

【英汉对照全译本】

THE LOGIC OF HEGEL

小 逻辑

〔德〕黑格尔 著

(二)

中国社会科学出版社

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黄 昀 常培育 译

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CHAPTER VIII

Second Sub-Division Of Logic

The Doctrine Of Essence

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The terms in Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and not yet absolutely reflected in them-selves; hence in essence the actual unity of the notion is not realised, but only postulated by reflection. Essence,—which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself—is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is relation to an Other,—this Other however coming to view at first not as something which is, but as postulated and hypothetised. —Being has not vanished: but, firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light—Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself.

The Absolute is the Essence. This is the same definition as the previous one that the Absolute is Being, in so far as Being likewise is simple self-relation. But it is at the same time higher, because Essence is Being that has gone into itself; that is to say, the simple self-relation (in Being) is expressly put as negation of the negative, as immanent self-mediation. —Unfortunately when the Absolute is defined to be the Essence, the negativity which this implies is often taken only to mean the withdrawal of all determinate predicates. This negative action of withdrawal or abstraction

第八章 逻辑学的第二部分

本质论

第一百一十二节

本质中的各个概念永远只是相关成对的,且仍然没有在其自身中得到完全的反思;因此,在本质中,概念的真实统一并非现实的,而只是通过反思的假定。本质,作为通过其自身的否定而与自身中介的存在,是自我联系,只是因为它是与其对方相联系,然而这种所看到的对方起初并不是存在着的某物,而是假定的和假设的东西。存在并没有消失:但是,首先,本质作为简单的自我联系,就是存在;其次,由于它的直接性的片面规定性,存在被贬为仅仅是否定之物,一束表面的或反射的光线。因此,本质是映现在其自身中的存在。

【说明】 绝对是本质。这一界说与前面关于绝对是存在的界说是相同的,因为存在同样是简单的自我联系。但它同时又更高一些,因为本质是进入了其自身之中的存在,这就是说,(存在中)简单的自我联系被设定为否定之否定,也即内在的自我中介。不幸的是,当绝对被界定为本质时,其中所包含的否定性往往只被当作对所有规定性的谓词的取消。这种取消的否定活动或抽象活动

thus falls outside of the Essence—which is thus left as a mere result apart from its premisses,—the *caput mortuum* of abstraction. But as this negativity, instead of being external to Being, is its own dialectic, the truth of the latter, viz. Essence, will be Being as retired within itself,—immanent Being. That reflection, or light thrown into itself, constitutes the distinction between Essence and immediate Being, and is the peculiar characteristic of Essence itself.

Any mention of Essence implies that we distinguish it from Being: the latter is immediate, and, compared with the Essence, we look upon it as mere seeming. But this seeming is not an utter nonentity and nothing at all, but Being superseded and put by. The point of view given by the Essence is in general the standpoint of ‘Reflection.’ This word ‘reflection’ is originally applied, when a ray of light in a straight line impinging upon the surface of a mirror is thrown back from it. In this phenomenon we have two things,—first an immediate fact which is, and secondly the deputed, derivated, or transmitted phase of the same.—Something of this sort takes place when we reflect, or think upon an object; for here we want to know the object, not in its immediacy, but as derivative or mediated. The problem or aim of philosophy is often represented as the ascertainment of the essence of things: a phrase which only means that things instead of being left in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, something else. The immediate Being of things is thus conceived under the image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence lies hidden.

Everything, it is said, has an Essence; that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another, and merely to advance from qualitative to quantitative, and *ice versa*; there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence. With respect to other meanings and uses of the category of Essence, we may note that in the German auxiliary verb ‘*sein*’ the past tense is expressed by the term for Essence (*Wesen*): we designate past being as *gewesen*. This anomaly of language implies to some extent

因而就超出了本质,本质因而就被当作一个远离了其前提的纯粹结果,一个抽象的骷髅。但是因为这种否定性不是外在存在的,而是其自身的辩证法,后者的真理,也就是本质,就会成为存留在其自身中的存在——内在的存在。那种反思,或自身的映现,构成了本质与直接存在之间的区别,是本质自身特有的规定性。

【附释】一提到本质即意味着我们将它与存在区别开来了,后者是直接的,且与本质相比较,我们将它看作仅仅是假象。但是这种假象并非是完全的不存在,或完全的空无,而是被扬弃了的存在。本质的观点一般说来就是反思的观点。反射一词最初是用于指当一束光直接照身在镜面上被它所反射回来。在这个现象里有两个方面,首先是直接的方面,其次是同一事物的间接的、派生的或转送的状态。当我们反思或思维一个对象时,这种类型的事物就会出现;因为在此我们想要认识的对象,并不是在其直接性中,而是作为派生的或中介了的。哲学的问题或目标常常表现为探求事物的本质,这只是指事物必须被指出是以别的事物为中介,或基于别的事物之上的,而不是仅停留在其直接性之中。所以,事物的直接存在被认为是一个作为外壳或帷幕的表象,在其之后还蕴藏着本质。

人们常说,一切事物都有其本质;即事物事实上并非它们所直接显现出来的那样。因而,除了纯粹地从质到质的转移和纯粹地从质到量的进展之外,反之亦然,还发生了其他的更多东西,相反还存在着一个永恒的东西,那个永恒之物首先是它们的本质。至于本质这一范畴的其他意义和用法,我们可以注意到在德文中助动词“存在”在过去时里被解释作“本质”(Wesen),我们指定过去的事物为曾经是。语言中的这一不规则用法在某种程度上意味

a correct perception of the relation between Being and Essence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being, remembering however meanwhile that the past is not utterly denied, but only laid aside and thus at the same time preserved. Thus, to say, Caesar *was* in Gaul, only denies the immediacy of the event, but not his sojourn in Gaul altogether. That sojourn is just what forms the import of the proposition, in which however it is represented as *over and gone*. — ‘*Wesen*’ in ordinary life frequently means only a collection or aggregate; *Zeitungs-wesen* (the Press), *Postwesen* (the Post-Office), *Steuerwesen* (the Revenue). All that these terms mean is that the things in question are not to be taken single, in their immediacy, but as a complex, and then, perhaps, in addition, in their various bearings. This usage of the term is not very different in its implication from our own.

People also speak of *finite* Essences, such as man. But the very term Essence implies that we have made a step beyond finitude; and the title as applied to man is so far inexact. It is often added that there is a supreme Essence (Being); by which is meant God. On this two remarks may be made. In the first place the phrase ‘there is’ suggests a finite only; as when we say, there are so many planets, or, there are plants of such a constitution and plants of such an other. In these cases we are speaking of something which has other things beyond and beside it. But God, the absolutely infinite, is not something outside and beside whom there are other essences, All else outside God, if separated from Him, possesses no essentiality; in its isolation it becomes a mere show or seeming, without stay or essence of its own. But, secondly, it is a poor way of talking to call God the *highest* or supreme Essence. The category of quantity which the phrase employs has its proper place within the compass of the finite. When we call one mountain the highest on the earth, we have a vision of other high

着对存在与本质关系的一种正确的理解。诚然我们会将本质认作是过去的存在,不过要记住过去的并非完全是否定的,而只是被扬弃了的,同时也是被保存下来的。因此,说恺撒到过高卢,只是否认了这一事件的直接性,而不是完全地否认他在高卢逗留过。逗留就形成了这一命题的重要所在,在其中无论它是被表述为结束了的和过去的。“Wesen”(本质)一词在日常生活中通常只是指一种集合或一种总和:如 Zeitungswesen(指新闻业),Postwesen(指邮局),Steuerwesen(指关税)。所有这些词不外是指所讨论的事物并非是被单独从其直接性去看的,而是作为一个复合体,是从它们的多样的关系去看。词语的这一用法与我们所指的本质的含义没有什么真正的区别。

人们又常常谈及有限本质,比如说人。但真正的本质一词意味着我们对有限的一种超越,因此,将有限本质一词应用到人身上是远为不恰当的。还有人说,存在着一个最高的本质(存在),也就是指上帝。对此就当有两种说法。首先“有”这一短语就意味着它只能是有限的;正如我们说,有许多行星,或有这样一种构造的植物,又有另外一种构造的植物。在这些例子中,我们所谈及的是某种在其之外或在其之旁还有其他事物存在的东西。而上帝,作为绝对的无限,却并非是在其之外或在其之旁还存在有其他本质的东西,一切其他外在于上帝的东西,如果是与他分离的话,就是没有本质的东西:在孤立状态,它成了纯粹的外观或假象,没有其自身的支柱或本质。但是,其次,上帝是最高的或极端的本质的说法也是一件乏味的事情。这一说法中所应用的质的范畴,在有限事物的范围内才有其正确的地位。当我们称一座山为世界上最高的山时,我们便在其之外想象到其他的高

mountains beside it. So too when we call any one the richest or most learned in his country. But God, far from being *a* Being, even the highest, is *the* Being. This definition, however, though such a representation of God is an important and necessary stage in the growth of the religious consciousness, does not by any means exhaust the depth of the ordinary Christian idea of God. If we consider God as the Essence only, and nothing more, we know Him only as the universal and irresistible Power; in other words, as the Lord. Now the fear of the Lord is, doubtless, the beginning, —but *only* the beginning, of wisdom. To look at God in this light, as the Lord, and the Lord alone, is especially characteristic of Judaism and also of Mohammedanism. The defect of these religions lies in their scant recognition of the finite, which, be it as natural things or as finite phases of mind, it is characteristic of the heathen and (as they also for that reason are) polytheistic religions to maintain intact. Another not uncommon assertion is that God, as the supreme Being, cannot be known. Such is the view taken by modern ‘enlightenment’ and abstract understanding, which is content to say, *Il y a un être suprême* : and there lets the matter rest. To speak thus, and treat God merely as the supreme other-world Being, implies that we look upon the world before us in its immediacy as something permanent and positive, and forget that true Being is just the superseding of all that is immediate. If God be the abstract super-sensible Being, outside whom therefore lies all difference and all specific character, He is only a bare name, a mere *caput morfuum* of abstracting understanding. The true knowledge of God begins when we know that things, as they immediately are, have no truth.

In reference also to other subjects besides God the category of Essence is often liable to an abstract use, by which, in the study of anything, its Essence is held to be something unaffected by, and subsisting in independence of, its definite phenomenal embodiment.

山。因此当我们称一个人是他所在的国家中最富有和最有学问的人时,也同样如此。但是上帝远不止是一个存在,即便是最高的存在也只是一个存在。然而,尽管这种关于上帝的表述在宗教意识的发展中是一个重要和必要的阶段,这一界说却绝对没有穷尽通常基督教中关于上帝的观念的深度。如果我们仅仅把上帝看作是本质,而且只是到此为止,那么我们只是将他认作是普遍的和不可抵抗的力量,换言之,就是主。现在无疑对主的畏惧就是智慧的开端,也只是智慧的开端。按照这种方式来看待上帝,他作为主,且仅作为主,是犹太教,同样也是穆罕默德教的突出特点。这些宗教的缺陷在于它们对于作为自然事物或精神的有限阶段的有限事物缺乏认识,而这却是异教和(由于同样的原因,他们也是)多神教的特点所主张坚持的。另一个并不罕见的说法即上帝作为最高的存在,是不能被认识的。这是近代“启蒙”和抽象的知性所带来的观点,这只是满足于说天地间有一至高无上的存在,而对其不再加以深究。如果照这样说,且仅仅将上帝当作一个至高的、彼岸世界的存在,就意味着我们会将直接的眼前世界看做是永恒的和肯定的事物,而忘记了真正的存在只是对所有直接之物的扬弃。如果上帝是抽象的超感官的存在,在他之外就存在着一切的差异和一切特定的规定性,那么他就只是一个空名,一个抽象理智的单纯的死躯壳。对于上帝的真正知识开始于当我们知道事物在它的直接存在中是没有真理性的。

除了上帝之外,关于别的主体,本质的范畴也常常容易被抽象地使用;通过它,在研究任何事物时,其本质都被当作是不受其明确的具体现象影响,且独立于其明确的具体现象而存在的。因

Thus we say, for example, of people, that the great thing is not what they do or how they behave, but what they are. This is correct, if it means that a man's conduct should be looked at, not in its immediacy, but only as it is explained by his inner self, and as a revelation of that inner self. Still it should be remembered that the only means by which the Essence and the inner self can be verified, is their appearance in outward reality; whereas the appeal which men make to the essential life, as distinct from the material facts of conduct, is generally prompted by a desire to assert their own subjectivity and to elude an absolute and objective judgment.

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Self-relation in Essence is the form of Identity or of reflection-in-to-self, which has here taken the place of the immediacy of Being. They are both the same abstraction,— self-relation.

The unintelligence of sense, to take everything limited and finite for Being, passes into the obstinacy of understanding, which views the finite as self-identical, not inherently self-contradictory.

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This identity, as it has descended from Being, appears in the first place only charged with the characteristics of Being, and referred to Being as to something external. This external Being, if taken in separation from the true Being (of Essence), is called the Unessential. But that turns out a mistake. Because Essence is Being-in-self, it is essential only to the extent that it has in itself its negative, *i. e.* reference to another, or mediation. Consequently, it has the unessential as its own proper seeming (reflection) in itself. But in seeming or mediation there is distinction involved; and since what is distinguished (as distinguished from the identity out of which it arises, and in which it is not, or lies as seeming,) receives itself the form of identity, the semblance is still in the mode of Being, or of self-related

此我们说,比如,对于人来说,重要的事情并不是他们做了什么或他们是怎么做的,而在于他们是什么。如果它是指一个人的行为不应只在其直接性中去看,而实际上只是由它的内在的自我来解释,且作为其内在的自我的一种显现的话,这是正确的。然而还应当记住,本质和内在自我所能被证实的唯一手段,就只是它们在外在现实中的表象;然而人们想区别于行为的实质内容而去寻求生活的本质的渴求,常常受到一种维护其主体性而逃避绝对的和客观的、判断的、期望的鼓动。

第一百一十三节

本质的自我联系是同一性的形式或自我反思的形式,它们在此取代了存在的直接性。它们都是同样的抽象物——自我联系。

感性的无思想性,将一切受限制的和有限的事物当作存在,就过渡到知性的固执了,其将有限之物当作自我同一的即不包含自我矛盾的东西。

第一百一十四节

这种同一性,因为它是从存在中产生的,最初就表现为只是受到存在的规定性的制约,且对于存在就如某种外在之物。这种外在的存在,如果与真实的(本质的)存在分离开来,就被称作非本质的。但是那却产生了一个错误。因为本质是在自身内的存在,它之所以是本质的只是因为它在其本身内包含着它的否定物,也就是与别物相联系,或中介。因此,它在其自身内有非本质之物作为其自身的固有的假象(反思)。但是在假象或中介物中包含有区别;且因为被区别开来之物(作为与它所从出的同一性区别开来的东西,在其中它不是同一性的假象,或谎称是其假象)自己获得了同一性的形式,其外表仍然是存在的形式,或自我联

immediacy. The sphere of Essence thus turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and mediation. In it every term is expressly invested with the character of self-relatedness, while yet at the same time one is forced beyond it. It has Being, —reflected being, a being in which another shows, and which shows in another. And so it is also the sphere in which the contradiction, still implicit in the sphere of Being, is made explicit.

As the one notion is the common principle underlying all logic, there appear in the development of Essence the same attributes or terms as in the development of Being, but in a reflex form. Instead of Being and Nought we have now the forms of Positive and Negative; the former at first as Identity corresponding to pure and uncontrasted Being, the latter developed (showing in itself) as Difference. So also, we have Becoming represented by the Ground of determinate Being: which itself, when reflected upon the Ground, is Existence.

The theory of Essence is the most difficult branch of Logic. It includes the categories of metaphysic and of the sciences in general. These are products of reflective understanding, which, while it assumes the differences to possess a footing of their own, and at the same time also expressly affirms their relativity, still combines the two statements, side by side, or one after the other, by an 'Also,' without bringing these thoughts into one, or unifying them into the notion.

A. —ESSENCE AS GROUND OF EXISTENCE

(a) *The pure principles or categories of Reflection*

(a) *Identity*

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The Essence lights up *in itself* or is mere reflection; and therefore is only self-relation, not as immediate but as reflected. And that reflex relation

系的直接性的形式。因此,本质的范围便成了一个直接性与间接性的尚未完全结合的范围。在其中,一切规定都被清楚地赋予了自我联系的特性,然而同时每一个又都被迫去超出它。它含有存在——反思的存在,一个映现他物的,且在他物中映现的存在。因此,它同样是这样一个范围,在其中仍然潜在于存在的范围内的矛盾被设立起来了。

【说明】 因为那唯一的概念是存在于一切逻辑的共同法则,所以在本质的发展中出现了与在存在的发展中同样的规定或范畴,但采取的是反思的形式。我们现在以肯定与否定的形式代替了有与无的形式;前者最初是相当于纯粹无生气的无对立存在的同一性,后者则发展(表现于其自身中)成为区别。因此,我们也将“变易”描述成为定在的根据:而当其返回到其根据时,其自身即为实存。

本质论是逻辑学中最困难的部分。它包括形而上学与一般科学的范畴。这些都是反思的知性的产物,知性虽然假定区别有其自身的立足点,却同时又明白地肯定其相对性,只是通过一个“也”字,将这两者先后相续地联合在一起,却不能将这些思想合而为一,或将它们统一成为概念。

A. 本质作为实存的根据

(a) 纯反思的规定或范畴

(1) 同一

第一百一十五节

本质映现于自身之内或者是纯粹的反思;因此本质只是自身联系,不过,不是直接的而是反思的自身联系。而那反思的联系

is self-Identity.

This Identity becomes an Identity in form only, or of the understanding, if it be held hard and fast, quite aloof from difference. Or, rather, abstraction is the imposition of this Identity of form, the transformation of something inherently concrete into this form of elementary simplicity. And this may be done in two ways. Either we may neglect a part of the multiple features which are found in the concrete thing (by what is called analysis) and select only one of them; or, neglecting their variety, we may concentrate the multiple characters into one.

If we associate Identity with the Absolute, making the Absolute the subject of a proposition, we get: The Absolute is what is identical with itself. However true this proposition may be, it is doubtful whether it be meant in its truth; and therefore it is at least imperfect in the expression. For it is left undecided, whether it means the abstract Identity of understanding,—abstract, that is, because contrasted with the other characteristics of Essence, or the Identity which is inherently concrete. In the latter case, as will be seen, true Identity is first discoverable in the Ground, and, with a higher truth, in the Notion. —Even the word Absolute is often used to mean no more than ‘abstract.’ Absolute space and absolute time, for example, is another way of saying abstract space and abstract time.

When the principles of Essence are taken as essential principles of thought they become predicates of a presupposed subject, which, because they are essential, is ‘Everything.’ The propositions thus arising have been stated as universal Laws of Thought. Thus the first of them, the maxim of Identity, reads: Everything is identical with itself, $A = A$; and, negatively, A cannot at the same time be A and not A . —This maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing but the law of abstract understanding. The propositional form itself contradicts it; for a proposition always promises a distinction between subject and predicate; while