COMMUNITY IN THE BALANCE

Morality and Social Change in an Indonesian Society

JAMES M. HAGEN

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For my mother, Dorothy, and my late father, John

Preface

Indonesia, the largest nation in Southeast Asia and the fourth largest in the world, covers an area of nearly two million square miles, much of it water, dotted by roughly 17,000 islands. The province of Maluku or the Moluccas, in the remote area of eastern Indonesia, where this study is set, is a microcosm of the nation being similarly dominated by the sea, with population concentrations, like Indonesia as whole, greatest in the coastal areas of the smaller islands.

The Maneo, who live in Maluku and are the focus of this book, reside in six small permanent villages, four inland and two coastal, and in the forests of central Seram, the largest island in the province, and are, thus, doubly distant from the centers of state power and wealth. I visited them first in 1989 and for 20 months between 1992 and 1994. My objective then was to examine Maneo kinship and marriage practices and explore, in a theoretically informed way, the day-to-day travails of living amongst relatives in close proximity: in short, doing the kind of ethnographic project that was common during the first fifty years of modern anthropology.

Alas, social organization does remain central to the book; however, in light of the communal violence between Muslims and Christians that swept through the region beginning as street fights in Ambon, the provincial capital, early in 1999, and continuing over the next two years and intermittently through the time this book has gone to press, I have been compelled to look at local social relations in broader terms. And not only because Maneo, specifically the two Maneo settlements on the south coast of Seram, reside in affected areas—a two-day journey by boat and bus from Ambon. The scope of violence raises important questions about how communities are created in more ordinary times because of the affinities kinship fosters and despite them. For as much as mutuality, a key dimension to community, is enhanced by being related, the day-to-day competing demands of dense, overlapping kin ties and kinship norms can generate conflict and can cause communities to fail—fail to grow like a sand pile sloughing off new grains (which may go unnoticed) or fail catastrophically.

When sectarian violence cut a swath through most of two provinces including Seram, which had been on the margins of most historic disputes of the last 400 years, the suddenness of the escalation stunned both the region's population and outside observers. Likely, those surprised included some of the instigators who helped spark it, perversely achieving what they could not have imagined—some 700,000 Muslims and Christians refugees and roughly 10,000 deaths by the end of the most intensive period of fighting. Although Indonesia as a whole is over 85

percent Muslim, Christians make up half the population of Central Maluku and that balance ensured no quick victory or a clear winner.

As I describe in the last chapter of the book, the rise and perpetuation of violence defies simple explanation. No Slobodan Milosevic stands behind the ethnic and religious antipathies, fueling them, orchestrating a Balkans-like collapse. Perpetrators there were, but on a smaller scale, and their machinations depended on mass frenzy and a mob to mobilize. The crowd's susceptibility to violence was induced by conditions undermining and distending relations with one another, including religious others; to understand this change in civil society, I focus on the concept of community. Admittedly, between Maneo and the opposing camps in the battle in Maluku, the circumstances of the groups' formations could not be more different. In some respects, the violence in Maluku represents the antithesis of the low-level divisiveness and strained amicability characterizing certain dimensions of Maneo social experience I write about here. For Maneo, so entangled in kinship they place little significance in being Maneo, blind to the community forest, so to speak, for all the kinship trees, community is relevant as a practical concern. A Maneo community is less an idea there than a site for a series of kinship interactions (and the deep memory of those interactions) in need of managing. Their relations are recurrent, dense, and overlapping; many can chart ties to neighbors in multiple ways. While they certainly would fight on behalf of kin, Maneo would sooner scatter than defend some collective representation. Conversely, for residents in and around Ambon where the fighting began and was most intense, religious affiliations have become the basis for defining boundaries. But within the opposing camps, affinities defined by a shared religious identity tend to be shallow and untested and the solidarity of 'members' merely assumed.

How could communal movements have become mobilized so destructively with so little warning? As several Indonesian scholars (notably Tamrin Tomagola and George Aditjondro) have reported, outside provocateurs, allies of former president Suharto's family in particular, sparked the fighting by training, arming, and financing combatants. When the fighting lulled, their agents fired off rounds and set fires to heighten tensions. Most ordinary citizens were simply bystanders caught in the crossfire. Even citizens quick to wield spears and machetes at the outset of the fighting likely did so, I believe, for the symbolic effect of the display. They had not necessarily intended to murder but to demonstrate solidarity, to be seen as fierce, and to convince themselves of the righteousness of the cause. By this account, crowds were pawns; even thugs like the Ambonese hired to protect Chinese gaming establishments in Jakarta, whose return coincided with the beginning of the fighting, were not soldiers—although the opposite is often claimed. Some militia members were coerced into fighting. A number of Butonese migrants in Ambon who had been forced to flee during the early phases of fighting to a distant homeland their parents or grandparents had left generations earlier were shamed into returning as militia members. Additionally, though the partisanship of the army (Muslim) and police (Christian) is well-documented, I also heard credible reports of soldiers

abandoned by commanding officers without food or pay and thus forced to turn to locals for support, eventually taking their side in the combat. That they did so out of gratitude and not religious zealotry does not minimize their culpability, but it does demonstrate how processes beyond people's control propelled them into taking actions they would not otherwise choose to take.

I am more interested in how, among civilians, susceptiblity grew to the blandishments of extremists and in how residents developed a hypersensitivity to perceived and in some cases historically distant injustices, despite the long record of relatively amicable Muslim and Christian interactions, friendships, and marriage. Civilian attitudes were critical. Even after polarization began in the early months of 1999, the disentegration of civil society was not inevitable; the causal significance of religious difference could not be inferred from the violence done ostensibly in the name of religion. The shifts in religious affiliations centuries ago cited as one source of friction, the perceived regional political dominance of Christians, and the emergence of a more political Islam, gloss over more immediate cross-cutting ethnic, territorial, linguistic, and class differences. Indeed, there are countless examples of cooperation and inter-religious solidarity. Muslims and Christians have married back and forth, not always with the blessing of kin, but usually, in the end, adding to reserves of mutual understanding. Such marital disputes offered practice in ways to negotiate more serious enmities. Even if religious differences remained stark, they could be observed without incitement to action. Muslims and Christians in Maluku have shared much of their history, and many of their formal associations have included members of both faiths. For instance, Muslims struggled on behalf of the unsuccessful movement to create a separate nation for South (and Central) Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan or RMS) in the early years of Independence (1949-53). This, despite the fact propagandists now contend it was entirely a Christian campaign, spreading the absurd notion that Christian attacks in the current fighting have been coordinated by RMS insurgents in Holland decades after its defeat. But ironically, as tension arose, sharing so much left only religious divisions to be exploited for the purpose of destabilizing the region—the result of which has been to make the fissure between Muslims and Christians seem more intractable and deeper.

At this point, to restore civility requires acknowledging that outside provocateurs did their work so effectively the situation on the ground, the loss of trust and mutual respect, has superseded what even a fully effective justice system (if one did exist in Indonesia) could possibly remedy. Some citizens have taken efforts to bridge religious divides, to maintain lines of communication, informally and through organizations in Jakarta and elsewhere, and to provide, in some instances, shelter for religious others at considerable risk to themselves and their families. In addition, beyond the cessation of hostilities, restoring peace demands understanding how ordinary people have become complicit in it and how everyday practice divided along religious lines works against reconciliation as the routineness of separation, though unavoidable in the short run, becomes habit. To say this is not to criticize

or lay blame but to point out the fragility of civil life when risks entailed by doing well for others increase—risks otherwise ignored in more ordinary times.

The major thesis throughout the book is that civil collapse needs to be understood against the forbearance that kept disputes, disagreements, and fights from becoming riots in the past. Herewith, analysis of Maneo social life can shed light on the wider religious conflict that has swept the region. Comparison is instructive particularly insofar as the four isolated mountain settlements where my wife Jennie and I spent over half the twenty months of fieldwork lack effective institutions for adjudicating disputes and lie beyond the reach of the Indonesian state. In the mountains, the seemingly random movement of people who survive by hunting, foraging, and shifting agriculture and whose lives are thoroughly entangled in those of others, in fact, yields a kind of civility, a subtle balancing and adjusting of mutual expectations and understandings. A sense of civility imbues in people a practical awareness and sensitivity to the concerns of others around them. It emerges out of people's proximity and shared experiences. In the sense that Maneo relations with one another are relatively unmediated by the state, what happens between them offers a microcosm of everyday civil relations and practices within the larger and more urban community too minute to be subject to state interference or sanction. The reality (and key principle of civil life) is that no Maneo can order another to trust and cooperate. They have to persuade others, assuage any ill feelings, and manifest goodwill. The fact they can chart kin ties to so many others offers no guarantee of harmony; indeed, to some extent and in some relationships, tension is inevitable. For example, among brothers (real and categorical) far more passes between them than is mandated by the terms of siblingship. They are not told how generous to be, and they are under no obligation to reciprocate. Yet because of their proximity to one another, brothers—who tend to stay put—find themselves in the position of having to compete, head to head, over the resources they share. In a way, male sibling relations are paradigmatic of Maneo community relations more generally. The proximity that makes them vulnerable to each other also reflects their reliance and their understanding of the stakes if they do not manage to cooperate in certain areas of everyday life.

The tenor of relations ebb and flow; on one end of the continuum, community begins where understanding and empathy are tested and enhanced, where people's experiences with one another foster some tolerance. On the other end, community ceases at the point where such perspicuity is lost and the requisite sensitivity to difference—difference of opinion or difference in ethnicity or religion—is no longer sustainable. Or, to put the matter in more concrete terms, the terminus represents the point where community is transformed; it contracts in terms of the kinds of interactions and differences that can be accommodated—a paradoxical shrinking alongside numerical expansion—where difference comes to be perceived as an uncontrollable threat. I realize that to suggest that moral perspicuity represents another casualty of the conflict in central Maluku on par with the loss of life and property, and the accompanying physical and emotional suffering might seem an incongruous proposition. Does it not misconstrue the way sentimentality is

appropriated in the service of power—specifically, in the service of those who have it and wish to preserve it? While such a possibility exists, skepticism risks conflating the objectification, representation, and codification of community responsiveness with the endowment that operates veiled, behind moral practice. Sentimentality may reflect some deeper concern over or empathy for the well-being of others. If this magnanimity, against more selfish desires and parochial interests, is never revealed entirely, it is because people are so often denied the chance to foster it. In the present context of civil life in Maluku, warfare has cut away at the hard-won ground of trust, tolerance, and civility. If, as I believe, Maneo preserve religious tolerance, though most are Christian, it is because they posit local origins for both Islam and Christianity. To deny this and contradict history would mean confronting others (Maneo and non-Maneo) as strangers; it would eliminate an effective way to foster civility among those who do not necessarily know each other or have reason to mistrust.

My perspective on this mutual understanding is Aristotelian. What drew me to Aristotle, first through his interlocutors (especially Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum), is the way he frames community as an ongoing project and not as principles or representations instantiated. He was interested in the polis (the city-state). But to say that a community (koinoneia) formed a polis was merely to recognize that its practices and organization had the overall coherence that qualified it as a political unit (Toulmin 1990:67), which could be variably defined. While Aristotle's observations regarding morality and politics were directed against Plato among others, they apply as well to Emile Durkheim's widely influential research on community. Durkheim theorized that people conjure representations of community from associations of minds—images that supersede those associations as totalities greater than the sums of their parts ([1915]1965). In arguing this, however, he assumes the efficaciousness of community symbols that move people to action—an influence that ought to be demonstrated. As Robert Belah (1973:xix) observes, Durkheim's quest to establish an empirical basis to Kantianism, led him to discover the equivalent of the metaphysical imperative in people's observance of obligations and norms. He believed people cooperated because they had to, and that the strength of people's ties was a function of rituals of affirmation or integration. That emphasis is misplaced; obligation describes only one dimension of people's commitment to one another, at most serving as a kind of salve on the vicissitudes of social life, offering limited perspective on the elusive domain of moral practice. People may have such obligations but have reason not to observe them. Social solidarity cannot be mandated; it is not a quality present or absent. Rather, it is engendered in the negotiation of differences in everyday practice, not from the apprehension of high-minded principles or axioms. The Maneo, lacking the institutional means for mediating the disputes, nonetheless manage to negotiate those disagreements most of the time. They understand that more unites them then divides them. Eventually, a similar realization may overcome the fear and hostility that besets a divided Moluccan society. Admittedly, my understanding of community emerges from the particulars of Maneo experience at a relatively peaceful and

prosperous time for them in the mid-1990s. But much of Maneo moral life centers on instilling tolerance during times of crisis when it is really needed, and to hasten the return to civility. Having traveled throughout much of central Maluku, I am convinced this moral perspicuity and is widely held.

Notes on Methodology

I first traveled to west and central Seram in 1988 and again the following year looking for places to conduct research. In a sense, Maneo sort of selected me by being such wonderful hosts when I arrived in 1989 by trail from Manusela and Kabohari from the west. It was a joy to return there three years later in 1992 for 20 months research. Not only the people but the location appealed to me because it was so out of the way, east of Manusela National Park, a backwater within a backwater. Even the nineteenth-century scientist Alfred Wallace (Darwin's contemporary and cofounder of the theory of evolution), who traveled many places throughout his six-year sojourn in the region, never made it into the interior of Seram. What appealed, too, was that although remote, the Maneo did not constitute an enclave community. They seemed to embrace aspects of the outside; literally, they were moving to do so. Nearly 400 people, about half the known Maneo population, now live on the south coast, a two-day walk over rugged terrain from the mountain settlements from whence they came beginning some three generations earlier. In addition, most Maneo were Christian, their parents and grandparents having abandoned their animist beliefs and practices gradually over a period of decades the first half of the twentieth century. Christian Maneo and those living on the coast were certainly no less Maneo for converting and leaving; their subsistence, kinship, and marriage practices are little different from the mountains.

Jennie and I divided our time between the four mountain and two coastal settlements. For logistical reasons, we spent more time in the villages of Maneo Rendah in the mountains and Maneo Ratu on the coast, traveling every few weeks to other, neighboring settlements. While the data presented, particularly the stories and anecdotes, reflect our choice of residence, I do not believe different choices would have changed the conclusions reached. (Over the course of the field work, I did manage to spend at least a month in each of the settlements.) I collected several types of data. From approximately thirty sources, I compiled fairly comprehensive genealogies of most Maneo, at least those from the villages. Some Maneo live in the forest permanently and would flee at our approach; some of these individuals appeared in the genealogies, but, I suspect, many more did not. Jennie and I gathered basic census data on residents of the six villages, although this did prove difficult given the movement of people to the forest and to clove orchards near the coast for extended periods of time. In addition, we interviewed approximately seventy-five people regarding specific details of their marriages—that is, about choices of spouse, about the circumstances by which marriages came into being, about property exchanges that accompany and facilitate nearly all Maneo mar-

riages, and about what happens afterwards in terms of where the couple lives and with whom. Because of the intricacies of Maneo kinship, answers to questions of relatedness were rarely simple, straightforward, or true to type. Finally, histories of two types were collected: oral histories of the lives of most Maneo elders (over fifty years of age) and the mythic, distant histories of Maneo origins. I learned as much of the latter as my teachers felt comfortable telling me.

Many of these interviews, particularly about kinship and marriage, were structured. Of course, much of what goes into a study of this sort comes from informal conversation, observation, and gossip. Initially, interviews and conversations were conducted in Ambonese-Malay, a regional variant of Indonesian as opposed to the local language; nearly everyone is bilingual. In fact, many of the young were more proficient speaking Ambonese-Malay than Upa'a (the local language), identified as Patakai-Manusela (Stokhof 1981). Church services and school (there was a sekolah dasar or elementary school in the mountains) were both conducted in more formal Indonesian, and students could be punished for speaking the local language. In addition, many parents spoke only Ambonese-Malay to their children. Being considered children of sorts ourselves, people often responded to us in the regional language even when we addressed them in Upa'a.

Ambon, the provincial capital of Maluku, lies two days travel from Maneo on the coast, two more from the mountain villages. We spent a fair amount of time there securing permission from government offices, meeting with sponsors at Universitas Pattimura, obtaining supplies, and so forth. We grew close to the family who owned the guesthouse in Tanah Tinggi; we knew people in the neighborhood; and we often met acquaintances from Seram who traveled and schooled there. It is something of a stereotype, but resident Ambonese, even immigrants, were quick to make friends as a statement of regional character (gaya Ambon) against the stereotypical reservedness of the nation's majority Javanese population. Because of this openness, even in the best of times, Ambon would never be confused for a harmonious place. Residents ascribed little virtue to the outward projection of calm. Since the riots, I have had to follow developments from afar, relying on reports from various Indonesian and English language newspapers, from several Web sites, and discussions with refugees and scholars in Jakarta and in the United States. Travel to the province was too dangerous when I last visited Indonesia in 2000. My own battle with muscular dystrophy, which was only diagnosed after my initial fieldwork, made travel to other places on the edge of the fighting too difficult to undertake.

Fieldwork (1992–94) was sponsored by LIPI (the Indonesian Institute of Science) and by Universitas Pattimura in Ambon and was made possible with support from the National Science Foundation (Award No. BNS-9113447), the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Abroad Program (Award No. P022A20004), the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, and the L.S.B. Leakey Foundation. Support for earlier trips came from the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies (CSSEAS) at the University of Michigan and from the Margaret Wray French Scholarship Fund. Later funding for travel, writing, and thinking

came from a Taft Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Cincinnati and a Mellon Foundation Fellowship in anthropological demography at the Population Research Institute at Penn State University.

A large number of people contributed significantly to the project, not all of whom can be mentioned, and none of whom can be held responsible for the shortcomings contained herein. Ray Kelly, Robert Hagen, Tom Fricke, Nancy Florida, Skip Rappaport, Ken George, Chris Duncan, Sue Trainor, Scott Camazine, Peter Just, Alan Feinstein, Rob Valkenier, Kyle Latinis, Helen Stern, Ferry Nahusona, Dave Tatem, and Dave Akin have all helped the project at various stages and in various ways. Valerio Valeri and Roy Ellen, both of whom have conducted extensive research on Seram over a period of three decades, were also generous in their advice and encouragement; Jim Collins has been a friend as well as an advisor on all things Maluku. In Indonesia, I benefited from the kindness, and comments of Tamrin Tomagola and Iman Prasodjo who kept me alert to the broader and more recent context of religious and ethnic conflict. Chapter 2 is little changed from an article that appeared in Volume 26, No. 1, of the American Ethnologist ©1999 by The American Anthropological Association; it is reprinted here by permission of the University of California Press. Chapter 5 is reprinted from an essay that appeared in Volume 5, No. 3 of the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute ©1999. (The map of Ambon in chapter 8 is reprinted courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.) Arguments in these and other chapters have been strengthened from comments and question after lectures at the University of Cincinnati, Reed College, University of Oregon, University of Connecticut, Cornell University, Yale University, and Stanford University.

In Ambon, Jennie and I enjoyed the hospitality of Jan and Irene Hekkers, who made us feel like honored guests as well and members of their family. I also wish to thank Bishop Sol for graciously allowing us use of the library. Of course, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the people of Maneo for all the kindness, hospitality, and patience they showed us. Our research kept us on the move between the various Maneo settlements, so the thanks we owe to all the residents of these places who have helped us is too extensive to acknowledge on an individual basis and too profound to be expressed with mere words. In particular, though, I wish to thank a few of our teachers, hosts, and kin, Minggus Tamala, Feris Boiratan, Simpson Boiratan, Miram Ipapoto, Tomas Tamala, Tenchis Ipapoto, Pede Tamala, Miki Kohonusa, Lefe Boiratan, Marianus Ipapoto, Obed Boiratan, Alleta Halamuri, Josua Ipaana, Naomi Boiratan and Jafid Halamuri. Special thanks, too, to Guru Lukas Rehena and his family. Finally, Jennie Sternhagen and I were together in Maneo for about three-quarters of the period of field work (fifteen months). Over the course of the next decade, with the joyous distraction of Peter and Sam, I did the writing, but the work here is truly a collaborative effort. To the extent the various arguments and analyses succeed in making sense, it is a testament to her involvement in all aspects.



Figure 1. Seram and Southeast Asia



Figure 2. Central Seram

Contents

Introduction

Community Matters

> In the modern world, moral authorities are proof of a society's inability to live a decent life." Lev Timofeyev in an interview with David Remnick in "Deep in the Woods: Solzhenitsyn, a new book, and the new Russia."

In June 1992, Jennie and I passed through the Transmigration site of Samal Baru on Seram's north central coast on our way to the village of Siahari, the northernmost Maneo settlement. We remained in Siahari for about two weeks before moving into the mountains. For reasons we could not immediately fathom, the place seemed odd. It contained ten houses, all but one of which seemed occupied at the time, and I counted some 30 residents. Only later, on subsequent visits, did we realize that the settlement is generally empty except on Saturdays and Sundays; the only house consistently occupied lay some 100 meters outside the village. People stayed when we were there because they were curious to see what we would do. When we departed for the mountains, much to their relief, I am sure, they left too, most of them returning to the Transmigration site we had recently passed through.

This was not an isolated occurrence. The disappearing act was repeated to varying degrees in the other three mountain Maneo settlements. We would arrive announced at a full village only to discover a virtual ghost village on unannounced return trips. The pattern of abandonment defied simple explanation. Siahari had a church, but then so did the Transmigration site where many lived during the week. Why did they not stay and celebrate services there? Elsewhere in the mountains, when people left for the forest, Sunday worship failed to bring them back. They remained apart for longer periods of time depending on the season. Many residents in the mountain villages left during the dry season, roughly May through September, and quite a few went to tend to and harvest cloves from orchards on the mountainside above the south coast of the island. But even in these settlements, dispersal did not follow economic interests entirely, nor was it necessitated by a subsistence regime dominated by hunting and foraging. If it did, and shifting settlements were the norm, mobility would leave unexplained the presence of permanent settlements and the fact that some Maneo tend to stay put. Maneo easily meet subsistence needs by processing the pith of sago palms, whether they live in permanent villages or not (Ellen 1978). What little amounts of cash they need to live in the mountains they can obtain in various ways that do not require prolonged absence. The Maneo have the flexibility to live anywhere, and they are capable of living with anyone, even by

themselves. Yet without the experience of living together in villages they might have ceased to be, dispersed, or joined nearby groups (such as Kabohari and Manusela to the west and Seti to the east) and disappeared as a distinct people.

The question of Maneo residence exposes deeper issues of community. In its root form (Latin *communis* meaning common), the term refers to a group that holds things or principles in common, which may arise because of shared origins and de facto differences between different groups, or that occupy a common territory. Interaction, proximity, and intention are all central to the definition, but what accounts for community in the first instance?[1] If proximity is central, then, for a community of people to exist there should be some minimal level or frequency of coresidence—a certain number of nights spent nearby—below which it ceases. Either Siahari (the first Maneo village we stayed in) should not count as a community or, less satisfactorily, it might be considered a 'postcommunity' (Ortner 1997)—except for the fact that people continue to congregate there even if they do so for shorter periods and for different, ostensibly more religious reasons than in the past. Nor does language, custom or myth distinguish Maneo from neighboring groups; territories might have been divided differently and the communities of central Seram might have aggregated in other ways.

The contingency of Maneo community invites a novel approach: to see it as an effect of such facts as place of birth and descent that incline people to certain practices, delimiting realms of possibility, and as the objects of one's sympathies and attachments. As an object and consequence of choice, residential instability may indicate a weak sense of belonging. Indeed, Maneo, who include roughly 1,000 people (759 of whom reside in the six villages, with the remainder living permanently in the forest), offered few if any pronouncements of collective identity and hosted few celebrations where a local collective identity was asserted. Their identities, instead, are invested and embodied in kinship relations that cross village boundaries and span even linguistic and ethnic differences. At once expansive, kin relations are also highly particular and tend to mire people in complex, overlapping responsibilities that militate against common expressions of identity. Kinship does not negate community, however. There is no necessary tradeoff between the lived dyadic network of kin ties and a more diffuse communal solidarity or, rather, to the extent there is, it results from certain untested assumptions regarding people's orientations: that the existence of the image of the group as a whole and a sense of collective identity prefigures people's commitment to it.

To advance conceptual understanding of community it is necessary to examine the contexts in which it is talked about. For Maneo, community describes the site for interactions, typically freighted with certain kinship and affinal (in-law) obligations and entanglements. More social than geographic, people's encounters are situational; they meet, parry, and riposte on the uneven terrain of social relations. Community is a product of these encounters inasmuch as other tangential relations are brought into play and help set the stage for other interactions. It has a temporal dimension. But as Maneo, especially Maneo men, talk