Global Stakeholder Democracy

Power and Representation Beyond Liberal States

TERRY MACDONALD

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For Tom and Zoe

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

THE ISSUES

In November 1999 the streets of Seattle became the scene of huge public demonstrations against what protest organizers called 'one of the most powerful, secretive, and anti-democratic bodies on Earth'.[1] The protestors' target was the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was to have launched the much-vaunted 'Millennium Round' of trade talks among the organization's 135 member states. Instead, the talks collapsed under the shadow of the public demonstrations. On the first day of the scheduled talks, an estimated 50,000 demonstrators flooded the streets of Seattle. By evening, a civil emergency had been declared and hundreds arrested, but protesters continued to deliver their message to conference organizers: 'This is what democracy looks like,' they chanted, as they encircled the city's prison to demand the release of the 500 protesters detained inside.[2]

The demonstrations were organized by an international coalition of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), representing a wide spectrum of divergent interests. While their objectives in relation to trade policy were often conflicting, many of the demonstrators were united by their demands for greater access to and inclusion within the WTO's decision-making processes, framed in terms of calls for 'a global citizen-based and citizen-driven democratic order'.[3]

The Seattle protests brought the issue of global democracy for the first time into the glare of prime-time global news. As such, they represented a watershed for the broad-based social movement seeking to salvage the democratic project in the context of the complex technological, economic, political, and social transformations commonly referred to as 'globalization'. In recent years, networks of political activists have mounted various high-profile campaigns seeking greater democratization of powerful international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, and increased 'corporate accountability' for the many powerful economic entities in the so-called 'private' sector. In part as a response to such political demands, many key global decision-makers—including national governments

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[1] 'International Forum on Globalization', Statement by Jerry Mander, President of the International Forum on Globalization, at a Press Conference Regarding the WTO, 4 November (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.ifg.org/media.html

[2] John Vidal, 'Real Battle for Seattle', *The Observer*, 5 December 1999.

[3] Vandana Shiva, *The Historic Significance of Seattle* (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.wtowatch.org/library/admin/uploadedfiles/Historic_Significance_of_Seattle_The.html

as well as leaders of international organizations, corporations, and NGOs—now recognize the need for democratic reform to ensure the stability, effectiveness, and legitimacy of global decision-making.

Although the Seattle protests thus served on one level to bolster NGO demands for the democratization of powerful international organizations such as the WTO, they had the additional effect of highlighting NGOs' own increasing power on the global stage, and raising parallel questions about the democratic legitimacy of NGOs themselves. The rise of NGOs as a force in global politics has been underway for many years; between 1960 and 1995, the number of international NGOs grew from roughly 1,300 to over 36,000,[4] and by 1999, the UNDP estimated the number of such NGOs to be around 44,000.[5] By 1996, the United Nations had adopted extensive formal provisions for NGO consultation and participation within UN institutions,[6] and these provisions served as part of a wider agenda for accommodating NGOs as recognized participants within a range of international institutions.[7]

The influence of NGOs has also grown within the corporate sector, as many corporations have attempted to enhance their perceived public legitimacy by establishing 'partnerships' or 'stakeholder dialogues' with NGOs. These 'partnerships' and 'dialogues' entail various consultation mechanisms which grant NGOs some input into corporate decision-making in issue areas such as human rights and environmental policy.[8] In recognition of this growing role, NGO leaders were invited in 2000 to participate for the first time in World Economic Forum discussions alongside political and business leaders. Moreover, in addition to these increasing roles within such high-level decision-making processes, many NGOs now exercise significant forms of power through operational roles in various development and humanitarian contexts, in which they commonly engage in important public decision-making about issues such as service-provision and resource-distribution within communities.

The political momentum behind NGOs' political demands for participation in these various forms of public decision-making in global politics has been strengthened by high levels of public trust in NGOs, which in many parts of the world have begun to rival levels of public trust in both business and government. Indeed,

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[4] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Democratization: Democratization at the International Level', in Barry Holden (ed.), *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (London: Routledge, 2000), 111.

[5] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2000* (2000 [cited February 2005]); available from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/hdr_2000_ch0. pdf p. 8.

[6] See United Nations Secretary-General, *Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of Non-Governmental Organizations in All Activities of the United Nations System* (United Nations, 1998 [cited February 2002]); available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/docs98/kofi998.htm

[7] For a fuller discussion of these developments, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali and United Nations Dept. of Public Information, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations Dept. of Public Information, 1996); Daniele Archibugi, Sveva Balduini, and Marco Donati, 'The United Nations as an Agency of Global Democracy', in Holden (ed.), *Global Democracy: Key Debates*.

[8] See, e.g., Kelly Currah, 'How Corporations Absolve Their Sins', *Guardian*, 28 August 2000; Andy Rowell, 'Corporations "Get Engaged" to the Environmental Movement', *PR Watch Archives*, 8/3 (2001).

a recent survey of public opinion leaders in the USA, Europe, and Australia measured public trust in government, business, media, and NGOs, and found that NGOs are beginning to surpass all other institutions in terms of their public credibility.[9] An author of the study, Richard Edelman, told political and business leaders in a speech to the World Economic Forum in New York that

NGOs are now the Fifth Estate in global governance—the true credible source on issues related to the environment and social justice. . . . Now companies must communicate with multiple stakeholders, especially NGOs, with speed, transparency, and an offer of interactivity.[10]

The growing influence of NGOs is underpinned by their perceived legitimacy, and this derives to some degree from their claims to serve as democratic representatives of global peoples. Consistent with this, it is commonly argued that as processes of 'globalization' transfer public political decision-making capacities from state-based to intergovernmental and corporate decision-making processes, NGOs are able to play an important democratic role as civic representatives in these new political domains.

Many global leaders have responded to such arguments by embracing some of the claims to democratic legitimacy made by NGOs and their public supporters. Over the last decade or so, democratic arguments in favour of greater 'civil society' participation in global decision-making have been advanced at the highest level of international leadership.[11] Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has argued that NGOs are 'a basic form of popular representation in the present-day world', and that accordingly '[t]heir participation in international relations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those international organizations.'[12] Former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan has also added his voice to the call for greater civil society participation, maintaining that for the UN and other international organizations 'a partnership with civil society is not an option; it is a necessity.'[13]

Despite the rhetorical endorsement of these global leaders, there is still much scepticism about the democratic legitimacy of NGOs. Many critics of NGO participation challenge the legitimate status of NGO constituencies, labelling them

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[9] Edelman PR Worldwide, *Edelman Trust Barometer 2005: The Sixth Global Opinion Leaders Study* (January 2005 [cited March 2005]); available from http://edelman.com/image/insights/content/Edelman_Trust_Barometer-2005_final_final.pdf

[10] *Edelman Survey: NGOs Trusted More Than Business or Governments* (2002 [cited February 2005]); available from http://solidar.org/Document.asp?DocID=3598&tod=487

[11] Prominent discussions include Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Commission on Global Governance, *The Millennium Year and the Reform Process* (1999 [cited February 2002]); available from www.cgg.ch/millenium.htm Boutros-Ghali and United Nations Dept. of Public Information, *An Agenda for Democratization.*

[12] Quoted in Riva Krut, *Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision-Making* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1997), 18.

[13] United Nations, *Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks* (Press Release) (2000 [cited February 2002]); available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000229.sgsm7318.doc.html

pejoratively as 'interest groups' with no special entitlement to representation. Critics of NGO participation also question how 'representative' NGOs actually are of the constituencies for whom they purport to speak. They assert that NGOs are unelected and unaccountable, arguing that unlike national governments, NGOs 'need not answer to the broad public they claim to represent'.[14] Consequently, some commentators dismiss them as 'self-appointed spokesmen for their cause'[15] or in even more unsympathetic terms as 'a self-serving coterie of elitists'.[16] Advocates of NGO participation therefore face the further challenge of establishing that NGOs are in some democratic sense 'representative' of the constituencies that can legitimately claim a voice in global decision-making, whichever these may be agreed to be.

Since the Seattle protests, the general challenge of building global democracy and these more specific democratic challenges posed by NGO power have been closely intertwined in the global democratic consciousness. Reflecting further upon this connection is potentially of great theoretical utility, since the controversies surrounding the democratic legitimacy of NGOs, and wider debates about the democratization of powerful international organizations, transnational corporations (TNCs), and other global actors, are underpinned by parallel theoretical dilemmas and practical difficulties. The challenges associated with democratizing this wider range of global actors—like the specific challenge of democratizing NGOs—can best be met by moving away from traditional state-based models of democracy, and better coming to terms with the complex normative implications of institutional *pluralism*.

Questions about the democratic legitimacy of NGOs are therefore of great significance not only because of the considerable power exercised by NGOs themselves in the global domain. Even more importantly, global NGOs are of significant democratic interest because they provide an ideal political lens through which to examine the larger theoretical and institutional questions of how we could conceivably build democratic institutions beyond liberal states, which have traditionally provided the central focus of democratic aspiration and critique.

THE PROJECT

Despite the prominence of these democratic issues on recent global political agendas, they have to date received surprisingly little analytic attention from normative political theorists. Much of the existing literature on global political legitimacy is framed as 'ideal' theory, and accordingly focused on abstract questions of rights and duties, rather than on the 'non-ideal' questions of how political power should

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[14] Jenny Bates, 'The Third Sector in Global Affairs: Civil Society Deserves a Voice, but Not a Vote, in International Institutions', *New Democrat* (2000).

[15] Bruce Stokes, 'New Players in the Trade Game', *National Journal*, 18 December 1999.

[16] Pranay Gupte, 'Whose Cause Is It, Anyway?', *Newsweek*, 6 December 1999.

be constrained through representative institutions. Moreover, the widespread pre-occupation of post-Rawlsian political theory with issues of distributive justice has directed the focus of much recent work on global political legitimacy, reinforcing the tendency of authors to neglect traditional democratic issues of power and representation in favour of issues related to the distribution of social and economic goods.

Several works have proved exceptions to this general theoretical tendency, and have directly tackled the political questions of power and representation in global politics. However, these have often tended to proceed by extrapolating institutional schemes from the domestic to the global level, and in doing so have not dealt satisfactorily with the distinctive organizational *pluralism* of the global polity. Political theorists have been for so long accustomed to preoccupation with the state (and its associated ideas of 'sovereign' or 'constitutionalized' public power) that it has thus far proven difficult to develop adequate theoretical responses to the powerful new roles of non-state actors on the global stage.

The most prominent theoretical alternatives that have been offered to the statism of 'communitarian' democrats have been various models of 'cosmopolitan' democracy.[17] These 'cosmopolitan' theories are extremely valuable in highlighting the normative and practical imperatives for adopting a global perspective on the democratic project. They are also valuable in exploring and articulating legitimate directions for future global institution-building. Although it may not be realistic to implement cosmopolitan democratic blueprints in full in the near future, some *elements* of them may be feasibly achievable. Moreover, ideal blueprints of this kind are helpful for *orienting* more long-term reform processes, even if they cannot be realized in the foreseeable future. As guides to contemporary projects of global institutional reform, however, their utility is limited in two key ways: first, by their universalist ideals of a unified global polity, which fit poorly with the fragmentation of existing global society; and second, by the constitutionalized structure of their institutional prescriptions, which I will argue in Chapter 1 has minimal prospects of implementation within a proximate time frame.

My central project in this book is to develop a theory of global democracy that can transcend the existing impasse between 'communitarian' statism and 'cosmopolitan' universalism, and deal more satisfactorily with the organizational pluralism of contemporary global politics. The theoretical arguments I develop here share much more in common with cosmopolitan than with communitarian democratic theories, and can be understood as an attempt to adapt rather than to overturn the broader cosmopolitan democratic project. But as will become clear as my arguments unfold, my pluralist institutional framework of stakeholder

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[17] For a prominent 'communitarian' approach to the problem of global democracy, see David Miller, *On Nationality*, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); for 'cosmopolitan' approaches, see David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Andrew Kuper, *Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).

democracy diverges in normatively and practically significant ways from some prominent cosmopolitan institutional models.

Throughout the book, I develop the stakeholder model of global democracy by systematically reflecting upon the democratic dilemmas surrounding the power of NGOs in contemporary global politics. One obvious advantage of focusing the analysis on NGOs is that doing so can help to answer important practical normative questions about how democratic policymakers should assess and respond to the power exercised by NGOs—and by extension, other non-state actors—within contemporary global politics. In addressing these practical normative challenges, this book seeks to counter some of the sceptical challenges to the legitimacy of non-state actors, and to make sense of certain widespread intuitions that the political activities of non-state actors need not threaten democracy, but rather have the potential to satisfy certain rigorous democratic standards, if the right institutional reforms are undertaken.

The other advantage of focusing analysis on NGOs in this way is that it can help us to develop more general democratic concepts and institutions that are suitable for our 'pluralist' global polity, by forcing us to rethink some standard state-centric assumptions about the fundamental elements of a democratic system. When we examine widespread intuitions about the way in which NGOs can attain democratic legitimacy in global public decision-making, it becomes evident that many of the theoretical conceptions invoked in these democratic arguments diverge significantly from those inherent in traditional, state-centric, democratic models.

First, the 'public' forms of power that NGOs exercise in global decision-making, and which common intuitions suggest should be subject to democratic standards of legitimacy, are quite different in character from the 'governmental' forms of public power that are the focus of conventional state-centric democratic theories. The governmental forms of power that we traditionally see as the rightful focus for democratic scrutiny are generally underpinned by the use or threat of force, are invested with law-making capacities, and to a significant degree are organizationally centralized, or at least constitutionalized. In contrast, many of the 'public' forms of NGO power that attract democratic criticism display few or none of these state-like characteristics.

Second, the 'constituencies' that NGOs commonly claim to represent are quite a different kind of entity from the territorially bounded populations that usually serve as electoral constituencies within democratic nation-states. Significantly, NGO constituencies—such as religious communities, indigenous peoples, women, environmental and human rights advocates, trade unionists, and business and professional communities—tend in general to be *non-national* and *non-territorial* in character, and moreover tend to *overlap* in terms of their individual memberships.

Third, the kind of democratic 'representation' in which NGOs could plausibly claim to be engaged is quite different in structure from the kind associated with representative institutions within democratic states. Whereas representation in state democracies is characterized primarily in terms of mechanisms associated with formal election procedures, NGOs can claim no such electoral mandate.

Therefore, if it is to be plausibly argued that NGOs are 'representative' of their various constituencies, it is necessary to invoke a conception of representation that does not rely on the formal mechanisms of *electoral* authorization and accountability.

In this light, it is evident that if we are to succeed in constructing a coherent framework for understanding the legitimate democratic role of NGOs in global decision-making, we must in the process confront fundamental theoretical questions about the character and scope of democratic public power, the basis for delineating democratic boundaries, and the institutional properties of democratic representation. We cannot merely seek to apply old theoretical conceptions of 'governments', 'peoples', and 'representation' to the new political phenomenon of global NGOs. Rather, we must re-examine the theoretical conceptions themselves, and consider how they must be reformulated if they are to accommodate the emerging norms and social realities of a globalizing world in which NGOs— as well as other non-state actors—play an increasingly significant role. For this reason, an examination of the democratic debates surrounding NGOs can help to bring the broader theoretical questions of global democracy into focus, and chart a productive route to the development of a wider theoretical argument which could potentially be applied to a more extensive range of global actors.

Through reflecting upon the democratic dilemmas surrounding the political power of global NGOs in this way, my arguments in this book challenge the widespread assumption that 'sovereign' power, nationally or territorially bounded societies, and 'electoral' processes are essential institutional foundations of a democratic system, serving, respectively, as the subjects, agents, and means of democratic control. In this book, I present a critique of these traditional democratic ideas, and proceed to rethink the democratic project from its conceptual foundations, posing the questions: *What needs to be controlled? Who ought to control it? How could they do so?* In the course of answering these questions, I develop a distinctive theoretical model of representative democracy based on the new concepts of *'public power'*, *'stakeholder communities'*, and *'non-electoral representation'*.

THE STRATEGY

Before outlining in more depth the substance of these practical and theoretical arguments, it is helpful to say a little more about the 'contextual' method of theory-building I employ. By developing my theoretical arguments via examination of policy-debates surrounding the democratization of NGOs, I employ what can be described as a kind of *contextual 'reflective equilibrium'*. The idea of reflective equilibrium has been employed by many political theorists since John Rawls to denote the outcome of a process of developing normative principles by making mutual adjustments between *intuitions* (or 'considered judgements', in Rawls's terms) and some kind of *ideal conceptions*, or abstract theoretical

formulations. The 'correct' principles, which are derived through this process of mutual adjustment, are those that most coherently reconcile our abstract ideal conceptions with our more specific intuitions, or judgements. The *contextual* method of seeking reflective equilibrium is distinctive insofar as it requires that the specific intuitions with which we attempt to reconcile our ideal theories should be derived not from hypothetical scenarios or thought experiments, of the kind favoured by many political theorists, but rather from concrete political problems, entangled as they are in all the complexity, ambiguity, and emotion of the real political world.[18]

The primary advantage of this approach is that it best enables our political theories to fulfil their central function: to guide us about how to *act* politically, in constructing our political institutions and formulating our political policies. We do not need to know how we should act in hypothetical worlds, but rather how we should act in our own world, in the present time, confronted as we are with the concrete imperatives and choices imposed by political life. Principles derived directly from, and addressed directly to, this world will be more useful to us than principles derived and delivered behind veils of abstraction. John Rawls, a prominent advocate of more abstract forms of normative reasoning, claims that whereas the politician looks to the next election, and the statesman to the next generation, the philosopher should look to 'the indefinite future'.[19] The contextualist philosopher, more modestly, looks to the *foreseeable* future, since the practical problems that lie beyond this horizon are unknowable, while the problems within it are all too readily accessible.

Principles derived contextually in this way will be more useful than those derived through more abstract reasoning processes for three key reasons. First, the *meanings* and *prescriptive implications* of our abstract theoretical formulations will be clearer, as they will have been interpreted, applied, and reformulated with respect to the very problems with which we are grappling, and on which we must make decisions and take action. Second, contextually derived principles will be more useful because they will embody normative insights that are *implicit in institutions and practices* but obscured through the process of theoretical abstraction.[20] Third, they allow us to incorporate more readily into our normative analysis the *empirical assessments and constraints* that are most evident in analysis of real rather than hypothetical examples, and that must always be recognized and accommodated within any practically viable and stable normative structures.[21]

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[18] Iris Young calls this kind of historically and socially contextualized theorizing 'critical theory'; see Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[19] John Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 7 (1987), 24.

[20] Joseph Carens makes similar points in his defence of a contextual method in political theory in Joseph H. Carens, *Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[21] Here I mean 'stable' in the colloquial political sense (incorporating elements of both normative agreement and strategic 'modus vivendi'), rather than in the exclusively normative sense in which Rawls employs the term. See John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, New edn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

In relation to my project here, it can be seen that deriving democratic principles through a process of mutual adjustment between our intuitions about the legitimate political roles of NGOs, on the one hand, and our abstract theoretical conceptions of 'public power', 'constituencies', and 'representation', on the other, will generate principles that are of greater practical utility and normative validity than principles generated through more abstract reasoning processes. Principles generated in this fashion are inevitably more pertinent to the decisions we have to make about the problem of NGOs; they embody normative insights that are implicit in the actual practices that we employ to deal with NGOs in the real world; and they can accommodate and function within the empirical constraints inherent in the contemporary global order.

I also need to explain here my choice of *which* (and *whose*) ideal theoretical conceptions should be invoked to engage our intuitions within a process of reflective equilibrium. As already noted, the abstract conceptions that I invoke and articulate in this book are ideals of democracy (and their constituent conceptions of public power, constituencies, and representation) that are embedded within real discourses about political legitimacy in global politics. These ideals are embedded to some extent in certain philosophical writings addressing the subject of global political legitimacy, but more importantly they are embedded also in the public and intra-organizational debates about legitimacy in which a wide range of global political practitioners are engaged. They have significant currency within various international organizations (such as the UN and the World Bank), within many NGOs and in parts of the wider NGO community, among a broad range of grassroots citizen groups and public commentators, and even to some smaller degree among some state governments and transnational corporations. In the course of developing my democratic arguments in this book, I draw upon some of these practitioners' contributions to the debate, although the sources I cite here only scratch the surface of this vast public discourse.

I certainly do not want to make the claim that the ideal of Global Stakeholder Democracy is universally endorsed by participants within these public discourses on global political legitimacy. Rather, these discourses are composed of a jumbled mix of different and incompatible norms and ideals, and characterized by a high degree of normative disagreement and disorientation. In this context, no single normative ideal could claim universal endorsement within global public discourse—neither Global Stakeholder Democracy nor any of its competitors. My claims about the connections between the Stakeholder model of global democracy and these public discourses about global political legitimacy are more modest: the model represents an attempt to draw out a range of concepts and norms with wide currency in these discourses, and tie them together within a coherent and potentially workable democratic framework. Once this model has been properly fleshed out, and its various implications more fully revealed, it may well be that some of those who had unreflectively invoked some central concepts and norms on which the stakeholder model is based would reject it in favour of more conventional democratic models. But my hope is that demonstrating how these concepts and norms can form the basis of a coherent and workable democratic model

will have the overall effect of strengthening commitment to these ideas within global society. Either way, the project of articulating the central norms of Global Stakeholder Democracy should be a useful one, since it can help build a better understanding of what is at stake, normatively and practically, in the political contests among competing norms of global political legitimacy.

We can see the democratic norms identified through the process I have described as 'free-standing' in the process of global public justification, rather than derivative of or subordinate to some wider normative framework. Our global democratic values can be seen as 'free-standing' in two senses. First, they are 'free-standing' in terms of the *source of their justification*; this means that democratic arguments can be publicly evaluated solely on the basis of their 'fit' within the limits of public democratic discourse, in the manner that I have described.[22] Second, they are 'free-standing' in terms of the *scope of their application*; this means that global democratic arguments can be distinguished from other normative arguments with currency in certain global discourses (such as arguments about global 'justice', social 'utility', or some other more 'comprehensive' moral standard) in accordance with the particular range of human actions or institutions that each seeks to regulate within the global domain.

Viewing global democratic principles as wholly 'free-standing' in this second sense is somewhat unconventional in the existing philosophical literature, because of a common tendency to subsume democratic arguments within broader frameworks of 'global justice'.[23] Philosophers often observe that whereas 'comprehensive' or 'ethical' principles apply to all domains of individual action and social interaction, principles of 'global justice' apply only to some more limited domain, commonly characterized as a global 'basic structure', or something similar.[24] However, the analogous question as to the particular range of activities and relationships that is the rightful domain of *democratic* principles (as distinct from principles of 'justice') is rarely examined, perhaps because the question is assumed to be unproblematic for one of two reasons.

First, the question of the scope of democratic principles is sometimes avoided by viewing democratic principles as secondary norms of 'procedural justice', derived from a broader theory of social justice.[25] By viewing principles of justice

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[22] Any further disagreements must then be resolved through political contestation rather than public justification; by 'political' contestation here I refer to opposing assertions of power in pursuit of both conflicting strategic interests and conflicting moral commitments.

[23] David Held, for example, suggests that global democratic theory should be grounded in a wider cosmopolitan theory of global justice in this way. See Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*; David Held, 'Law of States, Law of Peoples', *Legal Theory*, 8 (2002); David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, *Global Governance and Public Accountability* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).

[24] See Rawls, *Political Liberalism*; Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[25] Thomas Pogge characterizes democracy as 'procedural justice' in this way in Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*. John Rawls was the first to make this move, by grounding his theory of justice in the values shared by citizens of a democratic society. See Rawls, *Political Liberalism*.