbled upon powerful nationwide challenges in China.

The author holds that throughout the period right from the end of the post anti – Japanese War years till the overall breaking out of the civil war, the political situation in China had experienced a developing track started with the endeavors from many parties in seeking peace and ended up with the final breaking out of the war, which is a result of logical development of the immediate politics.

In demonstrating the above points, the book carries out the research in the following eight parts: Part I provides literary reviews of relative researches and introduces some of the most fundamental basis for such research. Part II mainly presents the background of the Yelta Agreements and its effect on Chinese politics. With the cooperation of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as its foundation, Yelta Agreement set up the framework for the development of postwar Chinese politics, that is, acknowledging the leadership of Chiang Kaishek with the precondition that KMT government gave up its one party rule and tried its best to avoid civil war.

Part III offers an introduction of Sino – Soviet Union Treaty of Friendly Alliance and its influence on Chinese politics. The signatures on the Sino – Soviet Union Treaty of Friendly Alliance accomplished the legitimization and specification process of Yelta Agreement which indicates the final ratification of KMT government to Yelta Agreement. As a result, KMT government was included into the political system designed in the Yelta Agreement while CCP was excluded outside.

Part IV confers the formation of the Northeast China issue and its initial developments. On the issue of Northeast China, both Yealta Agreement and Sino – Soviet Union Treaty agreed that the U. S. recognized Soviet Union's favorable rights in North East China and the U. S. would not interfere into the Northeast China affairs. In return, the Soviet Union guaranteed KMT government's sovereignty in the Northeast, and would made sure to have the KMT government to take over the Northeast. However, the U. S. 's clear intention to interfere into the Northeast right after the end of the WWII toppled the tacit agreements among China, the U. S. and the Soviet Union, and CCP's efforts in marching into the Northeast further complicated the Northeast issue.

Part V pictures the international background of the preliminary shaping of the

peaceful situation appearing in early 1946. The China White Paper issued by Truman government at the end of 1945, the conference of foreign ministers of the three countries in Moscow and Marshall's mission in China all together constituted the international background for China's stepping toward democracy and peace.

Part VI shows the two focalized manifestations that displayed the turning point of Chinese politics in the spring of 1946. On the one hand, because the Soviet Union repetitively delayed withdrawing its army from the Northeast, when the content of Yelta Agreement was publicized, its army was still there which stirred up the breaking out of the "Anti – Soviet Union Movement". On the other hand, the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the KMT totally overthrew the resolution of the political council, which triggered another turning point that brought Chinese politics from moving toward democracy and peace to the direction of monarchy war.

Part VII delineates the basic process of how China moved step by step toward overall civil war. In early 1946, the confrontation and divergence gradually went overt, and became especially clear on the issues of Sino – Soviet Union economic cooperative talks and the withdrawing of the Soviet army. As a result, the relationship among the "three – country and four – party" was reshuffled, and the two camps of CCP with the Soviet Union versus KMT with the U.S. appeared, and the civil war between CCP and KMT came into scene.

Part VIII concludes that if the U.S. and the Soviet Union really intended to make the political framework delineated in Yelta Agreement happen in the reality, it is indispensable that the following preconditions had to be met: Firstly, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had to closely cooperate with each other; secondly, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union could transcend their own national interests and cooperate with one rule in mind, that is, protecting China's national interests was their fundamental goal; thirdly, KMT is willing to give up its one party dictatorship political system; and fourthly, Chinese Communist Party could voluntarily accept the dominated status. Obviously, it is impossible to have all the above preconditions fully met in the actual political reality. By exploring the results of development of Chinese political situation in the postwar years, we can find out that the political changes that the U.S. and the Soviet Union brought to China by intervening into its inner politics were not peace and democracy, but a convoluted "three – country and four – party" political fast knot. The United States, whose immediate goal was to prevent the Soviet Union from controlling China, strove to transform China into its bridgehead to contain the expand of the communist Soviet Union and,

therefore, supporting the KMT government headed by Chiang Kaishek was its inevitable choice. The Soviet Union, whose strategic goal was to maintain its own security and regarded Northeast, Xinjiang and outer Mongolia as its sphere of power, would definitely not allow the U. S. to come in for a share, and, therefore, encouraging the CCP to march into Northeast of China would by its logical attitude. KMT, whose goad was to uphold its one party rule, and therefore, in order to guarantee its vested interests, eliminating CCP was its inner dynamics. As to CCP, since its basic goal was to get its status acknowledged and based on which helped to set up a united government, and its ultimate goal was to come into power, to get rid of the one party rule of KMT government and to establish a new China that would have the common people as the masters of the country was its bounden historical mission. The above tit – for – tat strategic goals of the four parties clearly reveal the irreconcilable fundamental interest conflicts of the "three – country and four – party". Therefore, in the actual political development process during the postwar years, compromises under specific conditions were just tactful and temporary, and conflicts, confrontations and war were inevitable results.



#### 序/刘景泉 /1

- 一、绪论 /1
  - (一)学术史整理 /1
  - (二)基本思路 /16
- 二、美苏合作:"雅尔塔协定"对中国政局的影响 /21
  - (一)"雅尔塔协定"的由来 /21
    - 1. 美国的思路 /21
    - 2. 苏联的参战条件 /32
    - 3. "雅尔塔协定"的签订 /36
  - (二)"雅尔塔协定"对中国政局的影响 /41
    - 1. 美苏确定的国共关系框架 /41
    - 2. 美国与中苏谈判 /48
- 三、国共和谈:国际背景下的重庆谈判 /55
  - (一)《中苏友好同盟条约》及其对国共关系的影响 /55
    - 1. 国民党政府对苏谈判策略与原则的确定 /55

- 2.《中苏友好同盟条约》的签订 /62
- (二)美苏与国共重庆谈判 /66
  - 1. 美苏与蒋介石的和谈邀请 /67
  - 2. 美苏与毛泽东赴重庆谈判 /75

# 四、逐鹿东北:四方关系的初步变奏 /84

- (一)美国介入东北事务 /84
  - 1. 美国干预中苏谈判 /84
  - 2. 美国运兵东北与国民党政府接收受阻 /94
- (二)中苏经济合作问题谈判 /102
  - 1. 中苏"经济合作"的意向 /102
  - 2. 苏方的要求与中方的应对方案 /105
  - 3. 经济合作谈判的进展 /110
- (三)苏联与中国共产党进军东北 /120
  - 1. 并非融洽的初次接触 /121
  - 2. 延安的神秘客人与"千载一时之机" /126
  - 3. "向北发展 向南防御"的决策与苏联 /130
  - 4. 由"独占东北"到"让开大路,占领两厢"的决策与苏联 /135

# 五、政治协商:和平曙光乍现 /144

- (一) 马歇尔使华:美国对华政策的再调整 /144
  - 1. 杜鲁门对华声明及美国对华政策的调整 /144
  - 2. 莫斯科三国外长会议与马歇尔使华 /149
- (二) 蒋经国与斯大林的秘密会谈 /152
  - · 1. 蒋经国与斯大林关于中共问题的会谈 /152
    - 2. 蒋经国与斯大林关于其它问题的会谈 /157

- 3. 对蒋经国与斯大林秘密会谈的评价 /160
- (三)和平局面的初步形成 /162
  - 1. 停战协定与军事调处执行部的设立 /162
  - 2. 政治协商会议的召开 /166
  - 3. 整军方案的制定 /170

# 六、爱国与排外:"雅尔塔体制"的根本动摇 /176

- (一)"雅尔塔协定"与反苏运动 /176
  - 1. 反苏运动的爆发 /176
  - 2. 反苏运动的性质与影响 /184
- (二)国民党六届二中全会 /190
  - 1. 国民党对政协的反应 /190
  - 2. 六届二中全会的召开与政治后果 /194

## 七、走向战争:美苏与中国政局的转折 /200

- (一)美国与中苏经济合作谈判的破裂 /200
  - 1. 谈判陷入僵局 /200
  - 2. 合作谈判的终结 /208
  - 3. 对中苏"经济合作"问题的分析 /212
- (二)美苏与东北停战调停 /215
  - 1. 政协会议前后的东北问题 /215
  - 2. 苏联撤军东北 /221
  - 3. 东北停战的实现 /231
- (三)马歇尔调停失败 /239
  - 1. 为战争而准备的谈判 /239
  - 2. 和平死了 /249

# 八、结语:现实政治的逻辑演进 /254

参考文献 /262

中文 /262

一、文献资料 /262

二、著作 /266

外文 /275

一、文献资料 /275

二、著作 /276

三、报刊资料 /279

人名索引 /280

后记 /289

# 一、绪论

回眸抗战胜利后中国具体的历史场景,不难发现,抗战胜利之初,在经历了百余年的外患与内乱后,和平、民主为众望所归、民心所向。在和平的环境中实现政治民主,以政治的民主保障和平,是当时中国的时代主题。重庆谈判、政治协商会议、南京谈判等都是和平、民主时代潮流的具体表现。

然而,抗战胜利尚不足一年,冲天的战火便再次笼罩整个中国。弥漫的硝烟中,血流成了河,江山破碎不堪,中华民族刚刚挺起的大国胸膛,再次承受重压!而和平民主的路标,也在若隐若现中一时失去了方向。这是一场不折不扣的悲剧,亲者为之痛、仇者以其快!

当然,我无意预先判断这场内战参与者的是非功过,这应该是本书完成后自然得出的结论;亦不愿纠缠于历史理想与历史现实的巨大落差之中。本书只是力图探讨这样一个问题:在和平民主的时代潮流中,是什么原因使得中国历史没有理性前行,而是以国共全面内战展现呢?

# (一)学术史整理

抗战胜利后,中国民心思治,然内战终未能免。对造成内战的原因,长期以来,大陆与台湾学者多从国共关系的视角出发,依据手中的材料,进行研究,但结论迥然有异。大陆较为通行的观点是:抗战胜利后,以蒋介石为首的国民党反动派,为维护其一党专政的反动统治,在美国的支持下,悍然发动全面内战。台湾较有权威的观点是:国民政府履行和平建国政策,希望通过和平谈判方式,谋求政治解决。于是战后乃有重庆会谈和政治协商会议之举行。不意中国共产党以和谈为手段,以叛乱为目的,在苏联的暗中支持下,破坏国民政府致力国家建设与制宪行宪,不

遗余力。①如上结论,受政治因素影响较大,同时也受限于资料的不足,较之战后初期中国错综复杂、瞬间变幻的政治形势,有将历史简单化之嫌。

20 世纪 70 年代,美国将战后初期的外交档案公之于众;20 世纪 80 年代,台湾方面整理出版了存于台湾的相关档案资料;20 世纪 90 年代,俄罗斯将部分相关档案资料公之于众;加之大陆地区近年来相继出版了毛泽东、周恩来、刘少奇等年谱、文集、传记、回忆录,使得对战后中国历史进行系统研究有了较为厚实的资料基础,关于战后中国政治的研究成果不但数量逐年增多,而且论述亦更加客观、厚实。

战后中国的历史走向,是美苏中三国、美苏国民党共产党四方关系纠缠推演的结果。战后中国政局的发展,国共关系的演变,在很大程度上受到美苏的影响。这一结论,目前已得到学术界的认可。

文安立著《冷战与革命——苏美冲突与中国内战的起源》是从总体上考察美苏 与国共由和而战历史过程的代表性著作。文安立认为,国际事务对于中国内战的 结果所起的作用比大多数中外学者所认识到的都大得多。因此,他提出采用"四维 模式"对苏、美及中国国、共的关系加以探讨。关于中国共产党,文安立指出,在二 次大战结束后毛泽东对战争与和平没有固定的看法。一方面,毛泽东从策略出发, 以及来自苏联的压力,认为和平如果在一段时间内得到维护,将对中国共产党有 利:另一方面,毛泽东急于推动革命的意念以及意识形态上的信仰又使他认定40 年代中期县向国民党开战的有利时期。关于中国共产党与苏联的关系,文安立认 `为,斯大林对中国共产党来说是一个起着关键性作用的决策者,中国共产党所有的 重要决定都是在同苏联人磋商后才做出的。不过,毛泽东和其他国家的大多数革 命领袖一样,遵从斯大林的领导,但这并不意味着毛泽东会服从斯大林的命令而采 取对中国革命造成致命损害的行动。关于美国,文安立认为,1945-1946年间,美 国政策的基本趋势既日益表现出与苏联对抗的意愿,又带有希望使内战避免在中 国发生的理想色彩。美国对蒋介石提供有限援助,这种政策从美国政府的角度看 是明智与审慎的。如果不是马歇尔使华打断了国民党的军事攻势,国民党本来是 有可能在军事上取得更大的优势地位的。但是,国民党政权存在的种种内在弱点 是造成国共形势转变的根本原因。就和平而言,如果杜鲁门在1946年春末夏初表

① 秦孝仪主编:《中华民国重要史料初编—对日抗战时期》第七编 战后中国(一)(以下简称《战后中国》(一)),(台湾)中国国民党中央委员会党史委员会,1981 年编印,第3页。