

【英汉对照全译本】

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

精神现象学

[德]黑格尔 著

(一)

中国社会科学出版社

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图书在版编目(CIP)数据

精神现象学/[德]黑格尔著;王诚,曾琼译:—北京:中国
社会科学出版社,2007.8

(西方学术经典译丛)

ISBN 978-7-5004-6294-1

I. 精… II. ①黑…②王…③曾… III. 黑格尔, G. W. F

(1770~1831)—现象学 IV. B516.35 B089

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字(2007)第097623号

出版策划 曹宏举

责任编辑 钟芳

责任校对 李莉

技术编辑 李建

出版发行 中国社会科学出版社

社址 北京鼓楼西大街甲158号 邮编 100720

电话 010—84029450(邮购)

网址 <http://www.csspw.cn>

经销 新华书店

印刷 北京京晟纪元印刷有限公司

版次 2007年8月第1版

印次 2007年8月第1次印刷

开本 630×970 1/16

印张 80.25

字数 863千字

定价 152.00元

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中国社会科学出版社

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The Absolute is Subject; the meaning of this statement. The sphere and element of systematic Knowledge; the course by which consciousness rises to this stage constitutes the Phenomenology of Mind.

The transformation of figurative presentations and familiar ideas into thoughts; and these again into notions. To what extent is the Phenomenology of Mind negative, or how far does it contain falsity? Historical and Mathematical truth. Nature of Philosophical truth, and its Method; objections to schematizing formalism.

Requisite for the study of philosophy. The negative procedure of ratiocination; its positive procedure; its subject. Philosophizing by the light of nature; healthy common-sense; the inspiration of genius.

科学认识总论

真理在其中被认为是概念的要素;它的真实形态是一个科学建构起来的体系。当代精神文化的地位和看法。知识的原则并不是知识的完成:反对形式主义。

绝对即是主体这个命题的含义。系统知识的范围和要素:意识借以上升到构成精神现象学这个阶段的过程。

表象和常识向思想的转化;然后又转化为概念。精神现象学否定的程度,或者说它包含了多少谬误?历史的数学的真理。自然哲学的真理及其方法:反对框架化的形式主义。

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The Phenomenology Of Mind

By *G. W. F. Hegel*

English Translation By

J. B. Baillie

本书根据 George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

And The Macmillan Company 1931 年版本译出

PREFACE

In the case of a philosophical work it seems not only superfluous, but, in view of the nature of philosophy, even inappropriate and misleading to begin, as writers usually do in a preface, by explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his contemporaries. For whatever it might be suitable to state about philosophy in a preface—say, an historical sketch of the main drift and point of view, the general content and results, a string of desultory assertions and assurances about the truth—this cannot be accepted as the form and manner in which to expound philosophical truth.

Moreover, because philosophy has its being essentially in the element of that universality which encloses the particular within it, the end or final result seems, in the case of philosophy more than in that of other sciences, to have absolutely expressed the complete fact itself in its very nature; contrasted with that the mere process of bringing it to light would seem, properly speaking, to have no essential significance. On the other hand, in the general idea of e. g. anatomy—the knowledge of the parts of the body regarded as lifeless—we are quite

序 言

如果在—本哲学著作的序言里,也像普通书序里作者们通常所做的那样,去解释作者心中所怀有的著述目的,触发著述动机的环境,以及作者所认为的他的著作与这同一问题上早期和同时代的其他论著的关系,那么,这样做不仅仅看起来是多余的,而且考虑到哲学的性质,这甚至是不合时宜的,从一开始就有误导之嫌。因为,无论在序言里说些什么与哲学有关的东西都似乎是合适的。比如说,给主要的趋势和观点、一般内容和结果作一个历史性的概括,对有关真理问题的主张和断言作一连串散漫的罗列,如此等等,这作为拓展哲学真理的方式和方法,是不能被接受的。

而且,由于哲学之存在本质地在于普遍性因素中包含着特殊,所以哲学比其他学科更易于使人觉得,目的或最终的结果看起来似乎已经以它特有的本性,绝对地表达了完全的事实本身;我们会说,相对结果而言,得出结果的过程看起来是没有什么本质意义的。而另一方面,在一般的观念里,例如解剖学,即关于身体各部分被视为僵死的东西而得到的知识,我们深信我们尚未占

sure we do not possess the objective concrete fact, the actual content of the science, but must, over and above, be concerned with particulars. Further, in the case of such a collection of items of knowledge, which has no real right to the name of science, any talk about purpose and such-like generalities is not commonly very different from the descriptive and superficial way in which the contents of the science—these nerves and muscles, etc.—are them-selves spoken of. In philosophy, on the other hand, it would at once be felt incongruous were such a method made use of and yet shown by philosophy itself to be incapable of grasping the truth.

In the same way too, by determining the relation which a philosophical work professes to have to other treatises on the same subject, an extraneous interest is introduced, and obscurity is thrown over the point at issue in the knowledge of the truth. The more the ordinary mind takes the opposition between true and false to be fixed, the more is it accustomed to expect either agreement or contradiction with a given philosophical system, and only to see reason for the one or the other in any explanatory statement concerning such a system. It does not conceive the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive evolution of truth; rather, it sees only contradiction in that variety. The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole. But contradiction as between philosophical systems is not wont to be conceived in this way; on the other hand, the mind perceiving the contradiction does not commonly know how to relieve it or keep it free from its oneness, and to recognize in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments.

有客观的具体事实,尚未占有这门科学的实质内容,因而必须把探讨特殊性放在首位。再说,这样一个收集起来的知识材料的堆积里,实在没有权利被冠名为科学。对它谈论任何目的之类的普遍性通常与叙述这门科学内容本身,例如神经、肌肉等等,所用的描述的和肤浅的方式,没什么两样。相反,在哲学里,如果也采用这种方式,而哲学本身又表明它不能把握真理,那就会立即觉得不一致了。

同样地,由于规定一种哲学著作所具有的、与讨论同一主题的其他论著的关系,一种外在的兴趣就会引入进来,使得真理知识的关键所在为之模糊不清。人们越是把真理与谬误的对立看成是固定不变的,就越习惯于期望要么赞成,要么反对某一特定的哲学体系,而且仅仅寻找理由去支持一个或另一个有关这样一个哲学体系的任何解释说明。这种人不会把复杂矛盾的哲学体系看成是真理演进的过程;而是只看见了这种多样性中的矛盾。当花朵盛开时,花蕾消逝了,而我们可能会说花蕾被花朵否定了;同样,当果实结出时,花朵又可能会被解释为是植物存在的一个虚假的形式,因为果实的出现是被当作植物真实的本性而代替花朵的。这些阶段不仅仅是彼此不同,而且是相互替代和相互排斥的。但是它们自身固有的本性所具有的不尽的活动使它们同时成为统一有机体的不同环节,在那里,它们不仅不相互矛盾,而且都同样是必要的部分;而正是所有环节的这种同等的必要性才构成了整体的生命。但是对于一个哲学体系之间的矛盾,人们不愿意以这样的方式去理解;另一方面,理解这种矛盾的意识通常也不知道如何把这种矛盾解脱出来或者保持避免其片面性,并且不能在看起来是冲突因而对立着的形态中去认识其中相辅相成

The demand for such explanations, as also the attempts to satisfy this demand, very easily pass for the essential business philosophy has to undertake. Where could the inmost truth of a philosophical work be found better expressed than in its purposes and results? And in what way could these be more definitely known than through their distinction from what is produced during the same period by others working in the same field? If, however, such procedure is to pass for more than the beginning of knowledge, if it is to pass for actually knowing, then we must, in point of fact, look on it as a device for avoiding the real business at issue, an attempt to combine the appearance of being in earnest and taking trouble about the subject with an actual neglect of the subject altogether. For the real subject-matter is not exhausted in its purpose, but in working the matter out; nor is the mere result attained the concrete whole itself, but the result along with the process of arriving at it. The purpose by itself is a lifeless universal, just as the general drift is a mere activity in a certain direction, which is still without its concrete realization; and the naked result is the corpse of the system which has left its guiding tendency behind it. Similarly, the distinctive difference of anything is rather the boundary, the limit, of the subject; it is found at that point where the subject-matter stops, or it is what this subject-matter is *not*. To trouble oneself in this fashion with the purpose and results, and again with the differences, the positions taken up and judgments passed by one thinker and another, is therefore an easier task than perhaps it seems. For instead of laying hold of the matter in hand, a procedure of that kind is all the while away from the subject altogether. Instead of dwelling within it and becoming absorbed by it, knowledge of that sort is always grasping at something else; such knowledge, instead of keeping to the subject-matter and giving itself up to it, never gets away from itself. The easiest thing of all is to pass judgments on what has a solid substantial content; it is more difficult to grasp it, and most of all difficult to do both together and produce the systematic exposition of it.