

《中庸》的文本

不是道德格言的松散汇编
而是为人的意义提供了

前后连贯内容广泛的洞见

An Insight of Chung-yung

《中庸》洞见

(中英文对照本)

杜维明 著

段德智 译 林同奇 校

人民出版社

经——院——哲——学——与——宗——教——文——化——研——究——丛——书

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Preface

序^①

① 中英文对照本序的中文版曾经原作者杜维明先生审阅和修订过,在此谨表示谢意。该译文并非我们按照文本的字面意义严格地和精确地直译过来的,而是在一些地方,我们采取了意译的方式。敬请读者在对照阅读时注意到这一点。——译者。

I am pleased to write this new preface to the bilingual edition that is to be released by People's Publishing House in China. Originally published in the monograph series of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy for more than twenty years, the book evolved from a focused inquiry into one of the Four Books to a general statement about Confucian religiousness.

My decision to write an extended essay on *Zhongyong* was motivated by a strong sense that, far from being a collection of loosely related sayings about moral education, the text offers a coherent and comprehensive vision of the meaning of being human. Confucian moral education, inspired by such a vision, is not only restricted to ethics narrowly defined but also embraces esthetic taste and religious sensibility. I arrived at such an understanding not by learning *about* the text but by learning *from* the text. The difference is subtle but profoundly significant. Learning *about* a text is to treat it as an object of study which necessitates a deliberate attempt to distance ourselves from it and to analyze it according to scholarly requirements involving disciplines such as philology and etymology. It is necessary and desirable to treat a text in such a way in order to familiarize ourselves with all the complicated issues of properly situating it in its historical context.

Yet, learning *from* a text is a further step, a much more engaged and committed step seeking to enable us to be enlightened by the text. It is an attempt to open ourselves up to the text not only as judges and investigators but also as appreciators and students. Of course, we can never totally suspend our investigation and refrain from judgment, but once we allow ourselves to be informed, instructed, and inspired by the text, it is no longer a mere object out there, but a friend and a teacher who takes an active interest in our well-being as students. Indeed, our relationship with the text is transformed from a subject-object dichotomy to an inter-subjective dialogue.

How can we hold a dialogue with a text if the author behind it has long gone? It seems, on the surface, that we are simply indulged in a monologue by imposing a dialogical mode on a situation in which our partner is forever silent. In this connection, dialogue is only an imaginary act no matter how ingenious it is performed. If we are satisfied with the idea that a text is not a living thing but a dead matter, this is the only conclusion we can draw from our reading experience. We should learn about the text because it is passively out there to be investigated, analyzed, and studied. Learning from the text, however, presupposes that investigation, analysis, and study are not merely methods of anatomical dissection but preparatory work in anticipation of a living encounter. The text is not only alive; indeed its vitality replete with a great transformative power can help us extend our intellectual horizons in ways hitherto never imagined possible.

It is important to note that although we can always learn from a text, only a very few texts are worthy of a close reading in order to learn from them continuously. Their sources of inspiration seem inexhaustible. The more we read them the more we are impressed by their

我很高兴为人民出版社出版的双语本写篇新序。二十多年前,此书作为亚洲和比较哲学学会的丛书之一,原本专门研究“四书”之一的《中庸》,逐步演变为探讨儒家宗教性的一般论述。

我之所以为《中庸》写一篇较长的论文,是出自于一种强烈的感受:《中庸》的文本,不是道德格言的松散汇编,而是为人的意义提供了前后连贯、内容广泛的洞见。受到这种洞见的启发,儒家的道德教育,蕴含着美学品味和宗教感悟,不仅仅局限于伦理学的某些狭隘的界定。我这样的学习感悟,来自文本,而不是关于文本的学习。“来自”与“关于”之间的差别貌似细微,实有深刻的不同。学习关于文本,把它当做研究对象,刻意拉开研究者和文本之间的距离,企图把文本拉回到它所植根的历史语境中,再遵循文献学和词源学的学术规范对它作出分析。当然,以这样的方式对待文本,是必要的,也是可取的。

然而,学习来自文本,是把文本当成不受时空限制的,自身有生命力的活体,它与我们更近一层,我们受到的启发也更投入;①学习来自文本,也是我们的心灵直接向文本开放的一种形式,此时,我们不是判官和审查者,而是鉴赏者和学习者。当然,这并不等于我们对文本不审查,不作任何判断;学习来自文本,是我们直接从文本中得到信息,受到教益,获得灵感,此时的文本不再是一个摆在那儿的对象,而是像一位超越时空限制、能与我们交流的良师益友。我们与文本的关系因此便由主客两分转换为主体间的对话。

如果隐藏在文本后面的作者过世已久,怎么能与文本展开对话呢?表面上看,这只是我们沉溺于独白之中,就像把一种对话的模式强加给我们永远沉默的对话伙伴。这种对话,更像一种后设的想象行为,不管对话开展得多么生动与灵巧。如果我们相信文本不是一种与时共生的活体,把它局限在它所产生的那个时空和语境中,它则像一种死物,我们只能从关于文本的学习中,得到它在其历史语境中的意义。关于文本的学习,是把文本被动地摆在那儿,供我们审查、分析和研究。来自文本的学习,不把文本当成审查、分析和研究的对象,也不对它作解剖学意义上的剖析。来自文本的学习,如同两个生命的相遇,文本不仅活着,而且充盈着巨大的转化能力,帮助我们拓展迄今想象不到的视域。

有一点非常重要,尽管我们能够永远向一个文本学习,但是只有很少的文本

① “学习关于文本”和“学习来自文本”是杜维明先生自己使用的两个中文表达式,与后面“关于文本的学习”和“来自文本的学习”的意思基本相同。——译者。

richness. To me *Zhongyong* is such a text. When I first encountered it in high school, I was over – awed by its apparent simplicity and its real profundity and incomprehensibility. It took me quite a while to realize that tying up loose ends prematurely is the wrong way to grasp its inner structure. The text needed to be read and reread to deepen my awareness of its multidimensional character. I then chose to read it regularly and conscientiously for self – understanding. I was gradually drawn to three major concerns of the text—personal cultivation, politics, and moral metaphysics—but I first regarded them as three discrete areas juxtaposed together in tension and conflict. I was unable to see how the pieces under the three headings could fit together into a broader vision. Once I understood that the defining characteristic of the Confucian way is to integrate the three seemingly separable human endeavors, my doubts were dispelled and the essay unfolded naturally. I composed the draft of my essay in three months.

When the essay was published by New York State University Press, I added a new chapter to the original essay to underscore the “religiousness” of Confucian humanism. I must hasten to note here that I do not regard Confucianism as a religion in the same sense that Christianity or Islam is a religion. If I had to choose between philosophy and religion, I would prefer to define Confucianism as a philosophy rather than a religion. However, in either case we inevitably fall into the preconceived categorization that is unsuitable to Confucianism. In the Western experience, the separation of the Judaic tradition as religious and the Greek tradition as philosophical is an accepted convention. Jesus and Martin Luther rarely appear in books on philosophy, and Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx do not feature prominently in books on religion. In the rest of the world, however, this separation is neither necessary nor desirable. Thus, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Daoism represent both religious and philosophical traditions. In this sense, Confucianism is similar.

The reason that I choose to emphasize the “religious” dimension of Confucian humanism is twofold. I want to show that as a comprehensive and integrated humanistic tradition, Confucianism is not “secular” humanism. More importantly, I want to demonstrate that without an understanding of Confucian religiousness, our appreciation of the Confucian “profound person” (*zunzi*) will be shallow, Confucian “politics” (*zheng*) misleading, and Confucian metaphysics inadequate. I am happy to report that at an international conference on “Indian and Chinese Philosophical Perspectives on Knowledge, Wisdom, and Spirituality” held in New Delhi in December 2007, the eminent Indian philosopher Balasubramania proposed that Confucianism is a form of “spiritual humanism.” Because I co – edited a two – volume study on “Confucian Spirituality,” I am delighted to accept his proposal.

I am grateful to Professor Duan Dezhi for making the bilingual text available to interested readers. Even though the English and Chinese versions refer to the same texts, hopefully this volume will serve as a reference for intercultural exchange. I strongly believe that it is a challenge to the Confucian tradition to articulate the meaning of a foundational text on Confu-

值得我们反复细读,从中得到取之不竭的灵感资源。我们越是阅读它们,越是能够感受到它们的深刻与丰富。在我看来,《中庸》就是这样一种文本。我在高中初读它时,它的表面上的简明及实质的深奥和晦涩,使我受到了很大的震撼。过了很长一段时间,我才意识到,过早地把《中庸》中一些松散的思想串联在一起,对于把握其内在结构来说,实在是一种错误的做法。我一遍又一遍地阅读文本,不断加深我对文本多维特性的意识。为了自我理解,我才经常地、自觉地阅读它。我逐渐被文本中三个主要的关怀所吸引:“修身”、“政”和“诚”(道德形上学)。开始,我觉得它们是相对独立,又处于紧张和冲突状态的三个领域,看不出它们能够整合进一个比较广泛的图景之中。后来我认为,儒家之道的特性,就在于将它们整合为一体。因此我的疑虑冰消瓦解,论点也就自然地展开了。不到三个月,写出了此书的初稿。

当这本书由纽约州立大学出版时,我又新增了一章,强调儒学人文主义的“宗教性”。在这里,我必须指出,我并不是把儒学人文主义的“宗教性”视为基督教或伊斯兰教相同意义上的宗教。如果我必须在哲学和宗教之间进行抉择的话,我宁愿把儒学界定为哲学,而不是把它界定为宗教。然而,在任何情况下,我将在所难免地陷入某种对儒学的先入为主的成见之中。在西方经验中,犹太的宗教传统与希腊的哲学传统的分离,早就成为公论。耶稣和马丁·路德很少出现在哲学著作中,而苏格拉底、柏拉图、亚里士多德、康德、黑格尔和马克思在关于宗教的著作中也得不到重视。在世界的其他地方,这种分离既不必要,也不合乎东方精神传统的特性。如印度教、佛教和道教的传统既是宗教的又是哲学的。从这个意义上说,儒学也同样如此。

我强调儒学人文主义的“宗教”向度,理由有两个:作为一种内容广泛和整体化了的传统,儒学并非“世俗”的人文主义;更重要的是,我想借以推证出,如果对儒学的宗教性缺乏理解,我们则对儒家的“君子”的鉴赏将因此而浅薄,对儒家的“政”的理解将误入歧途,对儒家的“诚”(道德形上学)的理解也将有所缺失。我很高兴地告诉大家,2007年12月在新德里召开的“印度与中国关于知识、智慧和精神性的哲学观”的国际学术会议上,著名的印度哲学家巴拉苏布拉马尼亚曾建议把儒学理解成“精神人文主义”的一种形式。我曾与他人合编过两卷本“儒学精神性”研究,所以我也愿意接受他的这一建议。

我感谢段德智教授,他为读者提供了这个双语版本。它可以作为不同文化交流的一个参照,即使英文版和中文版源于同一文本。我相信英文及其他语种

cian humanism in English. Unless the text makes sense to readers who are not educated in classical Chinese, the possibility of it becoming a “world classic” will be limited. The translation of my English interpretation of a Confucian classic into Chinese makes me critically aware of how little I have actually done and how much more there is left for me to do.

January 28, 2008
4 Bryant Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts

能够清楚地表达出儒学人文主义的基本价值,当然,对儒学传统是一个挑战。不能通过这种挑战,儒学文本只对受过古典汉语教育的读者有意义,成为“世界经典”,就会受到限制。我用英文解释儒学经典的论述,又被翻译成中文的过程,让我意识到已经做的太少,还没有做的事情太多!

2008 年 1 月 28 日

于麻省康桥,布然恩特街 4 号

Foreword

英文版第二版前言

It has been ten years since the publication of this exploratory essay in the monographic series of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy. I was originally impelled by a strong urge to show that the inner logic of *Chung – yung* can be demonstrated by focusing on three interrelated issues: the profound person, the fiduciary community and the moral metaphysics. I felt that, without imposing an alien structure upon the text, we could clearly see, in *Chung – yung*, the unfolding of a holistic humanist vision, a vision that takes the ultimate realization of the human project as the fulfillment of an anthropocosmic promise.

I am grateful to colleagues and friends in Chinese studies for accepting my interpretive stance as basically tenable, at least suggestive, and I am pleased that fellow students of comparative religion have found my inquiry into the Confucian tradition useful for understanding human religiousness in a global context. Of course, it was a happy surprise to know that this essay intended for a limited readership went into second print and that the demand continued.

In making this revised and enlarged edition available, I chose not to update the bibliographic literature for the expert. The intriguing scholarly issues can best be treated in monographic studies intended for learned journals. The discovery of the so-called “Lost Confucian Text” in the Ma – wang – tui find of 1974, for example, can greatly enhance our appreciation of the idea of “subjectivity” in *Chung – yung*. But to incorporate that body of literature into this essay, while Sinologically significant, will not affect the overall shape of the argument.

Rather, I decided to add Chapter 5 to underscore a line of thinking explicit in my interpretation: Confucian thought as a form of philosophical anthropology is laden with profound ethicoreligious implications. It is as much an evocation of human religiousness as an articulation of human rationality. Yet the dichotomy between faith and reason or between rationality and revelation is quite alien to the Confucian mode of thought. My main purpose in this new chapter is to show that the ultimate Confucian concern is self – transformation as a communal act and as a faithful dialogical response to the transcendent. My suggestion that *Chung – yung* lends itself to this interpretation is predicated on the belief that if the Confucian Way is characterized as humanistic, what it symbolizes is inclusive rather than exclusive humanism.

In revising and enlarging this essay, I have immensely benefited from the works of Robert N. Bellah, Eliot Deutsch, Charles Wei – hsun Fu, Shu – hsien Liu, Benjamin I. Schwartz, Huston Smith, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith. I am indebted to Rosanne Hall and Betsy Scheiner for their editorial help and to Thomas W. Selover for his painstaking effort in preparing the index.

Tu Wei – ming
Cambridge, Massachusetts

自从这部探索性论著被列入亚洲和比较哲学学会的专著丛书发表以来,至今已经十年了。当初我为强烈的愿望所驱使,想努力表明《中庸》的内在逻辑能够通过集中到三个相关问题上予以推证,这就是君子、信赖社群和道德形上学。我觉得,只要不把某种外在的结构强加给文本,我们就能够在《中庸》中清楚地看到一种全整的人文主义理念的展开,这种理念把人生筹划的终极实现看做是对天人一体观的承诺的践履。

我非常感谢从事中国研究的同事和朋友们,他们把我的诠释作为一种基本上站得住脚的,至少也是有一定启发性的东西接受下来;我也非常高兴地看到,从事比较宗教研究的学者们发现,我对儒学传统的探究有助于从全球的视域理解人的宗教性。当然,当获悉这部原本为有限读者写作的论著正在第二次印刷,而且对它的需求还持续不已,实在让我感到惊喜。

在出版增订本时,我并不想为了满足专家的需要而修订参考文献的书目。那些引人入胜的学术专题,可以在专门为学术杂志写作的专题论文中得到处理。诚然,例如1974年在马王堆发现的所谓“儒家佚文”这样一类史料,无疑能够极大地增进我们对《中庸》中的“主体性”观念的理解。但是,把这部分文献吸收到这部论著中,虽然从汉学研究的角度看颇有意义,但却会影响本书立据的总体框架。

相反,我决定增加第五章来强调一种在我的诠释中已相当明确的思想进路:儒家思想作为哲学人类学的一种形式,充满了深刻的伦理宗教的意蕴。它对人的宗教性的唤起,和它对人的理性的表达一样充分。然而,信仰与理性或理性与启示的二分,对于儒家的思想方式来说,是相当陌生的。在这新加的一章中,我的主要目的在于表明:儒家的终极关怀是自我转化,这种转化既是一种社群行为,又是一种对超越的诚信的对话式的回应。我认为,我们之所以能够对《中庸》作出这种解释,是建立于下面的看法上的,即:如果我们把儒者之规定为人文主义,则这种道所象征的便是一种兼容的而非排他的人文主义。

在增订这部论著的时候,我从罗伯特·N.贝拉、傅伟勋、刘述先、本杰明I.史华慈、休斯顿·史密斯以及威尔弗雷德·坎特威尔·史密斯的著作中受益良多。我非常感激赫若山·史密斯和贝齐·莎伊纳在编辑方面的帮助,也感激托马斯·W.塞洛弗在准备索引方面所付出的辛劳。

杜维明
于美国麻省康桥

Original Preface

英文版第一版序

Chung – yung, commonly known as the *Doctrine of the Mean*, is a central document in the Confucian tradition. For more than two thousand years, as an important chapter in one of the Five Classics,¹ *Chung – yung* has continuously been a source of inspiration for the creative mind in Chinese intellectual history.² From the time the great Confucian synthesizer Chu Hsi (1130 – 1200) selected *Chung – yung* as one of the Four Books,³ it has exerted an impact on traditional Chinese education as profound as that of the *Analects*. In premodern times, every Chinese literatus learned the work by heart before he reached adolescence, and from 1313 to 1905 it was a basic text for civil-service examinations. Indeed, the mode of thinking presented in *Chung – yung* is still readily perceivable as a defining characteristic of many a philosophical reflection in contemporary China.⁴

Although the significance of *Chung – yung* is widely acknowledged, however, few systematic attempts have been made to analyze the text as a whole. Traditional Chinese and Japanese scholars have assumed that since the integrity of the text as an authentic Confucian classic is beyond question, the scholar's task is simply to write exegeses on it. Recent students of Chinese thought, under the influence of the iconoclastic attacks on Confucianism prevalent since the "new cultural movement" of May Fourth in 1919, have raised some fundamental doubts about the cohesiveness of the text. As a result, quite a few Sinologists now believe that the work is no more than a collection of aphorisms.

My approach to *Chung – yung* is interpretive rather than exegetical. This is based on the assumption that the inner logic of *Chung – yung* cannot be made explicit merely by a series of commentaries on its words, sentences, paragraphs, or chapters. Hermeneutical analyses are suggestive and sometimes enlightening because they help us to gain insight into the underlying themes of the text, which, in turn, enable us to understand how the rules of this particular "language game," to use a current expression, are formulated. To be sure, as a method of learning we cannot afford to ignore the available exegetical commentaries on the text, especially those that are considered standard scholarship on the subject. But we must progress from commentaries to interpretations so that the meaning of the text as a whole is also taken into serious consideration.

I should note that the approach in this inquiry is not intended to be a form of structuralism. Certainly my purpose is, in part, to make it clear that there is a deep, integral structure in *Chung – yung* and that only through a holistic reading of the text can one penetrate its surface semantics and arrive at an appreciation of its inner meanings. My emphasis on wholeness may give the impression that I have relegated the historicity of the text to the background. While the primary concern of my work is to study *Chung – yung* as the unfolding of a humanistic vision, I have taken into account issues concerning the genesis of the text such as authorship and dating. I maintain, however, that although genetic problems are closely related to our quest for a broad understanding of the text, they are not to be confused with the problems of the semantic nucleus around which the symbolic articulations of the text evolve. Indeed, notwithstanding the danger of intentional fallacy, I would very much like to

《中庸》，在儒家传统中是一部极为重要的经典。两千多年来，《中庸》作为《五经》之一《礼记》中的重要一篇^①，在中国思想史上一直是创造性心灵的灵感的源泉^②。从伟大的儒学综合大师朱熹（1130—1200年）把《中庸》选作《四书》之一时起^③，它对传统的中国教育所产生的影响就和《论语》同样深广。在前现代时期，每一个中国文人在其青少年时代都要背诵这部著作；从1313年到1905年，它更成了文官应试的基本科目之一。其实，《中庸》所体现的思维方式依然可以被看做是当代中国许多哲学反思的鲜明的规定性特征^④。

尽管《中庸》的意义受到广泛承认，但是却很少有人对这一文本作过系统的和整体的分析。传统的中国学者和日本学者一向假定：既然这一完整文本作为本真的儒家经典是无可争议的，则学者的任务便只是对它作一些注释而已。自1919年五四“新文化运动”以来，激烈攻击崇尚儒学的风气一直很盛行；在其影响下，近来研究中国思想的学者已经对这一文本的逻辑连贯性提出了一些根本性的质疑。结果，不少汉学家现在都相信这部著作只不过是一些格言警句的汇编而已。

我对《中庸》的研究是诠释性的而非注释性的。这种研究基于下面这个假定，即《中庸》的内在逻辑是不可能仅仅通过对它的语词、句子、段落或章节作一些注释就予以阐明的。而诠释学的分析则具有启发性，有时甚至可以启迪心智。其所以能够如此，乃是因为这种分析有助于我们获得有关该文本的根本主题的某种洞见，而这又能够使我们理解，用时下流行的话说就是，该文本的特殊的“语言游戏”规则是如何形成的。诚然，作为一种治学方法，我们绝不应对文本的可资利用的注释置之不顾，尤其是那些被认为是这一领域的权威性的注释成果。但是，我们之所以必须从注释进展到诠释，乃是为了对该文本的意义作为一个整体进行认真的考察。

应当指出，我并无意使这种探究方法成为结构主义的某种形式。的确，我的目的部分地在于清楚地说明《中庸》中存在着一个深层次的和完整的结构，而且只有通过文本作出整体性的解读才能透过它的表层语义达到对其内在意义的理解。我这样强调解读的整体性很可能会给人一种印象，即我把文本的历史性边缘化了。诚然，我这部著作首先关心的是把《中庸》作为一种人文主义构想的展开来进行研究的，但是我也考虑到文本的原作者及写作日期一类的历史上的起源问题。然而，我却主张，尽管起源问题同我们寻求对文本的广泛理解密切相关，但是却也不能因此而把它们同文本的符号表达所环绕的语义核心问题混为

associate myself with the hermeneutical art, which takes as its point of departure that a central text in a spiritual tradition, far from being an anthology of isolated statements, is likely to have an organismic unity of its own.

My task, then, has not been to advocate a fundamentalist position on *Chung - yung* but to explicate the text through interpretation; since interpretation in this particular connection is not the imposition of a fixed notion of rationality on the text, but a process of opening oneself up to the text, I felt, even while writing, an acute sense of discovery and a strong need for confirmation. Thus the final product is simply an exploratory essay waiting to be validated or invalidated by the community of scholars in which the pursuit of this type of learning was made meaningful in the first Place. My interpretation of *Chung - yung* consequently is no more than a reenactment of an age - long Confucian ritual. If the reenactment has any objective value at all, it must be intersubjectively confirmed although it can probably never be empirically or positivistically verified.⁵

In this exploratory essay, therefore, I intend to take the traditional assumption seriously and will try to show how the seemingly unconnected aphoristic statements in *Chung - yung* make sense as integral parts of a coherent thesis on personality, society, and religion. My inquiry begins with a critical examination of the current impression that the contents of the text are varied and that it seems to lack a logically consistent form. I hope to show that the so - called "mystical" aspects of *Chung - yung* are basically in accord with the Mencian tradition of Confucian thought⁶ and that, without in any way rearranging the text, it can be understood and appreciated as the unfolding of an ethicoreligious vision on the inseparability of the Human Way and the Way of Heaven.

Through a symbolic analysis of the three core ideas in the text—*chiün - tzu* (superior man, or profound person), *cheng* (pol - itics), and *ch'eng* (sincerity)—I hope to demonstrate that such familiar dichotomies as the tension between self and society and the conflict between ethics and religion are alien to *Chung - yung*'s spiritual orientation. This interpretation will probably unsettle the conventional belief that Confucianism is preeminently a social philosophy or an ethical system. But my purpose is not so much to underscore a few selected elements in *Chung - yung* as to introduce a new way of analyzing all of its salient features. If my interpretative position is tenable, *Chung - yung*'s reflections on the "profound person" who is engaged in a continual process toward an ever - deepening subjectivity,⁷ on society as a "fiduciary community,"⁸ rather than as an adversary system, and on "sincerity" as a primary concept in the construction of a "moral metaphysics"⁹ will suggest an exceedingly interesting approach to some of the perennial human concerns.

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