

【英汉对照全译本】

THE LOGIC OF HEGEL

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# 小 逻辑

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〔德〕黑格尔 著

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(一)

中国社会科学出版社

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中国社会科学出版社

The Logic Of Hegel

By *G. W. F. Hegel*

English Translation By

*William Wallace , M. A. ,LL. D.*

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# CONTENTS

## 目 录

### (一)

CHAPTER I	Introduction .....	2
第一章	导言 .....	3
CHAPTER II	Preliminary Notion .....	48
第二章	初步的概念 .....	49
CHAPTER III	First Attitude Of Thought To Objectivity .....	106
第三章	思想关于客观性的第一种态度 .....	107
CHAPTER IV	Second Attitude Of Thought To Objectivity .....	138
第四章	思想对客观性的第二种态度 .....	139
CHAPTER V	Third Attitude Of Thought To Objectivity .....	220
第五章	思想对客观性的第三种态度 .....	221
CHAPTER VI	Logic Further Defined And Divided .....	258
第六章	逻辑学的进一步规定和划分 .....	259
CHAPTER VII	First Sub-Division Of Logic .....	284
第七章	逻辑学的第一部分 .....	285

## (二)

CHAPTER VIII Second Sub-Division Of Logic .....	384
第八章 逻辑学的第二部分 .....	385
CHAPTER IX Third Sub-Division Of Logic .....	540
第九章 逻辑学的第三部分 .....	541
 译者后记 .....	 708

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# CHAPTER I

## Introduction

### 1

Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted. The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the Truth. Both in like manner go on to treat of the finite worlds of Nature and the human Mind, with their relation to each other and to their truth in God. Some *acquaintance* with its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must presume, that and a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other reason than this: that in point of time the mind makes general *images* of objects, long before it makes *notions* of them, and that it is only through these mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking mind rises to know and comprehend *thinkingly*.

But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the *necessity* of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original acquaintance with them is thus discovered to be inadequate. We can assume nothing, and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning; and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or rather



# 第一章 导 言

## 第一节

哲学没有其他科学所享有的一种优势：它既不能像它们一样以意识自然接受的，作为其对象存在的依据，也不能假定它的认识方法在认识之初或进程之中便是一种已被接受的方法。诚然，哲学的对象与宗教的对象大体相同。两者的对象皆为最高意义的真理，即上帝，且唯有上帝才是真理。两者都同样地继续探讨自然的有限世界和人类的精神，着眼处在于两者的相互关系，以及它们和其上帝真理的关系。因此，哲学可以，甚至必须假定对其对象有某种熟知，而且对它们有相当的兴趣，换言之，就时间顺序而言，人的意识先形成对象的一般表象，然后才形成关于它们的概念，而且只有通过这些意识中的表象，依靠这些表象，能思的心灵才能做思维上的认识和把握。

但是，随着对思维的研究深入，这种研究变得很明显，思维既不能满足于任何不能提供其事实必然性的事物，也不能满足于任何不能证明其对象的存在、本质及性质的事物。因而，我们原先对它们的了解就显得不够了。我们既不能做任何教条式的假定和断言，也不能接受其他的断言和假定。然而我们仍必须

is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a beginning at all.

## 2

This *thinking study of things* may serve, in a general way, as a description of philosophy. But the description is too wide. If it be correct to say, that thought makes the distinction between man and the lower animals, then everything human is human, for the sole and simple reason that it is due to the operation of thought. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a peculiar mode of thinking—a mode in which thinking becomes knowledge, and knowledge through notions. However great therefore may be the identity and essential unity of the two modes of thought, the philosophic mode gets to be different from the more general thought which acts in all that is human, in all that gives humanity its distinctive character. And this difference connects itself with the fact that the strictly human and thought induced phenomena of consciousness do not originally appear in the form of a thought, but as a feeling, a perception, or mental image—all of which aspects must be distinguished from the form of thought proper.

According to an old preconceived idea, which has passed into a trivial proposition, it is thought which marks the man off from the animals. Yet trivial as this old belief may seem, it must, strangely enough, be recalled to mind in presence of certain preconceived ideas of the present day. These ideas would put feeling and thought so far apart as to make them opposites, and would represent them as so antagonistic, that feeling, particularly religious feeling, is supposed to be contaminated, perverted, and even annihilated by thought. They also emphatically hold that religion and piety grow out of, and rest upon something else, and not on thought. But those who make this separation forget meanwhile that only man has the capacity for religion, and that animals no more have religion than they have law and morality.

Those who insist on this separation of religion from thinking usually have before their minds the sort of thought that may be styled

设定一个开端：一个最初的和非衍生的开端，它设定一种假设，或者说它就是一种假设。看来设定一个开端似乎是根本不可能的了。

## 第二节

概括说来，这种对事物的思维研究可以作为哲学的一个描述。但是这个描述又太宽泛了。如果人与低级动物的区别就在于其能思维的说法是正确的话，那么人之所以为人，便在于思维的作用这个唯一的和简单的原因。另一方面，哲学是一种特殊的思维方式——在这种思维方式中，思维成为认识，并且是通过概念来认识的。因此，无论两种方式的思维是如何的同一和本质上一致，哲学的方式是不同于那种活动于人类一切行为中、使人性成为与众不同特点的更一般的思维的。而这种区别又将它自身与这样的事实相联系，即人的、基于思维的意识现象最初并非以思想的形式出现，而是以感情、感知或精神性的表象出现——这些形式的所有方面都必须与严格意义上的思维形式区分开来。

依照一种已经变成了无关紧要的观点的古老成见，正是思维，标志着人类从动物中脱离出来。尽管这个古老的信念可能看来无关紧要，但十分奇怪的是，一定有一些成见在当时的头脑中存在。这些成见将情感与思维截然分开到了彼此对立的地步，并将它们描绘成如此的敌对，以至于认为情感，尤其是宗教情感，定当被思维所玷污、曲解，甚至于消灭。它们还强调认为宗教与虔诚并不是植根于思维的，而是基于其他的一些事物。然而做这种区分的人却忘了同样只有人才有信仰的能力，而动物是没有宗教也没有法律和道德的。

那些坚持宗教与思维分离的人，心目中的思维通常是被归类

*after-thought*. They mean 'reflective' thinking, which has to deal with thoughts as thoughts, and brings them into consciousness. Slackness to perceive and keep in view this distinction which philosophy definitely draws in respect of thinking is the source of the crudest objections and reproaches against philosophy. Man,—and that just because it is his nature to think,—is the only being that possesses law, religion, and morality. In these spheres of human life, therefore, thinking, under the guise of feeling, faith, or generalised image, has not been inactive: its action and its productions are there present and therein contained. But it is one thing to have such feelings and generalised images that have been moulded and permeated by thought, and another thing to have thoughts about them. The thoughts, to which *after-thought* upon those modes of consciousness gives rise, are what is comprised under reflection, general reasoning, and the like, as well as under philosophy itself.

The neglect of this distinction between thought in general and the reflective thought of philosophy has also led to another and more frequent misunderstanding. Reflection of this kind has been often maintained to be the condition, or even the only way, of attaining a consciousness and certitude of the Eternal and True. The (now somewhat antiquated) metaphysical proofs of God's existence, for example, have been treated, as if a knowledge of them and a conviction of their truth were the only and essential means of producing a belief and conviction that there is a God. Such a doctrine would find its parallel, if we said that eating was impossible before we had acquired a knowledge of the chemical, botanical, and zoological characters of our food; and that we must delay digestion till we had finished the study of anatomy and physiology. Were it so, these sciences in their field, like philosophy in its, would gain greatly in point of utility; in fact, their utility would rise to the height of absolute and universal indispensableness. Or rather, instead of being indispensable, they would not exist at all.

为后思的那种类型的思维。他们就是反思,那是须得将思想作为思想来对待,并且在意识中呈现出来。对于哲学所明确作出的关于思维的区分,不能理解和固执于这种区分是产生对哲学粗鄙的反对和责难的根源。人类——由于其能思维的本性——是唯一能拥有法律、宗教和道德的生命。因此,在这些人类生活的领域中,被打扮成情感、信念或者普遍化的表象的思维并非是不活动的:它的活动与成果呈现并包含在那里面。但是具有为思维所塑造和渗透的情感和普遍化的表象是一回事,而具有关于它们的思想又是另一回事。由对那些意识形式的后思所产生的思想,就是包含于反思、一般性推理等等之内的,同样也包含于哲学之内。

忽略了一般的思维与哲学上的反思的思维之间的区别,还会导致另一种更为经常的误解:被认为是获得使一种意识呈现和对永恒真理的确信条件甚至是唯一途径。例如,关于上帝存在的(现在业已过时的)形而上学的证明曾经被如此看待,即关于它们的知识和对它们的真理性的确信,是造成上帝存在的信仰和信念的唯一的和根本的方法。我们可以发现与这样的教条类似的说法,比如我们说,在我们具备了关于我们的食物的化学的、植物学的和动物学的性质的知识之前,饮食是不可能的;直到我们完成了解剖学和生理学的研究之后,才能进行消化。如果是这样的话,这些科学在它们自身的领域内,正如哲学在其本身的领域内一样,就实用性而言将收获巨大;它们的实用性在实际上就会上升到——一个绝对的普遍的不可缺少的高度。或者更确切地说,它们不是不可缺少,而是根本就不会存在了。

The *Content*, of whatever kind it be, with which our consciousness is taken up, is what constitutes the qualitative character of our feelings, perceptions, fancies, and ideas; of our aims and duties; and of our thoughts and notions. From this point of view, feeling, perception, &c. are the *forms* assumed by these contents. The contents remain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented, or willed, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of thoughts, or merely and simply thought. In any one of these forms, or in the admixture of several, the contents confront consciousness, or are its *object*. But when they are thus objects of consciousness, the modes of the several forms ally themselves with the contents; and each form of them appears in consequence to give rise to a special object. Thus what is the same at bottom, may look like a different sort of fact.

The several modes of feeling, perception, desire, and will, so far as we are *aware* of them, are in general called ideas (mental representations): and it may be roughly said, that philosophy puts thoughts, categories, or, in more precise language, adequate *notions*, in the place of the generalised images we ordinarily call ideas. Mental impressions such as these may be regarded as the metaphors of thoughts and notions. But to have these figurate conceptions does not imply that we appreciate their intellectual significance, the thoughts and rational notions to which they correspond. Conversely, it is one thing to have thoughts and intelligent notions, and another to know what impressions, perceptions, and feelings correspond to them.

This difference will to some extent explain what people call the *unintelligibility of philosophy*. Their difficulty lies partly in an incapacity—which in itself is nothing but want of habit—for abstract thinking; *i. e.* in an inability to get hold of pure thoughts and move about in them. In our ordinary state of mind, the thoughts are clothed upon and made one with the sensuous or spiritual material of the hour; and in reflection, meditation, and general reasoning, we introduce a blend of thoughts into feelings, percepts, and mental images. (Thus, in

### 第三节

占据我们思想的内容,无论是哪一种,都是构成我们的情感、感知、想象、观念、目标、任务以及思维、概念的规定性要素。依照这样的观点,情感、感知等就是这些内容表现出的各种形式。无论它们是被感觉、观察、表象或期望的,也无论它们是被单纯地感觉着,或掺杂有思想地感觉着,或单纯地被思维着,这些内容始终保持如一。在这些形式的任何一种之中,或在任何几种混合的形式之中,这些内容都直面意识,或者是意识的对象。但是当它们成为意识的对象时,各种样式的形式就将其自身与内容结合在一起;而它们的各种形式就成为一个特殊的对象。于是从根本是同样的东西,就会看来好像是不同的事实了。

我们所能意识到的各种样式的情感、感知、欲望和意志,通常被称为观念(精神性的呈现),而且可以大体上说:哲学是以思想、范畴,或更确切地表达,是以丰富的概念去代替我们通常称为观念的一般表象。诸如此类的精神性的印象,可以视为是思想和观念的隐喻。但是拥有这些有形的概念,并不意味着我们认识到了它们的理性意义和它们所对应的思想和理性观念。相反,具有思想和理智的观念是一回事,知道哪些印象、感知和情感与它们相应又是另一回事。

这种区别在一定程度上可以解释人们所称的哲学的不易理解性。他们的困难一方面来自于他们没有作抽象思维的能力,而这种能力无非只是需要养成习惯而已;也就是他们不能够紧紧抓住纯粹的思维并在其中运动。在我们平常的精神状态中,思想往往披着当前的感觉上的或精神上的外衣,并且在后思、沉思和一般推理中,我们将思想混杂于情感、直观和表象之中。(因而,在

propositions where the subject-matter is due to the senses—*e. g.* ‘This leaf is green’—we have such categories introduced, as being and individuality.) But it is a very different thing to make the thoughts pure and simple our object.

But their complaint that philosophy is unintelligible is as much due to another reason; and that is an impatient wish to have before them as a mental picture that which is in the mind as a thought or notion. When people are asked to apprehend some notion, they often complain that they do not know what they have to think. But the fact is that in a notion there is nothing further to be thought than the notion itself. What the phrase reveals, is a hankering after an image with which we are already familiar. The mind, denied the use of its familiar ideas, feels the ground where it once stood firm and at home taken away from beneath it, and, when transported into the region of pure thought, cannot tell where in the world it is.

One consequence of this weakness is that authors, preachers, and orators are found most intelligible, when they speak of things which their readers or hearers already know by rote,—things which the latter are conversant with, and which require no explanation.

## 4

The philosopher then has to reckon with popular modes of thought, and with the objects of religion. In dealing with the ordinary modes of mind, he will first of all, as we saw, have to prove and almost to awaken the need for his peculiar method of knowledge. In dealing with the objects of religion, and with truth as a whole, he will have to show that philosophy is capable of apprehending them from its own resources; and should a difference from religious conceptions come to light, he will have to justify the points in which it diverges.

## 5

To give the reader a preliminary explanation of the distinction thus made, and to let him see at the same moment that the real import



一个纯是感觉材料的命题——比如“这片树叶是绿的”——中,我们就已经引入了存在和个体性这样的范畴了。)但是,这与使我们对对象的认识纯粹和简单是有很大不同的。

但是他们抱怨哲学的不易理解也在于另一个原因,那就是一种缺乏耐心的期望,要将意识中的思想或概念变成他们的一幅精神的图景。当人们被要求去理解一些概念时,他们常常抱怨他们并不知道他们须要思考什么。而事实是,在一个概念中,除了这概念本身以外,是没有其他东西可被思维的。这个措词所揭示的是一种用我们所熟知的东西去探求一个表象的渴望。意识,如果不去用它所熟悉的观念的话,就会感到它曾坚实地、自如地立足于其上的那个基础被抽去了,而且意识一旦进入到纯粹思维的领域内,就无法说清它处在世界的什么地方了。

这一缺点的一个后果就是,作家、传教士和演说家在谈及那些为读者或听众早已靠死背而知晓的事情——那些他的所精通的,以及那些无需解释的事情时,人们就觉得最好懂不过了。

#### 第四节

因而,哲学家必须认真对待大众的思维方式以及宗教的诸对象。对待一般人的意识方式时,正如我们所看到的,他首先必须证明他们的特定的知识方法的需要,并且几乎是得要唤起他们对于这种知识方法的需要;对待宗教对象以及对待总体的真理时,他必须表明从哲学本身出发就有能力理解它们;而且当与宗教的观念之间出现差异时,他必须辨明是在那些地方出现分歧的。

#### 第五节

为了将上面所作的区分给读者一个初步的解释,也让他同时了解到意识被翻译成为思想的形式和推理的概念后,我们意识中